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Abstract 
 
  
This thesis argues that Dame Iris Murdoch’s writings portray a dialectical picture of morality 
that invites the reader to acknowledge the presence of evil and reflect upon the necessarily 
‘opposing forces’ of good and evil. Murdoch’s engagement with both historical and 
contemporary discussions of evil is traced through close reading of both her published texts, 
including fiction and philosophy, and her unpublished and recently published texts and 
resources, including annotations, interviews and letters. These close readings are focused on 
the theological, psychological and literary aspects of the contemporary problem of evil. The 
perspectives offered within this study all transcend the focus on goodness invited by 
Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, thus challenging the biased perspective of scholars of the 
late-twentieth century who sought to elevate Murdoch’s good characters by drawing 
equations between her moral philosophy and her fiction. This study begins, first, by 
demonstrating how Murdoch’s writings engage with the problem of evil, with the theological 
attempt to reconcile goodness with the presence of evil and suffering in the world, by 
drawing on her allusions to the Book of Job and to the writings of Simone Weil and Dame 
Julian of Norwich, all of which assert the necessary presence of evil and suffering in the 
moral life. Second, I interrogate the inconsistencies between Murdoch’s fictional and 
philosophical pictures of evil to illustrate how her fictional and philosophical engagement 
with Saint Paul’s writings reveals that she adopted the same dialectical picture of morality for 
which she critiqued Jung in her moral philosophy. For her, Jung’s picture of morality merges 
aspects of dualism and monism, both of which, traditionally speaking, offer two 
countervailing ways in which to picture the moral life, where evil represents, respectively, 
either an independent moral force separate from the good or a failure to carry out the moral 
 iii 
ideals of goodness. Third, I identify and develop a link between contemporary moral, 
psychological and sociological discourses on psychopathy and the evil characters, both male 
and female, within Murdoch’s novels: not only do her antagonists and demons, often called 
‘enchanter’ figures by scholars, echo the psychopath’s moral psychology, but so too do her 
saintly figures. Such an ambiguous picture resonates with contemporary interpretations of 
psychopathy, such as those offered by Robert D. Hare, Kevin Dutton, or Simon Baron-
Cohen, which highlight the complex role of compassion, empathy and emotion on the 
individual’s moral awareness, whether they are saintly or psychopathic. In the final chapter, I 
argue that Murdoch’s dialectical picture of morality is indebted to Blake, whose The Songs of 
Innocence and of Experience and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell illustrates the necessity 
of the ‘contrary’ pairs of innocence and experience, reason and passion, and good and evil. 
While Murdoch may praise goodness, her complex engagement with evil reveals a dialectical 
task for the moral agent in which they have to appreciate the complexity of the moral life, 
with its inherently ambiguous mixtures of emotion and rationality, the saintly and the 
psychopathic, and goodness and evil. 
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Introduction 
The Problem of Evil and Iris Murdoch’s Dialectical Morality 
 
[A]rt is essentially more free [than philosophy and theology] and enjoys  
the ambiguity of the whole man. 
Iris Murdoch. 1 
 
[We] need to probe the mentality that neatly divides the world into the forces 
of evil and the forces of good, to understand its sources and its appeal. 
Richard J. Bernstein.2 
 
 
Dame Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) lived during a century of great moral, social and political 
upheaval marked by the experience of two World Wars and innovations in human cruelty, 
such as the gas chambers of the concentration camps, the nuclear bomb and multiple 
genocides. In 1961 Murdoch suggested that contemporary society, philosophy and literature 
had ‘not yet recovered from two wars and the experience of Hitler’ (EM, p.287) and later 
poignantly noted, in her 1992 moral treatise Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, that it ‘has in 
this century been the fate of so many to be confronted with totally ruthless unshakeable evil’ 
(MGM, p.120).3 For her, contemporary literary responses failed in their representations of 
such human wickedness; given the events of the twentieth century, she argued, it is ‘curious 
that modern literature, which is so much concerned with violence, contains so few convincing 
pictures of evil’ (EM, p.294). By contrast, Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy engage with a 
                                                                                                                
1 Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (1977), in EM, p.449.  
2 Richard J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11 
(2005); (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007), pp.10-12; Bernstein’s italics. 
3 Murdoch also exhibited an awareness of the ‘dangers’ posed by contemporary evil and 
technological advancements in her address to humanities graduates at Kingston University in 
1993. See Iris Murdoch, ‘Dame Iris Murdoch’s Address to the Kingston University 
Humanities Graduates, the Barbican, London, 4 November, 1993’, in Occasional Essays by 
Iris Murdoch, ed. by Y. Moroya and P. Hullah (Okayama: University Education Press, 1998), 
pp.49-53. 
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broad range of theological, philosophical, psychological, sociological and literary discourses, 
many of which resonate with twentieth- and twenty-first-century discussions of evil. 
For twenty-first century writers, contemporary instances of human wickedness, most 
notably those of terrorism, and especially the events of 11 September 2001, have motivated a 
growing interest in discourses on evil that echo those invited by two World Wars. For 
Richard J. Bernstein, the term evil has gained a new, fascinating and problematic currency 
within our increasingly media-driven world. He argues that 
 
this new fashionable […] discourse of good and evil […] represents an 
abuse of evil […] because, instead of inviting us to question and to think, 
[it] is being used to stifle thinking. This is extremely dangerous in a 
complex and precarious world. The new discourse of good and evil lacks 
nuance, subtlety, and judicious discrimination. [… Instead, we] need to 
probe the mentality that neatly divides the world into the forces of evil and 
the forces of good, to understand its sources and its appeal.4 
 
Bernstein’s criticism is levelled at absolutist discourses, or judgements, that, in their objective 
‘certitude’, override the fallibilistic nature of morality and politics, both of which should be 
‘open to ongoing examination, modification, and critique’.5 The current study argues that 
Murdoch’s dialectical picture of morality, which invites the reader to ponder the often 
                                                                                                                
4 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, pp.10-12; Bernstein’s italics. 
5 Bernstein, pp.13, 28. Bernstein develops his criticism of the contemporary use of the word 
evil with reference to the language used by George W. Bush after 9/11: ‘the introduction of 
absolutes […] distorts and corrupts politics. To speak this way, to speak about the “evil 
ones,” “the servants of evil,” “the axis of evil” – as Bush frequently does – […] blocks 
serious deliberation and diplomacy. It is used to “justify” risky military interventions and to 
trump serious consideration of alternatives in responding to real dangers. […] It stifles 
serious inquiry about complex issues that need to be carefully analyzed, investigated, and 
debated.’ Bernstein, p.83; Bernstein’s italics. 
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‘opposing forces’ of good and evil, provides a crucial answer to these contemporary worries.6 
Her novels, unlike the twentieth-century writers she critiques, such as T. E. Hulme, T. S. 
Eliot or Jean-Paul Sartre, contain numerous ‘pictures of evil’ that allow the reader to 
interrogate the fundamental moral questions contained within the theological, philosophical 
and literary problems of evil, such as: can wicked behaviour ever be justified? Can evil be 
used for good? How should we handle evil when we approach it, whether in ourselves and 
others? Are there characteristics or traits that predispose individuals to cruelty? Is evil 
universal? What causes people to inflict harm on each other? And how should we respond to 
human suffering? 
Murdoch’s literary responses to these questions, which rely upon the inherent 
ambiguity of art, allow her to illustrate the complexity of the moral life and to criticize the 
kind of absolutist, dualist moral thinking that concerns Bernstein: instead of calling upon evil 
to incite fear and shut down rational understanding, Murdoch’s novels provide a more 
dynamic moral discourse in which the reader can investigate the kind of behaviour that leads 
to pain and suffering. This dynamic moral discourse, like the pluralism that Bernstein invites 
in The Abuse of Evil, ‘demands that we make a serious effort to really understand what is 
other and different from us. It requires that we engage in the critique of our own views as 
well as those of the people we encounter’.7 Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy engage in such 
a pluralistic response that highlights the importance of attending to evil, acknowledging its 
existence and its power, and looking beyond dualist visions that deny the possibility for evil 
and good to be part of the continuum of the moral life. The ambiguous moral vision for 
                                                                                                                
6 I am using the word dialectical to imply not only that Murdoch’s picture of morality is 
‘concerned with or acting through opposing forces’ of good and evil, but also that it invites 
the reader ponder often conflicting questions about the complex nature of evil and the moral 
life. See The New Oxford English Dictionary, ed. by Judy Pearsall (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), p.509. 
7 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.35. 
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literature, as expressed within her philosophy and debated within her fiction, thus provides a 
space in which to acknowledge the various perspectives on the nature of evil. Her dialectical 
vision of the moral life, where individuals have to acknowledge not only the call of 
transcendent goodness but also the seductive evil tendencies within themselves and others, 
invites a pluralistic attitude to morality that engages with the resources of theology, 
philosophy, psychology and literature in its attempt to accurately portray human wickedness. 
The dialectical picture of morality within Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy illustrates 
the fundamental importance of engaging with and thinking about evil. Such an interpretation 
of Murdoch’s writings may seem controversial; the argument that she portrays a dialectical 
picture of morality may appear to conflict with her absolutist moral philosophy. If her picture 
of the moral life is centred around a Platonic Form of the Good, an objector might ask, surely 
evil represents a failure in goodness and thus represents a force that cannot be engaged with 
in the moral life? In turning towards Murdoch’s aesthetics, however, the reader finds a secure 
place for such moral thinking: art provides an arena ‘where everything under the sun can be 
examined and considered’ (EM, p.461) and should, therefore, necessarily reflect upon the 
realities of the moral life, including cruelty, suffering and wickedness.8 Where Murdoch’s 
moral philosophy more frequently offers a response to evil by lauding ideas such as attention, 
goodness, hope, love and unselfing, her fiction illustrates the complex realities that the 
                                                                                                                
8 My argument that Murdoch portrays a dialectical picture of morality chimes with the 
contemporary critic, Gary Browning, for whom ‘Murdoch is a dialectical thinker […] in that 
she connects areas of experience with one another and allows for a deeper understanding of 
aspects of experience to emerge from the construction of a progressively broader and more 
differentiated picture of things’. Such a vision is, for Browning, revealed in Murdoch’s 
fiction and philosophy: ‘Her moral perfectionism […] is more of a reminder to us to consider 
closely how we think about goodness and evil in our individual experience rather than a 
generic formula for living. Murdoch, in her philosophical writings, recognizes differences 
between art and philosophy […]. Art, for [her], is a means of perceiving and imagining 
reality. Visual and literary artists present the world realistically, and our engagement with a 
work of art enhances our appreciation of reality.’ Gary Browning, Why Iris Murdoch Matters 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), pp.34, 10. 
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individual faces within the moral life where an acknowledgement of evil allows for greater 
moral awareness. 
Such an awareness of the moral value of art is presciently reflected in discussions of 
contemporary political, sociological and environmental issues, all of which evoke the central 
dilemmas contained within Murdoch’s engagement with the theological, philosophical and 
literary problems of evil.9 In a recent talk, ‘How to Remain Sane in the Age of Populism’ 
(2019), the Turkish-British novelist, Elif Shafak, illustrated how the emotions of ‘fear, anger, 
anxiety [and] resentment’ that currently ‘guide and misguide politics’ can be traced to 
problems connected with art, dualism and language.10 Shafak’s response to these dilemmas 
over the past two years resonate with Murdoch’s vision of art, morality and politics.11 Indeed, 
recent Murdoch scholarship is asserting, in contradiction to earlier critics, that her novels are 
astute in engaging with such political concerns.12 Shafak, like Murdoch, sees the novel as a 
                                                                                                                
9 This thesis engages with some political and sociological discourses on evil, but it is only in 
the conclusion that I illustrate how the relationship between the environment and the 
contemporary problem of evil resonates with current Murdoch scholarship, which is turning 
its attention to such ecological dilemmas. Lucy Outlon, for example, is undertaking a PhD 
based at the University of Chichester, titled ‘Wild Iris: sensing Iris Murdoch’s environmental 
imagination’. 
10 Elif Shafak, ‘How to Remain Sane in the Age of Populism’ (London School of Economics, 
27 February 2019). Shafak’s talk was hosted as part of the London School of Economics’ 
‘New World (Dis)Orders’ season. The quotations above were taken from the online blurb to 
the talk: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/Events/LSE-
Festival/NewWorldDisorders/Events/20190227/how-to-remain-sane-in-the-age-of-populism> 
[accessed 02/05/19]. 
11 Despite their similarities, it does not appear that Shafak has read, or engaged with, any of 
Murdoch’s writings; Shafak does not quote Murdoch in any of the articles or essays 
considered in the following discussion. 
12 In Why Iris Murdoch Matters (2018), Gary Browning interrogates the tendency for literary 
commentators ‘to review Murdoch’s fiction while ignoring or downplaying her treatment of 
the social and political world’. See Browning, ‘Iris Murdoch and the Political’, in Why Iris 
Murdoch Matters, pp.115-44, p.116. For discussions of Murdoch’s engagement with politics 
see also: Anne Rowe and Sara Upstone, ‘Iris Murdoch, Ian McEwan and the Place of the 
Political in Contemporary Fiction’, in Iris Murdoch: Texts and Contexts, ed. by Anne Rowe 
and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp.59-75; Gary Browning, ‘Iris 
Murdoch and the Political: From Bohemia to the Nice and the Good’, Iris Murdoch Review, 
Vol 4 (2013): 31-7.  
 6 
‘porous’ medium (MGM, p.88) that allows the writer to ‘keep asking the most simple, the 
most fundamental and the most difficult questions’: ‘[t]he novel matters because it punches 
little holes in the wall of indifference that surrounding us’.13 For Shafak, novelists need to be 
aware of this moral responsibility; they ‘need to speak up about the dangers of losing our 
core values: pluralism, freedom of speech, minority rights, separation of powers, 
democracy’.14 Murdoch’s vision of the ambiguity of art, as expressed in ‘The Sublime and 
the Beautiful Revisited’ (1959) and The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists 
(1976), similarly highlights how the novel is a ‘liberal’ artefact (EM, p.286) whose ambiguity 
and freedom represent a ‘great hall of reflection’ (EM, p.461); her image of the novel as ‘a 
house fit for free characters to live in’ (EM, p.286) is echoed in Shafak’s argument that the 
novel ‘needs to be a free, egalitarian space where a diversity of voices can be heard, nuances 
celebrated and the unsayable can be said’.15 For Shafak, however, art is losing this 
fundamental liberal freedom in the context of our modern political milieu, which is defined 
by an interest in nostalgia that ‘purge[s]’ history of ‘its dark chapters’, leaving public 
awareness ‘stripped of its complexity, simplified and sanitised’.16 Echoing Bernstein’s 
similar concept of a ‘clash of mentalities’ in The Abuse of Evil, the environment Shafak 
critiques results in a ‘cognitive clash’ where a ‘vicious circle of division and hatred’ 
overwhelms the moral aims of art and politics, including its fundamental engagement with 
‘atrocities and injustices’.17 
                                                                                                                
13 Elif Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, New Statesman, 5-11 October 
2018: 40-43 (pp.41, 43).  
14 Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, p.43. 
15 Ibid., p.41. 
16 Shafak, ‘It’s not just Europe – toxic nostalgia has infected the world’, the Guardian, Mon 
10 December 2018. Accessed online. 
17 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.17 (Bernstein’s italics); Elif Shafak, ‘Divisive Language’, 
Index of Censorship, 44:1 (2015): 93-5 (p.95); Shafak, ‘It’s not just Europe – toxic nostalgia 
has infected the world’. 
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Shafak’s fight against populist ‘nostalgia’ and the increasing dualities within politics 
calls on the ‘nuanced’ capacities of the artist and the public intellectual, aided ‘calmly and 
carefully’ by a responsible use of language that seeks to remind people of the values of 
‘pluralistic democracy and harmonious coexistence’.18 She explains that  
 
[i]n a world beset with populist demagoguery and misinformation memory 
is a responsibility for writers everywhere. We cannot forget what has 
happened in the past when tribalism, nationalism, isolationism, fanaticism 
and jingoism managed to get the better of humanity. Even in the face of 
atrocity, humankind is failing to speak the same language.19 
 
For Shafak, the public intellectual, like the novelist or writer, can offer a route out of this 
‘world of dualities’.20 Indeed, Shafak could well be alluding to Murdoch in her argument that 
‘[a]n intellectual is someone who challenges binary oppositions, bridges cultural gaps, has 
the cognitive flexibility to connect various disciplines and passionately defends a nuanced 
way of thinking’.21 For Bernstein, the ‘clash of mentalities’ confronting the twenty-first 
century after 9/11 is indicative of the same inability to appreciate the value of ‘subtlety’ and 
‘nuance’, both of which are crucial to ‘our morality, politics, and religion’.22 Such a vision of 
art, as both Murdoch and Shafak would add to Bernstein’s list, offers lessons in the necessity 
of moving beyond limited dualist visions of the individual, politics and morality, and the 
fundamental importance of art and language in addressing the problems of evil. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
18 Elif Shafak, ‘Divisive Language’, p.95. 
19 Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, p.43. 
20 Elif Shafak, ‘It is time we stopped denigrating the public intellectual’, the Guardian, Fri 14 
July 2017. Accessed online. 
21 Shafak, ‘It is time we stopped denigrating the public intellectual’. 
22 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.17. 
 8 
Iris Murdoch’s Moral Philosophy and the Critical Bias Toward Evil 
Murdoch’s fundamental concern, both philosophically and artistically, is the moral life of the 
individual and her or his continued attempt to avoid evil and strive toward the good. Her 
philosophy offers a sustained affirmation of the importance of morality and moral discourse, 
and her novels concern the ‘deep dark struggles between good and evil’ (EM, p.21). In her 
first published philosophical book, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (1953), she outlines how the 
relationship between Sartre’s literature and his problematic philosophy, with its focus on a 
‘lonely’ and ‘solipsistic’ individual (SRR, p.106), results in a morally bankrupt fictional 
environment that ‘seems devoid of any understanding of the reality of evil’ or of the ‘variety’ 
of morality (SRR, p.20). The index of Existentialists and Mystics (1997), edited by Peter J. 
Conradi, lists evil seventeen times, and Murdoch’s discussion of it spans subjects including 
literature, philosophy and theology, and writers including Dostoyevsky, Hegel, Plato, 
Tolkien, Tolstoy and Simone Weil.23 The word evil does not appear in the index of her late 
philosophical treatise, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, despite it appearing no less than 
one-hundred-and-twenty times and spanning a far greater range of subjects and thinkers than 
the earlier two philosophical publications. The following discussion will draw on some of 
these references to evil, in both Murdoch’s early and late moral philosophy, to offer a 
truncated picture of her vision of the role of evil in the moral life and in literature. In so 
doing, I will begin to illustrate what this thesis will go on to prove, namely, the ways in 
which the more ambiguous or dialectical picture of morality in Murdoch’s later moral 
                                                                                                                
23 The index for Existentialists and Mystics does skip some references to evil, such as those 
that appear in Murdoch’s interview with Brian Magee (see EM, pp.21, 27). Nevertheless, 
seven of the references to evil listed in the index appear in The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato 
Banished the Artists (presented 1976; published 1977), while the remainder appear 
(chronologically) in ‘Knowing the Void’ (1956), ‘The Sublime and the Good’ (1959), 
‘Against Dryness’ (1961), ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), ‘The Sovereignty of Good over 
other Concepts’ (presented 1967; published 1970), ‘Art is the Imitation of Nature’ (1978) and 
‘Above the Gods’ (1986). 
 9 
philosophy chimes with her literary vision, where she oscillates between, on the one hand, an 
acknowledgement of the presence of evil in the moral life and, on the other, a denial of the 
power of evil. Before outlining her vision of evil, however, the first issue to address is the 
sometimes controversial relationship between her fiction and philosophy as explored by both 
Murdoch and her critics, a relationship that has arguably contributed to the lack of critical 
studies of her picture of evil. 
When critical approaches to Murdoch’s writings draw direct parallels between her 
literature and philosophy they potentially ignore the crucial differences that she perceived 
between them.24 Part of Murdoch’s reasoning for such pronounced distinctions, Anne Rowe 
suggests, originates from ‘a desire to preserve the status of both her fiction and her 
philosophy’.25 Murdoch acknowledges that ‘[a] little theory may come in just for fun in a 
sense, and because a particular character may hold a theory, but that won’t make the theory 
into the whole texture or background of the novel’ (TCHF, p.36). As such interviews 
repeatedly display, Murdoch ‘was horrified’, Rowe notes, ‘at the thought that her novels 
might be read as didactic enactments of her philosophy’.26 She denied the idea that her novels 
‘express[ed] a philosophy’ (TCHF, p.3), that she wrote ‘philosophical novels’ (TCHF, 
p.225), or that she was a ‘philosophical novelist’ (TCHF, p.58) and argued, instead, that 
artists should follow their ‘instinct’ and ‘not try to be a teacher in [their] art’; for her, ‘good 
novelists, for instance Sartre, are damaged by a desire to put across a philosophical creed’ 
                                                                                                                
24 The fundamental role that Murdoch allows for morality in both her fiction and her 
philosophy belies the differences she perceived between them. She vehemently wished critics 
to separate her fiction from her philosophy: ‘I certainly don’t want to mix philosophy and 
fiction’, she claimed, ‘they’re totally different disciplines, different methods of thought, 
different ways of writing, different aims’ (TCHF, p.36). For Murdoch’s exploration of the 
differences between literature and philosophy, see ‘Literature and Philosophy: A 
Conversation with Brian Magee’, EM, pp.3-29. 
25 Anne Rowe, ‘Introduction: “A Large Hall of Reflection”’, in Iris Murdoch: A 
Reassessment (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp.1-11, p.3. 
26 Rowe, ‘Introduction: “A Large Hall of Reflection”’, p.3. 
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(TCHF, p.240) because there is a sense in which ‘the author is speaking’ through the novel 
(SRR, p.58). Any criticisms of Murdoch’s writings that engage in such ‘dovetailing’ of 
Murdoch’s philosophical and literary practices, as Rowe argues, therefore, require careful 
‘justification’ and must heed the distinctions she placed between these discursive criteria.27 
The ‘writer’s job’, as Shafak similarly argues, ‘is not to try to provide the answers. It is 
neither to preach nor to teach’.28 
While comparing and contrasting Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy may be 
contentious, Murdoch’s discussions of them in interviews and within her philosophy 
nevertheless invites a close relationship between these two discursive mediums. Murdoch’s 
‘position’ on whether or not her novels were ‘philosophical’ was, as Gillian Dooley argues, 
‘ambiguous’ (TCHF, pp.xviii-xix). There are times when, Murdoch claimed, a novel may 
contain ‘an obvious and fairly explicit theoretical background’ (TCHF, p.3) or ‘play’ with a 
‘philosophical idea’ (TCHF, p.12), or even when the philosophy may take on a 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘chorus-like effect’ (TCHF, p.21). The relationship between these two 
discursive mediums, therefore, and the extent to which they can be discussed together 
remains equivocal. Indeed, Maria Antonaccio, whom Miles Leeson draws on to support his 
argument that Murdoch is a ‘philosophical novelist’, sees Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy 
as ‘emanat[ing] from the same point’: for Antonaccio, the novels, to a certain degree, ‘are 
metaphysics as a guide to morals’.29 Ultimately, following this vision, the central importance 
of morality to Murdoch’s fictional and philosophical writings means that the critic and the 
reader can explore the differences and/or similarities between her fictional and philosophical 
pictures of the moral life to examine the continued development of her moral thought. The 
problem, however, has been that when critics interpret the vision Murdoch portrays in her 
                                                                                                                
27 Rowe, ‘Introduction: “A Large Hall of Reflection”’, p.3. 
28 Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, p.41. 
29 Miles Leeson, Iris Murdoch: Philosophical Novelist (London: Continuum, 2010), p.15. 
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moral philosophy as absolutist and monist, as strictly centred around the Platonic Form of the 
Good, they leave less room for an attention to evil.  
The lack of consensus surrounding Murdoch’s engagement with evil in her fiction and 
philosophy arises from the fact that, when reading them in tandem, the reader can miss the 
extent to which her philosophy combines two partly incompatible systems of morality. For 
her, evil can be both positive and negative, both a moral force and a moral failure. This 
paradox arises from the subtle conflict between her adoption of Platonism and Christianity: 
from the former, she adopts a more dialectical form of morality where the presence of evil 
can be acknowledged in the continuum of the moral life; from the latter, she adopts a 
traditional form of monism where evil is conceived as a failure to conform to the ideal of 
good. In spite of these complexities, critics continue to follow Murdoch’s alignment of the 
Judeo-Christian God with a more Platonic Form of the Good to argue unequivocally that, to 
quote Heather Widdows, her moral philosophy is ‘derived from the good’.30 While her 
monist picture of morality, governed by a sovereign transcendent magnetic good, remains 
consistent throughout her philosophical career her response to evil fluctuates and is, much 
like the picture of morality in her fiction, inherently ambiguous: on the one hand, evil 
                                                                                                                
30 Heather Widdows, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005) p.71. 
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represents a pseudo-Christian failure in goodness and, on the other, it represents a force 
within the Platonic continuum of morality.31  
Like Christian thinkers, such as Saint Augustine and Saint Aquinas, Murdoch partly 
accepts the existence of original sin, which she takes to be an image of ‘the notion that one is 
almost irredeemable selfish and must try to do something about it’ (TCHF, p.108). Murdoch 
aligns this inherently selfishness nature with Freud’s vision of the ‘mechanical’ nature of the 
mind. Freud, she argues, ‘sees the psyche as an egocentric system of quasi-mechanical 
energy, largely determined by its own individual history, and hard for the subject to 
understand or control’ (SG, p.50). In ‘The Sublime and the Good’ (1959), Murdoch suggests 
that the two ‘enemies’ of her moral vision are ‘social convention’ and ‘neurosis’. In the 
former, ‘social convention’, the individual ‘fail[s] to see the [other] because […] [they] are 
sunk in a social whole which [they] allow uncritically to determine [their] reactions’ (EM, 
p.216). In the latter, ‘neurosis’, the individual ‘may fail to see the [other] because [they] are 
completely enclosed in a fantasy world of [their] own into which [they] draw things from the 
outside, not grasping [their] reality and independence, making them into dream objects of our 
own’ (EM, p.216). For Murdoch, ‘neurosis’ is caused by ‘the fat relentless ego’ (SG, p.51): 
the individual can be so enthralled by their ego that they fail to acknowledge the reality of 
                                                                                                                
31 Following both Christianity and Platonism, Murdoch’s moral philosophy echoes a monist 
picture of morality, where the good represents a sovereign ideal to which all individuals 
strive: ‘Good represents the reality of which God is the dream’ (MGM, p.496). In ‘On “God” 
and “Good” (1969), Murdoch admits that her ‘own temperament inclines to monism’ (SG, 
p.49) and she replaces God with a demythologised, secular concept of the good, a similarly 
‘single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention’ (SG, 
p.54; Murdoch’s italics). For her, the iconoclastic act of replacing God with a secular concept 
of the good hinders the ‘scarcely avoidable’ ‘degeneration’ that inevitably accompanies ‘the 
idea of a transcendent personal God’ (SG, p.58). Such iconoclasm, as she later explains in 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992), is a crucial part of any religion, which ‘contains a 
self-transcending imperative, a continuous iconoclastic urge to move beyond false 
consolation’ (MGM, p.124); ‘[m]orality and demythologised religion are concerned with 
what is absolute, with […] what Plato expressed in the concept of the Form of the Good’ 
(MGM, p.412). 
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those around them. These Murdochian visions of evil or sin illustrate that, as she argues in 
agreement with Freud, ‘[o]bjectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings’ (SG, 
p.50). These early philosophical discussions reveal the obstacles that the moral pilgrim 
encounters in the ‘endless task’ of morality (SG, p.23); they portray evil, whether it is caused 
by neglectful inattentiveness or egotistic ignorance, as a failure to conform to, or a failure to 
be drawn toward, the ideal of goodness.   
Alternatively, in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, where Murdoch discusses evil 
more broadly than her earlier philosophical writings, she presents a more ambiguous picture 
of morality that is influenced by Plato, where evil appears as an increasingly positive force. 
Indeed, in The Fire and the Sun, Murdoch almost seems to lament the fact that the ‘Republic, 
like many other great ethical treatises, is deficient in an account of positive evil’ (EM, p.457). 
While Murdoch does not adopt a strictly positive vision of evil, her adoption of Platonism 
nevertheless allows her to contextualise the force of evil within a more fluid moral 
experience: ‘That we can and do love Good and are drawn towards it,’ she argues at the end 
of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, ‘is something that we have to learn from our 
experience, as we move all the time in the continuum between good and bad’ (MGM, p.507); 
while evil ‘may have to be lived with’, it ‘remains evil, and we live too with the real 
possibility of improvement’ (MGM, p.506). In this vision of morality, Murdoch adopts traits 
from monism and dualism: she draws on a Christian-Platonic monism, with its central ideal 
of goodness, but sees the moral life as a fluid experience, a ‘continuum’ where evil represents 
a more tangible force than it had been in her earlier moral philosophy. While this Platonic 
‘continuum’ does not adopt a wholesale vision of dualism, with equal forces of good and evil, 
it does provide a more substantial role for evil in the moral life than portrayed within a strict 
monist vision of morality.  
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Twentieth-century critics of Murdoch’s works often employed Murdoch’s self-
assuredly monist picture of morality to draw problematic, morally biased equations between 
her early moral philosophy and her fiction which ignore her later ambiguous picture of 
morality. ‘Recognising that hers is an art preoccupied by the moral,’ Peter J. Conradi argues 
in The Saint and the Artist (1986), critics tend to ‘behave like a species of moral terrorist, 
conducting a series of ethical unmaskings and denunciations of the characters’.32 Conradi’s 
criticism is largely focused on Elizabeth Dipple, whose ‘account of Murdoch is,’ he suggests, 
‘intensely censorious about the characters, and gives out a missionary and humourless 
stridency’.33 He similarly criticises A. S. Byatt for her conclusion that, at the end of 
Murdoch’s literary debut, Under the Net (1954), Jake Donaghue ‘is free of his own net of 
fantasy’; this indication that Jake has achieved a ‘final enlightenment’, Conradi argues, is ‘at 
odds both with every theoretical pronouncement and also with what is there in the books’.34 
Although unmentioned by Conradi, Suguna Ramanathan’s Figures of Good (1990) offers a 
similarly morally biased discussion of Murdoch’s novels: for her, ‘the good figures […] form 
a centre of their own’ and provide ‘a sort of “deep structure” on which the novel rests’.35 For 
Conradi (speaking later in 2010), forms of criticism that ‘fixate’ too rigidly on Murdoch’s 
moral philosophy ‘turn literary criticism [into] a missionary cause or activity’.36 Instead, the 
critic must, as Dipple argues (ironically, considering Conradi’s critique), ‘break loose from 
                                                                                                                
32 Peter J. Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollins, 2001), p.365. 
33 Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, p.79. 
34 A. S. Byatt, Degrees of Freedom: The Early Novels of Iris Murdoch (1964); (London: 
Vintage, 1994), p.38. 
35 Saguna Ramanathan, Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1990), p.1-2. While Saguna Ramanathan does not neglect the existence of evil (she argues, 
for instance, that evil ‘is not ignored or wished away’ in Murdoch’s fiction), she nevertheless 
argues that ‘Murdoch’s saintly characters see more clearly than those surrounding them. 
Their perceptive awareness guards them from violent, willed impulse though they live in 
regions of confusion and wickedness’. See Ramanathan, Figures of Good, pp101-2. 
36 Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, p.62; Peter J. Conradi, ‘Laughing at Something Tragic: 
Murdoch as Anti-Moralist’, in Iris Murdoch and Morality, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril 
Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), pp.56-69, p.59. 
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the compelling frame’ that Murdoch provides in her philosophy.37 Indeed, as Murdoch 
herself argues in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, ‘Artists indicate or invent, in the 
invention of their work, their own relevant tests of truth’ (MGM, p.86). For her, aesthetic 
judgment must not be limited to the moral discourses found in external philosophies and 
theories, such as her own, but should engage with the internal moral discourses present 
within each piece of art, be it a poem, play or novel. The novel, as she argued, is ‘a great hall 
of reflection where […] everything under the sun can be examined and considered’ (EM, 
p.461); like other art forms, it is ‘porous or cracked’ and ‘points beyond itself’ to ‘reality’ and 
the ‘world […] beyond it’ (MGM, p.88).  
Murdoch may argue that the novel is a fundamentally moral medium, that ‘Good 
novels concern the fight between good and evil’ (MGM, p.97), but this does not mean that the 
critic can apply Murdoch’s moral philosophy to her fiction to discover its moral workings. As 
Conradi argues, ‘fixat[ing] on Murdoch’s message or, for that matter, […] on the excesses of 
symmetry and coincidence in her work,’ results in ‘dead-end projects’.38 For Conradi, such 
blinkered critical perspectives have led to a disregard for those characters who ‘attack 
portentousness and false seriousness alike within Murdoch’s works’, namely, ‘her demons’: 
he suggests that ‘[p]ossibly we have had enough monographs about her virtuous characters 
and now need studies of her demons’.39 By defining Murdoch’s ostensibly good or morally 
successful characters by direct comparison with her philosophy, or rather, with a specific 
reading of her moral philosophy that located the place of goodness rather than evil, twentieth-
century critics ignored the crucial (albeit complex) distinction Murdoch intuits between 
literature and philosophy. Twenty-first-century critics are beginning to revise such morally-
                                                                                                                
37 Elizabeth Dipple, Iris Murdoch: Work for the Spirit (Chicago: University Press, 1982), 
p.37.  
38 Conradi, ‘Laughing at Something Tragic: Murdoch as Anti-Moralist’, p.59. 
39 Ibid.; Conradi’s italics. 
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biased readings of Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy and to acknowledge, instead, the 
potential for the moral lessons inherent within her fiction to be more ambiguous, bleak, even 
evil or revolutionary, than her moral philosophy. In this respect, reading her novels can offer 
the same lessons propounded by her philosophy, albeit through a medium more conducive to 
engaging with the realities of the moral experience: unlike the ‘abstract’ and ‘direct’ medium 
of philosophy (EM, p.11), literature is a fundamentally ambiguous medium that ‘leaves a 
space for [the] reader to play in’ (EM, p.5). It is, therefore, the very ambiguity of her fictional 
world that highlights the most important lessons of the moral life: attend, refrain from 
prejudice, do not reduce people (or characters) to single-minded concepts or ideas. ‘We are, 
as real people,’ Murdoch asserts, ‘unfinished and full of blackness and jumble; only in our 
own illusioning fantasy are we complete’ (MGM, p.97). The moral life, as Murdoch asserts 
throughout her writings, is a complex, fluctuating, piecemeal, ‘progressive’ (SG, p.23) 
experience; as the priest, Father Bernard attests to the suffering George McCaffrey in The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, ‘[w]e are frail creatures, all our good is mixed with evil’ (PP, p.494). 
 
Situating this Study of Evil in Contemporary Murdoch Scholarship 
Contemporary studies of Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy exhibit increasingly new, and 
sometimes cross-disciplinary approaches, that break away from the tendency to draw 
equations between her moral philosophy and her novels. For example, the essays within Iris 
Murdoch: a reassessment (2006), Iris Murdoch and Morality (2010) and Iris Murdoch: Texts 
and Contexts (2012), some of which were originally presented at the biennial Iris Murdoch 
Conferences, display nuanced and, often, paradoxical aspects to the study of Murdoch’s 
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fiction and philosophy.40 Pamela Osborn’s examination of mourning in Murdoch’s fiction as 
an expression of Derridean ‘gaps’, for instance, illustrates how her disagreements with 
thinkers, such as Derrida, can provide fertile ground for criticism.41 Many of these more 
recent examples of Murdoch scholarship reflect upon contemporaneous twentieth-century 
events, draw on the life experiences revealed in Murdoch’s increasingly-available 
biographical resources, or engage with the newly-available resources held within the Iris 
Murdoch Archives in the Special Collections at Kingston University.42  
Contemporary, socio-politically aware studies of Murdoch fiction and philosophy 
have been nurtured by the continued development, over the past twenty years, of the Iris 
Murdoch Archive, which holds more than 5,000 of Murdoch’s letters, the work that Conradi 
undertook in preparation for his biography Iris Murdoch: A Life (2001), and numerous 
unpublished materials, including a manuscript on the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, hand-
written collections of her poetry, her annotated libraries and her journals. A selection of these 
letters have now been published in Avril Horner and Anne Rowe’s edited collection, Living 
on Paper: Letters from Iris Murdoch 1934-1995 (2015).43 The Heidegger manuscript, which 
has to date only had its introduction published in Justin Broackes’ edited collection, Iris 
Murdoch, Philosopher (2012), is currently being edited for publication by Broackes and is 
                                                                                                                
40 See Iris Murdoch: a reassessment, ed. by Anne Rowe (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006); Iris Murdoch and Morality, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and Iris Murdoch: Texts and Contexts, ed. by Anne Rowe and 
Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
41 See Pamela Osborn, ‘Minding the Gap: Mourning in the Work of Murdoch and Derrida’, in 
Iris Murdoch: Texts and Contexts, ed by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), pp.110-27; and Pamela Osborn, ‘Another Country: Bereavement, 
Mourning and Survival in the Novels of Iris Murdoch’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Kingston 
University, 2013). 
42 Hereafter, all references to the Iris Murdoch Archives in the Special Collections at 
Kingston University will be abbreviated to ‘the Iris Murdoch Archives’. 
43 Only Murdoch’s letters appear in the Iris Murdoch Archives, making the collection 
asymmetrical. 
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expected in 2020.44 The Journals, which might more accurately be described as notebooks, 
with their reflections on philosophy and ideas for novels, are in the process of being 
transcribed.45 These more recent acquisitions will prove illuminating for future researchers 
who wish to explore Murdoch’s engagement with contemporary events, debates and thinkers. 
Indeed, in the past decade, an increasing number of scholars have contributed to discussions 
of Murdoch’s philosophy that draw upon such hitherto-unavailable resources, such as the 
soon-to-be-published Heidegger manuscript.46  
While studies of Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy range widely in scope, there have 
been few extended discussions of evil. Exceptions to this rule include Peter J. Conradi, Niklas 
Fosberg, Avril Horner and Heather Widdows, all of whom have engaged either with 
Murdoch’s fictional or with her philosophical picture of evil. This thesis represents the first 
extended study of Murdochian evil that draws on both her fiction and philosophy to illustrate 
her engagement with the kind of the questions posed at the beginning of this introduction, 
including, more specifically, why does the study of evil within Murdoch’s writings matter? 
What does her picture of evil offer that is different from, or similar to, her contemporaries? 
How does she define evil in her philosophy? How does this definition relate to her fiction? 
                                                                                                                
44 Murdoch’s original handwritten manuscript of Heidegger resides at the University of Iowa. 
While this thesis draws more heavily on the published Introduction to Heidegger, as it 
appears in Broackes’ Iris Murdoch, Philosopher (2012), it also occasionally reflects on the 
typescript, which is available for reading in the Iris Murdoch Archives. Iris Murdoch, 
Heidegger [unpublished typescript], held in the Iris Murdoch Archive, KUAS6/5/1/4. 
45 There are only a few references to Murdoch’s Journals within this thesis, most of which are 
taken from Conradi’s Iris Murdoch: A Life. The acquisition of these Journals in 2017 meant 
that an exhaustive investigation could not be carried out for this thesis. 
46 For discussions of Murdoch’s engagements with Heidegger, see Miles Leeson, ‘Chapter 
Three: Martin Heidegger and The Time of the Angels’, in Iris Murdoch: Philosophical 
Novelist (London: Continuum, 2010), pp.69-85; and Frances White, ‘Chapter Four: Remorse, 
Holocaust Theory and Heidegger: The Message to the Planet, Heidegger: the Pursuit of 
Being and Jackson’s Dilemma’, in ‘“Past forgiving?”: the experience of remorse in the 
writings of Iris Murdoch’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Kingston University, 2010), pp.140-78. 
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How does she expect us to respond to evil? Can any social, political or historical influences 
upon her portrayal of evil characters be traced? 
Murdoch’s novels engage both directly and indirectly with the socio-political 
experiences of the twentieth century, such as World War I and II. Jake Donaghue, in Under 
the Net (1954), walks through the war-scarred streets of London, taking note of the ‘gutted 
warehouses’ and ‘pitted brick walls’ (UN, p.117). Mischa Fox in The Flight from the 
Enchanter (1958), a figure displaced by the Second World War, represents the first in a line 
of ambiguous ‘enchanter’ figures in Murdoch’s fiction who appear intent on cruelty or on 
manipulating situations to their advantage, sometimes for the power or prestige it offers them, 
sometimes for no reason at all. In The Saint and the Artist, Conradi provides a more 
sympathetic view of such ‘satanic’, ‘demonic’, ‘enchanter’ figures by highlighting the socio-
political milieu in which they are presented: while they may be ‘demonic egoists’, they may 
also be suffering from the effects of war and the demythologisation of religion.47 As Kum 
Kum Bajaj similarly argues, the characters within Murdoch’s fiction live not within ‘a free 
and independent world’ but the ‘cynical’ and ‘sadistic scepticism’ of the ‘modern world’.48 
For Frances White, Murdoch’s fictional engagement with remorse resonates with, and 
arguably contributes to, Holocaust literature.49 ‘Memory is a responsibility’, as Shafak 
argues; ‘[w]e ought to remember the past, not only in its polished glories but also its 
atrocities and injustices’.50 Murdoch’s freedom as a novelist to memorialise such instances of 
human wickedness allows her to enact the task that Alain Badiou reserves for evil, an 
                                                                                                                
47 Conradi, The Saint and the Artist, pp.201, 15, 66. 
48 Kum Kum Bajaj, A Critical Study of Iris Murdoch’s Fiction (New Delhi: Atlantic 
Publishers and Distributors, 2001), p.25. 
49 See Frances White, ‘Murdoch’s Dilemma: Philosophy, Literature and the Holocaust’ in Iris 
Murdoch, Philosopher Meets Novelist ed. by Sofia de Melo Araújo and Fátima Vieira 
(Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp.89-102. See also White, 
‘“Past forgiving?”: the experience of remorse in the writings of Iris Murdoch’. 
50 Elif Shafak, ‘It’s not just Europe – toxic nostalgia has infected the world’. 
 20 
experience that ‘force[s] the naming of the unnameable’.51 The critical perspectives offered 
by writers such as Conradi or White illustrate how Murdoch’s fictional picture of evil is not 
only partly fuelled by an engagement with twentieth-century evils but also contributes to 
contemporary responses to them.  
Murdoch scholars have discussed her portrayal of powerful, demonic, even evil 
characters from as early as the publication of The Flight from the Enchanter. The question of 
what positive picture of morality these characters portray, however, has often been left 
unanswered. In arguing from the perspective that ‘Murdoch’s saintly characters see more 
clearly than those surrounding them’, Ramanathan concludes, for example, that ‘evil seems 
not to have [a] sovereign power’.52 Such a view, however, cannot be unequivocally expressed 
about Murdoch’s fiction: characters such as Mischa Fox in The Flight from the Enchanter, 
Carel Fischer in The Time of the Angels (1966) or Julius King in A Fairly Honourable Defeat 
(1970) represent, and at times propound a moral vision centred around a powerful, singular 
force of evil that operates in contradistinction to the good. Reading Murdoch’s fiction from 
the perspective of these ostensibly evil characters themselves allows the writer, as Conradi, 
A. E. Denham, Avril Horner and Elaine Morley illustrate, to move away from the ‘falsely 
serious’ perspective generated by drawing equations between Murdoch’s good characters and 
her moral philosophy.53 A. E. Denham, for example, asserts the similarities between 
Murdoch’s enchanter figure and the psychopath, whose amoral personality is defined by a 
clinical construct that is in some ways compatible with Murdoch’s moral philosophy.54 In 
‘Holy Fool and Magus: The Uses of Discipleship in Under the Net and The Flight from the 
                                                                                                                
51 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (1993), trans. Peter Hallward 
(London: Verso, 2002), p.86-7, 91. 
52 Ramanathan, Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good, p.101, 21. 
53 Conradi, ‘Laughing at Something Tragic: Murdoch as Anti-Moralist’, p.59. 
54 See A. E. Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy and Moral Motivation’, in Iris Murdoch, 
Philosopher ed. Justin Broackes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.325-52. 
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Enchanter’ (2012), Conradi discusses the influence of Murdoch’s philosophy teachers on the 
development of her philosophical, powerful, ‘master’-like, ‘enchanter’ figures.55 A similar, 
more biographical, focus on these enchanter figures is taken up by Elaine Morley in Iris 
Murdoch and Elias Canetti: Intellectual Allies (2013), a study that examines the influence of 
the Nobel-prize winning author, Elias Canetti, had on her writings; Canetti, with whom 
Murdoch became ‘in thrall[ed]’ in a ‘volatile’ (LP, p.604) ‘love affair’ in 1953 (LP, p.97), 
arguably ‘haunt[s]’ (LP, p.604) the enchanter figures within her novels.56 Alternatively, Avril 
Horner’s ‘“Refinements of Evil”: Iris Murdoch and the Gothic’ (2010) offers the clearest 
example of the benefits of disconnecting Murdoch’s fiction from the limiting frame of her 
moral philosophy. For Horner, the presence of evil within Murdoch’s fiction offers the reader 
a fundamental moral lesson: by presenting evil as a ‘dynamic force to be recognised by those 
pursuing moral goodness’, Murdoch seduces the reader into being a possible ‘collaborator’ in 
wrongdoing.57 Here, Horner illustrates the extent to which, as Conradi argues, Murdoch’s 
fondness for her ‘demons’ can be ‘instructive’.58 Her figures of evil highlight the value of 
attending to evil, an act that allows the reader to acknowledge the dialectical task of the moral 
life, the portrayal of which has often been downplayed in the search for Murdoch’s 
philosophical picture of goodness within her fiction. 
While such critical discussions of Murdochian evil, which engage with fresh critical 
perspectives or biographical resources, highlight the relevance of the discussion of her evil 
characters, few of them have taken a more collective response that draws on both her fiction 
                                                                                                                
55 See Peter J Conradi, ‘Holy Fool and Magus: The Uses of Discipleship in Under the Net 
and The Flight from the Enchanter’, in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher ed. Justin Broackes (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.119-34. 
56 See Elaine Morley, Iris Murdoch and Elias Canetti: Intellectual Allies (London: Modern 
Humanities Research Council and Maney Publishing, 2013). 
57 Avril Horner, ‘“Refinements of Evil”: Iris Murdoch and the Gothic’, in Iris Murdoch and 
Morality ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 
pp.70-84, pp.71, 81. 
58 Conradi, ‘Laughing at Something Tragic’, p.59. 
 22 
and philosophy. The most recent critical works of interest to her engagement with her 
philosophical picture of evil are those by Niklas Fosberg and Heather Widdows, who argue, 
respectively, that her concept of original sin has been misinterpreted and that Murdochian 
evil is ‘Janus-faced’, ‘capable of captivating the moral pilgrim’ and ‘is something to be 
feared and even hidden from in our flight towards the good’.59 Widdows represents one of the 
first scholars to combat the fact that ‘evil […] has received little attention from Murdochian 
scholars’.60 In her earlier work, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch (2005), Widdows 
discusses evil on nine occasions, sometimes only in passing: she mentions Murdoch’s 
disagreements with Carl Gustav Jung’s ‘harmony’ of good and evil, that Murdoch’s novels 
explore ‘what makes people good and evil’, and draws attention to Conradi’s biography to 
explain to the reader that Murdoch gained an ‘awareness of evil’ from Canetti, which ‘is 
evident in her philosophy as well as her novels’.61 While both Fosberg and Widdows focus 
almost exclusively on Murdoch’s philosophy, this study will draw upon both Murdoch’s 
fiction and philosophy, as well as her annotations to philosophical texts and her letters, to 
develop a broader definition of Murdochian evil.62 It will highlight the differences between 
not only her early absolutism, or monism, and her later subtle dualism, but also the 
                                                                                                                
59 Niklas Fosberg, ‘A New Conception of Original Sin?’, The Heythrop Journal, 56: 2 
(2015): 272-84 (p.272); Heather Widdows, ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’, in 
The Positive Function of Evil (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.81-97, p.87. 
60 Widdows, ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’, p.81. 
61 Widdows, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch, pp.100, 6, 5. 
62 Margaret L. Pachuau also examines how Murdoch encounters evil, including the 
theological problem of evil, in her fiction and philosophy, but she does so from a strident 
Christian perspective. She concludes that ‘Murdoch herself displays no belief in anything 
inherently spiritual’, that her characters ‘satiate her own means [… to] denote the failure of 
religion’, and that, for her, religion is ‘merely another moot point for failure as is 
philosophy’. These arguments do not chime with the perspectives offered by other critics, or 
indeed by this thesis, in which Murdoch’s writings do engage with spirituality, do provide 
successful visions of, or arguments that arise from, religion. Moreover, the monograph itself 
is also problematic because it contains a large collection of quotations from other critics that 
are not properly referenced. See Margaret L. Pachuau, Construction of Good and Evil in Iris 
Murdoch’s Discourse (New Delhi, India: Atlantic Books, 2007), p.114 and passim. 
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potentially paradoxical picture of evil inherent in her moral philosophy and the more 
ambiguous picture of evil inherent in her fiction, a medium which is free to express the 
complex realities of the moral life and the challenges of evil. 
 
The Parameters of this Study 
Conforming to, and in some cases engaging with, the examples of more recent Murdoch 
criticism, this thesis will explore the similarities and disjunctions between her fictional and 
philosophical portrayal of evil and, in so doing, will illustrate how Murdoch participates with 
the literary, philosophical, psychological and theological problems of evil. The principal 
material will be Murdoch’s novels, including The Sandcastle (1957), The Bell (1958), A 
Severed Head (1961), The Unicorn (1963), The Time of the Angels (1968), The Nice and the 
Good (1968), A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970), The Sacred and Profane Love Machine 
(1974), Henry and Cato (1976), The Philosopher’s Pupil (1983), The Good Apprentice 
(1985), The Message to the Planet (1993) and The Green Knight (1993). Alongside a 
consideration of her novels, this thesis will also draw on a collection of recently published 
secondary materials, including letters and interviews, and unpublished materials, such as 
annotations to philosophical texts. Within this study, The Time of the Angels, A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat and The Philosopher’s Pupil emerge as her central texts on evil.  
Chapter One illustrates how any study that engages with evil needs to employ a varied 
vocabulary that acknowledges the ambiguities of the language of evil and the various 
discourses with which the problem of evil intersects. The investigations of Murdoch writings 
within this thesis will engage with these fresh literary, philosophical, psychological and 
theological perspectives, including the theological problem of evil, the philosophical problem 
of moral dualism, the clinical construct of psychopathy and, finally, the writings of William 
Blake. My engagement with these ‘problems of evil’ will invite a more nuanced reading of 
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Murdoch’s picture of morality that reveals the problems of making a strict monist reading of 
her fiction, wherein an awareness of the value of evil is often obscured. The critic, the reader 
and the writer, as Murdoch argues in The Fire and The Sun, need to acknowledge that art 
necessarily includes ambiguities and discontinuities: moral traits are malleable and 
interchangeable and, crucially, the visions revealed by such good or evil characters may not 
tally with the moral vision they ostensibly support; evil characters may not always be evil and 
good characters may not always be good. 
 Chapter Two examines Murdoch’s engagement with the theological problem of evil 
by drawing on the writings of the Book of Job, Simone Weil and Dame Julian of Norwich. 
The Time of the Angels, The Nice and the Good, A Fairly Honourable Defeat allude to the 
moral lessons inherent in the Book of Job, where the evils of self-righteousness and hubris 
can motivate an ignorance of the value of faith and the divine power of God. Murdoch’s 
criticisms of Simone Weil’s austere theodicy, which appear in her annotations to Weil’s 
writings, are questioned in the context of John Hick’s greater good, or soul-making, theodicy, 
whose Irenaean moral vision, like Murdoch’s, suggests the importance of seeing the moral 
life as a continuous, perfectible task. Murdoch’s allusions to Simone Weil and to Aeschylus’s 
Agamemnon, whose vision of violent grace greatly influenced Weil’s concepts of gravity and 
grace, highlight the importance, much like the Book of Job, of acknowledging a necessary 
powerlessness in the face of some evils. Murdoch’s exploration of these theological problems 
of evil, alongside her ambiguous vision of love, in The Message to the Planet, draws on the 
writings of Dame Julian of Norwich to highlight the value of faith, endurance and love over 
and above the attempt to justify the existence of evil.  
 Chapter Three reveals Murdoch’s dialectical, or dynamic, picture of evil by drawing 
on the writings of Saint Paul, Eckhart, Jung and Heraclitus. In The Time of the Angels, The 
Nice and the Good, A Fairly Honourable Defeat, and The Good Apprentice, Murdoch draws 
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on Saint Paul’s partly Manichean image of ‘principalities and powers’ to illustrate the 
presence of ambiguous spiritual forces in the moral life. These spiritual forces, as Murdoch 
suggests in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and explores within her annotations to Michael 
Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man (1978), are akin to Plato’s Eros and Eckhart’s image of God; 
they help to mediate between the central, monist Form of the Good and the ambiguous, 
dualist reality of both good and evil in the moral life. Murdoch’s disagreements with dualism 
in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, which appear in the context of her criticism of Jung 
and Heraclitus, are negotiated through a discussion of Peter J. Conradi’s recently published 
interview with Murdoch, which took place in 1983: therein she presents a vision of morality, 
echoed within her later moral philosophy and illustrated within her fiction, where the 
individual is invited to acknowledge, or ‘make a pact’ with, their evil tendencies. In Acastos: 
Two Platonic Dialogues (1980) and The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch engages with the 
same problems as the interview but resolves them within a more dialectical picture of 
morality that acknowledges the presence of evil in the moral life. This ambivalent picture of 
morality is not only debated in her late moral philosophy but also illustrated in A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat, where Rupert Foster’s moral outlook is critiqued for its ignorance to the 
dynamic nature of morality.  
Chapter Four reveals the similarities between Murdoch’s evil characters and the 
personality expressed within the clinical construct of psychopathy. For contemporary writers, 
the psychopath’s amorality is symbolic of the complex relationship between empathy and 
morality, a relationship that resonates not only with the writings of Simone Weil and Hannah 
Arendt but also with the portrayal of Murdoch’s enchanter figures. Murdoch’s portrayal of 
female figures of evil in The Sandcastle and A Severed Head transcends gender stereotypes 
and subverts her gendered vision of the sadomasochism of sexual attraction, providing a 
corrective voice to the often-silent narratives on female psychopathy. This perspective 
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illustrates how psychopathy provides a useful lens through which to address this lacuna not 
only in Murdoch scholarship but also in contemporary discussions of evil.63 Murdoch’s 
philosophical discussions of the ambiguous dichotomy of the existentialist and mystical hero, 
moreover, whose traits are echoed by various characters within her oeuvre, intuit 
contemporary discussions about the moral ambiguity of psychopathy. These engagements 
with the discourses surrounding the clinical construct of psychopathy illustrate the inherent 
moral ambiguity of Murdoch’s fiction, where many of her good and evil characters share 
greater similarities than implied by their moral differences.  
 Chapter Five will develop an extended literary comparison between the work of Blake 
and Murdoch. During the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, Murdoch’s moral philosophy argued 
that the problems within twentieth-century literature were caused by the solipsistic picture of 
morality presented by Romantic writers and philosophers. These criticisms of Romanticism, 
and by extension Blake, obscured the dialogue that exists between their works.64 This chapter 
addresses this disjunction and argues that Murdoch and Blake share a liberal, humanist vision 
of art that praises the value of the individual. The chapter then goes on to illustrate how, in 
The Bell and The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch’s allusions to The Songs of Innocence and of 
Experience support a Blakean critique of a Gnostic praise of innocence which obscures the 
                                                                                                                
63 Exceptions to the bias in critical discussions of Murdoch’s female figures of evil, or 
enchanters, might include Avril Horner, Robert C. Kane or Zohreh T. Sullivan, all of whom 
focus on characters like Honor Klein or Hannah Cream Smith who are aligned within 
Murdoch’s Gothic narratives. See, for example, Horner, ‘“Refinements of Evil”: Iris 
Murdoch and the Gothic’; Robert C. Kane, Iris Murdoch, Muriel Spark and John Fowles: 
Didactic Demons in Modern Fiction (New Jersey: Associated University Press, 1988); and 
Zohreh T. Sullivan, ‘The Contracting Universe of Iris Murdoch’s Gothic Novels’, in Critical 
Essays on Iris Murdoch, ed. Linsey Tucker, gen. ed. Zack Bowen (New York: G. K. Hall & 
Company, 1992), pp.61-72. 
64 The importance of Blake to Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy has not, to date, been 
explored by any critics at length. The only exception to this rule is, perhaps, Daniel 
Majdiak’s article on ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’ (1972), which contains 
concise but detailed criticisms of Murdoch’s quotations of Blake in The Time of the Angels. 
See Daniel Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, Texas Studies in 
Language and Literature, XIV.2 (Summer 1972): 359-75. 
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kind of evils that occur within blinkered moral states that ignore the value of the contrary of 
experience. In The Time of the Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil Murdoch echoes Blake’s 
critique, as expressed in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell and ‘The Tyger’, from The Songs 
of Experience, of the suppressing, or repressing, active, creative, passionate energies. 
Arguably, Murdoch’s portrayal of Tom McCaffrey and John Robert Rozanov in The 
Philosopher’s Pupil chimes, respectively, with her personal awareness of the dangers of 
‘degenerate innocence’ and the dangers of ‘diffused eroticisms’, both of which are evidenced 
within her letters. Murdoch’s engagement with Blake’s contraries highlights the creative, 
moral and spiritual value of reason and passion, innocence and experience and good and evil. 
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Chapter One 
The Theological, Philosophical and Literary Problems of Evil 
 
If one does not believe in a personal God there is no “problem” of evil, but 
there is the almost insuperable difficulty of looking properly at evil and human 
suffering. 
Iris Murdoch.1 
 
We need to grasp clearly how appallingly human beings sometimes behave 
[and] we still need to worry about […] the immediate sources of evil—not 
physical evil, but moral evil or sin—in human affairs. 
Mary Midgley.2 
 
[T]he problem of evil is not a religious problem; religion, rather, is one sort of 
response to the problem of evil. 
Susan Neiman.3 
 
 
Evil presents a collection of conceptual and pragmatic problems to etymologists, 
lexicographers, sociologists, philosophers, psychologists and theologians. Chad Meister, for 
example, acknowledges that evil is ‘ubiquitous’ but suggests that it is ‘simply too large and 
complex (and dark) a matter’ to be ‘fully master[ed], which is probably a good thing’.4 Such a 
defeatist attitude, which is problematic for many moral thinkers including Murdoch, arguably 
arises from the obscure origins and multifarious meanings surrounding evil. Evil is an 
ambiguous and broad term that divides into, or calls upon, different orders of classification, 
both theoretical and conceptual, including such dichotomies as monism and dualism, 
absolutism and relativism, positive and negative (sometimes termed ‘privative’) evil, and 
                                                                                                                
1 Iris Murdoch, ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), in SG, pp.45-74, p.71. 
2 Mary Midgley, Wickedness (1984); (London: Routledge, 2001), p.xi, 2. 
3 Susan Neiman, ‘Afterword to the Princeton Classics Edition’, Evil in Modern Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton Classics edn. (Princeton: University Press, 
2015), pp.329-49, p.349. 
4 Chad Meister, Evil: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: Continuum, 2012), p.vi. 
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natural and human (sometimes termed moral) evil. Following these different definitions and 
classifications, an evil person may be self-centred and inattentive, may be mentally disabled, 
may be ideologically or politically justified, or even, to some religious thinkers, be under the 
influence of the Devil. Each of these perspectives on evil calls for a different response, 
leaving the thinker to ponder such questions as, what causes evil? Why does suffering occur? 
Is evil autonomous? Can a spiritual force, or an immoral ideology, motivate an individual to 
be evil? And, ultimately, what is the nature of evil? 
 
The Language of Evil: Etymologies, Definitions and Concepts 
All etymologies of the word evil highlight its ambiguity as well as the ambiguity of its 
synonyms. Eric Partridge and Walter Skeat argue, respectively, that the word evil is ‘of 
obscure origin’, that its ‘root [is] unknown’.5 The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
traces it to the Old Saxon ubel and, through the Common Germanic ubliaz, to words that 
connotate transgression, going ‘up’ and ‘over’, ‘exceeding the due limits’.6 In Old English, it 
was ‘the most comprehensive adj[ectival] expression of disapproval or disparagement’.7 
Modern Colloquial uses of evil, however, we are told, are ‘almost entirely superseded by 
bad’, which is defined as the opposite of ‘good’ and was ‘first applied to worthless or 
contemptible persons’, including those who transgressed sexual norms (such as the 
hermaphrodite or wench).8 Skeat draws on a similarly ambiguous sense of transgression in 
his exploration of the relationship between the words evil and wicked: 
                                                                                                                
5 Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p.189; Rev. Walter W. Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary 
of the English Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882), p.197. 
6 Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, ed. by C.T. Onions (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974), p.332. Eric Partridge, alluding to Webster’s International Dictionary 
of The English Language, corroborates the link between evil and transgression in Origins: A 
Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, p.189.  
7 Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p.332. 
8 Ibid., pp.332, p.68. 
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The word wicked was orig[inally] a past participle with the sense ‘rendered 
evil,’ formed as if from the verb wikken to make evil, from the obsolete 
adj[ective] wikke (disyllabic) [… linking not only to wizard and witch, but 
also to] a doublet of the mod[ern] E[nglish] be-witched [… which was] used 
in the sense of ‘abandoned to evil’ rather than ‘controlled by witchcraft.’9 
 
Such etymological, or conceptual, ambiguity is, as Skeat illustrates, similarly present in the 
word bad, which echoes the German word böse (or the Dutch word boos), which denotes 
anger or naughtiness rather than evil, and the Gaelic word baoth, which describes a person 
that may be ‘vain, giddy, foolish, simple’ or ‘profane, wicked, wild, careless’.10 For Eric 
Partridge, bad and wicked also connote being ‘simple’ or ‘careless’: bad individuals are 
‘wide-open (to all influence, esp[ecially] the worst)’ and wicked individuals are ‘weak’-
minded.11 Following these etymologies, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines evil 
(in its noun form) as a form of ‘profound immorality, wickedness, and depravity, especially 
when regarded as a supernatural force,’ which may be applied to an individual’s ‘actions’ or 
simply to something that is ‘harmful or undesirable’.12 As both a noun and adjective, the 
meanings of evil are, for the most part, similar. In its adjective form, however, there is 
another stress placed on the spiritual nature of evil: there are evil ‘force[s] or spirit[s]’ that 
embody, or can be associated with, ‘the forces of the devil’.13 While the consensus that 
emerges from these definitions is of evil as a transgressive act, a form of moral failure or 
‘misbehaviour’, that often arises from carelessness, the etymological ambiguities inherent 
within the word problematise attempts to accurately define it and its synonyms. 
                                                                                                                
9 Skeat, An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, p.709. 
10 Ibid., p.87. 
11 Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, p.37. 
12 See The New Oxford English Dictionary of English, ed. by Judy Pearsall (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p.638. 
13 The New Oxford English Dictionary of English, p.638. 
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The philosophical and theological problems surrounding the meanings of evil, 
especially those concerning the spiritual definition of evil as a ‘force’ connected with the 
devil, both result in and intersect with two theoretical binaries and two conceptual binaries. 
The first of these theoretical binaries is monism and dualism. Simply put, monism is ‘the 
doctrine that only one supreme being exists’ and its opposite can be split into four different 
types, including religious, metaphysical, psychological and moral-philosophical dualisms.14 
The religious dualism defines ‘two principles or divine beings, one good one evil’; the 
metaphysical defines two views of reality, ‘finite and infinite, matter and form, matter and 
spirit, relative and absolute’; the psychological defines human beings as ‘made up of two 
radically distinct constituents (body […] and an immaterial mind or soul)’; and, finally, the 
moral-philosophical defines the division of fact from value, ‘the view that factual statements 
do not imply any evaluative statement’.15 The second theoretical binary, which is alluded to 
within the above definition of metaphysical dualism, is absolutism and relativism. In its 
‘cognitive’ and ‘ethical’ forms, respectively, relativism ‘holds that there are no universal 
truths about the world’, or ‘no universally valid moral principles’.16 The absolutist, 
conversely, is a kind of ‘idealist’ that believes such truths, whether they are verifiably present 
in the world or otherwise, are present, universal and valid.17 Where the debate about 
absolutism and relativism is a more philosophical problem, the debate about monism and 
                                                                                                                
14 The Oxford English Dictionary also provides a more detailed definition: Monism is defined 
as ‘a theory or doctrine that denies the existence of a distinction or a duality in some sphere, 
such as that between matter and mind, or God and the world’. The New Oxford English 
Dictionary of English, p.1194. 
15 Thomas Mautner, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn (London: Penguin, 
2005), p.170. 
16 See The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Robert Audi (General Editor), 2nd 
edn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.790. 
17 The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy describes ‘absolute’ as a term ‘used by idealists 
to describe the one independent reality of which all things are an expression. Kant used to the 
adjective “absolute” to characterize what is unconditionally valid.’ Cambridge Dictionary of 
Philosophy, p.3. 
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dualism represents a more theological problem and results in the first of the two conceptual 
binaries: positive versus negative evil. 
All the forms of evil discussed above, spiritual or otherwise, can be divided into either 
a positive or negative (sometimes termed ‘privative’) evils. Sophie-Grace Chappell explores 
the decidedly ‘muddled’ application of these terms in her essay on evil in ‘Socrates and 
Plato’. She explains that  
 
Under the heading of ‘positive bad’ the [OED] defines ‘evil’ as ‘morally 
depraved… doing or tending to harm… Of an omen, etc.: boding ill… 
causing discomfort, pain, or trouble, hard, difficult, unfortunate, miserable, 
unlucky, disastrous’. Then under the ‘privative bad’ heading it defines 
‘evil’ as ‘Not good… unsound, diseased, corrupt, unwholesome, inferior’. 
[…] Disconcertingly, [the OED] tells us that ‘bad’ too has both ‘positive’ 
and ‘privative’ senses, but the other way round from ‘evil’. ‘Evil’ (we were 
told before) was primarily positive and only secondarily privative. Though 
‘bad’ has just been used to define ‘evil’, we are now told that ‘bad’ is 
primarily privative and only secondarily positive in sense. To make matters 
worse, we also read that the first sense of ‘bad’ as privative is ‘defective’ 
(after which it means ‘incorrect’, ‘legally invalid’, or ‘unfavourable’).18  
 
The problem with many of these definitions, as Chappell illustrates, is that they rely upon 
antithetical and thus ‘privative’ concepts, where evil is immoral, undesirable, or a form of 
misbehaviour. Moreover, as in the etymological cases, these definitions become increasingly 
circular: ‘depravity’ is defined as ‘moral corruption’ and as an example of ‘wickedness’, 
which is itself defined as ‘a quality of being evil’ or ‘morally wrong’ and, differently, as that 
which is ‘malevolent’ and has or exhibits ‘a wish to do evil to others’. In Chappell’s 
                                                                                                                
18 Sophie-Grace Chappell, ‘Socrates and Plato’, in History of Evil in Antiquity: 2000BCE-
450CE, ed. by Tom P.S. Angier, series ed. by Chad Meister and Charles Taliaferro (New 
York: Routledge, 2019), p.1. Page numbers refer to my 13-page document, printed at the 
British Library. I am also grateful to Sophie-Grace Chappell for providing an early draft of 
this essay prior to its publication. 
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examinations of bad and evil, both words seem to lean toward a ‘privative’ or negative 
definition that refers to the denial of ideas such as comfort, goodness, health or luck. There 
nevertheless remains, however, a more spiritual sense in which evil can be a positive, isolated 
force, the prime example of which might be the Devil who, like the ‘Evil Principle’ within 
Manichean dualism, operates in contradistinction to goodness, to the Manichaean ‘Good 
Principle’ or to the Judeo-Christian God.19 The moral debate between these two visions of 
evil leads thinkers to ask such questions as: how can evil have conceptual validity if it is 
simply a lack of goodness? Or can goodness be more powerful than evil? Such conceptual 
complexities lend credence to Chad Meister’s suggestion that evil cannot be ‘fully 
master[ed]’.20 Conversely, however, they also provide a crucial arena to test the limits of 
language and moral discourse and, moreover, to question the place of evil within the religious 
or spiritual life. 
The theoretical binaries of monism and dualism and the conceptual binaries of 
positive and negative evil provide the religious thinker with the language to interrogate 
theological questions about evil and to differentiate religious visions of morality. The debates 
inherent in these binaries are especially pertinent to Christian discourses, where some 
thinkers, such as Saint Augustine, see evil as a ‘privation’ of good and other thinkers, such as 
Saint Paul, acknowledge that the powers, or forces, of evil can corrupt the individual. For 
Augustine, goodness (or the goodness of God) is a positive moral force that holds power over 
and above evil, and the resulting picture of evil is negative, or ‘privative’. He argues that 
 
the Almighty God, who […] has supreme power over all things, being 
Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil 
among His works, if He were not so omnipotent and good that He can bring 
                                                                                                                
19 Peter Vardy and Julie Arliss, The Thinker’s Guide to Evil (Hants, UK: John Hunt 
Publishing Ltd, 2004), p.26. 
20 Meister, Evil: A Guide for the Perplexed, p.vi. 
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good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of 
good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the 
absence of health; for when a cure is effected […] the evils which were 
present […] cease to exist […]. Just in the same way, what are called vices 
in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good.21 
 
In this monist vision, evil does not represent an adherence to a demonic force, but a failure to 
meet the ideals set out by the sovereign force of God’s goodness; ‘evil has no positive 
nature’, Augustine writes, ‘but the loss of good has received the name “evil.”’22 
Alternatively, in Ephesians 6.12, Saint Paul invites a more dualist vision of morality, where 
good and evil can be seen as ‘positive’ equally powerful moral categories; he writes, ‘For we 
wrestle not against the flesh and spirit, but against principalities, against powers, against 
rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places’. 23 Augustine 
originally ‘embraced’ Paul’s moral and metaphysical dualism between the flesh and the 
spirit, Michael Grant argues, and drew on it in his ‘insistence on the Fall of the human race 
resulting from its desperate ignorance, helplessness, sin and guilt’.24 However, he later 
revised, or mediated, these dualist (or Manichean) tendencies; it was, for Augustine, a 
‘shocking and detestable profanity, that the wedge of darkness sunders not a region distinct 
and separate from God, but the very nature of God’.25 The problems inherent in Paul’s vision 
                                                                                                                
21 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘Chapter 11: What is Called Evil in the Universe is But the 
Absence of Good’, The Enchiridion, trans. by J. F. Shaw, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf103.iv.ii.xiii.html> [accessed 16/07/17]. 
22 Saint Augustine, ‘Chapter 9.—What the Scriptures Teach Us to Believe Concerning the 
Creation of the Angels’, City of God, trans. by J. F. Shaw 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.iv.XI.9.html> [accessed 25/4/19]. 
23 All biblical quotations, unless otherwise indicated, are from the following edition: The 
Bible: Authorized King James Version, edited and introduced by Robert Carroll and Stephen 
Prickett (Oxford: University Press, 2008). Hereafter referenced in parenthesis. 
24 Michael Grant, Saint Paul: the Man (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1978), pp.44, 33.  
25 Saint Augustine, ‘Chapter 24.—Of the Number of Natures in the Manichæan Fiction’, 
Against the Manichaeans, trans. by Rev. Richard Stothert and Albert H. Newman 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf104.iv.viii.xxv.html> [accessed 25/4/19]. 
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of morality, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, are thus problematic for 
some Christian thinkers because they place a limit on God’s power and human autonomy. 
Such spiritual responses to evil invite further questions for religious thinkers, such as, are 
these forces more powerful than God? Does God allow them to control the individual? If so, 
does that make God responsible for evil? If evil is an active, independent, positive force, then 
either God is capable of corruption from this dangerous force, or is powerless to affect 
positive moral change in His creatures; both cases lead to the conclusion that God is not the 
supremely good Being presented in Augustine’s monist picture of morality. 
The debate between the pictures of evil inherent in dualism and monism brings into 
focus the final conceptual binary of human evil versus natural evil, which allows the religious 
and secular thinker to answer the question of whether or not God is responsible for evil by 
differentiating the evil carried out by humans and that caused by nature. Unlike natural evils, 
such as earthquakes or tsunamis, human evil represents an evil over which people have 
control.26 The fact of human evil, and the lasting impact that it has on people, is attested not 
only in theological studies but also philosophical, sociological, literary and historical studies. 
Reflections on the Holocaust, such as Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
the Banality of Evil (1963) or Susan Neiman’s Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative 
History of Philosophy (2002), for example, cross all these discourses, illustrating the human 
capacity for immense cruelty and the need to reflect upon these evils. When religious thinkers 
reflect on such human evils, however, the binary of human evil versus natural evil is partly 
collapsed. When the majority of religions are monist, and preach God’s omnipotence, the 
question of how He could allow evil remains similar from both perspectives: How can He 
allow people to be seduced into evildoing, whether by the forces of the Devil or the ideas of 
                                                                                                                
26 These definitions are paraphrased from their relevant entries in The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, 2nd edn, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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another person, such as Hitler? How can He allow discrete actions, caused by nature or by 
individuals, to lead to such horrendous suffering? Such theological reflections on the problem 
of evil reveal both the benefits and limitations of not only language but also religious 
reflection. Indeed, for Murdoch, a continually developing ethical sensibility, where the 
individual’s attention is driven away from the ego toward a loving and respectful attention to 
the Other, rests upon a broad and flexible moral vocabulary and an awareness of religious 
techniques, such as prayer.  
 
The Problem of Evil in Theology 
For theologians, the existence of suffering, caused by either human or natural evil, poses an 
acute test of faith that is termed the ‘problem of evil’, a problem in which the religious 
thinker asks how an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient being could allow the 
existence of evil and suffering within the world. This problem has concerned many writers, 
including early Christian thinkers like Saint Augustine, Enlightenment thinkers like Gottfried 
Leibniz, nineteenth-century thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche and, even after Nietzsche’s 
infamous pronouncement in The Gay Science (1882) that ‘God is dead’, twentieth-century 
thinkers like Iris Murdoch.27 In an increasingly secularised world the problem of evil, as 
Murdoch argues, should become less about providing justifications of how God can allow 
evil and more about responding to evil from a human perspective. ‘If one does not believe in 
a personal God there is no “problem” of evil,’ she argues in ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), 
‘but there is the almost insuperable difficulty of looking properly at evil and human 
suffering’ (SG, p.71). This pronouncement on the importance of responding to evil and 
suffering, for both religious and secular thinkers alike, chimes with Susan Neiman’s claim, in 
                                                                                                                
27 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882), trans. by Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Viking Press, 1965), pp.93-101, p.95 (aphorism 125). 
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the 2015 afterword to her study Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of 
Philosophy (2002), that ‘the problem of evil is not a religious problem; religion, rather, is one 
sort of response to the problem of evil’.28  
The Book of Job presents the earliest and perhaps most austere Christian response to 
evil, a response in which the individual is asked to accept the existence of evil, pain and 
suffering. Job’s extreme suffering (instigated by Satan as a test of Job’s faith) leads him to 
interrogate God, who responds with a terrifying display of his power, the vision of which 
leads Job to accept God’s divine majesty; finally, as a reward for Job’s obedience, God 
reverses his sufferings. In the exchange between God and Job, however, the problem of evil 
itself is denied. In the midst of his suffering, Job declares, ‘Surely I would speak to the 
Almighty, and I desire to reason with God’ (Job 13:3). God answers Job thus: ‘Where wast 
thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.’ (Job 38:4) 
‘Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty instruct him?’ (Job 40:2). With this charge, God 
highlights how the problem of evil, how the wish to question Him for a reason for evil and 
suffering, represents an attempt to comprehend a divine problem that falls outside human 
knowledge. In accepting this austere teaching within the Book of Job, the religious thinker 
learns the value of gratitude and respect for divine knowledge and the value of endurance for 
the contingent nature of the world, for all ‘things too wonderful’ for human understanding 
(Job 42:3), including not only evil and suffering but also beauty and nature. 
The nature of evil perplexed early Christian thinkers: both Saint Augustine and Saint 
Thomas Aquinas saw the existence of evil as a result of free will, yet where Augustine 
absolved God of responsibility for both human and natural evil, Aquinas and Saint Irenaeus 
saw God as responsible for it. Augustine bases his vision of evil on an interpretation of the 
Biblical fall story; ‘the only cause of evil’, he argues, ‘is the falling away from the 
                                                                                                                
28 Susan Neiman, ‘Afterword to the Princeton Classics Edition’, p.349. 
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unchangeable good of a being made good but changeable, first in the case of an angel, and 
afterwards in the case of man’.29 In Evil and the God of Love (1966), John Hick describes 
Augustine’s concept of ‘falling away’ as a ‘wilful turning of the self’ away from good toward 
badness, a ‘self-originating’ act of ‘“wicked[ness]”’.30 For Aquinas, alternatively, this ‘wilful 
turning’ cannot, as Hick explains, ‘act as a cause’ of evil: ‘Good is accordingly the cause of 
evil—but only accidentally and in virtue of some defective power of the agent’, the ‘defective 
power’ being brought about by free will.31 Aquinas suggests that 
 
[t]he order of the universe requires […] that there should be some things 
that can, and do sometimes, fail. […] [T]he order of justice belongs to the 
order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to 
sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the 
evil which is fault.32 
 
Aquinas’s picture of evil, where humans are inherently capable of evil or ‘fault[s]’ that 
represent a justified aspect of ‘the order of the universe’, is inherently austere and, to a 
certain extent, places the burden of moral development onto the ‘universe’ rather than the 
individual. Hick differentiates both Aquinas’s and Augustine’s vision of evil from that of 
Saint Irenaeus:  
 
Instead of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then 
incomprehensibly destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and 
misery, Irenaeus suggests that man was created as an imperfect, immature 
creature who was to undergo moral development and growth and finally be 
brought to the perfection intended for him by his Maker.33 
                                                                                                                
29 Saint Augustine of Hippo, ‘Chapter 23.—Summary of the Results of the Preceding 
Discussion’, The Enchiridion, trans. by J. F. Shaw, 
<http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf103.iv.ii.xxv.html> [accessed 25/4/19]. 
30 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (Norfolk: Collins Fontana Library, 1975), p.66. 
31 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.100. 
32 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt.1, Q.xlix, art.2. Quoted in Hick, p.103. 
33 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.220. 
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Irenaeus thus allows for human autonomy by suggesting that evil is neither inherent within 
the individual as a kind of ‘wilful turning of the self’, as in Augustine, or rationalised within 
an ‘aesthetic or mathematical’ vision of the ‘order of the universe’, as in Aquinas.34 Instead, 
for Irenaeus, evil and suffering exist as an integral part of ‘our world of mingled good and 
evil’, which is provided by God ‘as a divinely appointment environment for man’s 
development towards perfection’.35 For Hick, who follows this Irenaean vision of morality, 
the prevalence of the Augustinian and Aquinian vision of morality in contemporary Christian 
doctrine has led to the belief that suffering (in all its forms, both natural and human) is a form 
of ‘punishment’ for sin and that, in God’s aesthetic vision of the world, evils are balanced off 
by the existence goodness.36 According to these two visions of morality, human evil is 
inevitable and, therefore, represents a pointless problem with which to engage. 
These problems about the nature of evil received new attention during the 
Enlightenment, an era that, as Neiman suggests, was ‘on the border between theology and 
metaphysics’.37 In this more secular environment, the problem of evil not only highlighted 
the importance of religious discourse in framing questions about how to rationalise the 
existence of evil within the world more broadly but also posed fundamental questions about 
human autonomy and moral development. Indeed, one of the central terms in the theological 
problem of evil, theodicy, which defines the question of ‘how theism can be true in view of 
the existence of evils’,38 was coined by Gottfried Leibniz in Theodicy: Essays on the 
                                                                                                                
34 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.102. 
35 Ibid., p.221. 
36 Ibid., p.93. 
37 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, first edtn. 
(Princeton: University Press, 2004), p.4. 
38 Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. by, ‘Introduction: Problems of 
Evil’ to The Problem of Evil (Oxford: University Press, 1994), pp.1-24, p.3. 
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Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil (1710).39 Leibniz argued that 
God, being ‘a perfectly good, omniscient, and omnipotent being,’ creates the ‘best possible 
world’, a world in which the presence of natural evils does not preclude the existence of God 
because evil and suffering is part of God’s ‘best possible world’.40 For other thinkers during 
the Enlightenment, however, Paul Johnson argues, ‘Christian theodicy proved particularly 
feeble’.41 In Evil in Modern Thought, Neiman illustrates how such negative responses to the 
problem of evil arose from an increasing awareness of natural disasters, such as the 1755 
Lisbon earthquake, which invited responses from thinkers as wide-ranging as Kant, Rousseau 
and Voltaire. Voltaire, for example, felt that ‘Men do themselves more harm on their little 
molehill than does nature. More men are slaughtered in their wards than are swallowed up in 
earthquakes’.42 Alternatively, for Kant, Johnson explains, ‘[t]he lesson of the earthquake’ 
revealed a more Jobian lesson: ‘in the world of phenomena man was subject to the necessities 
of natural law, but in the world of the spirit he is free’.43 In this vision, Johnson argues, nature 
is ‘subordinate to the realm of ends governed by purpose’; nature, in other words, and the 
suffering it may or may not result in, represents the contingency of the world, the reasoning 
of which ‘ended in God’.44 The varying theodicies provided by these Enlightenment writers, 
Neiman argues, led to the ‘sharp distinction between natural and moral evil [or human evil] 
that now seems self-evident’.45 Whether the thinker comes from a theistic or atheistic 
background, the problem of evil thus poses fundamental ‘questions about what the structure 
                                                                                                                
39 Originally published in French under the title: Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la 
liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal (1710). 
40 Leibniz, quoted in Adams and Adams, ‘Introduction: Problems of Evil’, pp.4-5. 
41 Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity (1976); (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p.352. 
42 Quoted in Johnson, A History of Christianity, p.352. 
43 Johnson, A History of Christianity, p.352. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.3.  
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of the world must be like to think and act within it’, questions that have remained important 
for religious and secular thinkers alike through to the twentieth and twenty-first century.46  
Mark Larrimore’s more recent collection, The Problem of Evil: A Reader (2001), 
reveals the broad range of writers who have engaged with this fundamental human problem: 
Plato and Kant, Augustine and Saint Anselm of Canterbury, Freud and Jung, Eckhart and 
Dame Julian of Norwich, Milton and Dostoyevsky, and Emmanuel Levinas and Simone Weil 
have all, to quote Milton, sought to ‘justify the ways of God to man’.47 For some writers, 
such as Dame Julian of Norwich, Simone Weil or Jung, evil is a necessary aspect of the 
religious experience; for others, such as Darwin or Dostoyevsky, the existence of evil and 
suffering necessitate the denial of God. Darwinism invited a vision of the cruelty of the world 
unmediated by God where, to quote Tennyson, ‘Nature, red in tooth and claw / With ravine, 
shrieked against His creed’ of unconditional love.48 Darwin himself wrote that he could not 
be persuaded that ‘a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created’ 
parasites, or by the kind of violent sport on evidence when cats play with mice.49 In The 
Brothers Karamazov (1879-80), Dostoyevsky similarly probed the harsher realities of the 
problem of evil, where Ivan Karamazov pleads with his brother, Alyosha, to explain how 
God could allow the suffering of children: ‘Imagine you are creating a fabric of human 
destiny with the object of making man happy in the end […] but that it was essential and 
inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature – […] to found that edifice on its 
                                                                                                                
46 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.3. 
47 John Milton Paradise Lost (1667), ed. by Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg (Oxford: 
University Press, 2008), p.4 (Book 1, Line 26). All of the writers listed above, and many 
more besides, appear in Larrimore’s edited collection The Problem of Evil: A Reader. See 
Mark Larrimore, The Problem of Evil: A Reader (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).  
48 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, ‘In Memoriam’ (1850), quoted in Mark Larrimore, The Problem of 
Evil: A Reader, p.269. 
49 Charles Darwin, letter to Asa Gray (1860), in The Problem of Evil: A Reader, ed. by Mark 
Larrimore (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp.269-70, p.270. 
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unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions?’.50 Unlike 
Larrimore’s broader edited collection that draws on the writings of theologians, 
psychologists, philosophers, mystics and artists, The Problem of Evil (1990), edited by 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, highlights the prevalence of the 
problem of evil between 1955 and 1989 by collecting theodicies by theologians and 
philosophers, including  J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga and John Hick. For the latter, like 
Dame Julian of Norwich and Simone Weil, evil and suffering present the individual with an 
opportunity for moral development. Such ‘greater good’ theodicies force the individual to 
‘recognize and accept [their] vulnerability’ and to appreciate the importance of being drawn 
to the ideal of goodness symbolised by God.51 For writers like Dame Julian of Norwich and 
Simone Weil, ‘positive meaning’ can be found even in the most horrendous instances of 
suffering because, echoing the religious lesson offered within the Book of Job, the value of 
love and ‘divine gratitude’ outweighs all ‘earthly woes’.52 Such austere moral visions, Adams 
and Adams explain, do not value evil and suffering as experiences in themselves, but see 
them within the context of faith and ‘humility’ as lessons in the value of ‘acceptance, praise, 
and love’.53 
The problem of evil, therefore, represents a fundamental dilemma for both religious 
and secular thinkers that calls into question the causes of human evil, the moral efficacy of 
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language and the power of Goodness. For contemporary thinkers, whose theodicies reflect 
upon events such as the Holocaust or 9/11, the existence of evil and suffering problematises 
the existence of God and paradoxically both undermines, and reveals the value of, the task of 
responding to evil. Levinas, for example, famously noted that after the Holocaust theodicy 
‘appeared impossible’ and its task needed to be broadened to find ‘meaning’ in ‘nameless’ 
and ‘gratuitous human suffering’, both of which demand ‘more of the resources of the self ’ 
and appeal to our sense of ‘compassion’ and love.54 Following Levinas’s engagement with 
such ‘secular forms of theodicy’, Neiman explains that  
 
Theodicy, in the narrow sense, allows the believer to maintain faith in God 
in the face of the world’s evils. [But], in the broad sense, [it represents] any 
way of giving meaning to evil that helps us to face despair. Theodicies 
place evils within structures that allow us to go on in the world. Ideally, 
they should reconcile us to past evils while providing direction in 
preventing future ones.55  
 
Like Neiman and Larrimore, Paul Ricoeur acknowledges that this encounter with the 
‘challenge’ of evil dominates both philosophical and theological writings, be they theist or 
atheist, religious or secular:  
 
That both philosophy and theology encounter evil as a challenge unlike any 
other, [Ricoeur claims] the greatest thinkers in both these disciplines are 
willing to admit. What is important is the way in which this challenge, or this 
failure, is received: do we find an invitation to think less about the problem 
or a provocation to think more, or to think differently about it?56 
 
                                                                                                                
54 Emanuel Levinas, ‘Useless Suffering’ (1982), Entre Nous: Thinking-of-the-other, trans by 
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55 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.239. 
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Here, Ricoeur reveals the crucial task of interrogating evil: while some theological responses 
to the problem of evil leave less room for human autonomy and human reflection, others 
assert the value of turning attention toward the causes of human wickedness, of confronting 
the cerebral, and by extension the linguistic and philosophical, challenges it presents. Such a 
task necessarily combines both religious and secular discourses and resonates with the 
concerns of theology, psychology, philosophy and literature.  
 
Contemporary Evils and the Secular Theodicy  
Twentieth- and twenty-first-century secular philosophical responses to evil tend to focus on 
either the incredible cruelty and malice experienced and witnessed during the two World 
Wars or on contemporary acts of terrorism. Indeed, almost all present-day discussions of evil 
begin by referencing the destruction of the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, an event 
that, as Neiman argues in the preface to Modern Moral Philosophy, revealed both the limits 
and the fundamental importance of the secular problem of evil. The acts of totalitarianism, 
terrorists and war criminals may hinder the creation of new ‘theodicies’ and ‘consolations’, 
Neiman suggests, but the continued attempt to understand their evil represents the importance 
of moral thought and, indeed, philosophy.57 The problem of evil is not only ‘the root from 
which modern philosophy springs’, she claims, but also ‘the place where philosophy begins, 
and threatens to stop’ because it involves fundamental questions about God’s responsibility 
for evil and, crucially, the individual’s responsibility for evil, asking ‘how can human beings 
behave in ways that so thoroughly violate both reasonable and rational norms?’58 
 Hannah Arendt’s historical, philosophical and political writings are paradigmatic of 
the importance of post-war responses to the evils of Auschwitz, Nazism and the Second 
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58 Ibid., pp.13, 3. 
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World War. For Neiman, Auschwitz ‘inhabit[s] the borders of human meaning’, much like 
the kind of natural evil interrogated within the theological problem of evil and the 
Enlightenment thinkers’ responses to the Lisbon earthquake.59 Arendt’s works, however, with 
their allusions to Kantian moral philosophy, confront these limits; Eichmann in Jerusalem, 
Neiman argues, is ‘the best attempt at theodicy postwar philosophy has produced’.60 Arendt’s 
concept of the ‘banality’ of evil illustrates how evil is not something reserved for ‘demonic’ 
individuals but can be the result of ‘thoughtlessness’ or moral ‘carelessness’.61 Bernstein 
argues that Arendt’s response to the evils of Auschwitz, which highlights the importance of 
personal moral ‘responsibility’ over and above Eichmann’s ostensibly ‘thoughtless’ actions, 
draws on and exceeds Kant’s concept of radical evil.62 Kant’s ‘revolutionary’ concept, Joan 
Copjec explains, forges a link between his Practical Reason and a more Augustinian concept 
of human nature, thereby resulting in a picture of morality where the ‘battle between good 
and evil’ takes place between ‘the adoption of two possible types of rules: good or bad; 
disinterested (that is, based only on moral law) or self-interested (based on self-regard)’.63 For 
Arendt, however, radical evil ‘emerge[s] in connection with a system in which all men have 
become equally superfluous’, in which all human beings, as Bernstein explains, are stripped 
of the vestiges of ‘freedom’, ‘individuality’ and ‘spontaneity’.64 The actions of Auschwitz, 
and indeed of totalitarianism, he continues, represent a ‘new face of evil’ that undermines 
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62 Richard, J. Bernstein, ‘Reflections on Radical Evil: Arendt and Kant’, Soundings: An 
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Kant’s moral discourse.65 As Arendt declares, in her concluding remarks to The Origins of 
Totalitarianism: 
 
When the impossible was made possible [at Auschwitz] it became 
unpunishable, unforgivable absolute [radical] evil which could no longer be 
understood and explained by the evil motives of self-interest, greed, 
covetousness, resentment, lust for power, and cowardice; and which 
therefore anger could not avenge, love could not endure, friendship could 
not forgive.66 
 
Such an account of evil undermines the theoretical and conceptual binaries within which evil 
has traditionally been defined and destabilises the task of theodicy. Here, Bernstein argues, 
Arendt may not ‘provide a comprehensive theory of evil’, but she ‘invites us to […] return 
over and over again to questioning evil’.67 For Arendt, the individual should confront the 
challenges that such evils present to human understanding. Her post-war secular theodicy, 
while it may not provide a ‘comprehensive theory of evil’, highlights the fundamental 
importance of engaging with evil, however ambiguous and challenging it may be, from a 
human perspective. 
Such responses to evil are increasingly tested by the contemporary figures of evil, 
including criminals like Adolf Eichmann, Ian Brady and Myra Hindley, or Ted Bundy, whose 
acts are explored within historical and political explorations like Arendt’s as well as 
contemporary media, such as film and television. Today, society is particularly fascinated 
with depraved criminality and with the judicial system surrounding it, as evidenced in 
television programs like Making a Murderer or Conversations with a Killer: The Ted Bundy 
Tapes, the latter of which has also been developed into a film, Extremely Wicked, Shockingly 
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Evil and Vile.68 The ‘sensational[ism]’ and ‘spectacle’ of the media frenzy surrounding such 
figures, including Eichmann, has notably psychopathic undertones.69 This controversial 
clinical category, as will be explored in Chapter Four, is often used to define immoral 
individuals by measuring behavioural traits, including charm, a lack of empathy and 
manipulativeness. The artistic, historical and sociological exploration of such individuals 
poses fundamental questions about moral judgement and moral reasoning: Does evil have 
inherent biological or sociological causes? Are these causes to be classed as disabilities, and 
if so should they impact our moral judgements? What does it mean for moral judgement if a 
criminal believes their evil acts to be entirely justified? Arendt was adamant that Eichmann’s 
actions did not render him ‘diabolical’ or mad; he was completely sane and, simply, 
‘thoughtless’.70 Her exploration of Eichmann is thus emblematic of criminals, psychopaths 
and even terrorists, all of whom illustrate how, as Neiman argues, ‘the most unprecedented 
crimes can be committed by the most ordinary people’.71 This ‘new’ Arendtian radical evil 
which has ‘entered the world’ in the guise of genocides, such as the Holocaust or the Khmer 
Rouge, Juliet Flower Maccannell argues, ‘wears the face or mask of a certain detachment’.72 
The terrorist is, in this respect, like the ‘totalitarian murderers’ discussed in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism; such figures are, Arendt argues, ‘all the more dangerous’ because, following 
her concept of radical evil, they have like their victims become ‘superfluous’; ‘they do not 
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care if they themselves are alive or dead, if they ever lived or never were born’.73 Such 
detachment from morality and from ‘humanity itself’ is true not only of the psychopath but 
also of the terrorist, whose obsession with ‘death and fear’, as Neiman argues, disrupts 
attempts at moral judgement.74 The psychopath and the terrorist appear so self-centred that 
the attempt to pass moral judgement upon them is either hindered by a sense that their vision 
is ideologically justified and by the dilemma that they may or may not be mad, both of which 
undermine their sense of common humanity. 
When the universal basis of morality is undermined by moral dilemmas surrounding 
criminality, psychopathy and terrorism, it becomes increasingly hard, and for some thinkers 
impossible, to confront the challenge of evil. In a recent radio programme titled ‘666 Evil’, 
for example, which examined the historical, philosophical, theological and sociological 
debates on the problem of evil, Galen Strawson claimed that the idea of moral responsibility 
‘is not ultimately coherent’.75 Such a vision, Bernstein claims, was often adopted by those 
who responded to the September 11 attacks. In The Abuse of Evil (2005), he argues that 
 
[w]hat is so disturbing about the post-9/11 evil talk is its rigidity and 
popular appeal. Few stop to ask what we really mean by evil. […] In a 
world where there is fear and anxiety about unpredictable threats of 
terrorism that can strike at any place and any time, it is psychologically 
reassuring to label the enemy ‘evil.’76 
 
Such a critique of modern uses of the word ‘evil’ chimes with Arendt’s concepts of radical 
evil and the banality of evil, both of which are concepts that, to quote Neiman, resonate with 
                                                                                                                
73 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p.459. Quoted in Bernstein, ‘Reflections on 
Radical Evil: Arendt and Kant’, p.18. 
74 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.284. 
75 Galen Strawson speaking on: ‘666 Evil’, Moral Maze, produced by Dan Tierney, BBC 
Radio 4, 5 August 2015. 
76 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.10. 
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‘all that is meant when we use the word evil today: absolute wrongdoing that leaves no room 
for account or expiation’.77 For writers like Bernstein, however, such limits to understanding 
arise from an impoverished moral language; indeed, Bernstein argues that it is ‘almost as if 
the language of evil has been dropped from contemporary moral and ethical discourse’.78 The 
individual, therefore, must look beyond relativist visions of morality and the limitations of 
language, beyond the misuse of evil as a ‘psychologically reassuring’ concept, to see it as a 
fundamentally human problem. The problem of evil, as Mary Midgley similarly argues, 
chiming with Arendt, is ‘our problem’: it represents a ‘pressing matter’ for humanity and 
illustrates the need to understand ‘the immediate sources of evil—not physical evil, but moral 
evil or sin—in human affairs’.79 For Midgley, ‘existentialism and cultural relativism’ has a 
‘destructive effect’ on morality, which is primarily ‘shaped communally’.80 Joan Copjec, in 
her adoption of Kantian moral philosophy in the edited collection Radical Evil, partly shares 
this argument: ‘In this era of relativism and deconstruction,’ she argues, 
 
when ethical thought has shrivelled under the force of theoretical 
commonplaces such as ‘We can never know in advance or fully control the 
effects of our acts’ or ‘What is right for us may not be right for someone 
else’, Kant’s universalism is a most welcome corrective. What is says, in 
effect, is ‘Be reasonable! Be practical!’81 
 
                                                                                                                
77 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, pp.273, 3. 
78 Richard J. Bernstein, Radical Evil: A Philosophical Investigation (2002); (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2006), p.2. Bernstein notes in the preface to The Abuse of Evil that the 
manuscript for Radical Evil was completed just eleven days before September 11, 2001. 
Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.v. 
79 Midgley, Wickedness, pp.1-2. 
80 Ibid., p.21. 
81 Joan Copjec, ‘Introduction: Evil in the Time of the Finite World’, Radical Evil (London: 
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Here, echoing the theological responses evident in the Book of Job, the individual is asked, in 
the face of evils that strip people of their vestiges of humanity, to remember the goodness, 
love and hope that unites them, over and above evil. 
In this sense, as John Kekes argues in Facing Evil, evil can be seen as a non-
relativistic problem: evil represents an affront to humanity and moral judgement; it represents 
any action that causes ‘undeserved harm’ to its victim(s).82 Seen in such ‘simple’ terms, a 
focus on evil mediates the ‘evasive stratagems’ inherent within ‘commitments to rights, 
psychologizing, and relativism’.83 For Kekes, the individual must engage in a delicate form 
of ‘moral criticism’ that seeks a more pluralist response to evil, a response that does not, 
despite its similarities, represent a form of relativism. Indeed, as Bernstein vehemently 
suggests in The Abuse of Evil: ‘Pluralism is not relativism. […] Engaged pluralism is the 
very opposite of relativism’.84 The pluralist, as Kekes explains, believes that there is ‘no such 
thing as a best life for human beings’, that ‘morality makes different types of claims of moral 
agents’ and that ‘human lives can’, therefore, ‘be good in many different ways’.85 Unlike the 
relativist, who sees ‘external moral criticism [as] a sign of dogmatism, intolerance, and a 
noxious intolerance that attempts to impose alien standards on unwilling subjects’, the 
pluralist acknowledges the importance of rational moral criticism, a form of criticism that 
acknowledges that ‘some cultures, societies, or individuals are morally better or worse than 
others’. Such a vision contextualises evil within an Aristotelian or Utilitarian vision of 
humanity where evil is treated as an affront to ‘the fundamental goal of morality: promoting 
human welfare’.86 Murdoch and her contemporaries offer such an ethically sensitive and 
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84 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.35. 
85 Kekes, Facing Evil, p.233. 
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morally astute response to individuals and moral problems.87 If the individual is to engage in 
ethical discourse, as Anscombe claims in ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1981), then the 
concepts of evil and goodness need to be present: ethical explanations of ‘how an unjust man 
is a bad man’ require not only ‘a sound philosophy of psychology’ but also ‘a positive 
account of justice as a “virtue”’.88 In ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), Murdoch famously 
argues that an improved moral sensibility requires a more developed moral vocabulary, a 
vocabulary in which ‘the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by philosophers, can once 
be made central’ (SG, p.45). Murdoch returned to this problem in her final, unpublished work 
of moral philosophy on Heidegger, whose ignorance to ‘the concepts of “love” and “loving”’ 
in the ‘general area of human existence’ was emblematic of her worry, expressed in the 
aforementioned essay, that morality ‘may turn out to be meaningless’ (SG, p.71).89 For 
Anscombe, Kekes and Murdoch, the moral thinker has to look beyond the oversimplifications 
of dualism and relativism, within a philosophical context that acknowledges the value of the 
individual and of ‘love’, and attend to the realities of evil.90   
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For all of these thinkers, including Arendt, Bernstein, Kekes, Midgley, Neiman and 
Murdoch, an examination of evil needs to be open to complexities and needs to look beyond 
simple single-minded concepts and etymologies.91 The secular (or philosophical) problem of 
evil requires a pluralist vision that acknowledges the values of goodness and love, the 
uniqueness of the individual, and their capacity for failure. Such a pluralist attitude to evil 
answers many of the complexities discussed above. The ambiguous definitions of evil, 
arising in part from its etymological circularities and difficulties, provide a place within 
which to clarify moral judgements through an improved vocabulary. An engagement with 
such dilemmas allows the individual, as in theological responses to evil, to question their 
place in the world and to see the value of endurance as well as moral criticism and 
judgement. Such a secular, philosophical, pluralist theodicy, which seeks to understand how 
people can commit evil, acknowledges the ambiguity of the individual and the complexity of 
the moral life.  
 
Literary Responses to Evil and the Ethical Turn 
For many thinkers, notably those who align themselves with the contemporary ethical turn 
within literary criticism, the novel (like other narrative artforms) is an inherently ambiguous 
medium aptly suited to exploring the complex realities of the moral life, including evil. For 
some psychologists, sociologists and theorists, however, this literary portrayal of evil is 
problematic. In Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty, Baumeister argues that literary 
studies of evil can be ‘worse than useless’ for the moral thinker because they are not 
concerned with ‘facts’ and because they disregard the ‘difference’ between fiction and 
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reality, between characters like Macbeth and criminals like Ted Bundy.92 Baumeister’s 
scientific preference for facts chimes with the structuralist, deconstructionist and post-
structuralist visions inimical to thinkers within the ethical turn; during the 1970s and 1980s, 
especially, David Parker argues, literary theory was hampered by its antipathy to ‘the 
narrative or dramatic presentation of moral questions, dilemmas, embodied in characters, 
imagined agents, lives, selves or subjectivities’.93 While these linguistic theorists could be 
morally astute, or ‘crypto-ethical’, Parker notes, they nevertheless neglected the moral value 
of art by denying the possibility for ‘literary meaning’ and by seeing the ‘inner life of moral 
deliberation’ as ‘a mere effect of language’.94 For thinkers that follow Martha Nussbaum’s 
1990 assertion that there has been a new ‘turn toward the ethical’, however, literature can be 
seen as a productive medium within which to explore the moral dilemmas about evil.95 
Indeed, as Murdoch argues in The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (1976), 
‘art is essentially more free’ than philosophy and theology for the very reason that it ‘enjoys 
the ambiguity of the whole man’ (FS, p.449); art, which is concerned with ‘the discovery of 
reality’, as she argues in ‘The Sublime and the Good’ (1959), ‘stuns us into a realisation of 
our supersensible destiny’ through its ‘unutterable particularity; and most particular and 
individual of all natural things is the mind of man’ (EM, p.215). This vision of art, like that 
shared by post-ethical-turn thinkers, allows the audience (or reader) to engage in a pluralist 
response to evil, a response that acknowledges the necessary ambiguity of rational moral 
discourse by calling on the arguments inherent within the theological problem of evil as well 
as the contemporary secular problem of evil. 
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The fascination with evil that appears within art, comics, film and literature, like the 
contemporary problem of evil, intersects with criminal, ethical and psychological discourses. 
The fact that the Ted Bundy film, Extremely Wicked, Shockingly Evil and Vile (2019), for 
example, has caused outrage, because Zac Efron appears to ‘glamourise’ Bundy’s depravity, 
shows the extent to which society has not understood the lesson that an attention to the 
depravity of the psychopath, as well as the terrorist and the evils Auschwitz, can teach: 
however attractive, kind, ordinary or sane a person may appear, they may be capable of 
evil.96 In this respect, evil presents a ‘paradox’, as Richard Paul Hamilton argues in the 
introduction to This Thing of Darkness: Perspectives on Evil and Human Wickedness (2004), 
because it is both ‘something alien and something familiar’.97 Importantly, the enjoyment, 
fascination and intrigue surrounding evil, and evil characters, as the allusion to The Tempest 
in the title of Hamilton’s text suggests, can be traced to Shakespeare’s plays and beyond. 
Literature of the ‘early seventeenth-century’, as Molly Smith argues in The Darker World 
Within: Evil in the Tragedies of Shakespeare and His Successors, is, like our own, marked by 
an ‘intense fascination with evil’.98 The moral dilemmas and paradoxes that arise when the 
artist engages with such evil, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, can be creatively and 
ethically productive for both the artist and the reader; ‘the story itself’, as Wayne Booth 
argues, ‘consists of the conflict of defensible moral or ethical stances; the action takes place 
both within the characters in the story and inside the mind of the reader, as he or she grapples 
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with conflicting choices that irresistibly demand the reader’s judgement’.99 Here, for Booth 
as for ethical-turn thinkers, narrative artworks, which can acknowledge the value of goodness 
as well as the challenging and complex realities of evil, are inherently moral both despite, and 
because of, their fascination with evil.  
The importance of such artistic engagements with evil and suffering are perhaps most 
clearly illustrated by responses to events such as World War I and II, the Holocaust, or 9/11. 
William Styron’s Sophie’s Choice (1979), Thomas Keneally’s Schindler’s Ark (1982), 
Jonathan Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close (2005), even Iris Murdoch’s 
The Good Apprentice (1985) or The Message to the Planet (1989) illustrate how writers use 
art, to quote Robin Silbergleid, ‘to grapple with the losses of the twentieth century’.100 
Frances White quotes Silbergleid and Daniel Schwarz in her discussion of Murdoch’s 
contribution to this literary genre.101 Literature that engages with the Holocaust is important 
because, as Silbergleid and Schwarts argue, respectively, it contributes to ‘an ever-widening 
cultural memory of the Holocaust’ and represents ‘the voice of those who all along believed 
in the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of literature’.102 The Holocaust narrative, as White 
argues, ‘acknowledges the reality of the Holocaust, becomes a means of mourning the six 
million dead and acts as a form of memorial that counteracts the evil design to expunge their 
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existence from human history’.103 These works thus contribute to a reversal of Arendt’s 
radical evil, discussed above, which rendered individuals inhuman and ‘superfluous’.104 As 
Schwarz argues, ‘writing about the Holocaust paradoxically restores the uniqueness of the 
human spirit by restoring the imagination to its proper place and breathes new life into the 
materiality of victims and survivors’.105 While engagements with such traumatic events can 
lead to controversy, as in the case of Safran Foer’s Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, 
which draws a link between the horrendous events of Dresden and 9/11, they nevertheless 
highlight how memorialization is a necessary aspect of the human response to evil. An 
attention to such horrendous evils allows the writer (and indeed society) to acknowledge the 
realities of evil and suffering, combat the limits of language and trauma, acknowledge the 
value of the human individual.  
In ‘Art is the Imitation of Nature’ (1978), Murdoch offers a similar appraisal of 
fictional literature, a medium that she elsewhere argued was fundamental not only for its 
inherently moral discourse but also for containing ‘indications of hope’ (TCHF, p.92), and 
draws specific attention to J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, which Orson Scott Card argues 
is a ‘textbook example of the problem of dealing with evil’ because it aptly explores the 
‘inward struggle between righteous and evil desires’.106 Murdoch argues that 
 
fictional literature has a special moral dimension because it is about people 
and, I venture to say, it is in however covert, unclear, secret, ambiguous a 
way, about the struggle between good and evil.  
For various reasons contemporary writers are often reluctant to 
admit this, and it is interesting to see that a work such as Tolkien’s Lord of 
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the Rings, which is very clearly about the struggle between good and evil, is 
a great popular success. (EM, p.255) 
 
Indeed, Lord of the Rings has been proven an even greater commercial and popular success 
for twenty-first century audiences: Peter Jackson’s huge film franchise (while offering an 
interpretation of Tolkien’s source material) highlighted, as Murdoch and Scott Card claim, 
the importance of morality, and the importance of fighting against evil and shadow in the 
name of goodness and humanity. While the ‘struggle’, indeed the battle, against the powers 
of evil in such fictional works appears to trump the value of goodness, the audience is 
nevertheless able to hold on to ‘a difficult hope’, a phrase that Marcus Fisher uses in The 
Time of the Angels to assert the ‘exhilarating’ truth of his brothers amoral vision; such 
overwhelming visions may be ‘awful’, dangerous or ‘terrible’, but narrative artworks 
illustrate how ‘the human spirit can respond’ positively to such challenges of evil (TA, 
p.193). Here, the reader can acknowledge the lessons of attention, endurance and hope 
inherent with the theological problem of evil; ‘Hope’, as Murdoch argued, ‘is said to be a 
virtue, a kind of attention which may illuminate the way to the good’ (TCHF, 234).  
Literary explorations of evil are fundamental, therefore, for both pre-ethical-turn and 
post-ethical-turn thinkers because they offer not only an acknowledgement of evil within the 
moral life but also a collection of ethical lessons. In Literature and Evil (1957), Georges 
Bataille argues that the ‘acute form of Evil’ expressed within literary works, such as those of 
Emily Bronte, Jean Genet and William Blake, has a ‘sovereign value’ for the reader that 
‘demands a “hypermorality”’, a ‘rigorous morality’ which can only result ‘from complicity in 
the knowledge of [e]vil’.107 Bataille argues, for example, that in Blake’s writings, ‘[e]vil 
attains a form of purity’:108 they combat how the ‘sleepy’ ‘commentary’ of language can 
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‘conceal’ ‘violent truth’; ‘The horror of his mythological poems is there to liberate us, not to 
flatten us’.109 Where Blake’s vision of evil presents the ‘intense communication’ necessary 
for a ‘rigorous morality’, Jean Genet’s hope for evil to have ‘a spiritual value’ means that 
such ‘intense’ ‘communication escapes him’.110 Murdoch questions Sartre’s ‘canonisation of 
Genet’ in Sartre: Romantic Rationalist (1953) on similar grounds: Sartre’s critique of Genet 
‘seems devoid of any understanding of the reality of evil, the nature of cruelty, the harm done 
to its victims, the crippling (for instance the narrowing) of the evil-doer’s mind, the spreading 
ripples of misery and further evil which evil acts produce’ (SRR, p.20).111 Here Murdoch 
implies the importance of a ‘rigorous morality’, to use Bataille’s phrase, that can 
acknowledge not only the presence of evil but also the damage it can cause. Colin McGinn’s 
Ethics, Evil, and Fiction (1997), which conforms to a post-ethical-turn vision of literature, 
similarly illustrates how the ‘moral psychology of evil’ within literary works provides crucial 
ethical lessons for the individual.112 For McGinn, like Murdoch, ‘literature is where moral 
thinking lives and breathes on the page’; it ‘deals supremely with the moral life as it is lived, 
and morality is woven into life at every point’.113 In his vision, the ‘evil character is moved 
by something more than the mere absence of virtue’ and thus ‘[i]f we want to understand and 
eradicate evil, we need to start by acknowledging how good it feels’.114 Here McGinn chimes 
with Kekes, for whom the inability to face evil is caused by the tendency ‘to ignore or under-
emphasize the importance of the evil-avoiding aspect’ of moral thought, which ‘is concerned 
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with enforcing the deep prohibitions that enable people to make good lives for 
themselves’.115 Unlike the over-emphasised ‘good-producing’ aspect of moral thought, which 
‘aims at providing the external and internal goods and developing the character traits needed 
to achieve them’, Kekes argues, people need to acknowledge their ‘potentialities for 
baseness’.116 Speaking of the dangers of censoring evil, Orson Scott Card argues that it is 
‘only when the fiction directly enacts evil instead of merely depicting it or even advocating it 
[… that] a free society [can claim the] right to protect itself at the expense of the freedom of 
the writer and reader to communicate as they wish’.117 For all of these thinkers, both pre-
ethical turn and post-ethical turn, the reader, like the moral pilgrim, needs to attend to the 
realities of evil; they need to accept the human capacity for moral failure and to acknowledge 
the benefits as well as the dangers of evil within the moral life.  
The hope of all studies of evil, be they theological, philosophical, historical, 
sociological or literary, is that in locating, examining, and interrogating evil one can 
understand either how to hinder the activity of evil in everyday life or to come to terms with 
the suffering that we all face, even of the kind of inexpressible or meaningless suffering that 
arises from horrific events like Auschwitz or the Lisbon earthquake. Where the theologian 
often asserts values of faith above the stagnating focus on evil, the philosopher seeks to find 
ways in which to account for the presence of evil within the moral life, or like the 
psychologist or sociologist, the mind. As Murdoch warns, however, such thinkers must not 
fall into the trap of being ‘cynics, reductivists, [or] relativists’; instead, they should be 
‘liberal-minded’ with ‘a sensitive empiricism and grasp of detail’ in order to ‘scan a wide 
vista of human life’ (MGM, p.297). Such a vision reveals the importance of ethical criticism 
within literature and beyond: ‘the best ethical criticism, ancient and modern,’ as Martha 
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Nussbaum argues, has always ‘insisted on the complexity and variety revealed to us in 
literature, appealing to that complexity to cast doubt on reductive theories’;118 literature, as 
Wayne Booth argues, is ‘resistant to simple ethical categories’.119 Depending on narrative 
styles and the arrangement of plot, literature can allow one to examine an evil character’s 
motives, their effect on others and their definition by those around them; it can also, 
moreover, provide a crucial place within which to memorialize the damage caused by 
suffering and highlight the evil, whether natural or human, that leads to it. Seen within the 
context of its ability to depict the realities of evil, the value of language and of ‘judicious 
discrimination’, literature deconstructs the kind of strict absolutist moral thinking that 
Bernstein criticises in Radical Evil and The Abuse of Evil. For him, the ambiguity of the word 
evil makes it fodder for cultural or socio-political abuse where its complex meanings are 
bypassed to ‘obscure complex issues, block inquiry, and stifle public debate’.120 The 
complexities and circularities of evil, however, can arguably be used to both inform, and 
provide a route out of, such contemporary impoverished moral thinking: a re-adoption of the 
complex roots of the word evil, and the controversial arguments it generates for linguists, 
theologians, philosophers, historians, sociologists and creative writers, engenders a dialectical 
acceptance of the tension between these meanings, thus fuelling a better understanding of the 
complexity of the moral life and the challenges of evil. 
 
  
                                                                                                                
118 Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Introduction: Form and Content, Philosophy and Literature’, to 
Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp.3-53, p.22. 
119 Wayne Booth, ‘Why Ethical Criticism Can Never Be Simple’, p.26. 
120 Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil, p.121. 
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Chapter Two 
Evil and the God of Love: the Book of Job, Dame Julian of Norwich and Simone Weil  
 
Art can rarely, but with authority, show how we learn from pain, swept by the 
violence of divine grace toward an unwilling wisdom, as described in the first 
chorus of the Agamemnon. 
Iris Murdoch.1 
 
 
Relentless necessity, misery, distress, the crushing burden of poverty and of 
exhausting labour, cruelty, torture, violent death, constraint, terror, disease—all 
of this is but the divine love. It is God who out of love withdraws from us so that 
we can love him. 
Simone Weil.2 
 
 
This chapter explores Iris Murdoch’s engagement with the theological problem of evil. 
Throughout her fiction, Murdoch engaged, both directly and indirectly, with this fundamental 
human dilemma, where evil is seen not as a problem to be resolved, but as an experience to 
acknowledge. In The Time of the Angels, The Nice and the Good and A Fairly Honourable 
Defeat, she alludes to the moral lessons inherent in the Book of Job, the earliest and perhaps 
most austere engagement with the problem of evil, a text that reveals the dangers of self-
righteousness and egotism. Such a moral vision, which resonates with contemporary thinkers 
such as Paul Ricoeur, Susan Neiman and Mark Larrimore, asserts the importance of moral 
autonomy: accepting the realities of evil allows individuals to see their imperfections and, by 
extension, understand their perfectibility and capacity for goodness. Murdoch’s picture of 
morality and her response to the problem of evil draws on the writings of Simone Weil and 
                                                                                                                
1 Iris Murdoch, The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (1977), EM, pp.386-
463, p.458.  
2 Simone Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil (1956), trans. by Arthur Wills, vol. 2 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1976), p.401. 
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Dame Julian of Norwich, both of whom present an austere response to the problem of evil, a 
response where a transcendent absolute goodness retains power over and above evil but 
allows evil to remain a fundamental experience in the moral life. Their theodicies rationalise 
the pain caused by human wickedness (evil) and natural disasters (suffering) in the context of 
God’s divine love. Murdoch’s annotations to Weil’s texts reveal her antipathy to such an 
austere vision of the moral life. The influence of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon on Weil’s writings, 
however, helps illustrate the necessity of enduring the suffering that evil causes and, in so 
doing, echoes the ‘greater good’ theodicy offered by John Hick, whose perfectionist picture 
of morality resonates with Murdoch’s moral philosophy. In The Unicorn, Murdoch explores 
the complexities of Weil’s austere theodicy, illustrating the importance of enduring the 
meaninglessness of suffering in the context of an appreciation of God’s goodness, perfection 
and love. With its meditation on the ‘ambivalence of unconditional love’,3 The Message to 
the Planet not only proves Murdoch’s enduring fascination with Dame Julian’s and Weil’s 
writings but also illustrates the extent to which Murdoch’s ambiguous vision of love chimes 
with the problem of evil.4 Juxtaposing an experience of the problem of evil with the problem 
                                                                                                                
3 Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch, Writers and their Work Series (Liverpool: University Press, 
2019), p.44. 
4 While currently available resources do not indicate that Weil read or was influenced by 
Dame Julian of Norwich, they nevertheless share a concern for moral vision, for a cultivated, 
loving religiously-informed attention to the other. For James Charlton, the form of attention 
cultivated by Julian shares with Weil a concern for ‘the kenotic lifestyle’ (James Charlton, 
Non-dualism in Eckhart, Julian of Norwich and Traherne: a theopoetic reflection [London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013], p.101.), in which the individual evinces a ‘practice of self-
reduction in order to allow space and time for the care of the “the other”’ (Ibid., p.2). 
According to Weil, Charlton argues, ‘the main barrier to meditative experience to 
transformation is not “sin” but distraction’, an inattention to ‘reality’ (Ibid., p.140). Julian’s 
writings are saturated with discourses of vision, with her sixteen mystical ‘shewings’ 
comprising Revelations of Divine Love. Chief among her revelations is an awareness that the 
individual attends to their faults: ‘our courteous Lord let [this revelation] rest there […] until 
he gave me the grace and will to attend. And here I was taught that thought we be lifted high 
into contemplation by the special gift of our Lord, yet it behoveth us therewith to have 
knowing and sight of our sin and our feebleness.’ Dame Julian of Norwich, Revelations of 
Divine Love, trans. by James Walsh (1961); (Wheathampstead: Anthony Clarke Books, 
1973), p.198; my italics.  
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of love, The Message to the Planet offers an austere, mystical theodicy that highlights the 
value of acknowledging the presence of evil within the context of love and goodness.  
 
Murdoch’s Theological Response to the Problem of Evil 
The problem of evil, as Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams summarize, is 
an interrogation of ‘how theism can be true in view of the existence of evils’; it arises when a 
theist asks how God could allow suffering within his world.5 Charles Taliaferro notes that 
this question, or problem, has two solutions: the deductive or the probabilistic. For the 
religious sceptic, if God is ‘all-knowing and all-powerful and all-good,’ it follows that He 
should not allow the existence of evil; His failure to do so allows the sceptic to deduce that 
‘God does not exist’.6 Alternatively, a ‘more qualified anti-theistic argument grants that it is 
possible that an all-good God may permit some evil’.7 Unlike the former, this ‘probabilistic 
or inductive’ response to the problem of evil does not necessitate the removal of God.8 
Rather, it is ‘grounded in estimates of the likely magnitude of evil and estimations of what an 
all-good being would tolerate’.9 In the introduction to The Problem of Evil: A Reader, Mark 
Larrimore suggests that most thinkers (both intentionally and unintentionally) evince a 
probabilistic response to the problem of evil, a response that concerns itself less with the 
question of ‘belief’ or ‘disbelief’ and, instead, provides ‘stimuli for religious change’ and a 
space within which to reflect on the human causes of evil.10 
                                                                                                                
5 Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, ‘Introduction: Problems of Evil’, 
The Problem of Evil (Oxford: University Press, 1994), pp.1-24, p.3. 
6 Charles Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 
Ltd., 1998), p.299. 
7 Taliaferro, Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, p.299. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Mark Larrimore, ‘Introduction: Responding to Evils’, in The Problem of Evil: A Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), pp.xiv-xxx, p.xiv. 
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Murdoch engages both directly and indirectly with these theological problems in her 
philosophy and her fiction. While many of her antagonists offer a deductive vision of the 
problem of evil, where the existence of evil is called upon to disprove the existence of God, 
other characters engage in a probabilistic vision of the problem of evil, where the existence of 
an absolute good is not darkened by the inherent contingency and suffering of the world. In 
The Time of the Angels (1966), for example, Carel Fisher takes the ‘scattered’ nature of the 
‘spiritual world’, the existence of ‘Chaos’ and suffering and the lack of a unifying principle 
of goodness in the world as evidence that God is ‘dead’ (TA, p.170). Unlike Carel, Marcus 
Vallar in The Message to the Planet (1989) presents a probabilistic response to the problem 
of evil: an acceptance of the extreme evil and suffering of the Holocaust necessitates, he 
suggests, the existence of ‘a God that is no God. We must adore emptiness and the extremity 
of pain. […] We must stand together under that sign of evil and pain’ (MP, p.165). The two 
theodicies offered by Carel and Marcus in response to evil, pain and suffering are, 
respectively, morally limiting and morally illuminating. The ‘totally ruthless unshakeable 
evil’ that ‘so many [people were] confronted with’ during the twentieth century, as Murdoch 
acknowledges in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, has the capacity to ‘break hearts, breed 
weary cynicism, weaken the sense of absolute; and also of course reveal a small number of 
the hero saints of our time’ (MGM, p.120). On the one hand, Carel’s ‘cynic[al]’ theodicy 
‘weaken[s]’ the existence of God (or the ‘absolute’) and leaves him morally adrift, unable to 
differentiate between good or evil. On the other hand, Marcus’s austere, perhaps mystical, 
response to the problem of evil illustrates that where many people have ‘lost faith because of 
suffering or evil,’ as Larrimore argues, ‘others have found their way deeper into religious 
traditions, or found their way from one religious tradition to another’.11 Contemporary 
‘twentieth-century horrors’ such as the Holocaust may illustrate, as Neiman suggests, how 
                                                                                                                
11 Larrimore, ‘Introduction: Responding to Evils’, p.xiv. 
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‘we lack the conceptual resources to do more than bear witness’ to evil,12 yet within such 
secular responses to the problem of evil the individual engages with the fundamental 
‘challenge’ of evil.13 
Murdoch’s confronts this ‘challenge’, or problem, of evil within her moral philosophy 
where, in a vision more akin to Marcus Vallar’s, she moves beyond a Judaeo-Christian God 
towards a more Platonic vision of an absolute Form of Good. In her moral philosophy, the 
‘impersonality’ of goodness and the presence of the Good as an Ideal that is ‘essentially 
beyond us’ (MGM, p.509) allows for far greater autonomy than the determinism and 
punishment inherent in a traditional Augustinian conception of Christian morality.14 Niklas 
Fosberg argues that this perfectionist vision of morality is, moreover, the ‘opposite’ of a 
standard ‘other-worldly’ Platonism that ‘posits a perfect knowledge of perfect things’.15 
Rather, Murdoch’s perfectionism, which draws not only on Plato but also on Kant, represents 
‘a recognition of, and depends entirely upon, human imperfection’: for her, Fosberg explains, 
‘we must, or should, work on ourselves through an endless process of refinement’, a process 
that ‘requires (‘logically’ as it were) that we are not already arrived at our final destination – 
and we never shall be’.16 Arguably, Murdoch’s fictional exploration of this perfectionist 
                                                                                                                
12 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.238. 
13 Ricoeur, ‘Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology’, p.635. 
14 In ‘A New Conception of Original Sin?’, Niklas Fosberg also draws attention to how 
Murdoch’s concept of original sin exceeds the ‘one-sided focus on “agents” doing “actions”’ 
that we have inherited from existentialism. ‘According to Murdoch,’ he explains that, ‘our 
meager [moral-philosophical] vocabulary has contributed to a one-sided focus on actions and 
judgments, and we arrange things such as ethics, morals, rationality, law, freedom, guilt, 
blame, praise, punishment, etc. in accordance with wordings that fall far short of the reality’. 
This limited moral vocabulary, Murdoch believes, leads to ‘[m]oral philosophy, and indeed 
morals, [being] undefended against an irresponsible and undirected self-assertion which goes 
easily hand in hand with some brand of pseudo-scientific determinism. An unexamined sense 
of the strength of the machine [of human behaviour] is combined with an illusion of leaping 
out of it’ (SG, p.47). See Niklas Fosberg, ‘A New Conception of Original Sin?’, The 
Heythrop Journal, 56:2 (2015): 272-84 (p.278).  
15 Fosberg, ‘A New Conception of Original Sin?’, p.282. 
16 Ibid. 
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vision of morality, with its acknowledgement of human frailty, in The Time of the Angels, 
The Nice and the Good (1968), and A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970),  is indebted to her 
engagement with the Book of Job, a theological text that illustrates the importance of moving 
beyond the human capacity for egotism, self-righteousness and hubris. 
 
Iris Murdoch’s Perfectionist Theodicy 
Written contemporaneously with The Time of the Angels, Murdoch’s most explicit 
philosophical engagement with the problem of evil occurs in ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969). 
With its central concern about the failure of modern ‘terminology’ in moral philosophy and 
the problems caused by the ‘disappearance’ of God (by ‘the disappearance of a permanent 
background to human activity’ [SG, p.52]), this essay reveals a ‘tension between the denial of 
God and a desire for Him’, a tension that, as Anne Rowe argues, ‘underlies [Murdoch’s] 
theological expression’.17 For Murdoch, Rowe continues, ‘the place of God should be filled 
by “a kind of moral philosophy or even neo-theology, which would explain fundamental 
things about the human soul and the human being” (TCHF, p.21)’.18 Among these 
‘fundamental things’ are the ‘central characteristics’ associated with God, ‘a single perfect 
transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention’, and ‘religious 
techniques’, such as prayer (SG, pp.53-4; Murdoch’s italics). While Murdoch repeatedly 
attested the importance of religious discourse to morality, she nevertheless worried, as 
Conradi notes, that her philosophy ‘always turn[ed] into theology’, a fact that she believed 
was made all the more ‘awkward for me as I don’t believe in God’ (IML, p.456). This 
dilemma about her interdisciplinary approach and her disbelief in God is fundamental to the 
                                                                                                                
17 Anne Rowe, ‘“The Dream that Does Not Cease to Haunt Us”: Iris Murdoch’s Holiness’, in 
Iris Murdoch and Morality, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), pp.141-55, p.141. 
18 Rowe, ‘“The Dream that Does Not Cease to Haunt Us”: Iris Murdoch’s Holiness’, p.142. 
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problem of evil. Indeed, intuiting contemporary responses to the problem of evil, Murdoch 
goes on to suggest that ‘[i]f one does not believe in a personal God there is no “problem” of 
evil, but there is the almost insuperable difficulty of looking properly at evil and human 
suffering’ (SG, p.71). On the one hand, this conjecture adopts a deductive response to the 
problem of evil that necessitates disbelief in God. On the other hand, it chimes with a 
probabilistic response, where the existence of an absolute, divine being, such as the Judaeo-
Christian God or a more Platonic Form of Good, is not removed but problematized by the 
challenge of evil. This vision of morality echoes the pictures of evil inherent in Saint 
Augustine’s and Plato’s writings, for whom evil is, respectively, either evidence of original 
sin or of the continuum of morality ‘within which we are aware of truth and falsehood, 
illusion and reality, good and evil’ (MGM, p.250). 
Murdoch’s later critique of original sin in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, for 
which she draws on Kant’s writings, echoes Paul Ricoeur’s discussion of the problem of evil 
and his criticism of Augustine’s picture of evil. Augustine, Ricoeur argues,   
 
draws from [his] moral vision of evil the conclusion that […] all evil is either 
[…] sin or pain considered as punishment. This purely moral vision of evil 
leads in turn to a penal vision of history. No soul is unjustly thrown into 
misfortune. Only divine grace may interrupt the curse of punishment.19 
 
Here, Augustine’s picture of evil echoes Murdoch’s concerns about original sin, which she 
suggests could be defined as a ‘deterministic myth’ that ‘conceal[s] change and obliterat[es] 
freedom’ (MGM, p.103). For Ricoeur, such a vision of original sin obstructs the fundamental 
need to confront the ‘challenge’ of evil and suffering: ‘Besides the conceptual inconsistency’ 
indicated by Augustine’s picture, he argues, ‘it leaves unanswered the protest of unjust 
                                                                                                                
19 Paul Ricoeur, ‘Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology’, trans. David Pellauer, 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 53:4 (Dec., 1985): 635-648 (pp.639-40). 
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suffering, by condemning it to silence in the name of a massive indictment of the whole 
community of humanity’.20 This interpretation of Augustinian evil aligns with Kant’s critique 
of Christian morality in Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1973): because of sin, 
because of the individual’s ‘infinite guilt’, he suggests, ‘all mankind must look forward to 
endless punishment and exclusion from the kingdom of God’.21 For Kant, as Murdoch 
illustrates in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, this results in a dilemma that partly echoes 
the problem of evil: ‘if we had certain knowledge of God we would lose our freedom’ 
(MGM, p.446), but ‘if we could see God we would be his puppets’ (MGM, p.448). Murdoch 
agrees with Kant’s solution to this dilemma and his resulting vision of original sin which, 
instead of supporting a tension between atheism or theism, freedom or determinism, proposes 
that the individual is ‘seduced into evil’ and, therefore, is ‘not basically corrupt but capable of 
improvement’ (MGM, p.447). Here, Augustine’s fallen picture of the individual, sunk in a 
‘deterministic myth’ of original sin (MGM, p.103), is replaced by a perfectionist vision of 
morality, where the individual is freely capable of both good and evil. 
Murdoch’s vision of the individual’s capacity for moral improvement, of their 
continuous ‘moral pilgrimage’, thus derives not only from Kant but also from Plato; her 
‘Godless theology’, as Maria Antonaccio suggests, ‘remains suspended between Kant and 
Plato’, between an awareness of our imperfection and our capacity to be drawn to a Platonic 
                                                                                                                
20 Ricoeur, ‘Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology’, p.640. 
21 Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1785), trans. Theodore M. 
Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), p.66. Kant’s italics. 
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Absolute.22 Murdoch elucidates this moral vision at various points in Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals: 
 
That we can and do love Good and are drawn towards it is something that we 
have to learn from our experience, as we move all the time in the continuum 
between good and bad. (MGM, p.507) 
 
A picture of humanity must portray its fallen nature. We must keep 
constantly in view the distance between good and evil, and the potential 
extremity of evil. We are ineluctably imperfect, goodness is not a 
continuously active organic part of our purposes and wishes. However good 
life is, it includes moral failures. (MGM, p.509) 
 
Within this picture of morality, as many of the characters within Murdoch’s novels learn, evil 
and sin can be seen as a necessary experience within the moral life. In providing such a 
vision of morality, Murdoch chimes with modern commentators, such as Larrimore, for 
whom the problem of evil allows the individual to understand that  
 
Evil is a practical problem. Even the person who is a witness to evils finds 
her sense of agency challenged. In explaining or consoling, narrating or 
exorcising, praying or raging, we reassert human agency in the face of the 
                                                                                                                
22 Maria Antonaccio’s and Niklas Fosberg’s arguments here combined because, in spite of 
their differences, they offer an analogous picture of Murdochian morality, with its Kantian 
and Platonic influences. Plato, Antonaccio argues, allows Murdoch to affirm that ‘the moral 
life takes place within the continuum of consciousness’, and, ‘in the end, [she] parts with 
Kant’ because, as Murdoch argues, he ‘denied that [desire] could be a moral motive’ (MGM, 
p.331). ‘If at this point’, Murdoch argues, ‘we (I) part with Kant, it is in the interests of a 
more realistic and flexible account of moral progress, as a purification and reorientation of 
desire.’ (MGM, p.331) Yet, as Fosberg’s argument illustrates, the ‘other-worldly’ vision of 
Platonic perfectionism is tempered by Murdoch’s adoption of Kant, whose moral vision in 
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone highlights the realities of human imperfection. 
Maria Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
p.119; and Fosberg, ‘A New Conception of Original Sin?’, pp.2, 7. 
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apparent malevolence or indifference of the cosmos – or our human 
fellows.23 
 
Here Larrimore highlights how ‘the challenge of evil’ allows the individual, as Ricoeur 
argues, to ‘think differently’ about their moral frailties, to interrogate their human faults and, 
indeed, as Murdoch argues in ‘On “God” and “Good”, to ‘[look] properly at evil and human 
suffering’ (SG, p.71). The individual’s perfectionist moral experience requires an 
acknowledgement of the evils, moral frailties, or weaknesses, that might allow him, or her, to 
stray from the good.  
 
Human Frailty and the Sin of Pride in the Book of Job 
Murdoch’s enduring engagement with the problem of evil, which appears in her fiction in 
both religious and secular forms, was arguably formed during the 1960s when she 
contributed to a philosophical discussion of the Book of Job and began to draw on its themes 
in her novels, including The Time of the Angels, The Nice and the Good, and A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat.24 In Iris Murdoch: A Life, Conradi reveals Murdoch’s deep affinity with 
this Old Testament text, noting her contribution to ‘Job: Prophet of Modern Nihilism’, the 
                                                                                                                
23 Larrimore, ‘Introduction: Responding to Evils’, p.xiv. 
24 Written contemporaneously with The Time of the Angels (1966), Bruno’s Dream (1969) 
engages with similarly Jobian complaints: Bruno debates the existence and power of God, 
and Miles questions the compatibility of love, suffering and death. At one point in the novel, 
Miles even partly echoes Job’s madness, reflecting ‘I scarcely make sense of myself at all, I 
babble, I rave’ (BD, p.177). Some of her philosophy, which will be discussed below, was also 
published contemporaneously with these novels: ‘On “God” and “Good”’ was first published 
in The Anatomy of Knowledge, ed. by Marjorie Grene (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1969); a year later, it was published as part of The Sovereignty of Good (1970). 
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topic considered by the Philosophical Society at Trinity College, Dublin, in October 1964.25 
Conradi explains that Murdoch was ‘interested to find how strongly she felt against Job and 
pro God, though finding God’s reply to Job questioning his sufferings magnificently 
irrelevant’ (IML, p.447 [sic.]). Though Murdoch’s exact responses to this topic are 
unavailable, her journals illustrate that the themes of The Time of the Angels were developed 
contemporaneously with the talk at Trinity College, Dublin.26 Carel Fisher, for example, 
argues that ‘only [… the] author of the Book of Job understood’ that there is no ‘sense and 
justice’ in the world, that there is no ‘Goodness […] in the centre of things radiating its 
pattern.’ Instead, Carel suggests, there is ‘only power and the marvel of power, there is only 
chance and terror of chance. And if there is only this there is no God, and the single Good of 
the philosophers is an illusion and a fake’ (TA, p.170). By comparison with the vision 
                                                                                                                
25 It is unclear if Murdoch simply ‘respon[ded]’ to a paper titled ‘Job: Prophet of Modern 
Nihilism’, gave a pre-prepared ‘talk’ on the topic, or ‘address[ed]’ the Philosophical Society 
at Trinity College, Dublin, with her paper of the same name. Valerie Purton notes that 
Murdoch ‘talks on “Job: Prophet of Modern Nihilism”’ (IMC, p.67); Conradi notes that 
Murdoch ‘address[ed] the ‘illustrious’ [society … with] her topic “Job: Prophet of Modern 
Nihilism”’ (IML, p.447). A contemporary review published in Trinity News notes that S. M. 
Warner gave an ‘inaugural paper’: ‘His topic was “Job: Prophet of Modern Nihilism,” and he 
tied together Job, existentialism and modern literature to make his point. Job, he said, was an 
existentialist who, like Sartre, felt himself alone against a hostile God’. Later, the (unknown) 
author notes that ‘Iris Murdoch made two penetrating statements. Firstly, that contemporary 
man’s anxiety comes from the power to destroy, conflicting with the belief that he should be 
able to control it, and, secondly, that man cannot be free because he has to choose within this 
universe and this makes him neither a god nor a weakling. She said that the artist to-day was 
either over-relaxed—like Burroughts and Rauschenberg—or over-rigid like Sartre. The latter 
approach was better because it often reached the heart of life. Finally, she disagreed with the 
President, being on Jahweh’s side against Job, and seeing the author of the book as a great 
moralist as well as a great artist’. Unknown Author, ‘Nihilists at Phil: Iris Murdoch makes 
History’, Trinity News (A Dublin University Weekly), 5 Nov 1964. Accessed from 
<http://www.trinitynewsarchive.ie/pdf/12-01.pdf> [16/4/15]. 
26 Both Valerie Purton and Peter J. Conradi suggest that Murdoch began writing The Time of 
the Angels around April 1965 (see IMC, pp.97-9 and IML, p.467). Some of the ideas for the 
novel, however, can be seen in Murdoch’s diary entries between September and October 
1964. On September 30th 1964, for example, foreshadowing a phrase she would give to Carel 
Fisher (see TA, p.171), she writes: ‘Cause + effect: only in the infliction of pain the effect so 
contain in the cause as to convince of the reality of the victim’. Later, she ponders, ‘Can one 
draw strength from a demon [or devil]? More Sinful’. Iris Murdoch, ‘Journal No. 10: Feb 
1964-18 Mar 1970’ (Unpublished), in the Iris Murdoch Archive, KUAS202/1/10, pp.2-3. 
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explored in The Time of the Angels, Murdoch’s response to ‘Job: Prophet of Modern 
Nihilism’ that ‘[y]ou suffer, you are good. So what?” (IML, p.447) may seem both surprising 
and unsurprising, both austere and charitable. Her response partly chimes with the ideas 
voiced by Carel Fisher, for whom the Book of Job represents the lack of ‘sense and justice’ in 
the world. However, in her letter (dated 25 Oct 1964) to David Morgan (which Conradi 
quotes in Iris Murdoch: A Life), she asserts that the weakness of Job’s ‘complaints’ led her to 
believe that God was not simply ‘a witless old tyrant’ (LP, p.282-3). She thus saw that the 
Book of Job was not a straightforward display, to quote Carel, of ‘the marvel of [divine] 
power’ and the ‘terror of chance’, but an examination of Job’s moral frailty, his self-
righteousness and hubris (or excess pride). 
Throughout Murdoch’s oeuvre, antagonists and protagonists alike reveal the moral 
blindness and false sense of power occasioned by hubris and self-righteousness. Conradi’s 
aptly titled chapter in The Saint and The Artist, ‘Self-Sufficiency’, contrasts The Time of the 
Angels and The Nice and the Good. Where Carel illustrates the ‘sin [of] spiritual pride’ (SA, 
p.178), Kate Gray in The Nice and the Good illustrates the ‘virtue[s] of sadodovolnost’ (SA, 
p.189), a phrase (translated as self-sufficiency or self-esteem), which Conradi takes from 
John Bayley’s Tolstoy and the Novel, to indicate that ‘imperfect’ characters can be ‘agent[s] 
of light’ (SA, p.190).27 Arguably, John Ducane in The Nice and the Good, who undergoes a 
similarly Jobian experience of hubris and self-righteousness, represents such an ‘imperfect’ 
character. In a ‘half-guilty, half-annoyed way’, Ducane acknowledges his kinship with ‘the 
pride of judges’: he admits feeling ‘good enough, [even] humble enough, to be a judge’ yet 
believes that ‘no human being is worthy to be a judge’ (NG, p.74). Here, ‘though this was not 
                                                                                                                
27 In one of the few interviews attended by both Iris Murdoch and her husband, John Bayley, 
he mentions (after hearing Peter Conradi’s paper on ‘Iris Murdoch and Dostoyevsky’) that 
Murdoch’s writing lacks a sense of her ‘personality’, a trait that can be valued because, 
‘where all novelists are concerned, self-satisfaction is the great enemy’ (TCHF, p.171; my 
italics). 
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entirely clear in his mind’, the narrator suggests that Ducane experiences ‘one of the great 
paradoxes of morality, namely that in order to […] become good it may be necessary to think 
about virtue; although unreflective simple people may achieve a thoughtless excellence’ (NG, 
p.75). Reading the later novel, A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970), in the light of The Nice 
and The Good, the ostensibly good character Rupert Foster could also be said to exhibit this 
kind of ‘thoughtless excellence’, a kind of ‘surreptitious [moral] complacency’ (NG, p.75) or 
self-sufficiency. 
For Peter J. Conradi, Murdoch’s relationship with Elias Canetti between 1952-56 not 
only had an enduring impact on Murdoch’s fiction, notably A Fairly Honourable Defeat, but 
also may have motivated her interest in the Book of Job. Conradi poignantly notes that 
 
[h]er assertion that the structure of good literary works is to do with “erotic 
mysteries and deep, dark struggled between good and evil” owes much to 
these years. As Kathleen Raine accurately observed, Canetti’s quarrel with 
God is an ancient Jewish tradition going back as far as the Book of Job. 
Iris’s quarrel with Canetti reflects that tradition; the Hebrew 
“deuteragonist” was Satan. Canetti acts deuteragonist in many of 
Murdoch’s novels. (IML, p.373-4) 
 
For Conradi, the antagonist of A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Julius King, figures as such a 
‘deuteragonist’ and his actions allude ‘distantly to Satan’s dispute with God in the Book of 
Job about the existence of one righteous man’ (IML, p.373-4). Alternatively, like Ducane in 
The Nice and the Good, Rupert echoes the self-righteousness of Job, who acknowledges that 
‘my judgment was as a robe and a diadem’ (29:14), a perspective that, as the narrator 
confirms, leads him to ‘justif[y] himself’ (Job 32:1-2). Julius King confirms that Rupert was 
more concerned with ‘a big imposing good-Rupert image’ (FHD, p.420) than leading a 
‘truthful’, ‘open and orderly’ moral life (FHD, p.217). Julius believes, therefore, that 
Rupert’s death was not simply the result of ‘drowning’ in his swimming pool (FHD, p.420), 
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by ‘misadventure’ or suicide ‘with a large dose of sleeping pills and alcohol in his body’ 
(FHD, p.418), but of ‘vanity’ (FHD, p.420). He fails, unlike Ducane, to acknowledge the 
power of his inner ‘devil of pride’ (NG, p.75). While one may be powerless to stop the evils 
within others and should remain powerless to judge others, including God, for their ostensible 
cruelty, it is fundamental to accept and learn from one’s own inner devils, or evil tendencies.  
Murdoch’s awareness of the importance of interrogating these moral frailties, such as 
egotism, fantasy, hubris and self-righteousness, reveals her affinity with a broad range of 
theological thinkers, including not only the author of the Book of Job, but also William 
Blake, Simone Weil and, as I will go on to argue later, Dame Julian of Norwich. Indeed, for 
Blake, Kathleen Raine argues, Job is in an ‘unawakened’ state of ‘spiritual forgetfulness’ and 
is, in this respect, illustrative of ‘the supreme sin [that] sets the human ego above God’: self-
righteousness.28 Individuals, like Job, need to be tested and to use their knowledge of the 
realities of evil to ‘cleanse’ the ‘doors of perception’, as Blake argues, to see beyond the 
‘narrow chinks’ of their self-righteous vision.29 For Blake, Raine explains, 
 
the greater the righteousness the greater the spiritual danger, because 
whereas the sinner knows his own shortcomings and in this very recognition 
acknowledges God, the morally virtuous man is self-sufficient and likely to 
become ever more firmly entrenched in his own ego. Of all kinds of ego the 
righteous ego is the most perilous, because so convincing both to its 
possessor and to others.30 
 
                                                                                                                
28 Kathleen Raine, The Human Face of God: William Blake and the Book of Job (Hampshire: 
Thames and Hudson, 1982), p.39. 
29 The protagonist in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell learns, after dining with the Prophets 
Isiah and Ezekiel, that ‘If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to 
man as it is, infinite. / For man has closed himself up till he sees all things thro’ narrow 
chinks of his cavern’. See William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. 
Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.66-82, p.75, plate 14, line 115-6. 
30 Raine, The Human Face of God, pp.39-40. 
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Murdoch’s moral vision chimes with this critique of self-righteousness and egoism. For her, 
such solipsistic, self-sufficient ways of life should be mediated through a process ‘unselfing’, 
a concept that she relates to Simone Weil’s concept of ‘décrēation’, in which the individual 
‘repect[fully]’ attends to that which is around them and, with notable echoes of Blake, 
‘cleans[es] the mind of selfish preoccupation’ (MGM, p.245). For such thinkers, including 
Murdoch, religious ideas or techniques, such as attention, prayer and grace, all highlight the 
importance of enduring that which eludes our understanding, of attending to our human 
frailties and of ‘purif[ying] and reorientat[ing] an energy which is naturally selfish’ (SG, 
p.53). 
In The Nice and the Good, Ducane’s awareness of the value of this spiritual lesson is 
revealed when he reflects on Radeechy’s depravity evil, a reflection that leads him to a 
Jobian moral epiphany in the company of Judy McGrath, who took part in his magic rituals in 
a disused air raid shelter and was complicit in her husband’s, Peter McGrath’s, blackmailing 
of Radeechy. Unlike the ‘small powers, graceless and bedraggled’ (NG, p.214) that drove 
Radeechy, Ducane acknowledges his own capacity for evil: ‘could not evil damn a man’, he 
wonders,  
 
was there not blackness enough to kill a human soul? It is in me, thought 
Ducane […]. The evil is in me. There are demons and powers outside us, 
Radeechy played with them, but they are pygmy things. The great evil, the 
real evil, is inside myself. It is I who am Lucifer. With this there came a 
rush of darkness within him which was like fresh air. (NG, p.214) 
 
With this ‘rush of darkness’, Ducane acknowledges the substantive, powerful nature of evil, 
and Murdoch’s use of the simile ‘like fresh air’ suggests that his knowledge may be morally 
important and morally rejuvenating. Ducane’s fully-formed epiphany surfaces later when 
Judy McGrath attempts to seduce him and he feels a seductive ‘onrush of black beatitude’ 
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(NG, p.251). His ‘fantasy fingers stroked her body with a feathery creative touch’ but the 
‘faint smell […] mingled of sweat and cosmetics’ makes him recall the ‘grey tumbled heap of 
dead pigeons’ used in Radeechy’s depraved magic rituals. Ducane, seeing Radeechy’s 
handwriting on Judy’s back, feels a ‘Luciferian lightness’ and acknowledges the moral value 
of his earlier epiphany: 
 
I am the perfect whited sepulchre, Ducane thought. I’ve fiddled and 
compromised with two women […]. I am the cause that evil is in a man like 
McGrath. I cannot pity the wretched or bring hope or comfort to the 
damned. I cannot feel compassion for those over whom I imagine myself to 
be set as a judge. I cannot even take this girl in my arms […] because of my 
own conception of myself as spotless: my quaint idea of myself as good, 
which seems to go on being with me, however rottenly I behave. (NG, 
p.251) 
 
Here, Ducane acknowledges his own evil tendencies and understands, unlike Rupert in A 
Fairly Honourable Defeat, that his high-minded moral picture of himself is hubristic: he 
acknowledges that ‘the cause’ of the kind of evil he has questioned in others exists within 
himself. Ducane’s Jobian epiphany in The Nice and the Good highlights the importance of 
acknowledging the crucial role that evil plays in the moral life. While evil can outshine the 
good, an awareness of it can reveal the human propensity for moral failure. Here, the 
operation of evil does not necessarily involve the kind of suffering questioned within the 
problem of evil, or even by Job himself; instead, it can occasion great joy, it can, as for 
Ducane, provide a ‘rush of darkness […] like fresh air’ (NG, p.214).  
 
Simone Weil’s Austere Theodicy  
For Murdoch, Weil’s response to the problem of evil, where divine love and suffering are 
indelibly linked, and God is implicated in the presence of evil, results in an austere, violent, 
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even what has been termed as a ‘repellent’, vision of morality. Weil’s austere theodicy 
resonates with contemporary thinkers like Hick, for whom the problem of evil requires a 
‘greater good’ or ‘soul-making’ theodicy. For such writers, evil and suffering are a necessary 
part of the moral life that prove the realities of human imperfection: a moral life attended by 
truth and lies, success and failure, good and evil drives the individual closer to the ideal of 
goodness symbolised by God.31 In such theological responses to the problem of evil, the 
conceptual binaries of human evil and natural evil, of evil and suffering, are collapsed 
because they both represent forms of pain that problematise the existence of God. This 
conceptual ambiguity is especially pronounced in Weil’s writings, where the French words 
mal and malheur can be translated, respectively, as badness, evil or suffering, and grief, 
extreme suffering or affliction.32 Weil’s connection between evil and the love of God is 
indebted to Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, a text that illustrates how the painful experiences 
questioned within the problem of evil offer a paradoxical lesson of the value of divine grace. 
                                                                                                                
31 Charles Taliaferro explains that ‘As part of a strategy called great good theodicy 
(sometimes called the greater good theodicy), theists appeal to pervasive features of the 
cosmos which, they argue, are genuinely good. They argue further that either these goods are 
conditions for there being certain evils, or these goods require (or make probable) certain 
evils, in order to be realized. God allows evil for the sake of such greater goods.’ Taliaferro, 
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, p.305. 
32 Murdoch discussed the complexities of translating malheur in a letter to one of her oldest 
friends, whom she met at Somerville College, Oxford, Lucy Klatschko, who later ‘entered 
Stanbrook Abbey, Worcester, as Sister Marian’ (LP, p.614). In Christmas 1992, Murdoch 
wrote to her that ‘“Affliction” does not properly translate, even “grief” might be better, 
though less precise’ (LP, p.580). Rush Rhees similarly suggests that ‘there is no English 
equivalent’ for the French word malheur, explaining that translators of Simone Weil’s 
writings use ‘affliction’ to give ‘something not just equivalent to “suffering”’. Rush Rhees, 
Discussions of Simone Weil, ed. D. A. Phillips (Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 2000) p.181. The terminological uncertainty here is evident of the etymological 
difficulties evident not only in the French word mal but also the word suffering. For those 
who question God’s power in the theological problem of evil, it represents evidence of God’s 
failure to protect the individual from evil. The word itself has, recalling the etymological 
discussion in the Introduction, a negative connotation; it is defined as an ‘experience’ of 
being ‘subjected to (something bad or unpleasant)’; without an object, it is representing 
something that has ‘become […] worse in quality’. See The New Oxford English Dictionary 
of English, ed. by Judy Pearsall (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.1855. 
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While Murdoch was critical of these aspects of Weil’s moral thought, she nevertheless 
adopted them in her moral philosophy and, indeed, explored their complex impact on the 
moral life within her fiction. Weil’s influence on Murdoch’s writings has been explored by 
many critics, such as A. S. Byatt, Gabriele Griffin and Sabina Lovibond. The self-admittedly 
‘great debt’ Murdoch owes to Weil (TCHF, p.76) is reflected in her interpretation of Plato 
and her adoption of Weilian concepts, such as attention and void, within her moral 
philosophy.33 Yet, as Murdoch’s early writings illustrate, including a recently published radio 
talk, ‘Waiting on God’ (1951), her perspective on Weil was not entirely praiseworthy: while 
‘her work has that unmistakable fresh tang’, Weil not only ‘expresses herself vividly, [but 
also] violently’.34 In The Unicorn, the inability to understand Hannah’s form of suffering, I 
will argue, represents the fundamental spiritual lessons revealed within Aeschylus’ 
Agamemnon, Weil’s theodicy and, to a certain extent, the Book of Job: the individual should 
not seek to rationalise the experience of pain and suffering because such evils represent 
divine love.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
33 In Murdoch’s philosophical battle during the 1950s against ‘the popular “hero-of-the-will” 
to whom Existentialism had given birth’, Conradi argues, she found a ‘valuable ally’ in ‘the 
work of Simone Weil, whose thought helped deepen her moral address, and also enabled her 
the better to understand Plato’. Peter J. Conradi, ‘Chapter 30: Platonism in Iris Murdoch’, 
in Platonism and the English Imagination, ed. by Anne Baldwin and Sarah Hutton 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1994), pp.330-43, p.333. 
34 Iris Murdoch, ‘“Waiting on God”: A Radio Talk on Simone Weil (1951)’, ed. by Justin 
Broackes, Iris Murdoch Review, 8 (2017): 9-16 (p.10).  
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Affliction and the ‘Soul-Making’ Theodicy 
The marginalia in Murdoch’s copies of The Notebooks of Simone Weil (1956) and Waiting on 
God (1951) represent her interrogations of Weil’s austere theodicy.35 In her readings of 
Waiting on God, Murdoch wonders if the ‘problem of evil [is] too quickly solved’ by Weil’s 
concepts of necessity and obedience.36 Weil’s ‘mechanism of necessity’, like the natural 
force of gravity, is ‘blind’ and, while it causes ‘horrors’, is nevertheless ‘an object of love’.37 
For Murdoch, such a perspective reveals Weil’s ‘[o]bjective capacity to see God in all - in the 
ill things too’.38 In her annotations to The Notebooks of Simone Weil, Murdoch takes this 
criticism further, noting that Weil is ‘[t]oo ready to love evil! 401’, a claim that she repeats in 
her review of Weil’s Notebooks, ‘Knowing the Void’ (1956):39  
 
The personality which emerges from [Weil’s] writings is not always attractive, but it 
compels respect. She is sometimes unbalanced and scarcely accurate […]. She seems 
at times almost too ready to embrace evil and to love God as its author; many readers 
may find a repellent and self-destructive quality in her austerity. (EM, pp.159-160) 
 
                                                                                                                
35 The publication dates used above refer to the English translations of Simone Weil’s texts. 
The Notebooks of Simone Weil (1956) are a two-volume English translation by Arthur Wills 
of the three-volume original, titled Les Cahiers de Simone Weil (1952-5). These diaries, 
which were given to Gustav Thibbon by Simone Weil in early 1942, were first published in 
an edited form as Les Pesanteur at la grâce (1947), or Gravity and Grace in the English 
edition (1952). Waiting on God (1951), published in French as Attente de Dieu (1950), 
contains Weil’s letters to Father Perrin (a Dominican friend of Gustav Thibbon) and the 
spiritual reflections that their discussions encouraged. See Gustav Thibbon, ‘Introduction’, 
Gravity and Grace, trans. by Emma Craufurd (1952); (London: Routledge, 1992), pp.vii-
xxxvii, p.xii; and Par. J. M Perrin, ‘Préface’, Attente de Dieu, <http://classiques.uqac.ca/ 
classiques/weil_simone/attente_de_dieu/attente_de_dieu_1966.doc> [accessed 08/01/19]. 
36 Iris Murdoch, Annotations to Simone Weil’s Waiting on God, in the Iris Murdoch Archive, 
IML1102, p.72.  
37 Simone Weil, Waiting on God, trans. by Emma Craufurd (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1974), p.87. 
38 Murdoch, Annotations to Waiting on God, IML1102, [back of book]. 
39 Iris Murdoch, Annotations to The Notebooks of Simone Weil, Vol. 2, in the Iris Murdoch 
Archive, IML932, [back of book]. 
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Such interrogations of Weil’s writings, especially those concerning evil and the love of God, 
are not isolated or unique. Weil’s ideas, Rush Rhees claims, can be ‘hard to see, or to 
formulate’; it may be difficult to understand ‘what it is one can learn from [her]’.40 Indeed, as 
Lissa McCollough argues, one of the most ‘unorthodox or anti-orthodox elements in Weil’s 
religious thought stem[s] from her unusual conception of the creation of the world as a 
withdrawal of God’; ‘The withdrawal of God, [and] his abdication to necessity, results in the 
rending of God—a rending that is for Weil the theological origin of evil’.41 For Weil, the 
individual experiences the mechanism of God’s withdrawal within affliction, or malheur, an 
experience that creates a void, an ‘empty space’ where the individual can accept the love of 
God; this divine love, or grace, she explains, ‘can only enter where there is a void to receive 
it’.42 Within this void, within this submission to the realities of evil, pain and suffering, the 
individual accepts their place within the universe, their subjection to gravity and necessity, 
and can appreciate the value of truth and, therefore, the love of God.  
Affliction and the void are fundamental concepts within Murdoch’s moral philosophy. 
Indeed, she dedicates a chapter of Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals to these experiences of 
‘desolation’, ‘despair’ and wickedness, of ‘black misery, bereavement, remorse, frustrated 
talent, loneliness, humiliation, depression, secret woe’, all of which illustrate the extent to 
which it can be ‘terrible to be human’ (MGM, p.498). In Weil’s austere picture of morality, 
such painful experiences not only, as Murdoch acknowledges, represent a fundamental aspect 
of human life but also allow the individual to access God’s divine love. The most extreme 
example that Weil uses to illustrate this paradoxical and, as Murdoch notes, ‘repellent’ idea, 
                                                                                                                
40 Quoted in D. A. Phillips, ‘Editors Preface’, Discussion of Simone Weil (Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp.vii-xi, p.vii; Phillips’s italics. 
41 Lissa McCollough, The Religious Philosophy of Simone Weil (London: I. B. Tauris & Co 
Ltd, 2014), p.85, 89; McCollough’s italics. 
42 Simone Weil, Gravity and Grace, trans. by Emma Craufurd (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1992), p.10. 
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renders God complicit in evil and suffering. In her annotations to Weil’s Notebooks, Murdoch 
highlights Weil’s use of violent imagery, perhaps even the kind of violence that might have 
occurred during the Holocaust, in her exploration of God’s complicity in evil. (The 
underlined sections of the following quotation correlate with Murdoch’s lines to the side of 
the text.) Weil writes, 
 
Tearing a girl away from her mother’s side, against her will—the greatest 
and most painful form of violence that is possible for man to commit—is 
what serves us as an image of grace. […] It lies within our power to be 
mediators between God and that part of creation which has been entrusted to 
us. Our consent is necessary […]. God can only love in us this consent we 
show in withdrawing in order to allow him to pass, in the same way as he 
himself, the Creator has withdrawn in order to allow us to be. […] God, who 
is nothing else but Love, has not created anything else but love. 
Relentless necessity, misery, distress, the crushing burden of poverty 
and of exhausting labour, cruelty, torture, violent death, constraint, terror, 
disease—all of this is but the divine love. It is God who out of love 
withdraws from us so that we can love him.43 
 
Like Murdoch, McCollough acknowledges the controversial nature of this theodicy: ‘The 
scandal of Weil’s theology’, she attests, ‘is that it is the love of God that is the cause of all 
evil’.44 Indeed, Weil collapses the conceptual binaries of human and natural evil; God’s 
withdrawal is represented not only by human acts of ‘cruelty’, ‘exhausting labour’, ‘poverty’ 
or ‘torture’ but also natural events, such as ‘disease’ and ‘[r]elentless necessity’. While 
Weil’s justification of evil is undoubtedly, to use Murdoch’s term, ‘repellent’, it nevertheless 
presents a ‘greater good’ theodicy that reveals both the harsh realities of evil as well as the 
importance of faith, goodness, love and truth. 
                                                                                                                
43 Simone Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, p.401. See also, IML932, p.401. 
44 McCollough, The Religious Philosophy of Simone Weil, p.141. 
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Among the most prominent theologians who rationalise the existence of evil based on 
its social, personal and moral value are Saint Irenaeus and John Hick. Partly influenced by 
Irenaeus’s writings, Hick’s Evil and the Love of God (1966) offers a greater good theodicy 
where God provides evil and suffering for ‘soul-making’ opportunities. The latter term 
originates from John Keats’s letter to his sister: ‘Call the world if you Please “The vale of 
Soul-making”’, Keats implores; ‘Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and 
troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a Soul? A Place where the heart must feel 
and suffer in a thousand diverse ways!’45 Where Keats provides the central phrase for Hick’s 
theodicy, Irenaeus’s ‘eschatological’ theodicy, which ‘looks to the future’ ‘for its clue to the 
mystery of evil’, supports the foundations of Hick’s theodicy.46 Saint Irenaeus believed, on 
his interpretation of Genesis 1:26, ‘And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness’ (my italics), that ‘created things must be’ imperfect because, ‘from the very fact of 
their later origin’, they ‘must be inferior to [God]’.47 ‘God had power at the beginning to 
grant perfection to man’, Irenaeus argues, ‘but as the latter was only recently created, he 
could not possibly have received it, […] contained it, or […] retained it’.48 For Saint 
Irenaeus, as Hick explains, ‘our world of mingled good and evil’ is a ‘divinely appointed 
environment for man’s development towards the perfection’,49 where God represents a 
                                                                                                                
45 John Keats, quoted in John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (1966); (Norfolk: Collins 
Fontana Library, 1975), p.295. 
46 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term Eschatology as ‘the part of theology 
concerned with death, judgment, and the final destiny of the soul and of humankind’. The 
eschatological nature of Hick’s theodicy is evident in the conclusion to the definition of his 
theodicy, where he attests that ‘[t]he good that outshines all ill is not a paradise since lost but 
a kingdom which is yet to come in its full glory and permanence’. Hick, Evil and the God of 
Love, p.297. 
47 Saint Irenaeus, ‘Chapter XXXVIII.—Why man was not made perfect from the beginning’, 
Against Heresies (170), in ANF01. The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, 
ed. by Philip Schaff <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/anf01.ix.vi.xxxix.html> [accessed 
11/04/15]. 
48 Irenaeus, ‘Chapter XXXVIII.—Why man was not made perfect from the beginning’, 
Against Heresies. 
49 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.221. 
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developmental end-point, an ultimate Ideal of Perfection, to which all individuals aspire for 
their moral or spiritual growth. Drawing on these Irenaean ideas, Hick’s picture of the world 
‘sketches a teleological theodicy’, a rationalisation for evil based on its ‘purpose’: the ‘value’ 
of this world, he argues, must ‘be judged, not primarily by the quality of pleasure and pain 
occurring in it at any particular moment, but by its fitness for its primary purpose, the 
purpose of soul-making’.50 
Such a picture of morality, influenced by the perfectionism of Saint Irenaeus, bears 
considerable resemblance to Murdoch’s Platonic vision of morality.51 In Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals, explaining Plato’s moral perfectionism, she argues that   
 
[l]ife is a spiritual pilgrimage inspired by the disturbing magnetism of truth, involving 
ipso facto a purification of energy and desire in the light of a vision of what is good. 
The good and just life is thus a process of clarification, a movement toward selfless 
lucidity, guided by ideas of perfection which are objects of love. Platonic morality 
[…] concerns the continuous detail of human activity, wherein we discriminate 
between appearance and reality, good and bad, true and false, and check or strengthen 
our desires. (MGM, p.14) 
 
For Murdoch, as for Irenaeus, Hick and Plato, the individual is engaged in a ‘continuous’ 
moral task that, over time, allows them to realise their moral frailties. The imperfect moral 
agent, Hick suggests, is ‘voluntarily’ attracted toward the moral perfection of God.52 For him, 
                                                                                                                
50 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.295. 
51 There are some similarities between Murdoch and Hick, as Murdoch acknowledged when 
she read Hick’s edited collection of essays, The Myth of God Incarnate, which explores the 
importance of interpreting Jesus Christ as a historical, rather than a mythological figure, and 
includes a reference to Nuns and Soldiers. In a letter to Scott Dunbar, dated 19th October 
1977, Murdoch reflects on her reading of The Myth of God Incarnate, which she argues ‘has 
just caused a stir here [in the United Kingdom]’: ‘I have discovered that I am Christian’, she 
explains, ‘As far as I can see, I believe what they (Maurice Wiles, John Hick, [and the other 
contributors to The Myth of God Incarnate]) believe about Christ. […] They see the historical 
Christ as a man who occasioned a God-revealing myth. (Pure heresy!)’ (LP, p.451). See The 
Myth of God Incarnate, ed. by John Hick (London: SCM Press, 1977). 
52 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.317. 
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as for Saint Irenaeus, people ‘come short of [God’s] perfect’ ideal; though they are 
‘unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline’, God nevertheless provided them 
with autonomy, ‘love’ and ‘power’ to ‘overcome the [imperfect] substance of [their] created 
nature’.53 For all three thinkers, life is a ‘spiritual pilgrimage’; though people fail, they 
nevertheless, as Irenaeus argues, retain their ‘power’ to become perfect or, to recall Murdoch, 
to ‘check or strengthen [their] desires’ in ‘the light of a vision of what is good’ (MGM, p.14). 
For Murdoch, the ‘problem of the transformation of power,’ of our moral energies, our 
desires and our fantasies, ‘is fundamental’ (IML, p.545), and this moral task requires an 
awareness of our moral frailties, an awareness that can, as for Weil, be provided by the harsh 
realities of evil, pain and suffering. 
 
God’s Distance and the Pointlessness of Morality 
Murdoch’s philosophical picture of morality, like her fiction, draws on Weil’s writings to 
highlight the importance of acknowledging the presence of evil, pain and suffering as not 
only forms of divine grace but also proofs of the pointlessness of morality and, moreover, the 
distance of God or goodness. For Weil, suffering ‘has no significance. There lies the very 
essence of its reality. We must love it in its reality, which is absence of significance. 
Otherwise we do not love God’.54 ‘Again and again’, Rhees attests, Weil ‘comes back to the 
danger of missing the significance of affliction in one’s relation to God’.55 For Weil, God has 
to be placed at a distance from the human being: ‘If there were no affliction in this world’, 
Weil argues, ‘we might think we were in paradise’.56 By withdrawing from the world, God 
allows the individual to experience the evils of suffering, without which they would never 
                                                                                                                
53 Saint Irenaeus, ‘Chapter XXXVIII.—Why man was not made perfect from the beginning’, 
Against Heresies. 
54 Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, p.484. 
55 Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p.173. 
56 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.72. 
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accept the void as a route to divine love. Such ‘distance’ and ‘impersonality’ are, as 
Antonaccio asserts, similarly ‘essential’ to Murdoch’s concept of the Good.57 ‘We do not 
have dialogues with Goodness’, Murdoch argues, ‘[i]n an important sense Goodness must be 
an Idea […], an ideal’ (MGM, p.478). Instead of a ‘teleological theodicy’ like Hick’s, which 
searches for a rationalisation for evil based on its ‘purpose’, therefore, Murdoch’s secular 
theodicy draws upon Weil’s non-teleological theodicy with its ‘distant’ force of goodness: 
 
The Good has nothing to do with purpose indeed it excludes the idea of 
purpose. ‘All is vanity’ is the beginning and the end of ethics. The only way 
to be good is to be good ‘for nothing’ […] That ‘for nothing’ is indeed the 
experience correlate of the invisibility or non-representable blankness of the 
idea of Good itself. (EM, p.358) 
 
Murdoch’s ‘for nothing’ recalls Weil’s austere theodicy, which, as Allen argues, ‘does not 
argue for the goodness of the cosmos on the basis of […] a simple teleology’ but exhibits an 
‘understanding of nature as a system of relations’, including dialectical concepts like gravity 
and grace.58 For Weil, the ‘love of God is pure when joy and suffering inspire an equal 
degree of gratitude’.59 Influenced by Weil, Murdoch sees suffering as a form of evil that, to 
quote Rhees on Weil, the individual ‘ought not to try to remove’; affliction, as Weil argues, 
‘although painful[,] is a good, because, it is love’.60  
Weil’s concept of gravity illustrates the importance of acknowledging the painful 
realities of the world. According to Weil, ‘[c]reation is composed of the descending 
movement gravity, the ascending movement of grace, and the descending movement of the 
second degree of grace’.61 The ‘descending movement of gravity’ represents how all 
                                                                                                                
57 Antonaccio, A Philosophy to Live By, p.112. 
58 Diogenes Allen, ‘Natural Evil and the Love of God’, p.199. 
59 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.55. 
60 Rush Rhees, Discussion of Simone Weil, p.179; Simone Weil, Waiting on God, p.86. 
61 Weil, Gravity and Grace, pp.3-4. 
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individuals are ‘subject to chance’.62 ‘We are material beings’, as Diogenes Allen explains, 
‘part of the natural physical order, subject to its laws, subject to microbes and viruses, subject 
to ageing and decay, subject to death’.63 Weil illustrates the concepts of gravity, and their 
related concepts of necessity and obedience, with an image of the sea’s capacity for ‘horrors’. 
The fact that waves cause shipwrecks, she suggests, does not make the sea ‘less beautiful’; 
instead, it ‘adds to its beauty’, illustrating how the sea is not ‘a creature gifted with 
discernment and choice’ but a ‘fluid, perfectly obedient to every external pressure’, such as 
gravity and wind.64 ‘All the horrors which come about in this world’, Weil argues, ‘are like 
the folds imposed upon the waves by gravity.’65 The individual’s subjection to suffering 
teaches obedience, or submission, to the painful realities of the world, to gravity. 
In Weil’s picture of morality, acknowledging the world’s imperfections through 
obedience to gravity offers a moral lesson in appreciating God’s difference from humankind. 
For Weil, Eric Springsted explains, God is ‘wholly other’ than the individual and there is ‘a 
sense in which God is not affected by humans’.66 A similar, albeit less austere, vision of 
God’s ‘distance’ appears in Hick’s theodicy, where the suffering that individuals face in the 
world makes them increasingly aware of imperfection. ‘God must set man at a distance from 
Himself […] from which he can then voluntarily come to God’; such an Irenaean ‘epistemic 
distance’, Hick argues, ‘make[s] room for a degree of human autonomy’.67 Hick’s conception 
of God’s ‘distance’, however, is rendered incompatible with Weil’s moral vision when he 
argues that ‘the reality and presence of God must not be borne in upon men in the coercive 
                                                                                                                
62 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.38. 
63 Diogenes Allen, ‘Natural Evil and the Love of God’, in The Problem of Evil, ed. by 
Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (Oxford: University Press, 1994), 
pp.189-208, pp.190-193. 
64 Weil, Waiting on God, p.87. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Eric O. Springsted, ‘Conditions of Dialogue: John Hick and Simone Weil’, The Journal of 
Religion, 72:1 (January 1992): 19-36 (p.19). 
67 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.317. 
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way in which their natural environment forces itself upon their attention’.68 As Diogenes 
Allen explains, where Hick allows the individual ‘experience God’s love through suffering’, 
Weil illustrates ‘how we may experience the love of God in suffering itself’69. Unlike Hick, 
Weil argues that the ‘coercive’ nature of gravity not only ‘adds to [the] beauty’ of the world 
but also, as Murdoch explains, allows the individual ‘to confront, not only the pointless 
necessity of the world, but also […] its obedience to alien law’ (MGM, p.108). For Weil, the 
individual must submit to the ‘coercive’, necessary and painful experience of ‘gravity’ 
because it represents ‘an image by which the mind can conceive of the indifference [and] 
impartiality of God’.70 For Weil, ‘God can only be present in creation under the form of 
absence’ and experiences of extreme suffering caused by human evil, such as ‘[t]earing a girl 
away from her mother’s side’, offer examples of the kind of ‘cruelty’, ‘misery’ and ‘distress’ 
within which the individual can experience the void.71 In Weil’s vision of morality, as Allen 
argues, the fact that ‘divine love is recognized in the presence of suffering’ represents her 
support of the ‘composibility’ of divine grace and evil.72 
Weil’s combination of divine grace, evil and suffering draws heavily on the Greek 
vision of morality portrayed within Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, a text whose paradoxical vision 
of violent grace influenced Weil’s picture of the moral life, including her concept of affliction 
and her picture of God’s distance from the individual. The Notebooks of Simone Weil contain 
piecemeal reflections on the Agamemnon, in which the concepts of ‘violent grace’ (Χάρις 
βίαιος) and ‘τὸν πάθει µάθος—Knowledge through suffering’, illustrate the extent to which 
                                                                                                                
68 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p.317. 
69 Allen, ‘Natural Evil and the Love of God’, p.199. 
70 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.94. 
71 Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, p.99. 
72 Adams and Adams’ summary of Allen’s ‘Natural Evil and the Love of God’ offers an apt 
definition of both Weil’s and Aeschylus’ picture of morality. Adams and Adams, 
‘Introduction: Problems of Evil’, p.21. 
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the Greeks ‘were haunted by the idea of grace’.73 In ‘Zeus and Prometheus’, Weil suggests 
that ‘suffering’ plays a fundamental role in the Greeks’ understanding of ‘the relationship of 
man and the universe’.74 Their vision of ‘suffering’, she argues, highlights the value, not of 
‘suffering for its own sake’, but of ‘enduring’: ‘Man must endure that which he does not 
want. He must find himself in submission to necessity. […] Man must learn to think of 
himself as a limited and dependent being’.75 Weil sees this lesson, a lesson that ‘suffering 
alone can teach’,76 not only in the Agamemnon but also in Prometheus and the Book of Job, 
where ‘extreme physical suffering’ and ‘extreme distress of the soul’ ultimately result in ‘the 
complete revelation of the beauty of the world’.77 For Weil, as Murdoch praises in 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (and elsewhere), the individual must attend to such 
experiences however painful they may be: the individual must ‘perceive without reverie’, 
aiming for a condition in which they simply ‘endure’ the void rather than fill it with meaning 
(MGM, p.218). Such a vision of morality, as Murdoch suggests, may seem ‘abstract’ or even 
‘impertinent’, but Weil’s discussions of Aeschylus’ Agamemnon prove that suffering, despite 
the distress and pain it causes, can ‘be put to more positive and creative use’ (MGM, p.504). 
Indeed, Weil’s response to the Agamemnon supports her response to the problem of evil, her 
greater good or soul-making theodicy, where an endurance of suffering allows individuals to 
appreciate the experience of gravity and the void and teaches them to accept their moral 
limitations and to see the pointlessness of focussing inward rather than outward. 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals Murdoch illustrates the moral importance of 
submitting to the void, where the experience of affliction, or extreme suffering, not only 
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by Elisabeth Chase Geissbuhler (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1957), pp.56-9, p.57. 
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allows the individual to understand ‘reality of pain’ (MGM, p.502) but also to see beyond the 
‘anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world’ 
(SG, p.84). Murdoch argues that ‘[w]e have (gravity, necessity) a natural impulse to derealise 
our world and surround ourselves with fantasy’ (MGM, p.503). The void, however, in forcing 
the individual to look elsewhere, ‘makes loss a reality’ (MGM, p.503). God ‘enters into 
contact with a human individual’, Weil explains, ‘only through purely spiritual grace which 
responds to […] the exact extent to which the individual ceases to be an individual’.78 ‘To 
love truth’, Weil attests, ‘means to endure the void and, as a result, to accept death’.79 
Instigating an experience of the void, God’s otherness, His ‘distance’ or ‘withdrawal’ from 
the individual reveals the limitations of nature and our submission to gravity, the awareness 
of which offers a lesson in attention, décrēation, or unselfing where, moving beyond the ego 
toward inviting a vision of reality, the individual understands ‘what truth is like’ (MGM, 
p.245). 
 
The Aeschylean-Weilian Theodicy in The Unicorn 
In The Unicorn, Murdoch engages with Weil’s complex, dialectical vision of suffering and 
echoes Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, where the individual is invited to interpret evils, and the hurt 
they cause, as examples of divine grace. Murdoch corroborates this debt to Weil in a letter to 
Miklós Vetö, a postgraduate student who wrote a thesis on Weil under Murdoch’s 
supervision, where she attests that The Unicorn is ‘full of Simone Weil’, arguing that Weil is 
a ‘greater source’ of her ‘wisdom’ than many critics had acknowledged, at least by 1963; 
‘One cannot get away from [her] ideas’.80 For Murdoch, Weil’s writings portray ‘the union of 
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Szóke, ‘Letters from Iris Murdoch to Miklós Vetö: thirty years of friendship’, Iris Murdoch 
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a passionate search for truth with a simplicity and austerity of personal living’ (EM, p.160) 
and she has ‘a natural affinity’ with the ‘extremism’ and ‘imageless austerity of Zen’ that 
represents ‘what it is like to be stripped of the ego, and how difficult this is’ (MGM, p.247). 
Murdoch’s portrayal of Hannah’s suffering in The Unicorn echoes the challenges presented 
by Weil’s austere theodicy and moral asceticism, with their links to Aeschylus and Zen 
Buddhism. 
In The Unicorn, Murdoch aligns the central character, Hannah Crean-Smith, with the 
ambiguous ‘[r]elentless asceticism’ of Christ, Plato and Weil, all of whom could be 
interpreted as ‘secluded disciplined religious’ individuals, Murdoch argues, that may be ‘in 
touch with pure just loving judgement’, ‘wrapped in private egoism,’ or ‘simply mad’ (MGM, 
p.248). All of the characters in The Unicorn are similarly perplexed by Hannah, who is 
confined to her house, Gaze, after an ambiguous altercation on a cliff leads to her violent 
first-cousin husband, Peter, from whom she is estranged, falling and dreadfully injuring 
himself. For Violet Evercreech, believing perhaps that Hannah pushed Peter, she is ‘a 
murderous adulterous woman’ (U, p.181), ‘a woman infinitely capable of crimes’ (U, p.223). 
For Alice Lejour, however, Hannah’s calm acceptance of her incarceration, her ‘very 
exceptional quietness’, represents something ‘spiritual’ (U, p.101); indeed, as Effingham 
Cooper reflects, ‘[s]omething was written on that brow, something about suffering, only he 
could not read the characters’ (U, p.89). In the novel, however, Murdoch illustrates how 
Hannah’s suffering cannot, and should not, be contemplated, or symbolised and, instead, 
should be seen as an enigma or, to refer to Weil’s Zen-like austerity, a ‘koan’.  
While Hannah’s represent an aesthetic, interpretative task that may be ultimately 
unconducive to a true understanding of Weilian affliction, some of the characters interpret 
her suffering as a moral lesson. A. S. Byatt argues that Hannah’s ‘ambiguous’, ‘mysterious’, 
‘passive suffering’ can be read as forms of Freudian ‘obsessional neurotic fantasy’ and 
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Weilian suffering.81 She argues that these forms of suffering have both positive and negative 
moral value, revealing that suffering is not only ‘natural and inevitable, [and] something to be 
reckoned with’ but also that it invites a form of fantasy that hinders a ‘vision of perfection 
and reality’.82 For Byatt, Hannah’s suffering, which represents an ambiguous ‘machine’ (U, 
p.210) in the novel, is interpreted most effectively by Denis Nolan and Max Lejour, who 
respectively offer a Weilian and a Christian response to Hannah’s suffering.83 Denis’s vision 
of suffering, however, also echoes Weil; he argues that  
 
[w]hat is spiritual is unnatural. The soul under the burden of sin cannot flee. 
What is enacted here with her is enacted with all of us in one way or 
another. You cannot come between her and her suffering, it is too 
complicated, too precious. […] True obedience is without illusion. (U, p.65) 
 
Suffering is no scandal. It is natural. Nature appoints it. All creation suffers. 
It suffers from having been created, if from nothing else. It suffers from 
being divided from God. (U, p.198) 
 
For Max, as well as for Denis, Hannah’s form of suffering reveals the importance of 
acknowledging that ‘[s]uffering is only justified if it is purified’ (U, p.99). For Weil, 
experiencing the ‘ascending movement of grace’ requires a ‘descen[t]’ into ‘affliction’; 
requires an acknowledgement that suffering is a ‘koan’ planted by God in the ‘soul’ as 
‘something irreducible, a foreign body, impossible to digest, [that] constrains one to think of 
it’.84 Hannah’s awareness of the need to ‘discipline’ herself, to be obedient to her experience 
of suffering, is evidenced by her response to the characters around her, whom she argues 
‘have made [her] into an object of contemplation’ (U, p.219). Here, like Denis and Max, 
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83 Ibid., p.184. 
84 Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, pp.483-4. 
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Hannah’s criticism echoes the ‘imageless austerity of Zen’ (MGM, p.247) that Murdoch 
aligns with Weil’s writings and offers a non-teleological vision of morality that invites the 
individual to acknowledge the pointlessness of morality as well as the value of experiences of 
evil and suffering. 
The Unicorn references the moral austerity in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon that aided 
Weil’s vision of the moral life, where the individual must obediently submit to the necessary 
experience of gravity, of evil, pain and suffering. Weil’s picture of suffering, as McCollough 
aptly summarises, recalls Aeschylus’ verses:  
 
Pain is the root of knowledge […] because suffering alone causes us to feel 
that human life is impossible, that death alone is possible, that nothingness 
is true and irreducible. This realization is the beginning of truth, of spiritual 
understanding; it initiates a purification from illusion and constitutes the 
first genuine contact with reality.85 
 
Weil’s preoccupation with the vision of suffering present in the Agamemnon is evident not 
only in ‘Zeus and Prometheus’, published as part of La Source Grecque (1952), an essay that 
she begins with an extended quotation of lines 160 to 183 of the Agamemnon, but also in her 
Notebooks where she experiments with translations of these verses, where the speaker 
invokes Zeus, whose glory outweighs all other gods as well as the speaker’s anxiety, and 
whose ‘sovereign law’ proclaims that there can be ‘no wisdom without pain’.86 Murdoch read 
both The Notebooks of Simone Weil and La Source Grecque (1952), including the essay 
‘Zeus and Prometheus’, where she noted that, for Weil, ‘Justice + love dep[end] on seeing 
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how we are all subject to fortune + necessity [which are in] this way equal’.87 Weil’s 
experimentation with translations of the Agamemnon in her Notebooks highlights the 
importance of regarding suffering as a form of ‘meditation’, an idea that echoes her concept 
of attention, of the ‘just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality’ (SG, p.33). Weil 
writes, 
 
‘He who sings the praises of Zeus with love (προΦρόνω), with a well-
disposed heart, the same shall attain the fullness of wisdom, the state of 
perfection.’ […] ‘f I really must cast aside the vain burden of care, I have 
weighted up everything, I have nothing to [liken unto, compare] 
προσεικάσαι, save Zeus only, if I am really to cast aside the vain burden of 
care.’88 
 
Weil’s interest in these lines from the Agamemnon is shared by Max Lejour in The Unicorn, 
who is heard singing, ‘to a plain-song lilt of his own a Chorus from Aeschylus’:  
 
Zeus, who leads men into the ways of understanding, has established the 
rule that we must learn by suffering. As sad care, with memories of pain, 
comes dropping upon the heart in sleep, so even against out will does 
wisdom come upon us. (U, p.80) 
 
For Effingham Cooper, who is both confused by, and in awe of, Max’s asceticism, these are 
simply ‘healing familiar lines’ (U, p.80). For Weil, however, they inspire a vision of the 
importance of décrēation, of seeing beyond egoism, beyond the ‘vain burden of care’. God 
‘enters into contact with a human individual’, Weil explains, ‘only through purely spiritual 
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grace which responds to […] the exact extent to which the individual ceases to be an 
individual’ (GG, p.101). ‘There must be no consolation—no apparent consolation’, she 
argues; ‘To love truth means to endure the void and, as a result, to accept death’.89 While 
Murdoch reflects the values of Weil’s picture of suffering within The Unicorn, Effingham 
fails to carry out the austere ideal inherent within Aeschylus’ and Weil’s writings. 
The moral ambiguities inherent within The Unicorn, namely Hannah’s suicide (U, 
p.245), Hannah’s murder of Gerald Scottow (U, p.230) and Denis Nolan’s murder of Peter 
Crean-Smith (U, p.261), problematise an entirely positive response to Hannah’s suffering. 
Indeed, Effingham Cooper may revere the lines from the Agamemnon, but he does not 
necessarily exhibit an awareness, at the end of the novel, of unselfing or seeing beyond the 
‘vain burden of care’. He reflects, at the end of the narrative, that it was the quality of 
Hannah’s ‘fantasy’ that had ‘touched him’, not ‘its spiritual quality’; ‘He had, through 
egoism, through being in some sense too small, too trivial, too interested in the powers of that 
world, escaped from evil’ (U, p.268). Unlike him, the two characters that most clearly 
illustrated Weil’s vision of suffering, Hannah and Dennis, did not ‘escape’ from evil. On the 
one hand, Denis and Hannah’s murderous acts partly undermine their positive, Weilian moral 
messages. The reader may, as Horner argues, be rendered partly complicit in their evil acts; 
indeed, Denis suggests earlier in the novel, in a moment that affronts Marian, that it may be 
necessary ‘in the end to fight evil with evil’ (U, p.229).90 On the other hand, Denis’ decision 
to leave at the end of the novel may suggest an awareness of the concept of Ate, explained 
earlier by Max as ‘the name of the almost automatic transfer of suffering from one being to 
another’: ‘Ate is finally quenched […] when it encounters a pure being’, a truly good, ‘non-
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powerful’ individual, ‘who only suffers and does not attempt to pass the suffering on’ (U, 
pp.98-9). Perhaps Denis’s self-induced exile after his murder of Peter, as Marian suggests, 
allows him to contain evil, ‘bringing it, for her, for the others, to an end’ (U, p.263). The 
austere, bleak, unresolved ending of The Unicorn, therefore, illustrates the difficulty of truly 
acknowledging a Weilian, or Aeschylean, vision of violent grace, where the individual is 
invited, by attending to evil, pain and suffering, to learn from her moral mistakes, or from his 
evil. Such a dialectical, or paradoxical, response to the problem of evil is fundamental not 
only for Aeschylus, Murdoch and Weil but also Ricoeur, who argues that the individual must 
‘reach the point of discerning in suffering some educative and purgative value’, a lesson that 
reveals not only the value of unselfing but also of faith, perseverance, patience and love.91 
 
Dame Julian of Norwich and Simone Weil in The Message to the Planet 
Murdoch’s ambiguous vision of love draws on the austere, mystical writings of Dame Julian 
and Weil to provide a secular response to the problem of evil. For Susan Elizabeth Yore, who 
draws a link between Julian’s and Murdoch’s writings, Murdoch is a ‘moral mystic’: the 
‘literary writer, as a mystic,’ she argues, can ‘bridge the gap between the person and the 
communal, the body and the spirit, beauty and tragedy’.92 Yore quotes Philip Sheldrak’s 
argument that one of ‘the most important lesson[s] that postmodernity can teach spirituality’, 
for example, ‘is the need to reject the unhealthy division between the sacred and the 
secular’.93 In ‘On “God” and “Good”’, Murdoch offers a picture of morality that bridges the 
sacred and the secular; she argues that ‘[m]orality has always been connected with religion 
and religion with mysticism’, with ‘a non-dogmatic, essentially un-formulated faith in the 
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reality of the Good, occasionally connected with experience’ (SG, p.72). The mystic, as 
Murdoch argues in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, understands ‘the nakedness and 
aloneness of Good, its absolute for-nothingness’ (MGM, p.375). Yore argues that this aspect 
of Murdoch’s writings makes her moral vision important to contemporary thought: her vision 
of ‘human consciousness with morality as a central element’ challenges ‘the meta-ethical 
post-structural concern[s] with language’, offering instead a dialectical, postmodern picture 
of morality.94 In Murdoch’s picture of morality, the individual is a fallible but perfectible 
agent, capable of hearing the call toward goodness as well as being ‘seduced into evil’ 
(MGM, p.506).  
Dame Julian, as many Murdoch critics have noted, is one of the writers that Murdoch 
alludes to, both directly and indirectly, throughout her oeuvre. Julian’s ubiquitous phrase, 
‘Sin is behovely, but all shall be well, and all shall be well, and all manner of thing shall be 
well’, appears, Ramanathan notes, in ‘almost every Murdoch novel in varying contexts’.95 
While some characters repeat Julian’s phrase with ‘ironic frustration’, as Dipple argues, it 
nevertheless represents a fundamental praise of love and hope over the power of evil and 
sin.96 For Dipple and Ramanathan, Murdoch most deeply engages with Julian in Nuns and 
Soldiers (1980): not only does Anne Cavidge’s veridical vision of Christ directly reference 
Julian’s image of the hazelnut in Revelations of Divine Love, but Anne’s spiritual vocation 
indirectly alludes to Julian’s vocation as an anchoress. Despite the influence that Julian 
clearly had on Murdoch’s fiction, Murdoch rarely discussed her in interviews or letters. Yet, 
as late as 1993 in a letter to Sister Marian, Murdoch admitted that she was ‘still with Julian of 
Norwich […], but only in a feeble way’ (LP, p.583), offering a reticent that is belied not only 
                                                                                                                
94 Yore, The Mystic Way in Postmodernity, pp.36-8. 
95 Saguna Ramanathan, Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good (London: Macmillan, 1990), p.99. 
96 Elizabeth Dipple, Work for the Spirit (London: Methuen, 1982), p.328. 
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by Nuns and Soldiers but also by The Bell (1958) and The Message to the Planet.97 The final 
part of this chapter will focus on Murdoch’s allusions to Julian in The Message to the Planet, 
which arguably offers her clearest engagement with Julian’s and Weil’s writings on the 
problem of evil; for Julian, Murdoch and Weil, the problem of evil might be thought of as a 
problem of love, in which the individual learns that love, and indeed the moral life, is not 
limited by the experience of evil and may even be enriched it. 
 
The Problems of Evil and Love in The Message to the Planet  
While The Message to the Planet is centred around the story of Alfred Ludens and his 
obsession with the ageing frail genius, Marcus Vallar, its secondary plot-line concerns Franca 
Sheerwater, whose husband, Jack, hopes to set up a ménage a trois with Franca and his 
twenty-four-year-old mistress, Alison Merrick. Where Marcus is engaged in a ‘mission’ (MP, 
p.165) to the world that sees him attempt to appreciate the value of suffering, Franca’s 
engagement in the dilemma of whether or not she can accept her husband’s ménage a trois 
leaves her suffering doubts over her ability to love and trust her husband. Where Marcus 
engages with the problem of evil and echoes Weil’s moral asceticism, Franca engages with 
the concomitant problem of love, an experience outlined by Julian in Revelations of Divine 
Love, where an experience of evil and suffering leads her, paradoxically, to appreciate the 
value of love and divine grace. 
                                                                                                                
97 Murdoch’s engagement with Dame Julian’s writings cannot, unlike her participation with 
Weil’s writings, be proven by the texts within Murdoch’s libraries, now contained in the Iris 
Murdoch Archive; the 1973 edition of Revelations of Divine Love post-dates her first fictional 
reference to Julian in The Bell (1958) by fifteen years. While this thesis confines the 
discussion of Julian to The Message to the Planet, it does contextualise Murdoch’s 
engagement with Julian by mentioning such earlier references. These allusions to Julian 
represent a burgeoning area in Murdoch studies, as proven by Anne Rowe’s recent paper, 
‘Anchoresses as “God’s Spies”: Iris Murdoch and Dame Julian of Norwich’ (Regent’s Park 
College Oxford, Thursday 9 May 2019).  
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With its vision of faith, hope and unconditional love, the teachings of Julian exert a 
subtle but tangible influence throughout the narrative of The Message to the Planet. For Jack, 
‘Love itself is an end’ (MP, p.37); such ‘great’, ‘absolute’, ‘perfect’ love, Jack believes, is ‘a 
revelation’ (MP, p.38). Franca, like Anne Cavidge, is aligned with ‘nun-like austerity’ (MP, 
p.350): she is a ‘mother’ figure (MP, p.153) and a ‘saint’ (MP, p.400), a ‘sacred object’ (MP, 
p.234) whose ‘sovereign’ power (MP, p.149) justifies Jack’s behaviour and offers him 
‘complete security’ (MP, p.25): ‘You are the guardian of happiness’, attests Jack, ‘making us 
good’ (MP, p.37). For Dipple, such ‘religious longing for sainthood is persistently important 
in Murdoch’s thought, a longing that exists in inverse proportion to the failures, violence and 
guilt the characters enact’.98 Franca’s sainthood, her ‘enclosed, solitary’ life (MP, p.27), 
however, leads to evil; her attempt to achieve and engender Jack’s vision of a happy marriage 
in which ‘[a]bsolute love precludes jealousy’ (MP, p.37) results in a ‘devastating revelation’ 
(MP, p.180). Julian’s writings, therefore, are echoed not only in Franca’s loving devotion to 
Jack but also in her vision of pain, suffering and violence. Franca fails in her attempt to 
invoke Julian’s vision that ‘all will be well’ (MP, p.186), and her attempt to conceal her 
unhappiness results in images of violence: she posits ideas of ‘murder’ (MP, pp.180, 321) and 
‘suicide’ (MP, pp.181, 405); the painful endurance of Jack’s mistress is akin to carrying 
‘heavy poisonous lumps, lethal tumours’ (MP, p.232); and, finally, when she believes she 
should end her relationship with Jack, partly invoking Alison’s reference to Macbeth’s image 
of ‘wading through blood’ (MP, pp.187, 447), she acknowledges how ‘much blood will flow’ 
(MP, p.489) and that the ‘blood [has been] drained’ from her (MP, p.531). Here, as in 
Revelations of Divine Love, where Julian’s vision of Christ is attended by images of gore, 
Franca experiences the interconnected nature of love and pain, in which love’s value is 
                                                                                                                
98 Dipple, Works for the Spirit, p.78. 
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derived not from denying the presence of evil and suffering, but from enduring suffering and 
looking beyond evil to a vision of love and hope. 
Such an ambiguous and austere vision of love recalls the Revelations of Divine Love, 
in which Julian, like Weil, offers a greater good theodicy where evil and suffering are 
acknowledged as a necessary part of the moral life. For Ramanathan, Julian offers a Christian 
vision of morality in which sin is ‘irrelevant’: ‘Proper loving leads to stillness and good; the 
failure of love leads to troubled unhappiness and to bad. Evil is extreme wretchedness arising 
from a sinful failure to love’.99 This interpretation of Julian rightly stresses the importance of 
love, but partly misses the significance of evil within her vision of morality. For Julian, as for 
Murdoch, individuals must acknowledge their capacity for failure: we must, Julian argues, 
‘see our wretchedness, and meekly acknowledge it’.100 In full, Julian’s ubiquitous phrase 
reads ‘Sin must needs be, but all shall be well. All shall be well; and all manner thing shall be 
well’ and illustrates that however imperfect love can be, it retains its value and its power to 
trump evil.101 Julian’s point here is not to remove sin by focusing on hope, but to 
acknowledge the presence of both good and evil. As Janina Ramirez explains, 
 
[w]e need to be wounded in order to heal, and so the wounds of sin are the 
means by which we recognize the need for mercy, compassion, grace and 
love. […] It is not about austerity, or forgiveness, or perfection. It is about 
love. The understanding the God wants to give all his loves ones the gift of 
freedom from sin through love is a radical and almost unique aspect of 
Julian’s spiritual view.102 
 
                                                                                                                
99 Ramanathan, Figure of Good, p.100.  
100 Dame Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, p.200. 
101 Ibid., p.91.   
102 Janina Ramirez, Julian of Norwich: A Very Brief History (London: Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge, 2016), p.62. 
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For Julian, the existence of evil is rationalised within a vision of morality that stresses not 
only, as Weil does, the pointlessness and necessity of evil and suffering, or the fact that it is 
‘behovely’, but also the importance of faith, hope and perseverance. Here, as Murdoch 
illustrates throughout her oeuvre, the moral life, like the lessons of love, offer an ‘infinitely 
perfectible task’ (SG, p.23).103 ‘[W]e can only learn to love by loving’, as the Abbess 
explains to Michael Meade in The Bell: ‘Remember that all our failures are ultimately 
failures in love. Imperfect love must not be condemned and rejected, but made perfect. The 
way is always forward, never back.’ (B, p.243) For the Abbess, echoing Julian, denying an 
experience of goodness and love, however imperfect it may be, through fear of failure, is to 
deny the human potential for perfectibility. The moral life is, above all, an ambiguous 
continuous experience where evil, hope, love and pain co-exist. 
 
The Problem of Evil: Marcus Vallar, Simone Weil and Contingency 
In The Message to the Planet, Murdoch draws on Weil’s response to the problem of evil to 
illustrate the tension between Marcus’s fundamental focus on suffering and his inability to 
acknowledge the contingent nature of human life. Marcus, whose Jewish family never 
experienced the extreme pain caused by the evil of the Holocaust, is obsessed with this 
moment in history: he sees it as an icon, a fundamental ‘sign of evil and pain’ (MP, p.165). 
Rather than focusing on the questions of ‘consciousness’, ‘language’ and the ‘deep 
fundamental knowledge’ (MP, p.13) that attracted Alfred to Marcus’s philosophical ideas, 
                                                                                                                
103 Despite Ramirez’s argument to the contrary, Julian’s Revelations of Divine Love does to a 
certain extent support a perfectionist vision of morality akin to Murdoch’s. Julian argues that 
‘in every soul which shall be saved there is a godly will that never assented to sin, nor ever 
shall. This will is good that it may never will evil, but evermore, continually, it willeth good 
and worketh good in the sight of God’ (Dame Julian, Revelations of Divine Love, p.148). This 
vision of a force that ‘willeth’ and ‘worketh’ toward good echoes the Platonic force of Eros 
that Murdoch posits in her moral philosophy. 
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Marcus continuously returns to the problem of ‘suffering, extreme suffering, [the] pure 
experience of suffering’ (MP, p.165). Marcus explains his metaphysics to Alfred as follows: 
 
What is sought is a device. Something like an electrical circuit. Something 
present in a flash, intuitively seen to be necessary, which cannot be 
otherwise. […] Like […] the Ontological Proof. […] These are hints, 
pictures. What is sought is […] the foundation of things […], something 
necessary, something with must be so. Such a search cannot but be an 
ordeal, indeed a metamorphosis. One must be worthy, an intense purity and 
refinement of thought is required, even one might say a kind of holiness. 
(MP, p.163) 
 
We must adore emptiness and extremity of pain. (MP, p.165) 
 
The imagery and language associated with Marcus’s vision of suffering directly alludes to 
Weil’s writings, for whom ‘[m]an only escapes from the laws of this world in lightning 
flashes, […] instants of contemplation, of pure intuition, of mental void, of acceptance of the 
moral void’.104 Weil also saw the Ontological Proof, a concept with which Hannah engages 
in The Unicorn, as a fundamental aspect of the individual’s moral life. ‘[God] desires our 
love so much,’ Hannah explains to Marion, ‘and a great desire for love can call love into 
being. […] I just have to believe. I have to love God […]. I think if you really love, then 
something is there’ (U, p.53). Like Weil, Murdoch argued that the Ontological Proof is ‘an 
exercise in serious contemplative thinking’ (MGM, p.425) and she quoted Weil’s response to 
it three times: the ‘Ontological Proof is mysterious because it doesn’t address itself to the 
intelligence, but to love’ (MGM, pp.401, 425, 505).105 While Weil’s vision of the moral life 
may, considering her austere concepts of gravity, be ‘grim’, as Murdoch suggests, she 
                                                                                                                
104 Weil, Gravity and Grace, p.11. 
105 Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, p.375. 
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nevertheless illustrates the asceticism and faith needed to appreciate the painful realities of 
morality, to appreciate the existence of evil and suffering. 
Marcus’s belief that the Holocaust should be seen as an icon of human suffering and 
wickedness fails to reflect the austere, dialectical response to suffering provided by Weil. 
Indeed, for Alfred Ludens and the rabbi Daniel Most, Marcus’s vision of suffering is partly 
‘wrong’ (MP, p.396). For the former, his thought focusses on ‘[d]rama, pictures, thinking too 
much about evil, whether it’s done or suffered’ (MP, p.396). Responding to Alfred, Most 
warns that Marcus’s symbolisation of the Holocaust represents a ‘touching image, but one 
must beware of images, they console and are made to be destroyed. It was a technological 
achievement, it was a particular event in the history of our race’ (MP, p.416). Most’s 
iconoclastic response to Marcus, and indeed to the Holocaust, endorses a harsher, Weilian 
picture of suffering, where the moral life, as Murdoch explains, is ‘better understood as a 
confrontation with what is not just unintelligible but pointless’ (MGM, p.108). For Weil, 
there are no ‘No “fruits of action”, [there is] no quasi-aesthetic experience, just attention, 
truthful obedience, where even to regard suffering as a punishment would be a consolation’ 
(MGM, p.108). Within The Message to the Planet, therefore, as Frances White argues, 
Murdoch ‘questions and challenges […] the inherent risk in […] reducing [the Holocaust] to 
totemic, or even (bizarrely and unacceptably) aesthetic, status’.106 What is required instead, 
as Most suggests, is a dialectical response to suffering that acknowledges both its 
fundamental importance and its harsh realities: ‘Now when wickedness is so educated and so 
well armed, it may be the task of innumerable people to be [‘the conscience of mankind’], 
and to preserve the memory of what evil and what good is’ (MP, p.417). As Ricoeur argues, 
both an acceptance and an interrogation of suffering is crucial: one must not ‘separate [the] 
                                                                                                                
106 Frances White, ‘“Past forgiving?”: the experience of remorse in the writings of Iris 
Murdoch’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Kingston University, 2010), p.156. 
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individual experiences of [an ascetic] wisdom from the ethical and political struggle against 
evil that may bring together all people of good will’.107 Weil’s concept of affliction 
encompasses this kind of tension: the individual must accept the realities of evil, pain and 
violence, but the suffering they cause must be endured and not read as a ‘touching image’. 
Murdoch offers a remedial focus for Marcus’s symbolisation of suffering in Alfred’s, 
Gildas’s and Most’s responses to evil, all of whom stress the importance of the contingent 
nature of the world. Ludens, frustrated by Marcus’s continued focus on the Holocaust, 
announces 
 
for heaven’s sake, the world is full of suffering […]. Sometimes we forget 
the suffering of other people, sometimes we remember it, sometimes we do 
something about it. […] Marcus, I shall scream! Everyone suffers, not just 
the Jews, to think we have a special mission to the world is just 
megalomania. Of course one stays with that - it is exceptional - but there 
are a lot of different conclusions which are all reasonable ones. (MP, p.380) 
 
Such suffering is often the result of the inherent contingency of the world, as Murdoch 
repeatedly attests in her philosophy: ‘[w]e live with the sense of hopeless, ruthless 
contingency, we are victims of chance’ (MGM, p.77); ‘we are, as real people, unfinished and 
full of blankness and jumble’ (MGM, p.97); ‘most human lives are irretrievably sunk in 
misery and muddle and fear’ (MGM, p.490). ‘A proper understanding of contingency’, she 
argues, ‘apprehends chance and its horrors’ (MGM, p.107). That ‘the world is full of 
suffering’ is repeated by many characters in The Message to the Planet; even one of the 
secondary characters, a pub owner, attests that, ‘God, human life can be sad’ (MP, p.208). 
While Murdoch is weary of Weil’s non-teleological theodicy, her writings 
nevertheless echo Weil’s idea of God being so ‘indifferent’ that he could provide evil, pain 
                                                                                                                
107 Ricoeur, ‘Evil, A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology’, p.648. 
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and suffering. Her perfectionist morality highlights the need to focus on contingency and 
accepts that suffering can lead to moral benefits. For both Murdoch and Weil, the creation of 
the void that suffering engenders must be accepted as a pointless and meaningless 
experience. In The Message to the Planet, Gildas repeatedly attests the importance of 
accepting such contingent aspects of life: ‘Our lives rest upon contingency, rubble, rubbish. 
There aren’t any foundations except mud and chaos’ (MP, p.18). He does not rule out an 
acknowledgement of suffering, but suggests the importance of accepting such potentially 
dangerous, ‘dark’ revelations, in the light of hope: ‘Human beings live on top of rubble, 
mess, chance, they understand nothing, they are surrounded by darkness, they’ve just got to 
keep on walking. Ambulent, ambulent, ne tenebrae comprehendant’; walk, walk, that the 
darkness overtake (MP, p.42-3). In her late moral philosophy, Murdoch argues that literary 
engagements with ‘multiplicity’, an experience of chance, meaninglessness and pain, 
represent a crucial moral attitude to goodness. In art, she explains, the reader must ‘see 
through, [and] pass through, the busy multiplicity of particulars and contemplate, touch, 
become one with’ the work of art and the characters it presents’ (MGM, p.59). Here, the 
reader represents a paradigm of the moral individual who cannot, Murdoch suggests, 
conclude ‘that we can make no sense […] of what exists’ (MGM, p.79). While there is 
meaning in the moral life, however, it must be sought ‘for nothing’: ‘The only genuine way 
to be good’, Murdoch argues, ‘is to be good “for nothing” in the midst of a scene where every 
“natural” thing, including one’s own mind, is subject to chance’ (SG, p.69). For Murdoch (as 
in Platonic philosophy), the individual’s ‘egoistic consciousness’ separates them from an 
appreciation of ‘the order and true multiplicity of the real world’ (MGM, p.165). The 
individual, therefore, must silence such egoistic calls for meaning and, however difficult it 
may be, direct their attention upon reality. For Murdoch, ‘[t]he struggle against evil, the love 
of what is good, the inspired enjoyment of beauty, the discovery and perception of holiness, 
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continues all the time in the privacy of human souls’ (MGM, p.458). While multiplicity may 
be an overwhelming, painful experience of contingency, it also represents an aspect of the 
complex reality that the moral pilgrim has to accept alongside an appreciation of beauty, 
goodness, holiness and love. 
 
The Problem of Love: Franca and Dame Julian of Norwich 
In The Message to the Planet, Murdoch alludes to Julian’s writings to illustrate how the value 
of love tempers evil: where Blaise and Emily in The Sacred and Profane Love Machine echo 
Murdoch’s ambiguous vision of love and are unaware of the dangerous proximity of evil and 
love, Franca learns, as Julian and Weil illustrate, that evil can be accepted within the context 
of unconditional love. For Ramirez, Julian’s vision chimes with the following words from 
Ancrene Wisse’s Guide for Anchoresses: ‘They who love most shall be most blessed, not 
they who lead to the most austere life, for love outweigheth this’.108 While Weil’s concepts of 
affliction, gravity, necessity, obedience and void appear to value a theodicy in which 
suffering and evil become an expression of God’s love, she nevertheless offers, like 
Murdoch, a vision where the value of love outweighs her austere focus on morality. Weil’s 
personal experiences of pain through debilitating migraines became, for her, mystical visions 
that taught the importance of love. She recounts how  
 
a young English Catholic […] told me of the existence of those English 
poets of the seventeenth century who are named metaphysical. In reading 
them later on, I discovered the poem […] Love [III by George Herbert]. I 
learnt it by heart. Often, at the culminating point of a head ache, I make 
myself say it over, concentrating all my attention upon it and clinging with 
all my soul to the tenderness it enshrines. […] It was during one of these 
                                                                                                                
108 See Ramirez, Julian of Norwich: A Very Brief History. 
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recitations that, as I told you, Christ himself came down and took 
possession of me.109 
 
Herbert’s poem, which is also echoed in The Message to the Planet, draws an extended 
metaphor between, God and the moral life. Herbert writes,  
 
Love bade me welcome. Yet my soul drew back  
                              Guilty of dust and sin. 
[…] 
You must sit down, says Love, and taste my meat: 
                              So I did sit and eat.110 
 
Such an acknowledgement of pain and sin within the context of love is echoed in Jack’s and 
Franca’s vision of love in The Message to the Planet. Franca, in an early reflection on her 
love for Jack, reflects that ‘Love had stopped her mouth. But had love been right?’ (MP, 
p.119). Later, Jack similarly highlights the importance of holding on to love through pain: 
‘We shall go on living, and changing, together,’ he informs Franca, ‘and this will mean, for 
all of us,’ for himself, Franca and Alison, ‘more life, more being, a circle of love, a mystery, 
a stretching out to each other in the dark’ (MP, p.150). This lesson in love is paradigmatic of 
Murdoch’s pictures of the moral life and of the ambiguous nature of love which, like Julian’s, 
Herbert’s and Weil’s writings, teach the importance of enduring suffering and acknowledging 
the overwhelming, unconditional value of love over the painful realities of evil. 
In Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, love often represents a form of spiritual 
goodness as well as violence, pain and evil. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch 
                                                                                                                
109 Simone Weil, Waiting on God, pp.34-35. 
110 George Herbert, ‘Love (III)’ (1633) 
<https://www.poetryfoundation.org/resources/learning/core-poems/detail/44367> [accessed 
15/2/17]. See Appendix B1 for a facsimile of Herbert’s ‘Love (III)’. 
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offers a vision of love, ‘the fruit and overflow of spirit’, that mediates between two moral 
visions: 
 
Plato’s visions may seem far away from the mess of ordinary love, but they 
shed light, we can understand. Falling in love is for many people their most 
intense experience, bringing with it a quasi-religious certainty, and most 
disturbing because it shifts the centre of the world from ourself to another 
place. A love relationship can occasion extreme selfishness and possessive 
violence, the attempt to dominate that other place so that it can no longer be 
separate; or it can prompt a process of unselfing wherein the lover learns to 
see, and cherish and respect, what is not himself. (MGM, pp.16-17) 
 
For Martha Nussbaum, this vision of love, which Murdoch explores in novels such as The 
Black Prince and The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, alludes to writings of Dante and 
Plato.111 For Dante, ‘the sexual element in the love is an impediment and a source of 
delusion’; for Plato, alternatively, sexual love ‘is not simply a starting point for the mind in 
its search for the good, but a lifelong accompaniment to that search’.112 Murdoch’s dualist 
vision of love, Nussbaum argues, is explored in her novels where 
 
Murdoch grants that erotic love has a potential for violence and extreme 
selfishness; but she insists that it is also the greatest source many people 
can ever have of an experience of being forced out of their own ego, by the 
sheer blazing power of another person, towards the vision of something true 
outside the self.113 
 
On the one hand, love can be a ‘profoundly possessive’, ‘mechanical’ (SG, p.73) and 
‘entirely egotistic’ experience (MGM, p.326), in which the individual’s moral sensibility is 
                                                                                                                
111 Martha Nussbaum, ‘“Faint with Secret Knowledge”: Love and Vision in Murdoch’s The 
Black Prince’, in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, ed. by Justin Broackes (New York: Oxford 
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112 Ibid., pp.143, 139.  
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lost, hindered or silenced. Falling in love, as Miles reflects in Bruno’s Dream, often involves 
‘an enlivening and magnifying of the greedy passionate self’ (BD, p.176). On the other hand, 
love itself can result in a positive experience of unselfing, an experience in which the 
individual is ‘forced out of their own ego’. Indeed, for Murdoch, ‘[i]t is in the capacity to 
love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from fantasy consists’ (SG, p.65). Love, 
therefore, as Murdoch illustrates in both her fiction and philosophy, is capable not only of a 
Dantean amoral enchantment but also of a spiritual, grounding power, akin to the love of God 
or the Platonic vision of the good. Nussbaum argues that, for Bradley Pearson in The Black 
Prince, love is egoistic, self-centred and ‘self-serving’ as well as a source of moral ‘vision 
and illumination’.114 Though love can provide an experience of unselfing and a Platonic 
vision of something ‘true outside the self’, as Nussbaum suggests, it remains an ambiguous 
experience in which the individual, more often than not, confronts their moral limitations.115 
 The Sacred and Profane Love Machine illustrates how love can, paradoxically, have 
both a positive and negative impact on the moral life. On the one hand, supported by 
religious imagery, Blaise’s love for Emily is morally and spiritually justifying. His love, as 
the narrator explains, reveals ‘[t]he world in its detail’: ‘His whole being was engaged, he 
was identified with her real self, he fully inhabited his own nature for the first time in his life’ 
(SPLM, p.73). On the other hand, the solipsistic nature of Emily and Blaise’s love for each 
other is shown to be emotionally and morally obscuring. The moral ambivalence of Blaise’s 
love for Emily is aptly outlined in the middle of the novel: 
 
Intense mutual erotic love, love which involves with the flesh all the most 
refined sexual being of the spirit, which reveals and perhaps even ex nihilo 
creates spirit as sex, is comparatively rare in this inconvenient world. This 
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love presents itself as such a dizzily lofty value that even to speak of 
“enjoying” it seems a sacrilege. It is something to be undergone upon one’s 
knees. And where it exists it cannot but shed a blazing light of justification 
upon its own scene, a light which can leave the rest of the world dark 
indeed. (SPLM, p.261) 
 
Here, in this exploration of the ambiguous value of sexual love, Murdoch renders the 
narrative voice complex by drawing on both didacticism and internal narration: it is unclear if 
the narrator or Blaise himself is the figure who believes that ‘intense mutual erotic love’ is an 
experience to be cherished, ‘to be undergone upon one’s knees’. By the end of the novel, this 
argument in favour of the overwhelmingly positive moral value of love is undermined by 
Blaise and Emily’s wickedness; so enthralled in their relationship, so perplexed by its 
‘blazing light of justification’, they are incapable of seeing their moral faults. Their moral 
blindness is illustrated at the end of the novel where they ‘silently, surreptitiously, feverishly, 
like people trying to conceal a crime’, feed a ‘perpetual bonfire’ with the ‘poor rubble’ of 
Blaise’s ex-wife, Harriet (SPLM, p.339). Murdoch, however, provides a dissenting voice in 
David, who recoils at their ‘totally wicked’ behaviour: ‘They’re like Hitler, just destroying 
everything’ (SPLM, p.350). Despite its ‘rare’, ‘dizzily lofty’, spiritual ‘value’, Blaise and 
Emily’s love, as David’s powerful comparison illustrates, allows their sin to flourish, silences 
the call of empathy, and blinds them to the pain they cause those around them; the ‘blazing 
light of justification’ shone by their mutual ‘erotic love’ licences their evildoing. 
Unlike Jack’s love for Franca, or Blaise’s love for Emily, Franca’s experience of the 
evil occasioned by love affords her moral clarity, and her later return to Jack offers a lesson 
in unconditional love, a love capable of accepting, and developing beyond, pain. Her 
engagement with wickedness, with ‘an evil spirit’ (MP, p.233), provides her with a ‘new 
power: a power over her future’ (MP, p.411) that she uses to reinvigorate her relationship 
with Jack. Here, as Rowe suggests, ‘Franca’s humiliating acceptance of Jack’s behaviour 
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makes for uncomfortable reading’ because Murdoch ‘appears to applaud Franca’s 
victimhood’.116 Such a reading, however, misses the importance of Franca’s overwhelming 
unconditional love for Jack, a love which trumps the pain that she has undergone and the evil 
with which she has engaged. As Rowe argues,  
 
Strength, understanding, compassion and patience are the qualities readers 
are being invited to applaud in Franca, against which the vacuousness of 
Jack’s supreme self-centredness appears in sharp relief and becomes 
laughable. Jack should be seen as the fool in this set piece, not Franca, but 
the task of accepting such a distinction remains contentious and difficult.117 
 
By the end of the novel, the places of wife and mistress are swapped, and Franca finds herself 
with the choice of staying with Jack or leaving him. Franca’s acceptance of love instead of 
evil, despite the guiding power it had provided her, occurs because she, like Julian and Weil, 
understands that, in the context of unconditional love, it is unnecessary to rationalise evil. 
Indeed, the pain and suffering caused by Jack allow her to change and realise that ‘her play 
acting’ had been ‘a blazing furnace of wickedness’ (MP, p.553). By the end of the novel, 
Franca provides Jack with the moral impetus and autonomy to remain with her, telling him he 
‘must decide alone’ (MP, p.538). This ultimatum reaffirms the true value of their love, and 
they conclude the novel in the ‘lovely gently lighted real world’ (MP, p.552); ‘today is true 
and real’, Franca admits, ‘and to be lived with in the clear light and fresh air’ (MP, p.553). 
With the Sheerwaters’s door closed, Murdoch’s imagery at the end of the novel sounds a note 
of conclusion, offering a more calm and measured vision of love than the ‘blazing light of 
justification’ shone by Blaise and Emily’s mutual erotic love in The Sacred and Profane Love 
                                                                                                                
116 Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch, p.44. 
117 Ibid. 
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Machine (SPLM, p.261); instead, Franca’s is a Julianian love that has acknowledged the 
pains of evil and the value of unconditional love. 
In The Message to the Planet, Murdoch illustrates the dangers of seeking meaning 
within evil, pain and suffering instead of acknowledging the presence of contingency and 
human frailty. Where Marcus’s obsession with justifications for evil leave him morally 
trapped and potentially motivate his suicide, Franca’s engagement with the problem of love 
offers a more mystical response to the problem of evil that highlights the value of endurance 
and faith. The characters within The Unicorn, like Marcus, fail to acknowledge how a search 
for meaning can represent a form of selfishness or Jobian hubris. For Murdoch, the individual 
must acknowledge their human frailties and the existence of suffering as necessary aspects of 
the moral life. Influenced by the Book of Job and by Julian’s and Weil’s writings, Murdoch 
offers an austere theodicy that highlights how the experiences of evil, pain and suffering 
should be seen within the context of love and goodness. Speaking to Alfred, one of Marcus’s 
doctors similarly suggests that ‘[w]e are surrounded by horrors. The human soul is full of 
foul and dreadful monsters. Just stay with him. Hold his hand, stroke his brow, kiss him. […] 
He needs love. Ah, love, yes, we all need that’ (MP, p.392). 
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Chapter Three 
Iris Murdoch’s Dialectical Morality: Monism and Dualism in the writings of Saint Paul 
and Jung 
 
Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of 
the devil. For we wrestle not against the flesh and spirit, but against 
principalities, against powers, against rulers of the darkness of this world, 
against spiritual wickedness in high places. 
Saint Paul.1 
 
Good must triumph over Evil. [T]he only way in which morality ultimately 
operates [is] through the destruction of evil. [O]f course you have to make a pact 
with the evil tendencies within yourself. You can’t destroy them, you’ve got to live 
with them. Yet the background of this, I’d say, would be that you must destroy 
them. 
Iris Murdoch.2 
 
What this age needs is a dynamic morality. 
Iris Murdoch.3 
 
 
This chapter argues that Iris Murdoch’s engagements with dualism in her fiction and 
philosophy portray a morally-productive discrepancy: her fiction, with its portrayal of the 
complex realities of the moral and spiritual life, acknowledges the presence of ambiguous 
forces of good and evil; her philosophy, with its central concept of the good, problematises 
the existence of a single, independent powerful force of evil within the moral life. While 
Murdoch’s monism undermines a strictly positive vision of evil, both her late moral 
philosophy and her interviews invite a realist acknowledgement of evil as a substantive force 
within the Platonic continuum of the moral life. 
                                                                                                                
1 Saint Paul, Ephesians 6:11-12, in The Bible: Authorized King James Version, ed. Robert 
Carroll and Stephen Prickett (Oxford: University Press, 2008), p.244. 
2 Peter J. Conradi, ‘An Unpublished 1983 Interview’, the Iris Murdoch Review 4 (2013), 7-17 
(pp.14-15).  
3 Iris Murdoch, FHD, p.123. 
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The first part of this chapter argues that Murdoch’s adoption of a such a realist, 
pseudo-dualist picture of morality draws, in part, on Saint Paul’s writings, whose concept of 
‘principalities and powers’ illustrates the fundamental role that ambiguous spiritual forces 
play in the moral life. She drew a link between Paul’s intermediary forces of good and evil 
and the importance of Eros in controlling or mediating them: ‘Eros is the desire for good and 
joy which is active at all levels in the soul and through which we are able to turn toward 
reality’; he is, like Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’, ‘the ambiguous spiritual mediator and 
[a] moving spirit of mankind’ (EM, p.34). While such Pauline or Platonic spiritual forces can 
be dangerous, as explored in The Time of the Angels (1966), they can also be beneficial, or 
benign, as in The Nice and the Good (1968) and A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970). 
Regardless of their ambiguity, these forces represent, as Murdoch’s allusions to the Christian 
mystic Eckhart in The Sea, The Sea (1978) and The Good Apprentice (1985) illustrate, a 
fundamental spiritual energy in the moral life.  
 The second part of this chapter focuses on a recently published interview between 
Conradi and Murdoch where she outlines her philosophical disagreements with dualism, 
which are later developed in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals alongside the writings of 
Heraclitus and Jung. Her criticism of Jung and her engagement with the idea of making a 
‘pact’ with one’s evil tendencies present two problems: for both Jung and Jungian critics her 
criticism of his writings is partly incorrect; moreover, her suggestion within Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals that ‘[e]vil may have to be lived with’ (MGM, p.506) appears to support a 
Jungian vision of morality. These dilemmas and paradoxes can arguably be resolved by 
comparing the pictures of morality in her fiction and philosophy: where the latter offers an 
idealist picture of morality, the former offers a more realist, and indeed Jungian, presentation 
of the individual’s moral challenges. While Murdoch disagrees with a powerful 
‘independent’ force of evil, she nevertheless believes that the individual has to acknowledge 
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the fundamental presence of evil in the moral life; the individual is involved in a dialectical 
struggle between both monist and dualist forms of morality, between good and evil. 
 
Ambiguous Dualist Forces: Saint Paul’s ‘Intermediaries’ and Plato’s Eros  
Peter J. Conradi argues that Murdoch’s fictional exploration of ambiguous, dualist spiritual 
forces was partly informed by Elias Canetti’s vision of morality.4 Murdoch’s journal entry for 
1 April 1953 illustrates the extent to which Canetti’s dualist tendencies troubled her:  
 
Canetti claimed ‘Good has to become demonic, in our age, in real life. 
Unless it can live idyllically […].’ What is it for C[anetti] to be a 
manichee? He believes in real forces of evil - & is ready to use evil to serve 
good, if he can. […] Is his positive idea of good subject to anything 
transcendent? (IML, p.369) 
 
In The Time of the Angels, Carel’s Manichean vision of morality asserts the presence of such 
‘real forces of evil’ and, like Murdoch’s tentative worry about the lack of ‘transcendence’ in 
Canetti’s picture of morality, does not posit a ‘positive idea of good’. Murdoch’s 
interrogation of these dualist ideas within The Time of the Angels not only draws on the 
writings of Saint Paul but also echoes his fears about the dangers of dualism. Saint Paul’s 
writings offer a critique of the existence of these ambiguous, dualist forces within the moral 
life, which are for him both necessary and dangerous. Indeed, as the Christian mystic Eckhart 
similarly illustrated, the value of these spiritual powers should, despite their dangers, be 
acknowledged and perhaps even valued. For Eckhart, as for Murdoch, Saint Paul and Plato, 
these ambiguous forces represent the complex realities of the moral life where the individual 
necessarily experiences both good and evil.  
                                                                                                                
4 See Peter J. Conradi, ‘Canetti’s Weakness’, Iris Murdoch Review, 7 (2016): 19-29; and 
IML, pp.477-8. 
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Saint Paul’s Principalities and Powers 
Saint Paul’s concept of ‘principalities and powers’ illustrates the complex realities of the 
moral life by positing ambiguous, fragmented spirits alongside a benevolent God. The phrase 
‘principalities and powers’ appears in Saint Paul’s Romans 8.38, Ephesians 1.21, Ephesians 
3.10, Ephesians 6.12, Colossians 1.16, Colossians 2.10 and Colossians 2.15, and is 
representative of the dualist, often evil, spiritual forces capable of hindering an individual’s 
moral development.5 Within these verses such forces are, on the one hand, rejected in favour 
of the power of God’s love, as, for example, in Romans 8.38-9 where Saint Paul writes ‘[f]or 
I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor 
things present, nor things to come, / Nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be 
able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.’ On the other 
hand, Ephesians 6.12 highlights the challenge that such forces present: ‘[f]or we wrestle not 
against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the 
darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.’ Such verses reveal the 
difference between the monist position of God in Christianity, in which God is a single figure 
of good who has power over the Devil and thus over evil, as opposed to dualist religions, 
such as Gnosticism and Manichaeism, which posit equally powerful forces of good and evil. 
While Judaeo-Christian systems of morality are for the most part monist, they 
nevertheless contain a latent dualism. They can, for example, be labelled dualist for their 
portrayal of sharply-opposed and sometimes equally-powerful forces: (the good) God and 
(the evil) Satan or Devil. The writings of Saint Augustine and Saint Paul, moreover, partly 
invite the kind of dualisms inherent in Gnosticisms and Manichaeism. Michael Grant engages 
                                                                                                                
5 There is one appearance of the word ‘principalities’ in the Old Testament, Jeremiah 13.18, 
but it does not concern the same dualist ideas as Saint Paul’s use of the phrase. 
 116 
with these problems in Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man, where he compares Christianity with the 
dualist doctrines. Gnosticism, which flourished in the second century AD, posits, in 
opposition to ‘the evil and material world’, ‘a spiritual saviour’ who ‘offers redeeming […] 
knowledge’, or gnosis, of the moral agent’s ‘spiritual self’, thereby providing them with 
access to ‘the spiritual and good world’.6 Manichaeism, which later developed from 
Gnosticism, posits ‘a radical dualism of good and evil that is metaphysically grounded in 
[the] coeternal and independent cosmic powers of Light and Darkness […] in which Spirit 
represents Light and Matter represents Darkness’.7 Such dualist religions, with their 
combination of religious, metaphysical and psychological dualisms were originally 
influenced, Grant explains, by the problem of evil, by ‘the conviction that the good God 
could not have been the creator of the evil that so manifestly exists’ in the world; such dualist 
religions ‘felt it far more convincing to suppose that all this evil […] must have been created 
by another power who was not God’.8 Much like the later Manicheans, therefore, Gnostics 
posited a powerful source of evil in the world that operated against a sequestered, 
transcendent source of goodness, akin to the vision of God in Christianity or, indeed, Plato’s 
Form of the Good. By portraying evil as an autonomous moral category, equal in power and 
influence of good, such dualist doctrines differ from monist Christianity, where God has 
sovereign power over evil.  
 Saint Paul criticised the Gnostics and the Manicheans, respectively, for the elitism 
and dualism inherent in their pictures of morality. Victor White suggests that Paul’s most 
critical attitudes towards Gnosticism appear in I Timothy 6.20 and I Corinthians 8.1-2: ‘O 
Timothy, keep that which is committed to thy trust, avoiding profane and vain babblings, and 
                                                                                                                
6 The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edn, ed. by Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), p.341.  
7 Ibid., p.552. 
8 Michael Grant, Saint Paul: the Man (Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1978), p.42. 
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oppositions of science [gnosis] falsely so called’; ‘Knowledge [gnosis] puffeth up, but charity 
edifieth’.9 Gnosticism, White explains, is ‘essentially esoteric and sectarian and (in the Greek 
sense) aristocratic’: only if the individual was ‘a favoured initiate’ did they have access to its 
‘saving mysteries’.10 Instead of an elitist, doctrinarian picture of morality, in which the 
individual must be a ‘favoured initiate’ before they can access a false, ‘vain’ knowledge, Paul 
supports a more universal, charitable picture of morality.11 For Saint Paul, both Gnosticism 
and Manichaeism disrupt his monist Christianity where God has sovereign power over evil: 
the Gnostics presents a dualism of good spirit/soul and evil body/matter, whereas the 
Manicheans present a dualism good/light spirit and evil/dark flesh.12 Thus, in Ephesians 6.12, 
Paul critiques a dualist, perhaps Manichean, system of morality that posits ‘spiritual 
wickedness in high places’, that posits evil above the sovereign goodness of God and the 
universal love of Christ. For him, religious, metaphysical dualisms of good-light and evil-
darkness, of good-spirit and evil-matter, allow evil, unlike in traditional Christian monism, to 
have more power than goodness.13 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                
9 Victor White argues that Paul’s use of the word ‘knowledge’ in these verses can be 
interpreted as ‘gnosis’. Victor White, ‘Some Notes on Gnosticism’, in The Gnostic Jung, ed. 
by Robert A. Segal (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp.197-218, p.203. 
10 White, ‘Some Notes on Gnosticism’, p.203. 
11 In I Corinthians 13.8-13, Saint Paul writes ‘Charity never faileth […] now abideth faith, 
hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity’. 
12 See the definitions in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p.341 and p.552. 
13 Michael Grant makes a distinction between the partial religious dualism present in 
Christianity from the earlier Jewish tradition and the dualism present within the writings of 
Saint Paul. The Jewish tradition, as seen in the Old Testament, views God as ‘the sole creator 
of the universe’ thus precluding the possibility of a ‘dualism that divided the world between 
two rival powers’. Saint Paul accepted this ‘dualism of subordination’ over the religious 
dualism present in Gnosticism and Manichaeism. Grant, Saint Paul: the Man, pp.42-3. 
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Dangerous Fragmented Spirit 
In The Time of the Angels, Murdoch alludes to Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’ to 
highlight, not the value of God’s love, but dangers of the ambiguous, amoral, dangerous 
spiritual environment they create, in which evil is as captivating an option for the individual 
as good. For Carel, these spirits reflect the unfathomable faithlessness of the environment in 
which he lives. The problems caused by Carel’s faithless environment are similarly echoed in 
Murdoch’s later novel, The Philosopher’s Pupil (1983), where Father Bernard, a priest who 
like Carel does not believe in God, argues that ‘[o]ur problem now, the problem of our age, 
our interregnum, our interim, our time of the angels’ will only be resolved when religion 
‘change[s] itself into something we can believe in’ (PP, p.188). For Father Bernard ‘our time 
of the angels’ is, as Carel similarly attests, a time of ‘[s]pirit without God’ (PP, p.188). The 
fragmentation of such theological, ‘psychological forces’, as Anne Rowe argues, forms ‘a 
dangerous metaphysical space’ that disrupts the individual’s ‘moral parameters’; in such a 
morally ambivalent environment, ‘some new, more sinister, kind of “magic” [can] slouch in 
to fill this moral and spiritual vacuum’.14 Indeed, for Carel, the moral vacuum left by God 
allows for the triumph of evil. 
For Conradi, Murdoch’s attempt to ‘contest’ Carel’s Manichean ‘vision of life’ in The 
Time of the Angels arises, in part, from a ‘darkness’ that Elias Canetti ‘taught her’ and she 
subsequently ‘struggled to negotiate’.15 Conradi also connects Canetti’s Manichean interests 
to The Epic of Gilgamesh, one of literature’s ‘most ancient text[s]’ that influenced Canetti’s 
thought, including his obsession with mortality and morality.16 In The Epic of Gilgamesh, the 
main character’s, Enkidu’s, attempt to understand his mortality, results in a ‘descent into the 
                                                                                                                
14 Anne Rowe, ‘“The Dream that does not Cease to Haunt us”: Iris Murdoch’s Holiness’, in 
Iris Murdoch and Morality, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), pp.141-55, p.144. 
15 Conradi, ‘Canetti’s Weakness’, p.25. See, also, IML, pp.477-8.  
16 Ibid., p.26.  
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underworld’ where he witnesses ‘the House of Darkness’ wherein ‘those who dwell […] 
without light’ are clothed in ‘garments of feathers’ and eat ‘clay’ in an environment shrouded 
in ‘dust’.17 In The Time of the Angels, Murdoch echoes these images of ‘darkness’ and 
‘feathers’: Carel is seen dancing alone to Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake, ‘a shadowy figure 
moving in the darkness of his room’ (TA, p.28), and Pattie O’Driscol, Carel’s mixed-race 
mistress and lover, hearing this music, feels ‘feathery and light’ (TA, p.3).18 Murdoch 
similarly recalls this imagery in Carel’s demonic vision of morality, a vision that repeats 
throughout her oeuvre: in The Nice and the Good, John Ducane comes across a ‘large cage’ 
containing dead pigeons when investigating the magic rituals carried out by Radeechy (NG, 
p.212); in The Bell, Nick Fawley speaks, in his amoral sermon about sin, of the ‘delicious 
pleasure of writhing and groveling in the dust’ (B, p.266); even Gildas Sterne, in The 
Message to the Planet (1989), suggests that ‘[o]ur lives rest on contingency, rubble, rubbish. 
There aren’t any foundations except mud and chaos’ (MP, p.18). For these characters, a 
vision of chaos, darkness, dust, feathers and mud are representative of the potential depravity 
and meaninglessness of the moral life.  
Murdoch’s portrayal of Carel’s demonic vision draws on such bleak imagery to 
highlight the dangerous fragmented spirituality of Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’, as 
well as Canetti’s dark Manichean ‘vision of life’, where good and evil are so mixed that evil 
itself becomes ‘nameless’ (TA, p.171). Carel expounds his moral vision when speaking to his 
brother, Marcus Fischer. He argues, 
 
Suppose the truth were awful, suppose it was just a black pit, or like birds 
huddled in the dust in a dark cupboard? Suppose only evil were real, only it 
was not evil since it had lost even its name? Who could face this? The 
                                                                                                                
17 The Epic of Gilgamesh, quoted in Conradi, ‘Canetti’s Weakness’, p.25. 
18 In The Time of the Angels, Elizabeth is also connected with images of feathers: the sheets 
of her bed, Muriel witnesses, produce ‘the effect […] of a nest of feathery silky stuffs’ (TA, 
p.34), ‘tousled and feathery’ (TA, p.41). 
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philosophers have never even tried. […] Multiplicity is not paganism, it is 
the triumph of evil, or rather of what used to be called evil and is now 
nameless. […] God was at least the name of something which we thought 
was good. Now even the name has gone and the spiritual world is scattered. 
There is nothing any more to prevent the magnetism of many spirits. (TA, 
p.169-171) 
 
Carel’s Manichean vision of the world suggests that the removal of God, a sovereign, 
powerful, ‘magneti[c]’ figure of control, results in His spiritual forces (the angels of good and 
evil) being ‘scattered’. This ‘multiplicity’ of fragmented spiritual forces allows for the 
‘triumph’ of ‘evil’ (TA, p.171). Father Bernard’s faithless picture of the world had 
acknowledged a resolution to these problems of ambiguous fragmented spirit, and like 
Murdoch’s philosophy asserted the need to find a place for holiness. Carel, however, fails to 
see the positive vision inherent within Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’; instead, he sees the 
fragmented, ‘scattered’ godless world as a place of fear and horror, where the existence of 
evil and suffering renders the moral life pointless. While Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’, 
his ambiguous spiritual forces, can help the moral pilgrim, they also reveal the existence of 
evil, a fact that for thinkers like Carel leaves the world too amoral and chaotic for the 
existence of goodness. 
 
St Paul’s Intermediaries and Iris Murdoch’s Eros 
Saint Paul’s morality is rendered paradoxical by his support of ambiguous, potentially 
dualist, spirits and his religious, psychological dualism, where the individual’s good, spiritual 
nature is opposed by their evil flesh. Michael Grant suggests that Paul’s belief in the reality 
of such spirits, in ‘principalities and powers’, 
 
was a reasonable and logical corollary of Paul’s intense monotheistic belief 
in a single transcendent God. For it was hard to suppose that a God of such 
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exalted remoteness could concern himself directly with the details of men’s 
lives: and so it became necessary to accept the idea that there were 
intermediaries who would undertake such interventions, and that it was to 
them, discarnate intelligences in the universe, that we should address our 
prayers, rather than directly to the inaccessible supreme being.19 
 
These ‘intermediaries’ or spirits, which exist outside of God’s control, led Saint Paul to adopt 
an ‘antithesis between the spirit, which is God’s, and the flesh, which is Satan’s’ that, to a 
certain extent, disrupts his monist picture of morality.20 Here, as Grant argues, Paul offers an 
‘invitation to the dualism’ inherent in the doctrines of Gnosticism and Manichaeism that ‘he 
elsewhere explicitly reject[s]’.21 While Paul was critical of dualist doctrines, his acceptance 
of the dangerous reality of such potentially Manichean spiritual forces aids human moral 
autonomy; they provide the individual with the choice of good or evil. 
Murdoch’s late philosophical adoption of Plato’s Eros, an ambiguous guiding force in 
the moral life, echoes Saint Paul’s picture of morality, where the individual can encounter 
God’s goodness (and His love) through ‘intermediaries’. Murdoch’s engagement with 
Michael Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man and E. R. Dodds’s Pagan and Christian in an Age of 
Anxiety illustrates her interest in these partly dualist visions of morality. In Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals, for example, she explains that  
 
Similarities are noted (e.g. by E. R. Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age 
of Anxiety, p. 37) between Paul’s reference to demonic powers and the 
“intermediaries” of the symposium, of which Eros is one. […] Plato was 
                                                                                                                
19 Grant, Saint Paul: the Man, p.37. 
20 Ibid., p.43. Grant points out that Saint Paul exhibits a latent dualism in Romans 7:18 and 2 
Corinthians 5: ‘I know that in me (that, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing’; ‘whilst we are 
at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord’. Murdoch made a note of Grant’s 
discussion of the ‘opposites of flesh + spirit’ on this page and underlined his description of 
St. Paul’s ‘antithesis between the spirit […] and the flesh’. See Murdoch’s annotated copy of 
Michael Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man, shelved at IML57. 
21 Grant, pp.42-3. 
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not a Manichaean, and neither was Paul, though they were both acutely 
aware of the power of evil, and lived in societies which believed in 
ambiguous spirits’ (MGM, p.397). 
 
In her readings of Saint Paul: the Man, Murdoch clarifies this reading of Saint Paul’s vision 
of morality, with its inherently ‘ambiguous spirits’. She makes the following note in her 
marginalia to Grant’s text:  
 
38 Symposium : “every[thing] which is of the nature of spirits half god + 
half man” (Whole Q[uestion] of the [totally/totality] (?) demonic nature of 
the spiritual. [Christian] attitude to?  [Sic.]) If God is very transcendent we 
need angels + demons!22  
 
Here, Murdoch illustrates that, while Saint Paul, like Plato, was ‘not a Manichaean’, his 
awareness of ‘the power of evil’ led him to seek a system for its control: for him, God’s 
transcendent moral position required the presence of ‘intermediaries’, of both ‘angels + 
demons’. 23 Quoting from Dodds, Grant explains the impact of such Greek spiritual 
forces on Saint Paul’s picture of morality on the page to which Murdoch refers in her 
marginalia. (The underlined sections in the quotation, below, are Murdoch’s.) Grant 
argues that: 
 
Paul saw these forces with a vivid urgency that is all his own. Yet […] he 
was speaking in terms which would be fully familiar to his contemporaries 
[….] [T]hese were beliefs which went back as far as Plato’s Symposium, in 
which Socrates is made to say that “everything which is of the nature of 
                                                                                                                
22 Iris Murdoch, Annotations to Michael Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man, IML57, [back of 
book]. Square brackets are used to replace Murdoch’s shorthand, and once to point to a 
potentially unintelligible word which is either ‘totally’ or ‘totality’.  
23 According to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, the term ‘transcendent’ defines 
‘Existence beyond; independent existence’: ‘In theology, the transcendence of God is 
contrasted with his immanence or pervasion of the world’. See The Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy, p.922.  
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spirit is half-god and half-man” and the functions of such beings are “to 
interpret and convey messages to the gods from men and to men from the 
gods [… .] Being of an intermediate nature, a spirit bridges the gap between 
them, and prevents the universe from falling into two separate halves.” And 
by Paul’s time, as E. R. Dodds observes: “virtually everyone believed in the 
existence of these beings and in their function as mediators, whether he 
called them daemons or angels or simply ‘spirits’”.24 
 
Ambiguous spirits, then, can support the monist, ‘transcendent’ position of God in the 
Christian picture of morality and stop a more fragmented religious moral dualism from 
existing in the ‘universe’. Such a moral system means that, unlike in The Time of the 
Angels where ‘principalities and powers’ are dangerous, ‘nameless’ evil spirits, there 
can, as evidenced by Murdoch’s adoption of the Platonic Eros, be morally beneficial 
incarnations of these spirits.  
In Murdoch’s late moral philosophy, the dangers or benefits of these fragmented 
spiritual forces are negotiated by the Platonic figure of Eros, a similarly ambiguous spirit who 
negotiates the realist ‘continuum’ of morality and directs the individual toward the ideal of 
good. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines Plato’s figure of Eros, traditionally, the 
Greek god of love or desire, as an embodiment of Plato’s concept of anamnesis, which 
mediates the individual’s access to the Forms, for example, the Form of Good, through their 
spiritual nature.25 For Murdoch, Eros represents a central force in the moral life, providing 
‘an orientation of our energy and our appetites’ (MGM, p.497): ‘[t]hat we can and do love 
Good and are drawn towards it is something that we have to learn from our experience, as we 
move all the time in the continuum between good and bad. This is our everyday existence 
                                                                                                                
24 Murdoch, Annotations to Michael Grant’s Saint Paul: the Man, p.38. 
25 See The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p.31. 
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where spiritual energy, Eros, is all the time active at a variety of levels’ (MGM, p.507).26 The 
Platonic figure of Eros posits a spiritual, religious force within the moral experience that 
highlights, as Murdoch notes in her journal, the fundamental ‘problem of the transformation 
of power’ and energy (IML, p.545). While the ambiguous spiritual position occupied by Eros 
may be compared to Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’, Eros provides crucial moral 
guidance by helping the individual differentiate between good and evil.  
 Murdoch explores the morally beneficial, or benign, incarnations of such 
spiritual ‘intermediaries’ in The Nice and the Good and A Fairly Honourable Defeat; 
both of these novels highlight that such fragmented spiritual forces are implicitly 
connected to Plato’s picture of morality. In A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Tallis Browne 
reflects on the spiritual connection he has with his deceased twin. The narrator explains 
that 
 
[Tallis] never spoke to anybody about these matters. It was, he believed, 
from some other region that his sister visited him […]. There were 
principalities and powers, tall cold detached things. Her visitations were 
enigmatic and often menacing, yet perhaps she shielded him from what was 
other and worse. Perhaps because of her he did not suffer certain 
temptations. He suspected this because of a deep sense of lack of merit in 
certain regions where he was blameless. Can one shield another from evil 
and if so must the shield itself grow dark? (FHD, p.200) 
 
Tallis’s sister is an ambiguous spirit from a ‘detached’ realm of transcendent 
‘menacing’ spiritual presences; a benign, perhaps ‘dark[ened]’ spirit, that ‘shield[s]’ 
him from ‘temptation’. It is perhaps because of this protective spirit that the other 
‘demons’, the ‘minor presences, riff raff of creation, [and] debris’ that, surrounding 
                                                                                                                
26 For a more exhaustive description of Murdoch’s understanding of the Platonic figure of 
Eros and its relation to morality, see MGM, pp.496-7 and passim. 
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Tallis, are ‘merely a nuisance value’ (FHD, p.200). While ‘principalities and powers’ in 
A Fairly Honourable Defeat are benign, or potentially beneficial, Willy Kost’s 
reference to them in The Nice and the Good highlights their potential for good. He 
offers Jessica the following advice: 
 
You wish to act out your love, to give it body, but there is only one act left 
to you that is truly loving and that is to let [John Ducane] go, and to let him 
go gently and without resentment. Put all your energy into that and you will 
win from the world of the spirit a grace which you cannot now even dream 
of. For there is grace, Jessica, there are principalities and powers, there is 
unknown good which flies magnetically toward to the good we know. (NG, 
p.191) 
 
Here, Murdoch draws a connection between Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’ and a 
Platonic picture of morality in which the individual ‘intuit[s]’ the Form of Good that lies 
‘beyond’ their immediate vision (MGM, p.462). Willy Kost’s advice to Jessica merges the 
religious ‘grace’ of a Christian, Pauline vision of morality with a ‘magnetic’, Platonic call 
toward the Good. Like the goodness to which Kost refers, the tall ‘cool detached’ spirit of 
Tallis’s twin sister is, as Murdoch herself suggests (TCHF, p.73), a religious guarantor that 
‘shield[s]’ Tallis from danger. Such Platonic ideals are, to a certain extent, anti-dualist by 
merging the ‘transcendent and immanent’ (MGM, pp.461) nature of morality, both accessible 
to and beyond human experience.27 For Tallis and Willy, ‘principalities and powers’, 
therefore, are more akin to those expressed in Paul’s Romans 8.38-9: they are ‘persuaded’ 
                                                                                                                
27 Traditionally, transcendence and immanence are opposed, and form a metaphysical 
dualism, but Murdoch did not conceive of these two aspects of the good as separate. 
Murdoch’s integration of ‘both of sides of [this] dualism’ between transcendence and 
immanence, Heather Widdows argues, means that her concept of the Good ‘is never 
contained in a single object or action […] but always exceeds the confines of a particular 
situation’, and, moreover, that the Good ‘itself [can be] known’ from an attention to reality. 
Heather Widdows, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), p.72-3. 
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that ‘neither […] principalities, nor powers, […] shall be able to separate [them] from the 
love of God’, or the Platonic Form of the Good.  
 In both her fiction and philosophy, Murdoch aligns the fundamental ambiguous moral 
role of Plato’s Eros and Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’ with Eckhart’s theological imagery 
of the spiritual force of God in Commentary on the Book of Exodus. Murdoch explains in 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals how Eckhart’s response to Exodus 3.14, ‘I am that I am’, 
in the Commentary on the Book of Exodus, represents an absolute ‘affirmation’ of God’s 
presence and power (MGM, p.464). Eckhart argues that  
 
The repetition of the word ‘am’ […] indicates […] a certain turning-back 
and reversion of His being into and upon itself and its indwelling or 
inherence in itself: not only this but a boiling-up, as it were, or a process of 
giving birth to itself — inwardly seething, melting and boiling in itself and 
into itself, light in light and into light wholly interpenetrating itself, wholly 
and from every side turned and reflected upon itself. (Quoted in MGM, 
pp.464-5) 
 
Murdoch provides this image after praising Martin Buber’s picture of ‘religion being a 
matter of a continuous consciousness, a preservation of the moment, an entry into the 
whole of reality’ (MGM, p.464). For Buber, she explains, ‘encountered reality’ 
becomes a ‘deep abyss’, ‘a dark and ambiguous place containing demons’ (MGM, 
p.465). Such an abyss, Murdoch suggests, recalls ‘the dark realm of Plato’s anamnesis, 
of St John of the Cross’s abyss of faith into which we fall when we have discarded all 
images of God; or the seething bubbling cauldron in terms of which Eckhart once 
described God’ (MGM, p.464). For these thinkers, such ambiguous spiritual experience 
represents an engagement with the central creative energies associated with God. 
Murdoch recalls this image in both The Sea, The Sea (1978) and The Good Apprentice, 
 127 
to illustrate the fundamental importance of Saint Paul’s and Plato’s ambiguous spiritual 
energies. 
Murdoch’s image of a ‘seething’ Eckhartian abyss in The Sea, The Sea 
highlights the spiritual vitality of the saint-like figure, James Arrowby. In The Sea, The 
Sea, the protagonist and first-person narrator, Charles Arrowby, lives near and is later 
almost drowned in a similar ‘bubbling cauldron’, a dangerous rock formation called 
‘Minn’s Cauldron’, which recalls Eckhart’s apocalyptic, frenetic imagery (SS, p.26). 
The geological feature is comprised of ‘an arched bridge of rock under which [the sea] 
roars into a deep open steep-sided enclosure beyond’ (SS, p.5). The sea generates 
‘violent forces’: ‘churning waves’ (SS, p.5) ‘destroy themselves in a boiling fury of 
opposing waters and frenzied creaming foam’ (SS, p.245) and, when the tide recedes, 
‘the cauldron [becomes] an equally furious whirlpool as the water churn[s] itself into a 
circling froth in its desperate attempt to escape through the narrow outlet under the 
arch’ (SS, p.243). Charles is later pushed into Minn’s Cauldron, and he tries in vain to 
fight against the ‘vortex’: ‘I fought,’ he recounts, ‘my whole body fought, now flailing 
senselessly in a maelstrom of power which seemed about to dismember me’. He goes 
unconscious ‘knocking his head violently against the smooth rock’ (SS, pp.365-6). He 
later discovers that James Arrowby (his cousin) had, in a superhuman feat where James 
‘was simply standing on the water’, rescued him (SS, p.468). James’s entrance into this 
dangerous environment highlights the extent of his spiritual power and illustrates the 
values of these energies to both the religious and the moral life.  
In The Good Apprentice, Thomas McCaskerville draws on the same ‘seething’ 
Echkartian image when he questions Stuart Cuno’s ostensibly secular asceticism, which 
Stuart sees as an attempt ‘to be good, to be for others and not for oneself. To be 
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nothing, to have nothing, to be a servant’ of the good (GA, p.152). Thomas argues that 
such a moral position is 
 
dangerous […]. I liked your image of falling into the hands of God – oh, I 
know you didn’t mean him – but it’s a deep place, an ocean heaving and 
giving birth to itself, melting and seething in itself and into itself, 
interpenetrating itself, light in light and light into light, swelling inwardly, 
flooding itself, every part interpenetrating the rest until it spills and boils 
over. [… This is a] description of God by a Christian mystic. […] He was 
[a heretic]. All the best are. There are principalities and powers, fallen 
angels, animal gods, spirits cut loose and wandering in the void, they have 
to be reckoned with, St Paul knew that, he was the first heretic. (GA, p.157) 
 
Here, Thomas acknowledges the importance of ‘principalities and powers’, of ambiguous 
spirits that ‘have to be reckoned with’ and echoes Eckhart’s image of a ‘seething’ spiritual 
abyss. For Thomas, like Murdoch, Eckhart’s apocalyptic, ‘iconoclastic’, ‘fertile’ image of 
God as ‘a creative fullness of all being’ (MGM, p.465) is ambiguous but represents a crucial 
spiritual force. Stuart’s search for goodness beyond God, as Thomas argues, reveals the 
ambiguous, spiritual ‘principalities and powers’ with which the individual has to engage in 
the moral life.  
 Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’ exhibit the extent to which ambiguous 
spiritual forces are present in the world; for Murdoch, this morally ambivalent environment is 
negotiated by the figure of Eros. ‘Plato knew’, as Murdoch argues, that ‘morality, an 
orientation between good and evil, was in a unique sense fundamental and ubiquitous in 
human life’ (MGM, 401-2). Eros is ‘a principle which connects the commonest human desire 
to the highest morality and to the pattern of divine creativity in the universe’ (FS, p.33); he is 
‘a creative spirit, he is tension, exertion, zeal’ (MGM, p.343). In Murdoch’s interpretation of 
Saint Paul’s solution to the problem of dualism and her adoption of Plato’s vision of 
 129 
morality, the moral agent has access to ambiguous spiritual forces, and to the Platonic force 
of Eros, to help them engage with the realist ‘continuum’ of morality, in which he, or she, can 
experience the ‘independent’, ‘positive’, substantive forces of both good and evil without 
damaging the central, monist Form of the Good.  
 
The Problem of Dualism in Murdoch’s Fiction and Philosophy 
The question of whether or not a writer conforms to a dualist or monist picture of morality is 
fundamental to an understanding of his, or her, concept of evil: where evil is negative for 
monist, Christian thinkers, such as Augustine, it is positive for the followers of earlier 
religious traditions, such as Gnosticism and Manichaeism.28 Such dualist systems of morality, 
where evil holds equal power to the good, operate in sharp contrast to traditional Judaeo-
Christian monist systems of morality, where good has sovereign power over evil. For the 
theologian John Hick, neither of these perspectives accurately represents the realities of the 
moral experience: monists, who see the individual as inherently sinful, remove human 
autonomy and dualists, for whom evil is separate and incommensurate with good, remove a 
sense of the ambiguous experience of morality within which humans are capable of degrees 
of perfection or failure, degrees of goodness or evil.29 A similar issue with Christian morality 
drove Jung to criticise Saint Augustine. Where Hick saw evil and suffering as ethically 
beneficial experiences in the moral life, Jung believed that Augustine’s concept of privatio 
boni of evil was philosophically problematic. For him, the idea of evil being an ‘absence’ or 
‘privation’ of good hinders an acknowledgement of the presence of evil and thus damages the 
                                                                                                                
28 Examining whether or not a writer conforms to dualism, Peter Vardy and Julie Arliss, 
allows the reader to interrogate ‘where [their picture of] evil comes from’. See Peter Vardy 
and Julie Arliss, The Thinker’s Guide to Evil (Hants, UK: John Hunt Publishing Ltd, 2004), 
p.26-7. 
29 In the Introduction and Chapter One, I provided an elucidation of John Hick’s vision of 
morality. See John Hick, Evil and the Love of God (1966). 
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psyche by problematising the individual’s ability to ‘differentiate’ between good and evil.30 
While neither Jung nor Hick supports a strictly dualist vision of morality, they see evil as a 
central experience within the moral life.  
 Murdoch encounters a similar dilemma about whether monism or dualism provides a 
better framework for morality in her early philosophical writings. While both received critical 
treatment, she inclined to monism. In ‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), Murdoch argues that it 
is both the ‘traditional inspiration’ and ‘traditional vice’ of a philosopher to ‘believe that all is 
one’ (SG, p.49). Yet she goes on to say in contravention to this ‘vice’ that her own 
‘temperament inclines to [such] monism’ (SG, p.49). A reflection of this ‘monism’ can be 
seen in her picture of morality more broadly: for Murdoch, people are ‘magnetic[ally]’ drawn 
to a ‘single […] object of attention’ (SG, p.54), ‘the good’ (SG, p.61). The good, she explains 
in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, ‘exerts a magnetism which runs through the whole 
contingent world’ (MGM, p.343). For Murdoch, the good is transcendent and cannot be 
physically tested, but its reflections can still be intuited from a worthy ‘object of attention’ 
(SG, p.54). Throughout her philosophical career, as discussed in the last chapter, Murdoch 
posited this Christian monism and Platonic perfectionism, where, on the one hand, goodness 
appears as a ‘transcendent’ ‘singular’ force and evil represents a failure to meet the ideals of 
goodness and, on the other hand, the individual experiences the ‘continuum between good 
and bad’ (MGM, p.507).  
Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, as writers such as Saguna Ramanathan, Heather 
Widdows and Robert Hardy argue, directly engage with these debates about monism and 
dualism, positive and negative evil, Gnosticism and Manichaeism and the writings of 
                                                                                                                
30 Carl Gustav Jung, ‘Two Letters to Father Victor White’, in Jung on Evil, ed. by Murray 
Stein (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.72-83. These letters prove the long-term epistolary 
friendship that Jung and White shared; their discussions helped inform contribution to the 
collected essays in The Gnostic Jung (1992). 
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Augustine, Saint Paul and Jung. On the one hand, Murdoch’s monism results in a negative 
Augustinian picture of evil. Saguna Ramanathan draws on Murdoch monism to highlight her 
indebtedness to the Christian concept of privatio boni: ‘[g]ood and evil here’, Ramanatha 
explains, ‘are not equally strong, see-sawing forces, but rather states farther from, or closer 
to, the light. At the centre, evil simply vanishes, ceases to exist’.31 On the other hand, 
Murdoch’s adoption of more dualist forms of morality in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals 
makes her vision of evil, to a certain extent, a more ‘positive’ or independent force. For 
Heather Widdows, Murdochian evil ‘is indeed active in the moral life and has a positive 
function in revealing the moral terrain and inspiring moral striving and progress’, but it is 
also ‘capable of captivating the moral pilgrim’.32 While Ramanathan’s attempt to synthesise a 
definition of Murdochian evil relies entirely on her Christian monism, Widdows’s attempt to 
synthesise a definition of Murdochian evil relies on the more complex picture of morality 
presented in Metaphysics as a Guide Morals. Therein, Murdoch continues to portray a monist 
form of morality governed by the good, but a dualist form of morality in which evil can be 
seen as part of the Platonic ‘continuum’ of the moral life. Widdows, therefore, concludes that 
Murdochian evil is ‘Janus-faced’: its ability to ‘captivat[e] the moral pilgrim […] temper[s] 
any positive function. Evil in the Murdochian world is something to be feared and even 
hidden from in our flight towards the good’.33 In contrast to these two thinkers, however, 
Robert Hardy reveals the similarities between Murdoch and Jung in Psychological and 
Religious Narrative in Iris Murdoch’s Fiction (2000): he suggests that, while Murdoch’s 
‘main doubts’ about Jung relate to his (to use Murdoch’s phrase) ‘harmony of opposites’ and 
                                                                                                                
31 Saguna Ramanathan, Iris Murdoch: Figures of Good (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 
1990), p.99. 
32 Heather Widdows, ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’, in The Positive Function of 
Evil, ed. by Pedro Alexis Tabensky (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp.81-97, p.96. 
33 Widdows, ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’, p.96. 
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his ‘view on myth’, they nevertheless exhibit similarities.34 The dilemmas inherent with the 
contrasts between Ramanathan’s, Widdows’s and Hardy’s responses to Murdochian evil are 
brought into relief in a (recently published) interview with Murdoch and Conradi, where she 
accepts a religious dualism, with its ‘independent’ force of evil, as well as her standard 
Christian-Platonic monism, with its all-powerful, sovereign good.35 Indeed, despite her 
antipathy to dualism within many of her writings, the interview reveals, as she herself 
acknowledged in a letter to Penelope and Ralph Tanner, that ‘I am a bit of a Manichee!’36 
 
Iris Murdoch’s Pact with Evil in the Conradi Interview 
In her interview with Peter J. Conradi, Murdoch portrays a complex, dialectic morality in 
which the individual must acknowledge evil to fight its presence within the moral life. 
Murdoch’s attempt to account for evil within the Conradi interview, which recalls the 
writings of Heraclitus and Jung, and even William Blake, offers not only a hitherto 
unexplored perspective on evil but also an examination of evil that, in many ways, pre-empts 
her late philosophical picture of morality in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. Therein, she 
concludes her attitude to evil with ‘a metaphysical conjecture’: 
 
A picture of humanity must portray its fallen nature. We must keep in view 
the distance between good and evil, and the potential extremity of evil. We 
are ineluctably imperfect, goodness is not a continuously active organic part 
of our purposes and wishes. However good a life is, it includes moral 
failures. (MGM, p.509; Murdoch’s italics)  
                                                                                                                
34 Robert Hardy, Psychological and Religious Narrative in Iris Murdoch’s Fiction (New 
York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2000), pp.42-3.  
35 Heather Widdows’s ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’ draws on Murdoch’s 
philosophical writings, notably Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. However, as her article 
was published in 2009, it does not draw on the Conradi interview, which was published later 
in 2013. 
36 Murdoch’s declaration to Penelope and Ralph Tanner, quoted above, appeared in an 
advertisement sent via email, dated 29/09/17. Iris Murdoch, undated letter to Penelope and 
Ralph Tanner, quoted in an email from Anne Rowe, dated 05/10/07. 
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Here, as Heather Widdows’s discussions of Murdochian evil indicate, Murdoch highlights the 
danger of evil and its power to mislead the individual. Alternatively, such a picture also 
suggests, as both Saint Paul and Jung argue, that the individual should attend to, and perhaps 
engage with, such evil tendencies. Indeed, characters within Murdoch’s fiction, as Conradi 
asserts of Michael Meade in The Bell, are often experience ‘an education that 
characteristically resembles a katabasis or descent into chaos or contingency’: ‘The way up, 
[…] as for Heraclitus, turns out to be the way down’.37 Conradi’s awareness of this 
Heraclitean descent into chaos, into the darker aspects of the moral life, may owe something 
to his interview with her. 
Murdoch’s interview with Conradi took place in 1983, a year after she gave the 
Gifford lectures, which she had, by this time, begun to develop into Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals (1992).38 In response to Conradi’s question about her being a Manichean, she 
argues, 
 
No I’m not Manichean. No I’m absolutely anti-Manichean, I’m a Platonist. 
If you’re Manichean, as I understand it […] you recognise […] that there 
are wicked forces in the world which are independent of good forces. This 
is a very delicate matter. In fact it is probably the most delicate of all 
matters […]. The philosophy book that I’m writing at the moment is 
concerned with this. If one says that – then does one say – ultimately that 
good must or does triumph over evil? And if so, by what method? […] I 
                                                                                                                
37 Peter J. Conradi, ‘Chapter 30: Platonism in Iris Murdoch’, in Platonism and the English 
Imagination, ed. by Anne Baldwin and Sarah Hutton (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 
pp.330-43, p.339. See also: Avril Horner, ‘“Refinements of Evil”: Iris Murdoch and the 
Gothic’, in Iris Murdoch and Morality, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp.70-84, pp.84. 
38 The work for the (unpublished) Heidegger manuscript, according to Conradi, started in 
1986, so Murdoch’s reference to a ‘philosophy book’ later in the Conradi interview must 
refer to Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. For Conradi’s discussion of Murdoch’s 1982 
Gifford lectures and her translation of them into Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals see IML, 
pp.287, 501-2, 564-6. For Conradi’s discussion of the Heidegger manuscript see IML, p.586. 
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hold two views. […] I think that evil exists independently of good […]. 
Then the question would be, ‘does Good triumph over Evil at all?’ All 
right, that’s one point, and of course, Good must triumph over Evil. […] At 
any rate it certainly ought to. And does it do this by any kind of pact, or by 
destroying evil? I think there’s no pact. It can only triumph over evil by 
destroying evil. That is destroying, underlined.39 That this is the only way 
in which morality ultimately operates, through the destruction of evil. Not 
by saying ‘Oh Well!...’ But you see there are hundreds of ways in which 
you accommodate this idea: of course you have to make a pact with the evil 
tendencies within yourself. You can’t destroy them, you’ve got to live with 
them. Yet the background of this, I’d say, would be that you must destroy 
them.40 
 
Murdoch’s reply rationalises her disagreement with Manichaeism for its presentation of a 
religious moral dualism: for her there is not, as for the Manicheans, ‘a radical dualism of 
good and evil that is metaphysically grounded in [the] coeternal and independent cosmic 
powers of Light and Darkness […] in which Spirit represents Light and Matter represents 
Darkness’.41 Such a picture of morality would result in two ‘independent’, opposed ‘cosmic 
forces’ of good and evil, and thereby devalue her singular, sovereign good. The Conradi 
interview highlights, however, that Murdoch’s monism was beginning to subside in favour of 
a more dialectical morality that acknowledged the importance of an ‘independent’, and 
therefore dualist, force of evil. In the Conradi interview, the discontinuities and paradoxes of 
Murdoch’s thought are more tangible than in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, the 
‘philosophy book’ to which Murdoch refers. Her response to Conradi, however, raises a 
dilemma about Murdochian evil: how can a single, monist, ‘transcendent’ good be opposed 
                                                                                                                
39 I am quoting Murdoch’s phrase as it appears in the Iris Murdoch Review. In saying 
‘underlined’, Murdoch appears to be providing an extra stress upon the necessity for the 
destruction of evil.  
40 Conradi, ‘An Unpublished 1983 Interview’, pp.14-15. 
41 See The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p.552. 
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by an ‘independent’, dualist force of evil? And how can the individual both accept evil 
(‘make a pact with the evil tendencies within [themselves]’) and ‘destroy’ it? 
In her late philosophy, Murdoch’s discussions of Gnosticism and the necessity of 
making a ‘pact’ with evil are aligned with a critique of Heraclitus and Jung: ‘[w]e must see 
evil,’ she argues, ‘and reject any pact (Heraclitus, Jung) between evil and good’ (MGM, 
p.447). Murdoch develops her critique of Jung throughout Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. 
She argues that Jung ‘offer[s] what he feels to be a relevant and necessary metaphysic’: 
 
[He] pictures [‘spiritual energy’] as immanently circulating to produce an 
experiential harmony in which there is no positive vision of good as 
opposed to evil, but good and evil are seen as aspects or shades of a self-
adjusting whole. […] This Gnostic monism cannot be taken as a plausible 
account of morality. […] Self-contained soul-experience obscures, and is 
no substitute for, the struggle with an alien reality which engenders and 
imposes and develops absolute distinctions between good and evil and truth 
and falsehood. (MGM, p.135). 
 
Murdoch’s definitions of Jung as a ‘gnostic’ are likely to have been developed from her 
readings of Martin Buber’s Eclipse of God (1952). Her annotations to Buber’s text show her 
preoccupation with both the idea of ‘Jung as Gnostic’, who displays ‘a harmony of good + 
evil’, and Buber’s definition of Gnosis, where the ‘instincts [are] deified. Good + evil is 
God’.42 Moreover, Murdoch’s argument that, in Jung’s writings, ‘good and evil are seen as 
aspects […] of a self-adjusted whole’, echoes Buber’s suggestion that Jung is ‘an eminent 
Gnostic god, in whom good and evil are bound together and, so to speak, balance each 
                                                                                                                
42 Murdoch’s full annotation to Buber’s Eclipse of God appears as follows: ‘Jung as Gnostic. 
Not [?] v. evil, but a harmony of good + evil. [Zen?] cf Paul as gnostic? No.’ Iris Murdoch, 
annotations to Buber’s Eclipse of God, held in the Iris Murdoch Archive, IML1083. 
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other’.43 According to both Buber’s and Murdoch’s interpretations, Jung’s vision of morality, 
with its independent forces of good and evil, represents a Gnostic form of dualism. 
Murdoch’s criticism of Jung as a ‘Gnostic monis[t]’ who reduces good and evil into a 
semi-Heraclitean ‘self-adjusted whole’, is for many Jungian critics, an incorrect interpretation 
of his writings. Robert A. Segal does not discuss Murdoch, but his disagreement with 
Stephan A. Hoeller’s criticism of Jung does problematise her critique.44 Hoeller argues that 
‘Jung, in his intuitive knowledge of the Gnostics, recognized that, not dualism, but the 
recognition of the ultimate necessity for the union of opposites was at the heart of the Gnostic 
attitude’.45 Segal argues, however, that the Gnostics did not preach the ‘integration’ of 
opposites.46 Despite its wide variations, Gnosticism is dualist, not monist.47 The ‘integration’ 
of opposites, for which Murdoch criticises Jung, therefore, represents both a 
misrepresentation of his work and, to a certain extent, a conflation of the terms ‘Gnostic’ and 
‘monist’. As Segal argues, in ‘Jungian psychology the ideal state involves the acceptance of 
moral opposites: human beings must accept the evil as well as the good side of their own 
personality’.48 For Jung, Murray Stein explains, ‘evil is real and is not to be written off as the 
absence of good. […] Jung wanted to affirm the value of treating evil as “real,” as a genuine 
                                                                                                                
43 Martin Buber, ‘Religion and Modern Thinking’, Eclipse of God (1952), with an 
introduction by Leora Batnitzky (Princeton: University Press, 2016), pp.53-82, p.72. 
Murdoch devoted an entire chapter to Buber in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals; she did 
not, however, discuss his disagreements with Jung.  
44 While Murdoch does not appear to have read any of Hoeller’s works, the similarity 
between their criticisms of Jung helps to reveal the potentially flawed reason behind 
Murdoch’s criticism of Jung. Hoeller does not appear in any of the indexes of Murdoch’s 
published philosophical works, and my searches in the Iris Murdoch Archives have not 
revealed Murdoch exploring Hoeller’s work either. 
45 Quoted in Robert A. Segal (ed.), ‘Introduction’, The Gnostic Jung (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1992),, p.48. (Original quotation from: Stephan A. Hoeller, The Gnostic 
Jung and the Seven Sermons to the Dead, p.96.) 
46 Segal, ‘Introduction’, p.48. 
47 Victor White expresses the difficulty of defining a single version of Gnosticism: ‘we must 
understand’ he argues ‘that never was there such a thing as gnosticism in the sense of a single 
sect, or a coherent body of belief or practice’. White, ‘Some Notes on Gnosticism’, p.200. 
48 Segal, The Gnostic Jung, p.107. My italics. 
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force to be reckoned with in the world’.49 Stein here stresses the importance of Jung’s 
disagreement with the concept of privatio boni, a concept that he felt was damaging to the 
psyche. For him, an acknowledgement of the presence of evil is required for the moral agent 
to differentiate between good and evil. Augustine’s concept of privatio boni is, Jung argues,  
 
morally dangerous, because it belittles and irrealizes Evil and thereby 
weakens the Good, because it deprives it of its necessary opposite: there is 
no white without black […], no light without darkness, etc. If Evil is an 
illusion, Good is necessarily illusory too.50 
 
These definitions prove that Jung wanted evil to be a substantive concept in order that the 
individual could interrogate and fight it, rather than simply, unquestionably, acknowledge its 
presence as a positive force. 
 Bordering on both dualism and monism, Jung’s picture of morality echoes 
Heraclitus’s vision of morality as a unity in opposites and, indeed, as Kathleen Raine 
illustrates, William Blake’s conception of the contraries of the moral life. The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, Raine argues, was likely to be influenced by the Hermetica, which presents 
a picture of morality defined by ‘contraposition […] and contrariety [in] all things’.51 This 
Heraclitean picture of morality is generally attributed to the following fragments: 
 
44: War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods 
and some men, some bond and some free. 
45: Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an 
attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.  
57: Good and ill are one. 
                                                                                                                
49 Murray Stein (ed.), ‘Introduction’, Jung on Evil (London: Routledge, 1995), pp.1-24, p.7. 
My italics. 
50 Carl Gustav Jung, ‘Two Letters to Father Victor White’, in Jung on Evil, pp.72-83, p.73 
(30 April 1952). 
51 Kathleen Raine, Blake and Tradition, Vol. 2, Bollingen Series XXV.11 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), p.391 (Footnote 48 to p.119).  
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62: We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that 
all things come into being a pass away [necessarily] through strife.52 
 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals Murdoch criticises the war-like attitude to morality in 
fragments 44 and 62: good and evil, she argues, are not ‘condemned to everlasting war […] 
in Heraclitus’ sense’ (MGM, p.506). Moreover, implicitly criticising fragment 57, she argues 
that ‘[t]here is no harmonious balance whereby we suddenly find that evil […] actually 
enhances [good]’ (MGM, p.506). Jane Snyder, however, argues that fragment 45 offers a 
picture of morality defined by ‘unity through agreement’ not through ‘opposition’.53 For 
Snyder, the word ‘attunement’ in fragment 45 portrays a less violent picture of morality 
nature of picture of morality than in fragments 44 and 62.54 Synder thus mediates the 
conflict-driven, war-like associations that arise from fragments 44 and 62, thereby rendering 
Heraclitus’s, and indeed Jung’s and Murdoch’s, pictures of morality more compatible: 
Heraclitus’s dialectical picture of morality, which requires two opposing actions, 
                                                                                                                
52 Heraclitus of Ephesus, ‘Herakleitos of Ehesos’, in Early Greek Philosophy, 2nd edn, trans. 
John Burnet (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1908), pp.143-191, pp.150-1. (Book viewed 
online: <https://archive.org/details/burnetgreek00burnrich> [accessed 15/06/17].) Murdoch 
examines these fragments in her annotated copy of Geoffrey S. Kirk’s The Cosmic 
Fragments, now held in the Iris Murdoch Archives in Kingston University’s Special 
Collections (IML267). In her (unpublished) Heidegger manuscript, Murdoch criticises 
Heidegger’s attempts to examine Heraclitus’s Fragments because she suggests that the 
Fragments themselves are too ambiguous: to draw clear arguments from them is, she 
suggests, difficult, if not impossible. Fragment 45 and 62 exemplify this ambiguity. Burnet 
translates the second phrase of Fragment 45 as ‘an attunement of opposite tensions’, but 
others often translate it as ‘a harmony of opposites’. Similarly, Fragment 62—which is 
sometimes numbered 80—often contains question marks due to the difficulty of translating 
certain words: some translators use ‘necessarily’ in place of the unclear word—Burnet’s 
translation contains ‘(?)’ where I have placed ‘necessarily’ in square brackets. Geoffrey Kirk 
suggests that the phrase can be rendered: ‘War-strife is everywhere, normal-course-of-events 
is war-strife, everywhere things happen by war-strife and normal-course-of-events’ (see 
Geoffrey S. Kirk, The Cosmic Fragments [Cambridge: University Press, 1954], p.242). 
53 Jane Snyder argues that ‘we need not conclude that [Heraclitus] regarded all opposites as 
unified through a universal principle of tension. Unity through agreement, not tension, seems 
to be the underlying thought behind’ the metaphor of the bow and the lyre. Jane Snyder, ‘The 
Harmonia of Bow and Lyre in Heraclitus Fr. 51 (DK)’, Phronesis, 29 (January 1984), 91-5 
(p.94). 
54 Snyder, ‘The Harmonia of Bow and Lyre in Heraclitus Fr. 51 (DK)’, p.92. 
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acknowledgement and destruction, acceptance and denial, to be held together in tension is not 
only echoed by Jung but also Murdoch. 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch’s tentative critique of Jung, 
Gnosticism and evil slowly gives way to a vision more akin to her 1983 interview with 
Conradi. While she outlines the dangers, as she sees them, in Jung’s picture of morality, she 
nevertheless acknowledges the potential benefits of a more substantive concept of evil, a 
concept in which the individual can reflect upon, or learn from, its presence in the moral life. 
She argues,  
 
The (charming aesthetic) notion of the love affair between good and evil 
reappears in the work of Jung, presented as a new “scientific” religious 
picture. Isn’t this (we may be led to feel) worth reflecting upon? Yes, we do 
live with […] glimpses of some sort of goodness, while we are at the same 
time aware of ourselves as bad, vain, envious, jealous, struggling with 
strong selfish impulses. But surely (it is said) we can manage both pictures, 
both states, the tension between them, often invigorating and exciting, is the 
stuff of human existence? Did not “God” perpetuate and hallow this 
tension? As I suggested earlier, the age of science does tend to introduce us 
to a certain relativism, we see the “deep causes of our imperfections”, we 
become more patient with our selfish ego; striving too hard, against our 
natural impulses, for a virtuous life may be a mistake. Better to be a well-
adjusted moderate happier person than a would-be-good neurotic. Is there 
not (it may be argued) some sense in this view, whereby the notions of 
good and virtue fade in favour of a commonsensical balance between good 
and evil, wherein the terms “good and evil” begin to seem old-fashioned? 
(MGM, p.490) 
 
Here, Murdoch’s tentative critique of Jung’s writings echoes a discussion she had with David 
Pears, in which she argued that ‘I think there are many people who ought to be in a state of 
anxiety, conflict, neurosis […] for all sorts of reasons. I mean if, for instance, your choice is 
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to go on struggling as an artist and making yourself miserable’.55 Perhaps, therefore, 
Murdoch valued an awareness of one’s ‘evil tendencies’ because the ‘fight between good and 
evil’ can result in a ‘creative’ struggle within the ‘human soul’. Later, Murdoch posits a more 
direct expression of such a dialectical morality, illustrating the inherent struggle between the 
acceptance of evil and the destruction of evil that she pre-empted in the 1983 interview. She 
argues that  
 
The Platonic relation between the different levels of the soul, whereby the 
higher controls the lower, is not to be understood in a Jungian, Manichaean 
or Heraclitean way. There is a kind of “concession” involved in the […] 
image of the divided soul. We are divided creatures who must perhaps hope 
at best to control, not remove, our evil impulses. On the other hand the 
vision of perfection which condemns them as evil is never absent and there 
can be no pact between good and evil, they are irreconcilable enemies, and 
condemned to everlasting war, but not in Heraclitus’ sense. There is no 
harmonious balance whereby we suddenly find that evil is just a “dark side” 
which is not only harmless to good, but actually enhances it. Evil may have 
to be lived with, but remains evil, and we live too with the real possibility 
of improvement. (MGM, p.506) 
 
Both of these quotations portray a dialectical picture of morality where the individual must 
hope to both ‘control’ and fight their ‘evil impulses’. For Murdoch, there is a necessary 
tension within the moral life between good and evil that means, as she expresses in her late 
moral philosophy, that destruction of evil may be neither possible nor morally beneficial.  
Murdoch’s critique of Jung is thus problematic because the dialectical attitude to evil 
that she values in the Conradi interview and in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals is, in fact, 
                                                                                                                
55 Iris Murdoch, ‘The Idea of Freedom’, from Logic Lane series, dir. by Michael Chanan 
(1972). (Accessible via this link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JOvQTg8zdCw& 
index=5&list=PLBBD8BB3DB8952420>.) In her philosophy, Murdoch disagreed with 
Freud’s psychoanalytic aim of removing all ‘neuroses’ to make people ‘workable’ (SG, p.50). 
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markedly Jungian. Indeed, like Blake, Heraclitus and Jung, who see morality as a 
fundamental experience of the tension between the ‘contraries’ of good and evil, Murdoch 
sees morality as a Platonic ‘continuum between good and bad’ (MGM, p.507). For all of 
these thinkers, the individual must acknowledge the dangerous presence of evil in the moral 
life. Jung did not want a ‘harmony’ of good and evil, but an acknowledgement of its power in 
the context of goodness; indeed, for him, ‘[i]f Evil is an illusion, Good is necessarily illusory 
too’.56 Jung even goes as far as to echo Blake and Heraclitus, when he argues that ‘[t]here is 
no energy without opposites!’.57 Such a Blakean vision is similarly echoed by Murdoch when 
she asks, ‘surely (it is said) we can manage both pictures, both states, the tension between 
them, often invigorating and exciting, is the stuff of human existence?’ (MGM, p.490). In the 
day-to-day life of the moral agent, good and evil, innocence and experience, 
acknowledgement and denial are, to recall Blake, ‘contrary’ states that require each other for 
their definition and thus cannot be destroyed or ignored. For Murdoch, as for Blake, Jung, 
Heraclitus and Plato, a substantive force of evil needs to be acknowledged from both a 
metaphysical perspective and a psychological, or realist, perspective. 
 
Iris Murdoch’s Dynamic Morality 
A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Above the Gods and The Philosopher’s Pupil illustrate the 
fundamental difficulty of acknowledging this dialectical picture of morality. Arguably, 
Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy provide, respectively, idealistic and realistic responses to 
evil and morality. Where her early philosophy offers a metaphysical portrait of morality that 
outlines the ideals of goodness, her late moral philosophy illustrates the importance of the 
ambiguous, spiritual force of Eros to negotiate these difficulties. Murdoch partly accepted the 
                                                                                                                
56 Jung, ‘Two Letters to Father Victor White’, p.73 (30 April 1952) 
57 Jung, ‘Two Letters to Father Victor White’, p.75 (10 April 1954). 
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realist nature of morality in her later philosophy by suggesting that the moral life is not 
simply a choice between absolute, positive categories of good and evil, but an experience of 
the ‘continuum between good and bad’ (MGM, p.507). Her fiction, far earlier than her 
philosophy, however, portrays this more realistic picture of morality, where the individual is 
involved in a dialectical struggle, aided by ambiguous spiritual forces, by an experience of 
both monism and dualism, both good and evil. A restatement of Murdoch’s picture of 
morality in these terms necessitates a re-thinking of her moral philosophy away from a 
singular focus on the good, towards a more dialectical picture in which the experience of 
morality can, while still being governed by the good, be recognised for its ambivalence.  
Murdoch’s ambiguous engagements with dualism in A Fairly Honourable Defeat and 
The Philosopher’s Pupil, as Socrates argues in Above the Gods, offer a similar ‘common 
sense’ representation of the complex moral realities that Murdoch portrays in Metaphysics as 
a Guide to Morals. Aligning these fictional and philosophical texts may be controversial, 
considering Murdoch’s disagreement with being termed a ‘philosophical novelist’. Miles 
Leeson, however, believes that the term ‘philosophical novel’ is apt for Murdoch’s fiction: 
her novels, he believes, express a range of ‘complex philosophical ideas’, including ‘a 
discussion of morals and ethics, the role and function of society, the role of art in human lives 
and the development of human knowledge through personal experience’.58 A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat and The Philosopher’s Pupil fit Leeson’s definition by highlighting the 
extent to which she engaged with the philosophical problems of dualism in her fiction. 
Murdoch’s Platonic dialogues, however, occupy a more unique position in her writings, by 
bordering on both fiction and philosophy. When Michael Kustow, an associate director at the 
National Gallery, read Murdoch’s The Fire and the Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists 
(1977), he asked her to write Platonic dialogues that could ‘bring her philosophy closer to the 
                                                                                                                
58 Miles Leeson, Iris Murdoch: Philosophical Novelist (London: Continuum, 2010), p.11. 
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interested lay reader’ (IML, p.548). Conradi suggests that ‘[n]owhere else are her ideas 
brought so alive as in these two dialogues’ (IML, p.548). For him, the portraits of Plato and 
Socrates represent ‘two aspects of Iris herself, the former intensely puritanical and fanatical, 
the latter more relaxed, worldly-wise, pleasure-loving. […] [Plato’s] moral absolutism needs 
to be tempered by Socrates’ quieter and more patient wisdom’ (IML, p.548). Socrates’s 
‘relaxed’, ‘patient wisdom’ arises, for example, in his assertion at the end of Above the Gods 
that philosophy needs to ‘respect what [it] can’t understand’: philosophers must ‘[s]tay close 
to what’s obviously true’; they must ‘look’ and attempt to ‘describe’ reality in ‘simple’, 
‘common sense’ language (EM, p.524). The Conradi interview, like the Platonic dialogues, 
offers an example of Murdoch’s ability to merge both the ‘ordinary’ language associated with 
literature and the more ‘abstract’ language of philosophy. Therein, she debates the benefits 
and dangers of philosophical dualist discourses in a form more akin to the ‘idea-play’ of her 
novels, and concludes, like Julius, Alcibiades and Rozanov, that morality may be a 
dialectical, potentially dualist, system within which a ‘positive’ picture of the force of evil 
can be discerned. 
Murdoch’s fictional engagements with these problems in Above the Gods and The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, which allude to the kind of ideas discussed within the Conradi 
interview, are symptomatic of the difficulty Murdoch faces in trying to reconcile the dialectic 
of both making a ‘pact’ with evil and destroying it. In Above the Gods, Plato’s attempt to 
formulate a definition of religion is interrupted by Alcibiades. 
 
ALCIBIADES      Religion is knowledge, as Plato said. It’s the knowledge of 
good and evil. There! 
PLATO      It’s the fight between good and evil - […] 
ALCIBIADES      Knowledge is power, as we all know. Power is the knowledge 
that good and evil are not enemies, they are friends. The human soul is the 
seat of their harmony. The great chamber of the perfect soul enshrines the 
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secret love of good for evil and evil for good. That union is what is 
absolute, and beautiful, and real. We cannot overcome the darkness within, 
it’s fundamental and indestructible, we must cherish it, we must understand 
it and love it. Good needs evil, it can only exist by contrast, wise Heraclitus 
told us that, the struggle between the dark and the light is a kind of life-
giving play, a game played by lovers. So evil isn’t really evil, good isn’t 
really good, we pass beyond the ordinary childish abstract notions of good 
and evil, and enter into the unity of the world! Then we are kings, then we 
are gods, the unified soul is the lord of reality. That’s religion, that’s the 
mystery which the initiated know, and now is the new era when at last it 
will be made plain. 
PLATO      That’s a damned lie, the worst lie of all, Good must never make 
peace with evil, never, never! It must kill evil! 
ALCIBIADES      You are bloodthirsty! Don’t you want harmony, don’t you 
want to make something creative out of all that warfare that’s going on 
inside of you? Why be always tearing yourself to pieces? Don’t you want 
human life to work, to function? 
PLATO      That’s perfect muck! Good must be pure and separate and - absolute 
- and - only what’s completely good can - save us – (EM, pp.521-3) 
 
Here, as in the contemporaneous novel, The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch illustrates how, if 
the individual is to hope to defeat or ‘destroy’ evil, then they first have to acknowledge its 
presence. Like Alcibiades, Rozanov in The Philosopher’s Pupil, goads Father Bernard into a 
similarly vehement disagreement with the kind ‘Gnostic monism’ for which Murdoch 
critiques Jung. When Father Bernard, a priest who does not believe in God, attests that 
‘quietness’ and ‘silence’ are important to his own faith, that ‘[f]aith means – at least, not 
having to count your sins’, Rozanov believes it affords a dangerous moral ‘silence’. ‘[I]f 
there is no God’, Rozanov replies, then surely ‘you must count your sins, since no one else 
will, or do you believe that virtue is a harmony of good and evil?’ (PP, p.190) Father 
Bernard, however, replies, 
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I am not a Gnostic! A most detestable heresy! That really is magic! […] 
The desire to know can degenerate into mere trickery. Our natural love for 
evil makes us think we understand it. Then we read good into it, like 
turning lead into gold. But it’s not like that – the difference between good 
and evil is absolute – the two poles are not in view – we are not gods […] 
we experience [‘this absolute difference’] at every moment. (PP, p.190-1) 
 
Father Bernard, like Plato, disagrees with the suggestion that good and evil could be a union 
of opposites: ‘[g]ood must be pure and separate and – absolute’; the individual is ‘at every 
moment’ aware of the ‘absolute difference’ between good and evil. Alcibiades’s response to 
Plato, however, represents a reductio ad absurdum of the faith held by Father Bernard: for 
Alcibiades, the individual cannot, for whatever reason, remain silent in the face of evil.59 
Unlike Father Bernard, Plato conceives of a more combative attitude to morality. The 
individual, Plato suggests, must acknowledge the dangerous presence of evil, and they must 
experience ‘the fight between good and evil’. Perhaps, like Alcibiades, Plato even partly 
accepts that the individual ‘cannot overcome the darkness within’; that there is a necessary 
‘struggle between the dark and the light’. 
 Like the dialectical picture of morality elucidated within Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy, this picture of morality is more akin to her earlier fiction, in which she illustrates 
the ambiguous and complex nature of the moral life. In A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Julius 
King enacts an elaborate plan to reveal the true ‘frailty of human attachments’ to see ‘how 
old Rupert would stand up to a real test’ (FHD, p.394). Julius’s plan involves fabricating a 
relationship between Rupert Foster and his sister-in-law, Morgan Browne, by sending them 
misleading love letters: both Rupert and Morgan believe they are receiving letters from each 
                                                                                                                
59 Alcibiades’s dramatic response arises partly due to him being ‘drunk’, as Murdoch’s stage 
directions note (EM, p.521).  
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other, when they are actually receiving letters written, respectively, to Rupert’s wife, Hilda, 
and Morgan’s ex-lover, Julius. Rupert is writing a book on moral philosophy that asserts that 
the individual ‘experience[s] the difference between good and evil, the dreariness of 
wickedness, the life-givingness of good’ (FHD, p.213). Julius’s plan, however, proves ‘what 
all Rupert’s high-minded muck […] really amount[s] to in practice’ (FHD, p.394). Earlier in 
the novel, Rupert’s son Peter similarly criticises his father’s ‘high-minded’ moral outlook. 
For Rupert, morality ‘is static by definition. A dynamic morality is a contradiction in terms’ 
(FHD, p.124). Peter, however, asserts that a ‘dynamic morality’ allows the individual to 
experience reality: ‘Nothing is real’, Peter suggests, ‘unless it’s felt and present’ (FHD, 
p.124). Rupert’s high-minded morality, as Peter’s disagreement illustrates and Julius’s plan 
reveals, does not leave room for the true moral complexity of reality. Focusing his disbelief 
squarely on Rupert’s picture of morality, Julius suggests that  
 
Grown men show an equal facility for making completely absurd 
metaphysical assumptions which they feel instinctively to be comforting – 
for instance the assumption that good is bright and beautiful and evil is 
shabby, dreary or at least dark. In fact experience entirely contradicts this 
assumption. Good is dull. […] Evil, on the contrary, in exciting and 
fascinating and alive. […] What passes for human goodness is in reality a 
tiny phenomenon, messy, limited, truncated, and as I say dull. Whereas evil 
(only I would prefer some less emotive name for it) reaches far far away 
into the depths of the human spirit and is connected with the deepest 
springs of human vitality. (FHD, p.214-4) 
 
Rupert vehemently disagrees with this picture of morality, but, as Julius’s manipulative plan 
unfolds, he begins to exhibit a fascination with wrongdoing, proving the existence of Julius’s 
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dialectical picture of morality.60 The narrative voice explains that Rupert feels ‘mad elation’ 
while reading the love-letter that he believes to be from Morgan. ‘Human beings’, the 
narrative voice continues,   
 
crave for novelty and welcome even wars. Who opens the morning paper 
without the wild hope of huge headlines announcing some great disaster? 
Provided of course that it affects other people and not oneself. Rupert liked 
order. But there is no man who likes order who does not give houseroom to 
a man who dreams of disorder. The sudden wrecking of the accustomed 
scenery, so long as one can be fairly sure of a ringside seat, stimulates the 
bloodstream. (FHD, p.243) 
 
Here, Murdoch charges the narrative voice with irony as Rupert begins to give ‘houseroom’ 
to ‘disorder’: Rupert, the figure who has repeatedly asserted the importance of strict ‘high-
minded’ moral codes, now fully experiences Julius’s understanding of morality, a morality in 
which ‘evil’ is not ‘dreary’ but ‘exciting and fascinating and alive’. He, like other human 
beings, is ‘stimulate[d]’ by the illicit, immoral, secretive relationship that develops between 
himself and his sister-in-law. Julius accurately predicts, earlier in the novel, that Rupert’s 
blinkered moral vision would prove vacuous:  
 
You feel that you are upright and noble and generous, your life is orderly. 
You gain satisfaction from comparing yourself with others. […] That is 
why […] your big book will be no damn good. You do not even conceive 
of, let alone face or consider, the possibility that your world of good and 
evil is simply a consoling superstition. (FHD, p.216) 
 
                                                                                                                
60 There is, moreover, a palpable echo of Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell here: Julius’s 
assertion that ‘evil […] is connected with the deepest spring of human vitality’ recalls 
Blake’s assertion that ‘Evil is the active springing from Energy’. William Blake, The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790), in Blake’s Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 
2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant (New York: W W Norton & 
Company Ltd., 2008), pp.66-82, p.69 (plate 3). 
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Rupert has been so preoccupied with developing a system of morality that provides a central 
ideal of the Good that he does not understand how to cope with evil and temptation. His 
world, as Peter asserts, ‘is all elsewhere’ (FHD, p.124). Rupert’s failure is thus not only 
caused by the moral bias that results from his ‘high-minded[ness]’ but also by his inability to 
understand the reality of the moral experience. The moral pilgrim cannot only concern 
themselves with ‘high-minded’ transcendent ideals; they must also acknowledge their 
potential for moral failure and learn how to combat the evil tendencies within themselves. 
A Fairly Honourable Defeat highlights the importance of accepting the limits of an 
idealist, philosophical response to morality, especially if, as Rupert’s moral philosophy does, 
it fails to account for human frailty. The discrepancy between Murdoch’s early moral 
philosophy and the picture of morality in her fiction highlights the absolute difference 
between these two discourses: literature can, as Murdoch suggests, be ambivalent but 
philosophy has to be ‘direct’ (EM, p.11). In a purely philosophical, metaphysical sense, 
Murdoch does not wish to support a ‘positive’, substantive form of evil because it results in a 
dualist picture of morality where the individual can be misled by evil. Yet, in her fiction, she 
highlights that evil exists, it is ‘exciting and fascinating and alive’, and it can, as Widdows 
argues, ‘captivat[e] the moral pilgrim’. 61 In a realist sense, therefore, evil does exist 
‘independently’ from good. The individual must, to recall Simone Weil, attend to their 
capacity for evil: however dangerous and impossible it may be, they must acknowledge their 
evil tendencies in the hope they can be ‘controlled’, even ‘destroyed’. This perspective, 
regardless of the extent to which Murdoch criticised Jung for his psychological response to 
evil, is markedly Jungian: he, like Murdoch, wants to acknowledge the presence of evil so 
that it can be recognised as ‘a genuine force to be reckoned with in the world’.62  
                                                                                                                
61 Widdows, ‘Murdochian Evil and Striving to be Good’, p.96. 
62 Murray Stein, ‘Introduction’, p.7. My italics. 
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The Conradi interview, like Murdoch’s fiction, proves that while Murdoch’s early 
moral philosophy may offer a more idealistic, monist picture of morality, her late moral 
philosophy accepts, in a realist sense, that the moral life involves a Platonic experience of the 
continuum between good and evil. An awareness of this realist experience is reflected in 
Murdoch adoption of Saint Paul’s ‘principalities and powers’ and Plato’s figure of Eros; as 
Thomas McCaskerville remarks in The Good Apprentice, ‘St Paul knew’ that the ambiguous 
spiritual forces of good and evil, the intermediaries of the moral life, ‘have to be reckoned 
with’ (GA, p.157). The individual, therefore, needs to acknowledge the presence of evil; 
indeed, as Peter Foster argues in A Fairly Honourable Defeat, perhaps ‘[w]hat this age needs 
is a dynamic morality’, a morality in which the individual can feel the ‘presence’ and reality 
of evil to understand its true danger and thus move in the direction of the good. 
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Chapter Four 
Psychopaths, Enchanters, Mothers and Saints 
 
The psychopath is a rebel, a religious disobeyer of prevailing codes and 
standards […] a rebel without a cause, an agitator without a slogan, a 
revolutionary without a program; in other words, his religiousness is aimed to 
achieve goals satisfactory to him alone [… . They] sparkle with the glitter of 
personal freedom.  
Robert Lindner.1 
 
Popular literature and film argue the dullness of the good, the charm of the bad. 
The violent man is the hero of our time. 
Iris Murdoch.2 
 
Lucas […] is the bravest person I know - […] He lives absolutely outside 
ordinary conventions. […] He is […] honest, he sees the terrible things, he 
doesn’t try to cover them up or imagine them away - the evil of the world, the 
senselessness of it all, the rottenness of us ordinary people, our fantasy life, our 
selfishness - In a way [… he is] a sort of counter-saint. 
Iris Murdoch.3  
 
 
This chapter identifies and develops a link between contemporary moral, psychological and 
sociological discourses on psychopathy and the evil characters within Iris Murdoch’s novels. 
Currently available resources on Murdoch, such as biographical writings, the materials held 
in the Iris Murdoch Archives and her philosophical writings, show no indication that she was 
aware of the clinical construct of psychopathy. Yet, as this chapter argues, the portrayal of 
identifiably psychopathic traits in Murdoch’s novels contributes to the psychological realism 
of her characters and the moral complexity of her fiction. 
                                                                                                                
1 Robert Lindner, Rebel Without a Cause (1944), quoted in Robert D. Hare, Without 
Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (New York: Pocket Books, 
1995), p.81. 
2 Iris Murdoch, MGM, p.13. 
3 Iris Murdoch, GK, p.171. 
 151 
By developing this hitherto unexplored connection between Murdoch’s fiction and the 
clinical construct of psychopathy, I illustrate how her fiction, as well as her philosophy, 
contributes to a topic that has flourished in popular media. 1991, for example, saw not only 
the publication of Bret Easton Ellis’s novel American Psycho but also the translation of 
Thomas Harris’s 1988 novel The Silence of the Lambs into a film whose popularity spawned 
a film franchise including Hannibal (2001), Red Dragon (2002) and Hannibal Rising (2008), 
and even a three-season television series (2013-15). Such fictional psychopaths and serial 
killers have undoubtedly contributed to the proliferation of factual, ‘educational’ and 
sensationalist articles surrounding psychopathy in contemporary blogs, newspapers and 
websites. Such concerns with psychopathy, however, appeared earlier than the late-twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries. ‘From Euripides to Shakespeare to Hitchcock,’ as Russel D. 
Covey argues, ‘criminal madness has played a central role in the most popular and influential 
media of the day’.4 
I begin this chapter by synthesising the historical discourses surrounding 
psychopathy, its development in clinical and psychological circles, and its complex 
relationship to morality. The psychopath is a figure whose charming nature calls to our 
fantasies; whose lack of empathy, or lack of motivation to imagine the emotional realities of 
the other, heightens his egotism and enables his dominance; and whose cognitive empathy 
affords him a dangerous but morally necessary knowledge of human frailties. Arguably, the 
striking portraits of evil within Murdoch’s fiction can be aligned with this amoral figure that 
has so perplexed the twentieth century and beyond. 
This chapter begins by outlining the moral, psychological and sociological dilemmas 
surrounding the theoretical study of psychopathy and then goes on to develop three new links 
                                                                                                                
4 Russell D. Covey, ‘Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity’, Stanford Law 
Review, 61:6 (Apr., 2009): 1375-1427 (p.1375). 
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between Murdoch’s fictional picture of evil and twentieth and twenty-first century 
discussions of psychopathy. I argue, first, that Murdoch’s enchanter figures bear a striking 
resemblance to the psychopath, whose literary legacy can be traced back to at least the 
sixteenth century and whose moral difficulties can be aligned with post-war responses to 
evildoing. For contemporary writers the psychopath’s amorality is symbolic of the complex 
relationship between empathy and morality, a relationship that resonates with not only 
Simone Weil’s and Hannah Arendt’s writings on the potential for some individuals to see evil 
as a duty, or moral necessity, but also with the portrayal of Murdoch’s enchanter figures. 
Second, I illustrate how Murdoch’s engagement with gendered visions of dominance and evil 
intersects with contemporary discourses on gender: her portrayal of female figures of evil 
transcends gender stereotypes and subverts her own gendered vision of the sadomasochism of 
sexual attraction, providing a corrective voice to the often-silent narratives on female 
psychopathy. Finally, I illustrate how Murdoch’s philosophical discussions of the ambiguous 
dichotomy of the existentialist and mystical hero, whose traits are echoed by various 
characters within her oeuvre, intuit contemporary discussions about the moral ambiguity of 
psychopathy. Seen in the context of the chapter as a whole, the final discussion proves the 
moral ambiguity of Murdoch’s fiction. Her characters illustrate that all individuals, both good 
and bad, psychopathic or saintly, male or female, are capable of egotism and blindness. Such 
a complex picture of morality reveals the universal capacity for moral frailty and demands a 
dialectical response that highlights the difficulty of delineating the differences between 
people. Some individuals may be capable of psychopathic violence, but this perspective 
cannot be used to justify definitions of them based on ostensibly absolute, empirical or 
scientific theories. The artist provides an invaluable corrective vision such pattern-making: 
like the ‘dialectician’, Murdoch argues, the artist ‘mediates’ between ‘the one and the many’, 
seeking to ‘[o]rder and separate and distinguish the world justly’ (EM, p.455; my italics). 
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Murdoch’s fiction, following this vision, thus provides a perfect testing ground for the 
egotism and moral blindness that motivates psychopathic forms of evil, demanding an 
acknowledgement of the fact that, as Murdoch argues, ‘we move all the time in the 
continuum between good and bad’ (MGM, p.507).  
 
The Clinical Construct of Psychopathy  
Psychopaths are frequently seen as synonymous with criminality, evil and madness. Indeed, 
one of the main benefits of Canadian criminal psychologist Robert D. Hare’s ground-
breaking Psychopathy Checklist (1991; revised 2003)5 is that it outlines the structure of a 
personality that often reoffends.6 From their less harmful propensity for lying and 
manipulation, to their far more dangerous and damaging propensity for depraved assault and 
murder, psychopaths provide a stark illustration of the potential for human wickedness. 
The clinical construct of psychopathy, however, can both challenge and support moral 
and psychological discourses. The psychopath’s apparent ‘irrationality’, as Robert J. Smith 
argues, problematises discussions about moral agency and responsibility: while his behaviour 
appears to be completely amoral and anti-social, it is nevertheless rational and, therefore, 
indicative of the prevalence of Machiavellian behaviour within modern society.7 The fact that 
the clinical construct of psychopathy defines a sane personality means that the psychopath 
disproves the cliché that wickedness is aligned with, or arises from, insanity. Previously, as 
                                                                                                                
5 All references to, and quotations from, the Psychopathy Checklist within this thesis refer to 
the 1991 edition. Occasionally, other writers will abbreviate Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist as 
PCL, to refer to the earlier edition, or as PCL-R, to refer to the revised 2003 edition. 
6 Grant T. Harris, Tracey A. Skilling and Marnie E. Rice argue that, despite having 
‘previously suspected that psychopathy was merely a euphemism for a lengthy history of 
officially recorded criminal conduct’, Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist ‘was the single best 
predictor of violent recidivism’. See Grant T. Harris, Tracey A. Skilling, and Marnie E. Rice, 
‘The Construct of Psychopathy’, Crime and Justice, 28 (2001): 197-264 (p.199). 
7 Robert J. Smith, ‘The Psychopath as Moral Agent’, Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 45:2 (December 1984): 177-193 (p.177). 
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Andrew Scull explains, people were seen as mad simply because they represented a 
‘departure from conventional morality’.8 During the fin-de-siècle, for example, degenerate or 
mad individuals, Scull explains, were seen as ‘monstrosities’ whose ‘inherited defects and 
biological inferiority were written on their physiognomy’.9 Such visions of difference, 
degeneracy, deviance and insanity, as Horner and Zlosnik explain, shifted according to 
contemporaneous understandings of what constituted conventional morality and what was 
deemed ‘culturally unacceptable’.10 Individuals, therefore, could be defined as mad, or 
‘degenerate’, simply for exhibiting non-conventional, ostensibly anti-social behaviour even 
though such acts may not be immoral. While the construct of psychopathy and the 
contemporary discussions surrounding it represent (often empirical) developments away from 
these biased, limited understandings of antisocial behaviour and evil, they nevertheless 
continue to occupy an unstable, and sometimes controversial, position in discourses on 
gender, morality and psychology.  
 
The History of Psychopathy 
Psychopathy, as Hare attests, has had a ‘long and sometimes confusing history’.11 The first 
use of the term psychopath, Kent A. Kiehl and Morris B. Hoffman suggest, was by J.L.A. 
Koch, a nineteenth-century German physician; derived from the German word 
psychopastiche, Koch’s term ‘literally mean[t] suffering soul’.12 The resulting metaphor, 
                                                                                                                
8 Andrew Scull, Madness: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: University Press, 2011), p.59. 
9 Scull, Madness, p.61. 
10 Avril Horner and Sue Zlosnik, Landscapes of Desire: Metaphors in Modern Women’s 
Fiction (Hemel Hempstead, Herefordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), p.10. 
11 Robert D. Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist (1990); (New York: Multi-Health 
Systems, Inc., 1991), p.2. 
12 Kent A. Kiehl and Morris B. Hoffman, ‘The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, 
Treatment and Economics’, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4059069/ 
pdf/nihms580794.pdf> [accessed 10/05/18] (page 5). Article originally published in 
Jurimetrics, 51 (2011): 355-97. 
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however, which echoes the complexities surrounding the etymology of the word evil, is 
capable of referring to a broad collection of mental and social disabilities. Moreover, it 
implicitly suggests that a psychopath’s particular form of suffering could be alleviated or 
remedied. While Hare’s disambiguation of the word psychopath heightens these conceptual 
inconsistencies by suggesting that the psychopath’s ‘mind’ (psyche) is suffering from a 
‘disease’ (pathos), his clinical construct of psychopathy nonetheless diverges from both of 
these views.13 The motivation for creating his own Psychopathy Checklist arose in part from 
the fact that terms like ‘moral insanity, psychopathic personality, psychopathy, sociopathy, 
[and] antisocial personality’ were all being used interchangeably despite their differences.14 
Rather than suffering from a mental condition, from insanity or from a ‘disease’, Hare’s 
vision of psychopathy is grounded by a distinctive set of empirically verifiable traits that 
predisposes the psychopath to cruel, manipulative, self-centred behaviour.   
The first description of psychopathy compatible with Hare’s construct was provided 
by the post-revolutionary Parisian physician Philippe Pinel. Naming his proto-psychopathic 
condition ‘insanity without delirium’, Pinel suggested that such individuals exhibited 
‘remorselessness and a complete lack of restraint’.15 His view, Hare explains, was unique for 
its time: where some saw psychopaths as ‘morally insane’ or simply ‘evil’, he saw them as 
‘morally neutral’.16 In comparison to the German concept of psychopastiche and the fin-de-
siècle concept of ‘degeneration’, Pinel’s concept of ‘insanity without delirium’ suggests that 
psychopaths are not mentally disabled. Instead, the fact that their acts (however immoral) 
issue from ‘choice, freely exercised’ discredits (even disproves) the idea that their ostensibly 
insane behaviour could be cured or that their behaviour simply represents a departure from 
                                                                                                                
13 Hare, Without Conscience, p.22.  
14 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.2. 
15 Quoted in Robert D. Hare, Without Conscience, p.25. 
16 Ibid. 
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conventional social understandings of what is morally acceptable.17 Pinel’s concept of 
psychopathy, as Hare argues, thus instigated a paradox in which public opinion ‘seesawed 
between the view that psychopaths were “mad” and that they were “bad” or even diabolical’; 
they were believed to be suffering either from a mental disability that removed their moral 
awareness or from a moral disability in which they retained their mental autonomy but 
nevertheless carried out depraved, extreme amoral acts for selfish gain.18 This last 
perspective, importantly, provides a picture of ‘positive evil’, where the individual’s cruelty 
springs not from a failure in goodness or moral awareness, but from a demonic adherence to 
evil itself. 
Hervey Cleckley, an American psychiatrist, was the first to address the moral and 
psychological ambiguities reflected in the disambiguation and history of psychopathy. His 
study titled The Mask of Sanity (1941), as its subtitle aptly describes, drew on psychiatric 
case studies in order to Clarify Some Issues About the So-Called Psychopathic Personality. 
Cleckley’s psychopath (whose traits I have here condensed) is marked by charm, 
egocentricity, intelligence, insincerity, promiscuity, unpredictability, unreliability, a lack of 
anxiety, a lack of emotional insight, a failure to plan ahead and a lack of guilt or remorse.19 
What marks psychopaths out as dangerous, for Cleckley, is their potential for horrendous 
crimes as well as their propensity to generate ‘a perfect mask of genuine sanity’, a facade of 
‘normality’.20 Hare suggests that Cleckley’s study offered not only a much-needed attempt to 
                                                                                                                
17 Hare, Without Conscience, p.25. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Cleckley’s more exhaustive list of sixteen traits expands on some of those listed above, 
highlighting the psychopath’s non-delusional, anti-neurotic nature; his often ‘inadequately 
motivated antisocial behaviour’; his inability to ‘learn by experience’; his ‘incapacity for 
love’ and ‘unresponsiveness [to] interpersonal relations’; his capacity for ‘fantastic and 
uninviting behaviour with drink and sometimes without’; and, perplexingly, his propensity to 
use suicide as a threat. Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some 
Issues About the So-Called Psychopathic Personality, 5th edn (1988), <https://cassiopaea.org 
/cass/sanity_1.PdF> [accessed 13/11/17], pp.338-9. 
20 Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity, pp.253, 385. 
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clarify the concept of psychopathy, but also an implicit response to the moral challenges that 
arose from the atrocities of World War II, resonating with the question of ‘How and why 
could individuals—even, terrifyingly, one individual in command of a nation—operate 
outside the rules that most people accepted as restraints on their basest impulses and 
fantasies?’21 Interestingly, Hare neglects to draw attention to the ways in which these ideas, 
as I will go on to argue in the next part of this chapter, resonate with Arendt’s Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. Nevertheless, Cleckley provides a pioneering trait-based study of the 
psychopath’s personality that illustrates how his, or her, personality provides an ideal testing 
ground in which to examine the complex social motivations for evil. 
Developing and improving these earlier studies of psychopathy, Hare’s Psychopathy 
Checklist remains the most renowned, and rigorously tested, clinical construct of 
psychopathy.22 Hare’s empirically researched system was motivated by the continued 
confusion surrounding the use of the term of ‘psychopath’ by criminologists, psychologists, 
scientists and sociologists in academic circles during the 1970s. Drawing together a 
collection of twenty ‘interpersonal, affective, and behavioural symptoms’, or traits, Hare’s 
construct of psychopathy reorganises, and partly crosses over with, the traits noted by 
Cleckley, allowing the clinician to score the psychopathic behaviour of the given 
individual.23 In full, Hare’s psychopath exhibits 
 
glibness or superficial charm; a grandiose sense of self-worth; the need for 
stimulation, or a proneness to boredom; pathological lying; conning or 
manipulative behaviour; a lack of remorse or guilt; a shallow affect; a 
                                                                                                                
21 Hare, Without Conscience, pp.26-7. 
22 The Hare Psychopathy Checklist, and its revised editions, are not the only tests for 
psychopathy. Hare has also created a reduced, 12-trait edition called the Psychopathy 
Checklist: Screening Edition. There is, additionally, another diagnostic system, still in 
development, called the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality. See 
[Unknown Author], ‘Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality’, 
<https://www.gcu.ac.uk/capp2/> [accessed 11/06/18]. 
23 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.2. 
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callous nature, or lack of empathy; a parasitic lifestyle; poor behavioural 
controls; promiscuous sexual relations; early behavioural problems; a lack 
of realistic, long-term plans; impulsivity; irresponsibility; a failure to accept 
responsibility for actions; many short-term marital affairs; juvenile 
delinquency; revocation of conditional release; and criminal versatility.24 
 
Despite their differences, Pinel’s, Cleckley’s and Hare’s portraits clarify the kind of 
behaviour that can be expected from these often-dangerous individuals, whose cruel ability to 
manipulate situations to their advantage is aided by their lack of empathy and masked by 
their ability to charm the onlooker. 
 
The Complexities and Criticisms of Psychopathy 
While Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist (1991) provides a world-leading resource to define an 
individual as a psychopath his paradoxical examinations of the roots (or causes) of 
psychopathy and his problematic engagement with gender motivate many of the 
contemporary clinical, fictional, moral and psychological critiques of psychopathy. Hare 
inconsistently handles the question of whether or not psychopaths are influenced by their 
genetics or past experiences and displays a biased, often self-contradictory, attitude toward 
the expression of psychopathy in men versus women. While the latter of these problems 
receives a more detailed focus in section three of this chapter, it is important to note that both 
of these issues echo biased historic understandings of madness. 
In the Psychopathy Checklist (1991), Hare notes the lack of available ‘evidence to 
determine how useful the PCL will be with female offenders’.25 Despite the fact that this lack 
of clinical ‘evidence’ problematises potential diagnoses of female psychopaths, however, 
Hare argues in Without Conscience (1993), only two years later, that female psychopaths 
                                                                                                                
24 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.2; I re-written Hare’s numbered list into prose. 
25 Ibid., p.63. 
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exhibit markedly different styles of psychopathic behavior than men. By comparison to men, 
he suggests, they are inclined to more promiscuous and ‘cheating strategy[ies]’ in ‘sexual 
relations’, inconsistently express affection for children and ‘routinely physically and 
emotionally neglect […] or simply abandon’ their children.26 Repeating these arguments with 
Babiak in Snakes in Suits (2006), Hare even goes as far to suggest that ‘the prevalence of 
psychopathy’ among female offenders ‘is almost as high as it is among male offenders’.27 
These three explorations of the female psychopath are, of course, separated by a considerable 
amount of time, and there has, at least from the late 1990s onwards, been increased focus on 
the way in which women exhibit psychopathic traits. In ‘Psychopathy and Recidivism among 
Female Inmates’ (1998), for example, Randall T. Salekin, Richard Rogers, Karen L. Ustad 
and Kenneth W. Sewell argue that there are fewer female criminals in the judicial system and 
thus fewer points of comparison to be drawn between male and female psychopaths; 
psychopathy, therefore, is not only ‘less pronounced in female offenders’ but also ‘less 
predictive of later recidivism’.28 Later, in The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain (2005), 
James Blair, Derek Mitchell and Karina Blair similarly assert the fact that the empirical data 
concerning psychopathic women remains ‘sparse’.29 This continued, conspicuous lack of 
empirical data surrounding female instances of psychopathy thus limits the claims that can be 
made about the relationship between gender and psychopathy and, by extension, 
problematises Hare’s insistence on the stark differences between men and women. 
                                                                                                                
26 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.167-8. 
27 Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare, Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths go to Work (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), p.102. 
28 See Randall T. Salekin, Richard Rogers, Karen L. Ustad and Kenneth W. Sewell, 
‘Psychopathy and Recidivism among Female Inmates’, Law and Human Behavior, 22:1 
(Gender and the Law; Feb., 1998): 109-128 (p.125). 
29 James Blair, Derek Mitchell and Karina Blair, The Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain 
(Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), p.27. 
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Such uncertainties about psychopathy are also implicit in Hare’s exploration of the 
origins of psychopathy. Setting up a dichotomy between biological and psychological 
impacts on the development of psychopathy, Hare claims that the psychopathic personality 
‘emerges from a complex—and poorly understood—interplay between biological factors and 
social forces’.30 While he sides with the former biological perspective, his judgements on the 
quality of an individual’s upbringing, however, instigate a paradox. He asserts, first, that ‘I 
can find no convincing evidence that psychopathy is the direct result of early social or 
environmental factors’.31 Yet, he then goes on to argue, in direct contravention to the earlier 
perspective, that 
 
an individual with a mix of psychopathic personality traits who grows up in 
a stable family and has access to positive social and educational resources 
might become a con artist or white-collar criminal, or perhaps a somewhat 
shady entrepreneur, politician, or professional. Another individual, with 
much the same personality traits but from a deprived and disturbed 
background, might become a drifter, mercenary, or violent criminal. […] In 
each case, social factors and parenting practices help to shape the 
behavioural expression of the disorder.32 
 
This converse observation of the impact of social class on the development of psychopathy 
represents a kind of reductio ad absurdum that not only undermines Hare’s own earlier 
criticism of the power of ‘social’ forces over the development or ‘expression’ of 
psychopathy, but also destabilises the clinical construct of psychopathy itself. If a child from 
a more emotionally supportive environment is, as Hare’s argument indicates, capable of 
hiding from the judicial system for a considerably longer period of time, he (or she) might be 
capable of avoiding diagnosis as a psychopath altogether. As we learnt above, a diagnosis of 
                                                                                                                
30 Hare, Without Conscience, p.173. 
31 Ibid., p.170. 
32 Ibid., p.174. Hare’s italics. 
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psychopathy requires that the individual exhibit early behavioural problems, juvenile 
delinquency and criminal versatility, all of which this adult white-collar criminal is less likely 
display because of his more positive upbringing. While this paradoxical problem provides a 
stark vision of the importance of a positive upbringing, it nonetheless destabilises the clinical 
construct of psychopathy itself.33 Indeed, Hare’s conflicting perspectives raise the question of 
whether or not his construct of psychopathy can be trusted, in so far as it can be used to 
accurately examine the origins of psychopathy, or to test the psychopathic nature of women. 
The resulting ambiguities in the construct of psychopathy are arguably responsible for 
the wide range of terms that can be used to define the broad behaviours exhibited by the 
psychopath. Some clinicians and psychologists prefer not to use the term psychopathy, using 
instead terms like antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, conduct 
disorder or sociopathy.34 For Hare, psychopathy continues to represent a personality disorder 
unique to others, but he notes that 
 
                                                                                                                
33 In The Science of Evil: on Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty (also published as Zero 
Degrees of Empathy) (2011), Simon Baron-Cohen suggests, for example, that ‘secure 
relationships promote both social development […] and language development’ and may 
therefore play a crucial role in the development of empathy and, by extension, psychopathy. 
Simon Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil: on Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty (New 
York: Basic Books, 2012), p.76. (Published in the US as Zero Degrees of Empathy.) 
34 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders does not list Psychopathy, 
including instead Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), Borderline Disorder (DB) and 
Conduct Disorder (CD), all four of which are related to each other. APD, like BP, takes into 
consideration the individual’s sense of self-image and mood with traits such as dysmorphia, 
depression and narcissism. APD, which lists many of the same traits as Psychopathy, is also 
more likely to occur if the individual presents with ADHD (attention-deficit / hyperactivity 
disorder) and CD, the latter of which captures adolescent and childhood antisocial behaviour. 
Paul M.G. Emmelkamp and Jan Kenk Kamphuis argue that, by comparison to APD, 
Psychopathy ‘places a greater emphasis on interpersonal and affective traits’, meaning, 
therefore, that ‘while most psychopaths can be diagnosed with [APD], most adults who fulfil 
the criteria for [APD] are not psychopaths’. See Paul M.G. Emmelkamp and Jan Kenk 
Kamphuis, Personality Disorders (Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press, 2007), p.166. Also 
see entries for APD, BP and CD in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
5th edn (Arlington: American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
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some clinicians and researchers—as well as most sociologists and 
criminologists—who believe that the syndrome is forged entirely by social 
forces and early experiences prefer the term sociopath, where those—
including this writer—who feel that psychological, biological, and genetic 
factors also contribute to development of the syndrome generally use the 
term psychopath.35  
 
Regardless of their different academic backgrounds, commentators continue to debate what 
term accurately defines the psychopath’s personality, what causes his, or her, behaviour and 
how best it might be alleviated, either by medical or by psychotherapeutic practices. Indeed, 
as Xanthe Mallett suggests, many psychologists question whether the terms psychopath and 
sociopath ‘should be differentiated at all’.36 Arguably, Hare’s problematic arguments and the 
difficulties that criminologists, psychologists or sociologists face in applying such personality 
disorders to human behaviour reflects the instability of the psychiatric methods used to 
examine immoral behaviour. It is perhaps such a lack of trust in the clinical construct of 
psychopathy that influenced the decision in the Mental Health Act 2007 to consolidate and 
simplify the four distinct classifications of ‘mental illness, psychopathic disorder, mental 
impairment and severe mental impairment’, as previously laid out in the Mental Health Act 
1983, to a ‘disorder or disability of the mind’, removing the psychopathic category in the 
process.37 
For some contemporary commentators on psychopathy, the instabilities of such terms, 
the lack of confidence in judicial and psychiatric mental categories, and the tendency for 
people to draw controversial or problematic attention to differences in gender are related to 
                                                                                                                
35 Hare, Without Conscience, pp.23-4. Hare’s italics 
36 Xanthe Mallett, ‘Psychopaths versus sociopaths: what is the difference?’, 28 July 2015,  
<https://theconversation.com/psychopaths-versus-sociopaths-what-is-the-difference-45047>  
[accessed 12/04/18]. 
37 [Unknown author], ‘Mental disorder no longer split into separates classifications’, 
<http://www.mentalhealthlaw.co.uk/Mental_disorder_no_longer_split_into_separate_classifi
cations> [accessed 10/05/18]. 
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society’s historic understandings of madness and deviance. Jon Ronson’s The Psychopath 
Test: A Journey Through the Madness Industry (2011), for example, which offers a 
‘picaresque journey’ through the complexities of ‘the Madness Industry’ correlates with 
modern criticisms of madness and psychopathy, such as those offered by Cary Federman, 
Dave Holmes and Jean Daniel Jacob.38 For the latter, the Psychopathy Checklist lacks ‘any 
scientific basis for [its] judgement[s]’ and may even heighten ‘the public’s sense of the fear 
of criminality’ and ‘the fear of the unknown’.39 The psychopath, they argue, exists ‘as a 
reality created by certain discursive contexts based on shifting behavioural classifications that 
try to meet criminological theories of deviance and dangerousness’.40 Believing the 
psychopath to be ‘always already dangerous’ and thus incapable of change or goodness, these 
discussions resonate with criticisms of the fin-de-siècle concept of degeneracy.41 Such 
historic problematic attitudes to madness are, for Andrew Scull, echoed in the character of 
Randle P. McMurphy from Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (1962; adapted 
into a film in 1975), who offers a ‘damning portrait’ of ‘the mental health machine’.42 Scull 
argues that the lobotomy of McMurphy, which represents ‘a device to tame’ his madness and 
social deviance, alludes to the biased, sexist, unempirical attitudes that influenced the 
development of psychiatry, indicating that psychiatry itself may be a ‘sham’.43 Scull 
illustrates this point by drawing attention to the stigma toward female madness and its 
connection to biology, which can be traced as far back as the Roman era when the idea of 
hysteria was seen as ‘a disorder for women’ rooted in their chemistry.44 During the nineteenth 
                                                                                                                
38 Nicholas Blincoe, Review: ‘The Psychopath Test: A Journey through the Madness Industry 
by Jon Ronson’, Telegraph, 13 Jun 2011.  
39 Cary Federman, Dave Holmes and Jean Daniel Jacob, ‘Deconstructing the Psychopath: A 
Critical Discursive Analysis’, Cultural Critique, 72 (Spring 2009): 36-65 (p.57, 37).  
40 Federman et al., ‘Deconstructing the Psychopath: A Critical Discursive Analysis’, p.43. 
41 Ibid., p.38. 
42 See Scull, Madness, p.101. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.14. 
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century this ‘ancient’ Hippocratic understanding of biochemistry was merged with nascent 
developments in psychiatry, and hysteria was seen as an inescapable feminine ‘neurological 
disease’.45 While differences may exist between men and women, between moral and 
immoral individuals, such contemporary commentators argue that the body and mind is too 
complex, and the historic understanding of sickness, madness and deviance too convoluted, 
to draw reliable moral arguments or clinical definitions from either. 
While the clinical construct of psychopathy remains complex, and in some cases 
morally problematic, it nevertheless has moral, psychological and social advantages, 
highlighting a broad range of experiences that inform the individual’s moral sensibility. For 
sociologists and criminologists, psychopathy highlights the importance of positive social 
environments and secure parental relationships for moral development; for biologists and 
neurologists, it highlights the importance of researching biological or genetic factors in moral 
development. These responses not only reveal the ambiguities and complexities of the 
clinical construct of psychopathy, and the complex gender politics with which it intersects, 
but also provide accurate warnings about the need to pay attention to evil and the 
psychopathic traits that often foster human cruelty. As Hare suggests, and goes on to 
illustrate in Within Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us (1993) 
and Snakes in Suits (2006), examinations of psychopathy play a ‘vital role’ in ‘the 
development of reliable ways to identify these individuals in order to minimize the risk they 
pose to others’.46 For Federman et al. and Scull, however, the morally beneficial visions that 
psychopathy may reveal must be tempered by an awareness of their intersection with 
historical discourses of gender, madness and sexuality. 
  
                                                                                                                
45 Scull, Madness, pp.70-1. 
46 Hare, Without Conscience, p.28. (I have removed Hare’s italics from this phrase.) 
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Art, Psychopathy and Iris Murdoch’s Enchanter  
The ambiguity of psychopathy, however, can be put to positive creative use: the clinical, 
sexual, socio-political and moral quandaries that the clinical construct of psychopathy reveals 
provide artists with a valuable medium through which to assert the complexity of the 
individual and to challenge biased stereotypes of evil. While art’s ‘interest in evil’ may be 
worthy of critique, Murdoch argues, its ‘very ambiguity and voracious iniquitousness’ is 
characteristic of its ‘freedom’ (EM, p.461), a freedom within which the psychopathic 
individual undoubtedly allows the artist to examine the dangers of immorality, or amorality, 
and to assert the ‘ambiguity of the whole man’ (EM, p.458). For many artists and writers, 
including Murdoch, a direct engagement with the moral and psychological discourses 
surrounding evil, such as the traits contained within the clinical construct of psychopathy, 
offer a crucial illustration of the reality of evil and the moral complexities that have to be 
confronted when attempting to understand its motivations. 
The figure defined by the clinical construct of psychopathy offers a complex vision of 
the benefits, danger and proximity of evil. Indeed, in my earlier research, I suggested that 
Hilary Burde from A Word Child (1975) was an exemplar of Murdoch’s enchanter figures 
who ‘appear in Murdoch’s novels as a warning’ about ‘the potential extremity of evil’ (MGM, 
p.509).47 The popularity of fictional criminals is arguably fostered by the wide coverage of 
atrocities and criminality in the news media, by increasing clinical, philosophical and 
psychological studies of psychopathy, and by a growing general interest in criminality and its 
motivations. Joseph Grixti argues, for example, that the fictional depiction of Jeffrey Dahmer 
in a 1992 comic represented the modern tendency to elevate criminals ‘to the rank of 
                                                                                                                
47 Daniel Read, ‘Psychopathy, Morality and Art in Iris Murdoch’s A Word Child’ 
(unpublished master’s thesis, Kingston University, 2014). 
 166 
ambiguous monster hero’.48 For some commentators, like Sarah Scott McCready, such 
fictional engagements with evil do not ‘accurately portray’ the realities of ‘serial homicide’.49 
Art, however, offers a crucial place within which to explore the extremes of human depravity. 
J. K. Rowling, for example, describes Voldemort, the central evil character in her Harry 
Potter novels, as ‘a raging psychopath, devoid of the normal human responses to other 
people’s suffering’.50 Rowling was careful to portray such evil characters not as caricatures 
but as a reminder that there ‘ARE people like [this] in the world’ and that it is important to 
‘inform’ people of the various ‘shades of evil’.51 There is, as Murdoch argues in Metaphysics 
as a Guide to Morals, ‘ruthless unshakable evil’ in the world (MGM, p.120) and the 
individual has to be wary of the kind of the psychopathic traits that often motivate it. Such 
engagements with evil, as Roy F. Baumeister suggests, are fundamental to creative, 
criminological, philosophical,  psychological and sociological discourses: an attempt to 
understand evil, he argues, requires an engagement with the ‘excuses, rationalizations, 
minimalizations, and ambiguities that mark [a criminal’s] state of mind’.52 ‘We all suffer 
from self-love,’ as Murdoch argues, discussing Plato’s Laws, ‘so we must be gentle with 
remediable criminals and try to see how, in their case too, there was a sense in which they did 
not err willingly’ (EM, p.442). For the artist, therefore, the psychopath is an ideal symbol of 
the human frailties that often motivate evil, such as egotism, impulsivity, a lack of empathy 
or manipulativeness. 
                                                                                                                
48 Joseph Grixti, ‘Consuming Cannibals: Psychopathic Killers as Archetypes and Cultural 
Icons’, The Journal of American Culture, 18:1 [1995]: 87–96. 
49 See Sarah Scott McCready, ‘Serial Killing Myths Versus Reality: A Content Analysis Of 
Serial Killer Movies Made Between 1980 and 2001’ (unpublished master’s thesis, University 
of North Texas, 2002). 
50 J.K. Rowling in conversation with Jeff Jensen. Jeff Jensen, ‘“Fire” Storm’, Entertainment 
Weekly, 7 September 2000 <http://www.accio-quote.org/articles/2000/0900-ew-jensen.htm> 
[accessed 13/11/17]. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Roy F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty (1997); (New York: Holt 
Paperbacks, 1999), p.20.  
 167 
Murdoch directly engages with these moral dilemmas in The Fire and the Sun: Why 
Plato Banished the Artists (1977), where she resists Plato’s ‘banishment’ of art by aligning it 
with the morally transformative, dialectic activity of philosophy. For Plato, the ‘best’ method 
for moral transformation is ‘dialectic, that is, philosophy regarded as a spiritual discipline’ 
that ‘detach[es] the soul from material and egoistic goals and enliven[s] its spiritual faculty’ 
(EM, p.404). For Plato, Murdoch explains, ‘[t]rue understanding comes […] after sustained 
and persistent discussion’ (EM, p.405). For her, however, the ‘prescription for art is the same 
as dialectic: overcome personal fantasy and egoistic anxiety and self-indulgent day-dream’ 
(EM, p.455). The recipient of art approaches it as ‘a great hall of reflection where we can all 
meet and where everything under the sun can be examined and considered’ (EM, p.461). For 
Simone Weil, whose readings of Plato had a great impact upon Murdoch, ‘imaginative 
literature’ is either ‘tedious’ or ‘immoral’, and ‘only manages to escape this alternative by 
passing to a certain extent, by dint of art, over the side of reality—which genius alone is able 
to do’.53 Murdoch sees this inclusive, just, realistic vision in the ‘wise moralistic writers’ 
whom she revered, such as Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Homer, Henry James, Tolstoy, 
Shakespeare and Stevenson, whose portrayal of ‘the complexity of morality’ (TCHF, p.224) 
requires not only good characters but also attractive, perceptive, violent immoralists. For 
Murdoch, such artists prove that, while art’s ‘playful’ engagement with evil may be 
‘dangerous’ (EM, p.443), its ultimate ambiguity allows it to be ‘a great hall of reflection’ 
wherein ‘meticulous justice’ can be ‘tempered by tolerance and common sense’ (EM, p.442).  
The just moral vision within Murdoch’s fiction presciently reflects contemporary 
criticisms of the clinical construct of psychopathy, illustrating the inability for psychiatric, 
psychological or scientific discourses to accurately capture human complexities and 
                                                                                                                
53 Simone Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil (1956), trans. by Arthur Wills, vol. 1 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 1976), pp.143-4. 
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differences. The fictional exploration of the causes of Hilary Burde’s immoral behaviour in A 
Word Child, as I have argued in earlier research, for example, intuits contemporary 
psychological critiques of the relationship between childhood experiences of violence and 
adult immorality.54 Hilary’s first-person narrative suggests that his immoral behaviour is 
influenced by the vision of ‘human wickedness’ (WC, pp.17-8) that Aunt Bill represented in 
his childhood.55 His childhood, however, was not without positive influences: his sister, 
Crystal, and his teacher, Mr Osmand, both provided him with a vision of moral duty, 
goodness and ‘salvation’ (WC, p.20-1). On the one hand, Murdoch’s exploration of the 
wickedness experienced by her characters in childhood, then, partly supports A. E. Denham’s 
view that the ‘tragic biographies of psychopaths’ are often marked by ‘childhood loss and 
abandonment’, ‘social exclusion’ and an ‘exposure to radical brutality’.56 On the other hand, 
Murdoch’s inclusion of positive influences in Hilary’s childhood partly echoes the views of 
contemporary psychologists such as Sue Gerhardt, who undermine the veracity of such 
deterministic psychological arguments. For Gerhardt, life is not a static experience, but ‘a 
                                                                                                                
54 Alongside the above discussion of Hilary Burde’s childhood, my Master’s dissertation 
drew three links between Murdoch’s portrayal of Hilary, arguably one of her ‘quintessentially 
evil characters’, and contemporary discourses on psychopathy. First, Hilary’s behaviour 
toward his work colleagues, his sexual partners, his family and his close friends all evidence 
psychopathic traits such as a lack of empathy, a parasitic lifestyle, conning and manipulative 
behaviour and poor behavioural controls. Second, Hilary’s first-person narrative, in which he 
continuously attempts to exculpate himself of the guilt of killing Anne Jopling, intersects 
with contemporary discourses about the complex relationship between psychopathy and 
criminal law. Finally, Murdoch’s portrayal of Hilary as a violent, volatile and unreliable first-
person narrator, whose narrative provides him with the power to charm the reader, indicates 
the ambiguous psychopathic nature of all artists, whose creative works, as Murdoch argues, 
provide them with a potentially dangerous form of ‘power’ (MGM, p.429). Read, 
‘Psychopathy, Morality and Art in Iris Murdoch’s A Word Child’, passim. 
55 For Hilary, Aunt Bill’s wickedness was symbolised by her particular way […] of stepping 
on insects’ (WC, pp.17-8), an image that Murdoch echoes when Hilary ‘pin[s] Tommy 
against the door, […] press[ing] her violently back, squeezing the flesh as hard as [he] could 
[…], as if [he] wanted to drive her body back through the wood or flatten her like an insect’ 
(WC, p.52; my italics).  
56 A. E. Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, in Iris Murdoch, 
Philosopher, ed. by Justin Broackes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.325-52, 
p.352. 
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continual process of adaptation’ where ‘change and development’ are continually possible.57 
Similarly, for Murdoch, human behaviour cannot be wholly determined by past experiences 
or classified into discrete psychological categories. In The Message to the Planet, the 
inability of the characters to define Marcus Vallar’s behaviour illustrates the difficulty of 
accurately defining human behaviour, especially through scientific discourses. At the 
beginning of the novel, the characters see Marcus as ‘mad’, ‘a destroyer’, ‘intolerable, 
insupportable’ and ‘dangerous’ (MP, p.1-3). The novel, however, charts his mental decline: 
no longer such a formidable individual, he is described by his daughter, Irina, as ‘stark 
staring raving mad’ (MP, p.96), by Alison Merric (and later Jack Sheerwater) as a ‘manic-
depressive’ (MP, p.349, 519), and by Suzanne Moxon as ‘a sufferer from Asperger’s 
Syndrome’ (MP, p.388).58 As Dr Marzillian, the ambiguous psychiatrist (who runs the mental 
institute where Marcus resides) suggests, ‘our knowledge of the soul, if I may use that 
unclinical but essential word, encounters certain seemingly impassable limits’, and there are 
‘some matters’ or cases, such as the one presented by Marcus, that ‘resist inquiry and remain 
mysterious’ (MP, p.509). Like those who criticise psychological determinism and question 
                                                                                                                
57 Sue Gerhardt, Why Love Matters: How Affection Shapes A Baby’s Brain (2004); (East 
Sussex: Routledge, 2010), p.195. 
58 Denham and Baron-Cohen both explore the relationship between autism and psychopathy. 
Denham suggests that recent research problematises the ‘pervasive image’ of the autistic 
individual that ‘depicts him as unresponsive to [the] socio-affective cues of others, lacking 
emotional warmth, and incapable of empathy’. This picture of autism is articulated in The 
Message to the Planet by Suzanne Moxon, who believes Marcus Vallar has Asperger’s 
Syndrome, ‘a particular form of autism characteristic of very clever children, wherein a 
specialized brilliance […] [is] combined with a complete inability to feel affection for other 
people or even to communicate with them’ (MP, p.388). The emotional difficulties of these 
individuals, however, Baron-Cohen explains, is ‘largely restricted to the cognitive 
component’ of emotional understanding rather than the ‘affective’ component, meaning that 
while they may not be able to recognise that someone is upset, they can empathise with them 
once this is ‘pointed out to them’. Psychopaths, alternatively, might recognise that someone 
is upset, but they lack the ‘motivation’ to empathise with them: if the psychopath ‘judges that 
another is […] suffering,’ as Denham explains, ‘he does so as a non-partisan observer: he 
does not register, as Nagel puts it, a “pained awareness of their distress as something to be 
relieved”.’ See Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, pp.341-50; and 
Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil, pp.105-28. 
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the definition of human behaviour into discrete categories or disorders, Murdoch’s portrayal 
of both Marcus Vallar and Hilary Burde highlights the complexity of the individual and the 
inner life. She thus challenges the ways in which clinical practitioners and psychologists 
theorise human behaviour, problematising the kinds of theories that might result in an 
individual being defined as simply ‘degenerate’, ‘evil’ or ‘mad’. 
An increasing number of contemporary writers, including Federman et al. and Scull, 
similarly criticise rigid psychological and sociological structures, including the construct of 
psychopathy. Paul Babiak and Robert D. Hare’s Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths go to 
Work (2006) and Kevin Dutton’s The Wisdom of Psychopaths (2012), for example, highlight 
that psychopathy does not directly equate with criminality or evil, and can even represent a 
collection of morally beneficial traits. Babiak and Hare offer a fictional depiction of what 
leads to the ‘success’ of psychopathic people within ‘modern organizations’ and attempt to 
demystify how such individuals deploy their invisible, and sometimes ‘destructive’, 
psychopathic traits to their advantage.59 Kevin Dutton’s study, alternatively, partly resolves 
the moral and psychological criticisms of psychopathy by highlighting the fact that it 
represents a ‘spectrum’;60 as Hare argues in more scientific parlance, psychopathy is a 
‘syndrome—a cluster of related symptoms’ or ‘traits’.61 For Dutton, while psychopathic traits 
may define violent criminals and murderers, they also define ‘antipsychopaths’, ‘elite 
spiritual individuals’ or saints, thus indicating that psychopaths and their saintly counterparts 
‘may have something to teach us’.62 Dutton’s argument, therefore, mediates the kind of 
criticisms offered by Ronson, Federman et al. and Scull, for whom psychopathy can be 
aligned with madness and its historically and socially problematic relationship to moral 
                                                                                                                
59 Babiak and Hare, Snakes in Suits, p.xiv. 
60 Kevin Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths: Lessons in Life from Saints, Spies and Serial 
Killers (London: Arrow Books, 2013), p.32. 
61 Hare, Without Conscience, p.34. Hare’s italics. 
62 Ibid. 
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deviance. Instead, the psychopath’s traits can be used to good, evil or indifferent effects, and 
his ostensibly evil predispositions can, in fact, be turned toward the good.  
Murdoch’s enchanter figures have held such morally ambiguous roles from their very 
first appearance within her oeuvre. Her first enchanter, the infamous Mischa Fox in The 
Flight from the Enchanter (1956), as Cheryl Bove argues, galvanised her fictional interest in 
‘the power figure’.63 Described as evil and demonic, ‘a man capable of enormous cruelty’ 
(FE, p.31), and a figure of ‘great authority’ with ‘a kind of oriental magic’ (FE, p.140), Fox 
is an enthralling demonic figure. His power, however, proves a necessary tool to counteract 
the psychopathic control of the Polish refugee brothers, Jan and Stefan Lusiewicz. Like 
Mischa, the Lusiewicz brothers exert a violent, sometimes sexual, power over Rosa Keepe 
and her brother, Nicholas. Rosa knew ‘that she had not the strength to escape from the power 
of the brothers. […] The darkness in which those two held her was profound beyond the 
reach of names. She could not of her own will break the spell’ (FE, p.102). The extremity and 
violence of their power is illustrated later in the novel when, having discovered the Lusiewicz 
brothers’ power over his sister, Nicolas’s threat to deport Stefan backfires: 
 
‘Listen you now,’ said Stefan, and then his voice continued in the dark. ‘I 
tell you something true. If you make such trouble for me I kill you.’ He 
spoke slowly and there was something cold and objective about his tone 
which made it impressive. ‘I not say this for threat. I tell you it as fact. […] 
I say I am the master here!’ (FE, p.233) 
 
Stefan’s alignment with darkness and his ‘cold and objective’ tone emphasises his 
intimidating, volatile psychopathic nature, which captivates, enslaves and terrifies Rosa and 
Nicholas. Deciding that ‘only darkness could cast out darkness’, Rosa finally realises the 
                                                                                                                
63 Cheryl K. Bove, Understanding Iris Murdoch (South Carolina: University Press, 1993), 
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necessity for Mischa’s demonic nature, and the narrator now describes him as a ‘demon of 
unreason [that] did not come to Rosa wearing a psychological disguise but bearing the name 
of a friend’ (FE, p.235; my italics). Arising from the ‘same region’ as that of the Lusiewicz 
brothers, Mischa’s charming, demonic power is used for ‘tender’ purposes to diminish the 
Lusiewicz brothers’ psychopathic cruelty (FE, p.241). In The Flight from the Enchanter, this 
psychopathic charm allows characters either, as in the case of Jan and Stephan, to exploit the 
weaknesses of others to their advantage or, as in the case of Mischa, to positively enact the 
fantasies of others. In his first appearance in Murdoch’s oeuvre, therefore, the ostensibly evil 
enchanter figure is portrayed ambivalently: Mischa is transformed into a beneficial enchanter 
figure, and Murdoch equivocates the evil of one psychopathic enchanter figure (Mischa) in 
the light of an even more dangerous one (Stefan). Dangerous but necessary, the ambiguous 
and dangerously charming antagonists within Murdoch’s novels, including Honor Klein in A 
Severed Head, Julius King in A Fairly Honourable Defeat, Mischa Fox in The Flight from 
the Enchanter and Mother May in The Good Apprentice, are capable of turning their 
propensity for evil into good to fulfil the moral needs of others, contesting the pejorative use 
of the term enchanter, or even psychopath.  
 Regardless of the ‘dangerous’ imaginative medium that artists, filmmakers or writers 
employ, their explorations of evil (however depraved or ostensibly unrealistic they may be) 
offer fundamental moral and psychological explorations of what causes human wickedness. 
‘Pure wickedness’, as Mother May explains to Edward in The Good Apprentice, ‘never seems 
wicked. It’s when it’s mixed with good that it shows’ (GA, p.258). The psychopath’s 
fundamental mixture of good and evil allows Murdoch to equivocate straightforward dualist 
readings of her novels, which separate her evil characters from the good and, moreover, often 
separate men from women. The ‘[p]rimitive destructive forces’ of her female, as well as 
male, enchanters, as Robert C. Kane argues, ‘are needed to free mankind from the shackles of 
 173 
civilization’ and from the ‘demonic distortions’ or ‘rigid concepts’ that are often used to 
define people.64 The psychopath, therefore, appears in the work of art as a unique individual 
whose acts can be justly surveyed in all their ambiguity and complexity: these figures can be 
male or female; they can be misunderstood, intentionally cruel, manipulative or evil; yet they 
can also be beneficial, they can also be, as Dutton argues, ‘elite spiritual individuals’ or 
saints. 
 
Moral Duty, Empathy and the Psychopathic Enchanter 
Murdoch’s fictional antagonists, or ‘enchanter’ figures, as they are frequently termed by 
Murdoch scholars, are often distinguished from other characters by their criticisms of society, 
their demonic energy, their immorality, and their violence. Often referred to pejoratively, the 
enchanter, to use Miles Leeson’s definition, is described as ‘one who holds the other 
characters within their grasp by fear and sexual intrigue’.65 These enchanter figures, however, 
are a fundamental tool with which Murdoch tests various moral questions, such as: are 
individuals capable of a demonic (positive) evil devoid of goodness? What causes or 
motivates this evil? Can the individual go beyond morality, beyond good and evil? And can 
evil be a duty? Murdoch’s engagement with these questions not only resonates with post-war 
discussions of evildoing and contemporary discussions of empathy but also connects with her 
literary forebears, some of whose works are alluded to within her portrayal of similarly 
formidable, even pseudo-psychopathic, evil characters.  
Murdoch’s fictional exploration of these moral dilemmas invites a dialogue with the 
clinical construct of psychopathy. In ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’ (2012), 
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 174 
the first (and only) published essay that explores Murdoch’s engagement with psychopathy, 
A. E. Denham concludes by drawing a link between the enchanter and the psychopath.66  For 
her, the charming, manipulative, powerful and seductive behaviour of Julius King, the central 
enchanter figure of A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970), described by others as a ‘monster’ 
(FHD, p.224), exemplifies the powerful psychopathic nature of Murdoch’s enchanter figures. 
Earlier critical explorations of the demonic or evil characters within Murdoch’s fiction had, 
to a certain extent, already implicitly drawn this link. In Didactic Demons in Modern Fiction 
(1988), Robert C. Kane explores the psychology that drives the immoral behaviour within 
Murdoch’s fiction, arguing that evil is  
 
caused by neurotic self-obsession that blurs [moral] vision and prevents the 
individual from seeing the otherness of people who are not himself. As he 
fails to recognize their uniqueness, the self-absorbed individual imposes his 
private fantasies upon other real people.67 
 
Kane’s discussion intuits the psychopathic lack of empathy displayed by Murdoch’s 
enchanter figures and highlights the role that ‘fantasy’, and its ability to obscure moral vision, 
plays in the enchanter’s, or indeed the psychopath’s, predisposition for evildoing.  
Denham’s essay similarly illustrates how Murdoch’s moral philosophy exhibits a 
prescient awareness of the discussions surrounding psychopathy, especially with regards to 
the psychopath’s lack of empathy, or inability to attend to the other. For Murdoch, art, 
morality and religion aim at combating our egotism by fostering a truthful appreciation of 
others, by illustrating the importance of acknowledging ‘the extremely difficult realization 
that something other than oneself is real’ (EM, p.215). This loving process, as Murdoch 
explains, highlights the fundamental role of the imagination, a ‘moral discipline’ that is 
                                                                                                                
66 A. E. Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, p.334. 
67 Kane, Didactic Demons in Modern Fiction, p.152. 
 175 
exhibited when carrying out such ‘[f]airly everyday advice’ as ‘[b]e more sympathetic, 
imagine her situation, see it from her point of view’ (MGM, p.322). For Murdoch, the moral 
life is driven by such an empathic attention to reality: a true ‘moral vision’ of one’s 
surroundings and of other people, she argues, ‘occasions right conduct’ (SG, p.66). The 
crucial experiences and traits that Murdoch explores in relation to the moral life resonate with 
those that define the psychopath’s ability to commit acts of cruelty and evil. ‘The 
psychopath’s disorder’, Denham claims, ‘is just as Murdoch’s phenomenology of “moral 
vision” would predict: it is at once a failure to feel properly and a failure to judge correctly’; 
the psychopath ‘misses out certain wholly ordinary and pervasive facts about everyday 
psychology’ and ‘fails to perceive and believe all that […] he must if he is to form true other-
regarding, basic moral judgements’.68 The inability for the psychopath to empathise, to 
‘recognise and attribute’ states of distress or suffering, to be ‘moved by what he sees’, results 
in an egocentric, solipsistic moral lifestyle.69 
Contemporary writers, such as Simon Baron-Cohen and Paul Bloom, debate the moral 
importance of empathy, or of a ‘just and loving’ attention to the other, as it is expressed in 
Murdoch’s moral philosophy. Baron-Cohen and Bloom, in The Science of Evil: on Empathy 
and the Origins of Cruelty (2011) and Against Empathy: the Case for Rational Compassion 
(2017), respectively, take opposite views on the role that empathy plays in the moral life, and 
focus their discussion on the psychopath’s ‘complete lack of empathy’.70 This emotional 
colourblindness, or failure to ‘construct a mental and emotional “facsimile” of another 
person’, Hare suggests, is ‘closely associated’ with psychopathic traits such as ‘egocentricity, 
[a] lack of remorse, shallow emotions, and deceitfulness’.71 As Baron-Cohen and Bloom both 
                                                                                                                
68 Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, p.351-2. 
69 Ibid., p.350. 
70 Hare, Without Conscience, p.6. 
71 Ibid., p.44. 
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explain, however, the psychopath’s failure to empathize is only limited to his emotional 
understanding. For Bloom, empathy can be divided into two forms: emotional empathy and 
cognitive empathy. The former is comparable to sympathy, to the experience of ‘feeling what 
you believe other people to feel’; the latter is a form of ‘social intelligence’.72 This cognitive 
empathy, or improved ‘theory of mind’ to use Denham’s term, provides the psychopath with 
a perfect tool to exploit human frailty.73 Psychopaths, as Bloom explains, ‘are good at 
understanding other people [but] bad at feeling their pain’.74 The psychopath’s failure in 
emotional empathy allows them to become adept ‘social predator[s]’ and exemplifies what 
Bloom sees as the ‘biased’, ‘shortsighted’ and ‘innumerate’ nature of empathy, rationalizing 
his belief that it should be jettisoned from the moral life.75 For Baron-Cohen, however, both 
emotional and cognitive empathy, while they may have their limitations, are fundamental to 
goodness: ‘Without empathy we risk the breakdown of relationships, we become capable of 
hurting others, and we can cause conflict.’76 Like Murdoch, Baron-Cohen presents a picture 
of morality that highlights the importance of imagination, moral vision and love. As Baron-
Cohen’s and Bloom’s studies illustrate, however, the psychopath’s paradoxical personality, 
his failure in emotional empathy that motivates or allows him to carry out his wickedness 
versus his success in cognitive empathy that provides him with an acute vision of human 
frailties, challenges the ostensibly universal appeal of empathy, of love, and of moral duty. 
                                                                                                                
72 Paul Bloom, Against Empathy: the Case for Rational Compassion (London: Vintage, 
2017), p.3. 
73 The term ‘theory of mind’ (TOM), Denham explains, refers to the ability to ‘represent 
other’s mental states’, their ‘beliefs, desire[s], intentions, imagination, emotions’. Denham 
draws a comparison between the autistic individual and the psychopath to elaborate on these 
complex, somewhat paradoxical differences in ‘mindreading’. Where psychopaths have a 
functional TOM but are ‘dysfunctional in their emotional and moral responses to others’, 
autistics ‘suffer from TOM defects’ but do experience empathy and understand the moral 
requirements of others. Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, pp.340-1. 
74 Bloom, Against Empathy, p.72. 
75 Hare, Without Conscience, p.xi; Bloom, p.9. For further discussion, see Bloom, pp.15-56. 
76 Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil, p.191.  
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The Successes and Failures of Empathy in A Fairly Honourable Defeat 
A Fairly Honourable Defeat engages with the kind of post-war experiences that motivated 
Hannah Arendt’s fundamental response to evil: the enchanter, Julius King, whose original 
surname was Kahn, was at a concentration camp, in Belsen (FHD, p.421). The demonic 
Julius, however (who is symbolically aligned with the Devil), provides an example par 
excellence of the psychopath’s paradoxical failure and success at ‘mindreading’: he lacks 
emotional empathy but is capable of a greater cognitive empathy than his peers, and is thus 
more aware of their human frailties. As a bet with Morgan Browne, he engineers a 
‘demonstrat[ion]’ of the fact that, as he believes, ‘[t]here is no relationship […] which cannot 
quite easily be broken’ (FHD, p.224), that ‘Anyone can be made to drop anyone’ (FHD, 
p.225). By fabricating a relationship between Rupert Foster and his sister-in-law, Morgan, he 
destroys Rupert’s marriage to Hilda and deconstructs his high-minded picture of morality. 
Rupert’s moral vision, similar to Murdoch’s, expounds a vision of ‘the dreariness of 
wickedness [and] the life-givingness of good’ p.213-5). Julius, however, believes that evil is 
‘much more exciting and fascinating and alive’, and ‘more mysterious’, than good (FHD, 
p.213-5). Here Julius echoes Weil’s vision of the interconnected nature of ‘literature and 
morality’: unlike ‘real evil’ which, as in the case of Eichmann, ‘is dreary, monotonous, 
barren [and] tedious’, ‘imaginary evil is romantic, fanciful, varied’.77 Rupert’s death at the 
end of A Fairly Honourable Defeat, which is caused by ‘misadventure’ or suicide (FHD, 
p.418), results from Julius’s active, diabolical, psychopathic vision, a vision that reveals the 
weakness of Rupert’s philosophical belief in a ‘truthful’, ‘orderly and open’ moral life (FHD, 
p.217). 
Julius’s Machiavellian plan exhibits a considerable psychopathic lack of emotional 
empathy. He informs Morgan that ‘no one would really suffer’ from this plan (FHD, p.225): 
                                                                                                                
77 Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, pp.143-4. 
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the ‘breaking’ of relationships, he flippantly claims, is not ‘a matter of any genuine 
seriousness’ (FHD, p.224). Julius’s inability to understand the importance of relationships, of 
the value of love, aligns with his psychopathic belief that virtue is ‘unutterably depressing’ 
(FHD, p.215). Julius is, therefore, as Cleckley argues of the psychopath in The Mask of 
Sanity, ‘unfamiliar with the primary facts or data of what might be called personal values’.78 
As Denham’s discussion of the psychopath accurately indicates, Julius is incapable of being 
‘moved by what he sees’, incapable of understanding goodness, love and truth.79 Julius’s 
amoral vision and his distance from humanity strongly echo the emotional failures outlined 
by Cleckley:  
 
It is impossible for him to take even a slight interest in the tragedy or joy or 
the striving of humanity as presented in serious literature or art. He is also 
indifferent to all these matters in life itself. Beauty and ugliness, except in a 
very superficial sense, goodness, evil, love, horror, and humour have no 
actual meaning, no power to move him.80 
 
Such a psychopathic attitude is notably illustrated by Julius’s indifference to Rupert’s death 
at the end of the novel. ‘[H]ow terribly stupidly they all behaved. Don’t you agree?’ he says 
to Tallis, ‘Human beings set each other off so. Put three emotional fairly clever people in a 
fix and instead of trying quietly to communicate with each other they’ll dream up some piece 
of communal violence’ (FHD, p.419). 
However, while Julius’s indifference, or lack of empathy, at the end of the narrative is 
cruel, his vision of humanity is partly correct; like many of the enchanters in Murdoch’s 
fiction, he is both extreme and morally truthful. As Peter J. Conradi argues, Murdoch’s own 
philosophical vision of the ‘unregenerate psyche’ is ‘brilliantly described by the satanic 
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79 Denham, ‘Psychopathy, Empathy, and Moral Motivation’, p.350. 
80 Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity, p.40. 
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Julius’.81 In human relationships, Julius believes, ‘Anyone will do to play the roles. [People] 
never really see each other at all […]. Human beings are essentially finders of substitutes’ 
(FHD, p.223-4). Here, as Conradi notes, Murdoch gives to Julius the fundamental message 
that the moral agent is, more often than not, a ‘blind puppet’ of their ‘mechanical’ and 
‘unenlightened’ unconscious mind.82 ‘Driven along by their own private needs’, as Julius 
explains, people ‘latch blindly on to each other, then pull away, then clutch again’ (FHD, 
p.223-4). While the moral vision portrayed by Murdoch’s enchanter figures, therefore, may 
appear bleak and have painful repercussions, they nevertheless exhibit a perceptive 
awareness of the moral challenges that the individual confronts. Indeed, as Julius argues, 
Rupert’s death was caused by his vain inability to acknowledge the potential for evil and 
failure in the moral life: ‘He loved a big imposing good-Rupert image’, Julius explains, 
‘Rupert didn’t die of drowning. He died of vanity’ (FHD, p.420). Rupert’s death, therefore, 
indicates the austere but fundamental moral message revealed by the psychopath’s high 
cognitive empathy: we are all capable of a psychopathic moral blindness, of being confused 
by emotions, and of ignoring the importance of truth and the challenge of evil. 
 
Simone Weil, Hannah Arendt and the Psychopathic Evil 
In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch explores such psychopathic failures in moral 
duty alongside the post-war responses to evil offered by Hannah Arendt and Simone Weil. 
Where Weil’s Notebooks contain piecemeal discussions of evil, drawing particular attention 
to literary works such as Doctor Faustus, Metamorphoses or Therese Desqueyroux, Arendt’s 
examination of Adolf Eichmann’s flawed moral reasoning indicates certain limitations within 
Kantian moral philosophy and the ease with which ‘thoughtlessness’ can lead to evil. To a 
                                                                                                                
81 Peter J. Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollins, 2001), p.104. 
82 Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, p.104. 
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certain extent, Murdoch’s alignment of Kant’s moral philosophy with Existentialism echoes 
Eichmann’s distorted use of Kant’s moral philosophy.83 For Murdoch, the existentialist hero, 
with his will ‘separate from the rest of his being and uncontaminated’, is a ‘lonely brave man’ 
that believes he can ‘do anything’ (EM, p.225). Murdoch’s fiction directly engages with such 
psychopathic visions of immorality: a number of her antagonists and enchanter figures, such 
as John Robert Rozanov in The Philosopher’s Pupil (1983), Jesse Baltrum in The Good 
Apprentice (1985), and Marcus Vallar in The Message to the Planet (1989), articulate not 
only a Nietzschean sentiment of being ‘beyond good and evil’ but also an Arendtian or 
Weilian idea that ‘evil can be a duty’.84 The limited moral psychology of Murdoch’s 
enchanter figures, whether motivated by psychopathic or existentialist discourses, makes 
their evil ‘habitual, a way of life, something which one just “has to go on with”’ (MGM, 
p.103). 
Murdoch’s annotations of The Notebooks of Simone Weil (1952-5), and her 
subsequent discussions of them within Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992), reveal the 
extent to which Simone Weil encountered such psychopathic moral visions within literature. 
For Weil, Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, both of which 
engage with the idea that evil can be ‘a necessity or even a duty’, are more successful at 
presenting the reality of evil than Mauriac’s Therese Desqueyroux, which fails to represent 
                                                                                                                
83 Among the ‘deep and abiding connections between the lives and thoughts’ of Murdoch and 
Arendt, despite their ‘manifest’ differences, Frances White argues, are their ‘respective 
interpretations of Kant’. See Frances White, ‘Two Women in Dark Times’ in Iris Murdoch 
and the Moral Imagination: Essays, ed. by M.F. Simone Roberts and Alison Scott-Baumann 
(North Carolina, USA: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2010), pp.13-29. 
84 For the location of where these characters are connected with the phrase ‘beyond good and 
evil’, see: GA, p.216; PP, p.195; and MP, p.20. 
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‘the colour of evil, the monotony and facility of it’.85 As she argues in a later passage, which 
Murdoch both noted and underlined, where ‘imaginary evil is romantic and varied, real evil 
[is] dreary, monotonous, barren and tedious’.86 In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 
Murdoch extends Weil’s discussion of ‘imaginary evil’ to include ‘Shakespeare’s wicked 
characters, such as Iago and Macbeth’, both of whom illustrate the ‘the natural irresistible 
exercise of a depraved vision’ (MGM, p.103). For these characters, evil takes on a 
psychopathic mode: ‘There’s nothing serious in mortality’, Macbeth realises, ‘All is but toys; 
renown and grace is dead’.87 Following Weil, Murdoch argues that such infamous literary 
characters, whose evil represents a psychopathic lack of empathy, show the reader that ‘[e]vil 
is terrible and also very close’ (MGM, p.103).  
Murdoch’s fictional exploration of evil, power and psychopathic callousness draws on 
such prominent literary sources of Machiavellian, unemphatic cruelty. She alludes to, or 
echoes, the writings of Robert Louis Stevenson, Shakespeare, John Milton and Christopher 
Marlowe in many of her novels, including A Fairly Honourable Defeat and The 
Philosopher’s Pupil. 88 For Janfarie Skinner, Stevenson’s infamously charming, unempathic 
                                                                                                                
85 Weil quotes the following phrase from Ovid’s Metamorphoses: ‘Video meliora probaque, 
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argues, ‘it seems that one conceives the good and one does so in a sense, but one does not 
conceive the possibility of it’. Later, she also draws a link between Metamorphoses and 
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good appears as a temptation’. See Weil, The Notebooks of Simone Weil, vol. 1, pp.108, 250. 
86 At the back of The Notebooks of Simone Weil, Vol. 1, Murdoch wrote, ‘evil + good in 
imagination 141’. See Iris Murdoch, annotations to The Notebooks of Simone Weil, held in 
the Iris Murdoch Archive, IML931. 
87 William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Arden Shakespeare, ed. by Sandra Clark and Pamela 
Mason (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp.105-300, p.192 (Act 2, Scene 3, Lines 94-5). 
88 Pinkie Brown, the psychopathic antihero in Graham Greene’s Brighton Rock (1938), might 
similarly have influenced Murdoch’s enchanters. For Nick Turner, Murdoch’s ability to draw 
on both ‘academic and popular fields’ within her fiction is illustrated by the psychopathic 
‘Graham Green-like violence of Henry and Cato’, which has ‘both a moral point, and a drive 
[that] involves the reader at a surface level’. Nick Turner, ‘Saint Iris? Murdoch’s Place in the 
Modern Canon’, in Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment, ed. by Anne Rowe (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp.115-23, p.118. 
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and violent character, Long John Silver, ‘triggered’ Murdoch’s wider ‘fascination with 
themes of violence, entrapment and enclosure’.89 Indeed, as ‘one of the most dangerous and 
charismatic enchanters of English literature,’ Skinner suggests, he ‘lurks behind’ and ‘meets 
many of the requirements’ for Murdoch’s enchanter figures, including Julius King in A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat.90 Shakespeare’s Richard III, who admits that he could ‘set the murderous 
Machiavel to school’ and, later, puts into place ‘inductions dangerous’ to set his brothers, in 
‘deadly hate, the one against the other’,91 could also be listed among the characters that 
influenced Murdoch’s enchanter figures. Like Silver, who Skinner argues is ‘seductive’ and 
has ‘a capacity for extreme violence and cruelty’,92 Richard’s ‘[v]iolent, ambitious, cunning 
and demonically isolated’ behaviour,93 as well as his ‘deadly charm and dangerous 
psychology’, are notably psychopathic.94 While no critics have drawn attention to Richard 
III’s psychopathic behaviour thus far, others have suggested that Iago, with whom George 
McCaffrey is aligned in The Philosopher’s Pupil, offers ‘an accurate portrait of a 
                                                                                                                
89 Janfarie Skinner, ‘The Influence of Childhood Reading on the Fiction of Iris Murdoch’, in 
Iris Murdoch: Texts and Contexts, ed. by Anne Rowe and Avril Horner (Hampshire: Palgrave 
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90 Skinner, ‘The Influence of Childhood Reading on the Fiction of Iris Murdoch’, p.221. 
91 William Shakespeare, Henry VI Part III, Arden Shakespeare, ed. by John D. Cox and Eric 
Rasmussen (London: Thomson Learning, 2001), pp.185-368, pp.279-80 (Act 3, Scene 2, line 
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Richard III’. Richard’s psychopathic traits, however, equivocate Siemon’s argument that 
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of Richard III. See John D. Cox and Eric Rasmussen, Introduction, to Henry VI Part III, 
Arden Shakespeare, (London: Thomson Learning, 2001), pp.1-176, p.78; and James R. 
Siemon, Introduction, to Richard III, Arden Shakespeare (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 
Plc., 2017), pp.1-123, p.40, 42. 
94 Skinner’s suggestion that Violet’s dismissal of familial duty in Murdoch’s The Book and 
the Brotherhood echo Ebenezer’s actions in Stevenson’s Kidnapped could additionally be 
linked with Richard III’s psychopathic lack of empathy. See Skinner, pp.218-9. 
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psychopath’.95 While George is ‘like Iago’ (PP, p.56), however, his vision of morality 
directly alludes to a Miltonian phrase. When he ponders, ‘If crime is a duty then evil be thou 
my good makes sense’ (PP, p.145), Murdoch alludes to a section in Paradise Lost (1667) 
where Satan’s psychopathic undertones are tangible: ‘So farewell hope, and with hope 
farewell fear, / Farewell remorse; all good to me is lost. / Evil, be thou my good.’96 The 
central immoral characters in Othello, Paradise Lost, Richard III and Treasure Island exhibit, 
or engage with, psychopathic traits: their Machiavellian acts are powered by charm, by a lack 
of emotional empathy and by high cognitive empathy. Such characters reveal not only how 
evil, as Weil argues, can be ‘a necessity or even a duty’, but also the extent to which writers, 
many of whom Murdoch alludes to within her writings, have engaged with the psychopath’s 
amoral personality for far longer than the clinical term has held currency.  
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) reveals the 
similarly psychopathic lack of empathy and existentialist moral solipsism that drove 
Eichmann’s flawed moral vision. Indeed, Susan Neiman argues that, while Arendt’s concept 
of the banality of evil is ‘a new phrase’, ‘it isn’t a new discovery. At Auschwitz the devil 
showed the face that earlier literature merely suspected’.97 For Arendt, however, Eichmann’s 
actions also revealed the limits of Kantian moral philosophy. She draws on various reports 
from Eichmann’s trial to explore his misguided belief that he had ‘lived his whole life 
according to Kant’s moral precepts’, such as the ‘categorical imperative’: according to 
Eichmann, he had ‘d[one] his duty’, he had ‘not only obeyed orders, he also obeyed the 
                                                                                                                
95 Fred West, ‘Iago as Psychopath’, Spring Atlantic Bulletin, 43:2 (May 1978) 27-35 (p.27). 
Mary Midgley also aligns the sexual proclivities of Iago with the psychopathic personality. 
See Mary Midgley, Wickedness (London: Routledge Classics, 2001), pp.154-5. 
96 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. by Stephen Orgel and Jonathan Goldberg (Oxford: 
University Press, 2008), p.87 (Book IV, lines 108-10). 
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law’.98 Such an interpretation of Kantian ethics offers a mis-representation of Kant’s moral 
discourse, illustrating, as Arendt argues, the potential for Kant’s moral philosophy to be 
‘distorted’.99 Kant formulates the categorical imperative thus: ‘I ought never to conduct 
myself except so that I could also will that my maxim become a universal law’.100 As Arendt 
recounts, however, in Eichmann’s ‘household’ version of Kantian morality, his ‘categorical 
imperative’ became ‘the Third Reich’.101 This ‘blind obedience’ to the Nazi regime 
represents a failure to carry out Kant’s moral philosophy, in which the individual should see 
their acts in the context of a universal law that, when drawn upon for making moral choices 
and judgements, acknowledges a collective ‘humanity’.102  Eichmann’s ability to distort these 
Kantian precepts illustrates the kind of limitations that Murdoch’s moral philosophy combats. 
For her, Kant’s moral philosophy, as Horner and Rowe suggest, represents ‘an account of 
ethics based too heavily on rational action’ (LP, p.387). While Murdoch and Kant, 
Antonaccio argues, were both ‘trying to picture the moral being of the human as necessarily 
related to some absolute’, Murdoch conceived this relation ‘under the category of 
consciousness’, not ‘under the category of the will as practical reason’.103 For Murdoch, the 
kind of moral duty expressed within Kantian philosophy ‘is not a rigid external code, it is a 
rule I impose on myself, felt as external by a mixed and imperfect nature’ (MGM, p.137); it is 
a ‘command whose authority may be recognised as running against the stream of the inner 
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life’ (MGM, p.294). Here, as Roger Scruton similarly surmises, the moral ‘authority’ of the 
‘categorical imperative’ should arise from ‘real and unconditional demand[s]’ that face the 
individual, namely the Other.104 Murdoch’s conception of the inner life locates the 
complexities and hinderances involved in moral action and highlights the need for attention 
in order to combat the kind of ‘distortion’ that, as Eichmann illustrates, such ostensibly 
universal Kantian moral laws can undergo. The moral frailties accounted for within 
Murdoch’s moral vision, therefore, chime with Arendt’s argument that Eichmann illustrated 
the ‘banality’ of an evil both terrible and ‘commonplace’, an evil that arose from failing to 
attend to the other.  
In The Philosopher’s Pupil, the eponymous character, George McCaffrey, the ex-
pupil of the philosopher John Robert Rozanov, echoes both Arendt’s discussions of 
Eichmann and the proto-psychopathic literary characters discussed by Weil. Like Arendt and 
Weil, Murdoch’s fictional and philosophical explorations of the idea that ‘evil can be a duty’ 
(MGM, p.101) illustrate how commonplace evil can be, how it can seem ‘necessary’ (MGM, 
p.103), or even be invited by society. George is presented in The Philosopher’s Pupil as an 
ambiguously evil, demonic, psychopathic character: he smashes the town’s Roman glass, 
imagines himself drowning babies, and tries to drown his wife. Where his brother, Brian 
suggests that he is, simply, ‘commonplace, a thoroughly vulgar fellow’ (PP, p.56), George 
ponders a more diabolical moral vision, asking ‘[i]f crime [can be] a duty’ (PP, p.145). On 
the one hand, George blames Rozanov for his ‘distorted’ vision of morality: Rozanov was 
‘Mephistopheles to [George’s] Faust’ and ‘destroyed’ his belief in morality (PP, p.146), 
instigating the amoral Nietzschean belief that ‘it is our duty’ to go ‘beyond good and evil’ 
(PP, p.196). On the other hand, Brian’s use of the word ‘commonplace’ to describe his 
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brother echoes Arendt’s definition of the ‘banality’ of Eichmann, who was both ‘terribly and 
terrifyingly normal’.105 George is, as his sister-in-law, Gabriel, suggests, ‘just like everyone 
else only in his case it shows’ (PP, p.47). Here, both George and Eichmann recall Cleckley’s 
definition of psychopaths in The Mask of Sanity (1941) which highlights their ability to 
portray a façade of ‘normality’.106 Indeed, for the characters of The Philosopher’s Pupil, 
George’s immorality is not only accepted but also revered: the near-murder of his wife, 
George admits, has made him ‘more popular now than ever’ (PP, p.74).107 Eichmann’s 
‘normality’ was for Arendt, Juliet Flower MacCannell argues, ‘less an index of his mental 
health than of the fact of the existence, on the world scene, of a state’ that licensed, rather 
than censured, the evil in which Eichmann took part.108 For Arendt, the moral ambiguities 
surrounding Eichmann’s immoral, ordinary, even socially acceptable acts offer a fundamental 
moral lesson:  
 
It was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with 
stupidity—that predisposed [Eichmann] to become one of the greatest 
criminals of that period. And if this is “banal” and even funny, if with the 
best will in the world one cannot extract any diabolical or demonic 
profundity from Eichmann, that is still far from calling it commonplace. 
[…] That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak 
more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are 
inherent in man—that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in 
Jerusalem.109 
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For Arendt, Eichmann is symbolic of the ‘sheer thoughtlessness’ permitted by the moral 
environment of Nazi Germany, where an ignorance to the plight of others became 
commonplace and evil become ordinary. The psychopathic moral failures in empathy, love, 
and respect for the other evidenced by Eichmann indicate that evil is not limited to criminals, 
to the insane, to enchanters, or to psychopaths; instead, all individuals have the capacity for 
wickedness. Murdoch’s fiction invites such an acknowledgement of the universality of evil; 
indeed, as in the case of The Philosopher’s Pupil, it is usually the central ostensibly ‘evil’ 
character that instigates this fundamental attention to, and subsequent social complicity with, 
evil. 
The moral dilemmas instigated by Murdoch’s antagonists and enchanters directly 
align with the twentieth and twenty-first century moral discourses that intersect with the 
clinical construct of psychopathy. Her writings, moreover, directly engage with the complex 
picture of morality that arises from the Arendtian or Weilian idea that ‘evil can be duty’, that 
evil can be a commonplace action illustrative not of an inherently diabolical nature but of a 
lack of moral attention. Arendt’s response to Eichmann’s evil, according to Susan Neiman, is 
fundamental in revealing the flawed modern assumptions about evil and evil intention.110 
Arguably, the same can be said of Murdoch’s fiction: the lack of guilt and the moral 
justification expressed by many of her evil characters represents the ease with which evil can 
become ‘commonplace’. Such a revelation, Neiman argues, affronted many readers of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: ‘The conviction that guilt requires malice and forethought led most 
readers to conclude that Arendt denied guilt because she denied malice and forethought’.111 
What Arendt actually revealed, however, Neiman argues, is that ‘Eichmann’s harmless 
intentions did not mitigate his responsibility’.112 Murdoch’s fiction allows the reader to make 
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a similar judgement of her enchanter figures. These psychopathic characters hold an 
ambivalent position in Murdoch’s fiction because their amoral vision illustrates not only the 
callous, wicked behaviour of which people are capable but also the concomitant bleak and 
necessary truth of their moral vision. The psychopath, therefore, is a moral enigma: aware of 
the human weaknesses rife for exploitation and unmoved by the distress of others, he is 
capable both of being a moral catalyst and of causing extreme harm. On the one hand, his 
high cognitive empathy allows him to see the moral challenges that the individual confronts 
and the human frailties that often obscure them. In this sense, Murdoch’s perceptive 
psychopathic enchanters chime with the infamous American psychopath Ted Bundy’s 
suggestion that ‘No man is truly innocent’, that ‘we all have transgressed [in] some way in 
our lives’.113 On the other hand, the psychopath’s lack of emotional empathy renders him 
incapable of fully understanding duty, love, morality and virtue, problematizing the universal 
call of morality. Murdoch’s fiction illustrates how the moral pilgrim needs to attend not only 
to both good and evil but also to that which charm or calls to our fantasies and obscures our 
awareness of morality; in so doing, Murdoch not only stresses the value of attention, 
imagination and vision, but also invites a corrective vision to the psychopath’s enchanting 
power and moral perplexity.  
 
Feminine Evil: Charm, Gender and Sexuality 
Much like her male antagonists, Murdoch’s female figures of evil can be aligned with the 
clinical construct of psychopathy and her portrayal of them both contributes to and challenges 
the sometimes biased twentieth and twenty-first century discussions surrounding female 
psychopaths. ‘For years,’ Seth Meyers explains, ‘research has told us that psychopaths are 
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usually male’.114 Even after twenty-three years of the Psychopathy Checklist being in use, 
Stéphanie Klein Tuente, Vivienne de Vogel and Jeantine Stam attest, ‘there are concerns 
about whether the PCL-R captures the construct of psychopathy satisfactorily in women’.115 
While it remains a renowned system with which to diagnose psychopathy, ostensibly 
providing clinical and judicial justifications for the definition of often immoral individuals, 
its sexual bias not only limits its universality (and perhaps its clinical accuracy), but also 
indicates the problems surrounding society’s judgement of female criminality or evil.  
For contemporary writers, gender stereotypes continue to complicate attempts to 
understand and depict feminine evil. Donna Fergusson, for example, suggests that the bias 
toward dominant male protagonists and ‘vulnerable’ (often anthropomorphised) female 
characters in children’s literature is indicative of, as Jess Day argues, the ‘wider cultural 
discomfort with women who are not well-behaved and good’.116 The bias toward depicting 
women as kind, passive and weak recalls the dichotomous nineteenth-century view of 
womanhood, in which women were relegated to domestic, private ‘spheres’117 and, as Sandra 
Gilbert and Susan Gubar argue, defined by ‘the vexed and vexing polarities of angel and 
monster, sweet dumb Snow White and fierce mad Queen’.118 Such dualist visions of 
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womanhood are confronted by Carol Anne Duffy in The World’s Wife (1999), a collection of 
poems that, for Jeanette Winterson, represents a lament for ‘women in captivity’, for ‘a mind 
that can never escape itself or be set free by others’.119 The central poem, ‘The Devil’s Wife’, 
written from the perspective of Moors’ murderer, Myra Hindley, illustrates how restrictive 
gender stereotypes affect society’s understanding of feminine evil. The poetic persona 
announces that ‘The Devil was evil, mad, but I was the Devil’s wife / which made me worse. 
I howled in my cell.’120 In Duffy’s poetic vision, Hindley represents an abject or uncanny 
‘threat [… that] cannot be assimilated’: beyond ‘evil’, demonic or ‘mad’, she is both ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ society’s binary opposition of womanhood.121 Duffy’s poem, therefore, like 
contemporary representations of the female psychopath, Deborah Jermyn suggests, ‘draws 
attention to the precarious nature of the symbolic order’, of patriarchal society and of the 
gender stereotypes governing femininity.122 
Arguably, fictional representations of the female psychopath, whose freedom from 
moral and social conventions affords her the opportunity to move beyond traditional spaces 
of womanhood, allow the writer to challenge and deconstruct ‘cultural paradigms of 
womanhood delineating the serene mother, the beautiful siren, the devoted wife, the eccentric 
artist’.123 For Horner and Zlosnik, the engagement of women writers, such as Margaret 
Atwood, Jean Rhys, and Virginia Woolf, with dichotomous metaphors of space, of 
‘house/home and sea’, domestic and wild, allows them to ‘articulat[e] the desire for woman’s 
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sexual, social and artistic freedom’.124 Deborah Jermyn’s feminist reading of female 
psychopaths from the ‘Women from Hell’ genre, including Alex Forest in Fatal Attraction 
(1987) and Annie Wilkes in Stephen King’s Misery (1987; adapted into a film in 1990), 
illustrates the capacity for female psychopaths to transcend gender stereotypes.125 For 
Jermyn, the female psychopath portrayed in contemporary film  
 
is worthy of far more detailed analysis since she both reaches an 
unsurpassed level of violence and deception and enters scenarios which 
explore women’s changing roles and ‘new’ freedoms in a supposedly 
postfeminist age. This is a significant combination, since many of the fears 
about the female killer and fears of feminism are entirely the same; both 
undermine the foundations of sexual division in our culture.126 
 
In contravention to the male-dominated list of fictional psychopaths and the masculine focus 
in critical discussions of psychopathy, the female psychopaths to which Jermyn draws 
attention challenge society’s vision of feminine evil, acknowledging the reality of 
psychopathic women long-before their existence had been categorically confirmed by 
clinicians, psychologists and sociologists. Murdoch’s fictional engagement with the politics 
of gender and sexuality similarly relies on a portrayal of such striking female antagonists:  
Nan Mor in The Sandcastle, Honor Klein in A Severed Head, Gracie Tisbourne in An 
Accidental Man, Emily McHugh in The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, Mother May in 
The Good Apprentice, and many more besides, challenge and transcend gender stereotypes, 
illustrating the potential for feminine evil.  
                                                                                                                
124 Horner and Zlosnik, Landscapes of Desire, p.7. 
125 While critics like Babiak, Hare and Salekin et al. suggest that female psychopaths exist, 
their arguments about the differences, or similarities, between male and female psychopaths 
are problematic, as Farouzan and Cooke and Tuente et al. illustrate. See Tuente et al., 
‘Exploring the Criminal Behaviour of Women with Psychopathy: Results from a Multicenter 
Study into Psychopathy and Violent Offending in Female Forensic Psychiatic Patients’. 
126 Jermyn, ‘Rereading the bitches from hell: a feminist appropriation of the female 
psychopath’, p.252. 
 192 
Gender, Sexual Attraction and the Psychopathic First-Person Male Narrator 
In A Severed Head (1961), as in many of her first-person narratives, Murdoch explores the 
relationship between misogyny and the sadomasochistic, and sometimes violent, nature of 
sexual attraction. The novel is a first-person narrative about enchantment, love and power in 
which the adulterous narrator, Martin Lynch-Gibbon progresses from being in love with both 
his mistress, Georgie Hands, and his wife, Antonia, to being obsessed with the demonic 
Honor Klein. Martin learns, early in the narrative, that his wife is engaged in an affair with 
her psychoanalyst, Palmer Anderson, and after he is called upon to collect Palmer’s half-
sister, Honor Klein, from the train station, he begins to fall in love with her. Honor, as 
Murdoch suggested in interviews, is presented in the novel as ‘an almost purely demonic 
figure’.127 Honor’s appearance within the narrative as a kind of psychopathic enchanter 
figure, therefore, challenges stereotypical visions of womanhood and reverses Murdoch’s 
sadomasochistic vision of sexual attraction: she, not Martin, holds the position of power 
within their relationship. Murdoch’s critique of gender stereotypes, however, not only 
appears within her female evil characters but also within the first-person narratives of her 
male narrators. Martin’s narrative affords him a dangerous psychopathic power, wherein he 
can charm the reader, shaping the narrative in such a way that Honor’s evil, demonic and 
powerful nature, which conforms to the monstrous half of the ‘binary opposition[s] of 
womanhood’,128  frequently obscures his own psychopathic violence.129 Murdoch’s 
engagement with the complex politics of gender, sexuality and love in A Severed Head, 
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therefore, resonates with the ambiguous and biased twentieth-century discussions of 
psychopathy and feminine evil that flourished more than a quarter of a century later. 
While Murdoch scholars have focussed less on her visions of feminine evil, scholars 
such as Tammy Grimshaw and Sabina Lovibond have examined how Murdoch’s novels 
confront the politics of gender and sexuality, albeit ambiguously. In interviews, Murdoch 
‘passionately’ supported ‘women’s liberation’ (TCHF, p.61), ‘particularly education for 
women’ (TCHF, p.48), but distanced herself from feminism and ‘women’s studies’ (TCHF, 
p.62), arguing instead for women ‘to be equal, to be ordinary, to join the human race’ (TCHF, 
p.83). Despite this wish for equality, Murdoch tended, as she herself admitted, to ‘identify 
more with [her] male characters than [her] female characters’ (TCHF, p.82) and, therefore, to 
focus her novels, especially her first-person narratives, on men. By less frequently portraying 
women in central roles of power than men, Murdoch’s fiction can seem to offer covert 
support rather than criticism of gender stereotypes and patriarchal modes of control. 
However, while her attitudes to gender and sexuality problematise the potential for her to be 
viewed as a feminist, or a women’s writer directly concerned with ‘the female predicament’ 
(TCHF, p.61), Murdoch nevertheless invites the reader to question gender stereotypes within 
her fiction. Her novels, as Tammy Grimshaw affirms, illustrate ‘the manner in which the 
power of society and social expectations affect the roles that […] women are expected to play 
out in their relationships, as well as in their communities’.130 Such an attention to gender and 
sexuality, Lovibond argues,  
 
can constitute a theoretical advance if the phenomena singled out for 
attention have not hitherto been credited with their true ethical significance. 
The curious legacy of Iris Murdoch as a chronicler of female experience 
seems to be that while she does a good deal of this kind of pointing on her 
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own account, she also leaves a mass of further material unprocessed, so that 
it remains to others to watch, learn and point afresh […].131 
 
For Lovibond, Murdoch’s authorial distance, her tendency ‘merely to point’ or leave the 
reader to ‘fend for themselves’, results in a subtle but positive approach to gender politics.132 
There is, therefore, as Murdoch argued, ‘a lot of social criticism in my novels’, albeit in ‘a 
quiet way’ (TCHF, p.48). Murdoch’s critiques of society’s vision of femininity can be found 
not only in the sexism evidenced by some of her male characters, including her narrators, but 
also in the relationships she depicts within her novels, whose ambiguity and complexity 
illustrate the effect of stereotypes on love and sexual attraction.  
Murdoch’s fictional exploration of the emotional and moral complexities of sexual 
attraction was partly informed by her own attraction to power figures. For Lovibond, 
Murdoch’s gendered, sadomasochistic vision arises from her own reverence for the ‘precious 
image’ of the male philosopher, ‘of the “great scholar” or “great teacher” before whom [she] 
sometimes dreams of abasing herself’.133 For many critics, Murdoch’s awareness of the 
obsession and sadomasochism of love can be aligned with her relationship with the Nobel-
prize winning author, Elias Canetti. ‘Through her relationship with him’, Rowe and Horner 
suggest, ‘she learnt much about power and obsession and she drew on his character and her 
feelings for him when creating the many male enchanter figures who haunt her novels’, 
notably Mischa Fox in The Flight from the Enchanter, the novel that she dedicated to Canetti 
(LP, p.604). As Murdoch argued when discussing Julius King from A Fairly Honourable 
Defeat, her novels illustrate the ‘real life’ tendency for people to cast themselves in a 
subservient role: ‘People very often elect a god in their love life,’ she explained, ‘they elect 
somebody whose puppet they want to be’ (TCHF, pp.73-4).  
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The charming, manipulative and powerful enchanter figure that frequents Murdoch’s 
novels is, as her fictional, personal and philosophical vision illustrates, more often than not, 
masculine and attracts the attention and love of weaker female characters who are willing to 
enjoy a feeling of enslavement or subservience to them. Mischa Fox illustrates this 
widespread tendency to engage in such dangerous relationships in The Flight from the 
Enchanter: 
 
Every young girl dreams of dominating the forces of evil. She thinks she 
has that virtue in her that can conquer anything. Such a girl may be virgin in 
soul even after much experience and still believe in the legend of virginity. 
This is what leads her to the dragon, imagining that she will be protected. 
[…] The poor dragon has to eat her up, […] and that’s how dragons get a 
bad name. (FE, p.134) 
 
Mischa’s vision of sexual attraction alludes to the Romance genre, highlighting the role of 
charm, fantasy and pain in sexual attraction. The Romance genre, ‘being closer to the wish-
fulfilment dream,’ Northrup Frye suggests, ‘tends to absorb emotion and communicate it 
internally to the reader’ and ‘is characterised by the acceptance of pity and fear […] as forms 
of pleasure’.134 Mischa’s gendered, romantic vision of sexual attraction is repeated 
throughout Murdoch’s oeuvre: Anne in A Word Child, Dorina in An Accidental Man, and 
Diane in The Philosopher’s Pupil, among many others, are all drawn to, and seek out, such 
dangerous men. The ‘cult of the hero’ as Lucas suggests in The Green Knight, ‘is a persistent 
phenomenon, men will love a monster if he has bella figura’ (GK, p.273). In relationships, as 
well as the religious life, the moral life and art, Murdoch argues, we often exhibit ‘a 
preference of what is exciting and charming to what is good’ (MGM, p.337). This propensity 
to be attracted, charmed or enchanted by that which satisfies, or calls to, our fantasies arises, 
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Murdoch claims, because ‘human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an egocentric 
kind’ (SG, p.51) and by ‘our baser energies [or fantasies which are] connected with power, 
curiosity, envy and sex’ (MGM, p.8), many of which we are unaware and do not fully 
acknowledge. Thus, as Anne Rowe argues, the ‘real enchanter’ within Murdoch’s novels is 
not necessarily the enchanter figure themselves, but ‘the unconscious self and the vision of 
reality that results from its distortions of truth’.135 The tendency for Murdoch’s characters to 
fantasize about such dangerous, formidable, ‘monstrous’ individuals, therefore, often arises 
from their ignorance toward the ‘baser energies’ that drive their subconscious. 
Murdoch’s fictional exploration of the tendency for women to romanticise the power 
of love and pity within her novels, however, echoes the similarly gendered vision of sexual 
attraction presented by late-twentieth-century commentators on the power of psychopathic 
men over women. While psychopaths and their victims can be both male and female, the 
psychopath’s target is, we are told, more often than not female. In Without Conscience 
(1993), Hare argues that the psychopath’s success arises from a woman’s tendency toward 
subservience, from her reverence for masculine power and from the psychopath’s awareness 
of these human weaknesses. Seeking out weaker or more ‘nurturant’ people ‘who have a 
powerful need to help or mother others’, the psychopath will, Hare explains, deploy ‘a certain 
cherubic quality that some women […] find attractive’ in order to gain their trust and exploit 
them:136  
 
Many such women are in the helping professions […] and tend to look for 
the goodness in others while overlooking or minimizing their faults […]. 
Many women may think, ‘Maybe if I change it will be okay. I can try 
harder, keep out of his way, become more tolerant, give in a bit more.’137 
                                                                                                                
135 Anne Rowe, The Visual Arts and the Novels of Iris Murdoch (New York: Edwin Mellen 
Press, 2002), p.60. 
136 Hare, Without Conscience, p.149. 
137 Ibid., p.149; 205. 
 197 
 
Murdoch’s fiction frequently illustrates these tendencies for women to exhibit a ‘romantic 
need for unrequited love’ and to romanticize dangerous psychopathic men and the ostensibly 
healing power of pity.138 In A Word Child (1975), for example, the fear-inspiring first-person 
narrator, Hilary Burde, who sees his monstrosity as ‘one of [his] chief assets’ (WC, p.27), 
suggests that Anne’s pity for him ‘changed imperceptibly into enslaving fascination’ and love 
(WC, p.122). Early in An Accidental Man (1971), Austin (who appears in many ways to be a 
prototype for Hilary Burde in A Word Child) poignantly notes that ‘women’ exist ‘to make a 
man feel good in spite of himself’ (AM, p.42). Later in the novel, Dorina repeats her 
estranged husband’s vision, believing that Austin ‘must be saved through me’ (AM, p.247), a 
sentiment that Diane repeats in The Philosopher’s Pupil (1983), believing that ‘Only she 
really loved [George McCaffrey] and could save him from himself’ (PP, p.299; Murdoch’s 
italics). While these visions of sexual attraction are often reinforced within Murdoch novels, 
and by late-twentieth-century clinical discussions of psychopathy, Murdoch inverts the roles 
usually held by men and women within A Severed Head, confronting the ‘social expectations 
[that] affect the roles that […] women are expected to play’.139 
Honor Klein’s portrayal within A Severed Head is, at this point in time, unique in 
Murdoch’s fiction, where enchanter or power figures tend to be male, and in discourses on 
psychopathy, which tend to diagnose fewer female psychopaths and highlight the tendency 
for women to be weaker than men. As Murdoch’s vision of sexual attraction suggests, 
Honor’s psychopathic power calls to Martin’s fantasies: he is attracted to her directness, her 
emotional coldness and her moral vision, all of which Murdoch illustrates by drawing a 
symbolic link between Honor’s morally austere, formidable nature and the war-like imagery 
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that surrounds her.140 As Martin notes at an early point in the narrative, Honor ‘appeared to 
me for a second like some insolent and powerful captain, returning booted and spurred from a 
field of triumph, the dust of battle yet upon him, confronting the sovereign powers whom he 
was now ready if need be to bend to his will.’ (SH, p.58) In such moments, Honor exudes a 
psychopathic ‘ruthless[ness]’ (SH, p.97), a ‘detachment and precision’ that affords her with ‘a 
sharp business-like air’ (SH, p.174). The most prominent image of her violent power occurs 
when she masterfully wields a Samurai sword in front of Martin in a ‘possessive predatory 
way’ (SH, p.95). ‘In Japan’, Honor explains, the Samurai sword is a spiritual, ‘religious 
object’ connected with ‘control, with power’ (SH, p.96). Honor’s use of the sword to 
‘decapitate’ a napkin into ‘pieces’ (SH, p.97), leaves Martin feeling ‘an intense desire’ to 
‘take the sword’ from her (SH, p.98), an ‘intense desire’ for her symbolic and tangible power. 
Attractive, dominant, and powerful, Honor illustrates the possibility for the qualities of 
Murdoch’s male enchanters to be present in females and Honor’s presence within the 
narrative as a formidable demonic force ‘transcend[s] the limitations of gender’, a task that 
Grimshaw suggests many of Murdoch’s first-person narratives achieve.141  
A Severed Head not only challenges Murdoch’s gendered vision of sexual attraction 
but also resonates with modern twenty-first century discussions of psychopathy, many of 
which undermine the kind of gendered discussions of psychopathy offered by Hare, which 
insist on the stark differences between men and women and between male and female 
psychopaths. Indeed, for many commentators besides Hare, sociological, evolutionary and 
biological differences between men and women not only shape the success of male 
                                                                                                                
140 Honor and her half-brother Palmer are symbolically aligned with each other in A Severed 
Head, especially after Martin sees them engaging in incest. Like Honor, Palmer is aligned 
with war-like, soldierly imagery: Martin describes him as ‘some casual yet powerful emperor 
upon a Byzantine Mozaic’ (SH, p.106) and, later, as ‘an old warrior’ (SH, p.134). Moreover, 
Palmer exhibits a psychopathic coldness and directness: he is described as being ‘serene and 
detached’ (SH, p.30), with a ‘clear’ ‘cool stare’ (SH, p.75).  
141 Grimshaw, Sexuality, Gender, and Power in Iris Murdoch’s Fiction, p.22. 
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psychopaths but also inform the different methods used to draw attention to, or diagnose, 
their female counterparts.142 For Andrew Scull, however, the growing body of contemporary 
writers that draw on ostensibly trustworthy biological and neurological methods in their 
explorations of the origins of morality and the differences between men and women represent 
a problematic regression to historic discourses on insanity, supporting an outmoded dualist 
vision of femininity. In a recent article, he problematises the claims of pop psychologists and 
pop philosophers like Simon Baron-Cohen and Paul Bloom, who ‘claim to have discovered 
genes that give rise to and shape complex human behaviours’, such as depression, empathy or 
schizophrenia.143 The relationship between such experiences and the neurological and 
biochemical structures of the brain, Scull argues, is often ‘evaporated when put to the test’.144 
For him, therefore, we should ‘reject the image of us as machines ruled by our genes and the 
mechanical operations of our male and female brains’.145 Murdoch’s portrayal of Honor as a 
power figure resonates with such contemporary discussions, where individuals can be 
                                                                                                                
142 Both Baron-Cohen and Blair et al. expound biological and evolutionary arguments: the 
former argues that males are ‘more prone to antisocial behaviour’ because they have 
differences in brain matter that are linked to ‘increas[ed] antisocial behaviour’ (Baron-Cohen, 
The Science of Evil, p.84); the latter argue that evolutionary differences in ‘physical size’ 
between men and women predispose the former to physical intimidation (Blair et al., The 
Psychopath: Emotion and the Brain, p.20; also see Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths, 
p.14). While some critics support such ‘hard-wired [biological or evolutionary] gender 
differences’, Dutton argues, others note the effect that ‘social stigma[s]’ have on the 
interpretation of ‘women presenting with externalising antisocial psychopathology’ (Dutton, 
The Wisdom of Psychopaths, pp.242-3). The impact that social conditioning has on women is 
notably explored by Gilbert and Gubar, who argue that, in the past, young women were 
‘reared for, and conditioned to, lives of privacy, reticence, domesticity’: their social training 
in ‘docility, submissiveness, selflessness’ and ‘renunciation’ often led to ‘ill health’, 
generating various forms of ‘anxiety’ disorder of body dysmorphia, including agoraphobia 
and anorexia (Gilbert and Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the 
Nineteenth-Century Literary Imagination, p.2030). Here, as Gilbert and Gubar make clear, 
the binary oppositions of womanhood generate a cycle where women’s failure to act as 
expected leads to anti-social behaviour, to behaviour that locates them outside society’s 
norms.  
143 Andrew Scull, ‘What is Empathy? Are we really hard-wired to feel other people’s pain?’, 
TLS, 10 April 2018. 
144 Scull, ‘What is Empathy?’. 
145 Ibid. 
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charmed not only by masculine but also feminine power figures, and women themselves can 
be psychopathic, powerful, or even evil. A Severed Head thus illustrates, as Murdoch herself 
suggested in interviews, that ‘there is [not] much difference between men and women’ 
(TCHF, p.61). 
Murdoch develops this positive attitude to gender inequality in her first-person 
narratives by placing the reader in the same position as those who are enchanted; the power 
exhibited by characters such as Sandy in Under the Net, Honor Klein in A Severed Head, or 
Aunt Bill in A Word Child is also exhibited by the unreliable narrator themselves, whose 
narrative is, more often than not, self-serving. The appearance of female enchanter figures 
within Murdoch’s narratives, therefore, may owe as much to the male narrator’s ‘binary 
opposition[s] of womanhood’ as to Murdoch’s insistence on the lack of ‘difference between 
men and women’ (TCHF, p.61).146 The biased, patriarchal worldview presented by 
Murdoch’s male first-person narrators, whose narratives allow them to subjugate women and 
conceal the harm they cause, reveals how ‘even aggressively misogynist writings’, as 
Lovibond argues, can invite the reader ‘to ponder certain specific, determinate ways in which 
the feminine character turns out badly under the existing [patriarchal] regime of gender’.147  
Murdoch’s first-person narrators, with their psychopathic charm and control over the 
narrative and the reader, illustrate the dangers of art, many of which are explored in 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals and The Fire and The Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists 
(1977). Plato, Murdoch explains, ‘had deep reasons, moral, psychological, political and 
metaphysical, for mounting an attack on art’ (MGM, p.18). For him, art ‘explor[es] the 
meaner, more peculiar aspects of our being, in comparison with which goodness seems dull’ 
(MGM, p.12); it is ‘jauntily at home with evil and quick to beautify it’ (EM, p.457); it is 
                                                                                                                
146 Rowe, ‘“A Man Shut in a Glass”: Considering Iris Murdoch’s Patriarchal Stereotypes in 
Under the Net (1954)’. 
147 Lovibond, Iris Murdoch, Gender and Philosophy, p.23. 
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‘ambiguous, and defenceless in the hands of knaves or fools’ and thus ‘may become a vehicle 
of falsehood’ (MGM, p.18). The ‘attractive’, confident, ‘interesting’, enchanting picture 
presented by Murdoch’s artistic narrators represents a kind of psychopathic mask that echoes 
that dangerous ‘power’ of the artist (MGM, p.429).148 Such masks, Babiak and Hare suggest, 
are a psychopath’s ‘most useful’ and ‘effective’ attribute, allowing them to surreptitiously 
exploit the fascinations, obsessions and weaknesses of others.149 The psychopath, like Plato’s 
poet, is ‘a charming illusionist’(MGM, p.12), whose artifice disguises his malice: the first-
person narrator, to use Philips’s explanation of Julius King in A Fairly Honourable Defeat, 
‘has to charm’ so that the characters surrounding him, and the reader, are ‘fascinated by him’ 
(TCHF, p.183).  
Martin Lynch-Gibbon’s first-person narrative in A Severed Head provides him with 
such a psychopathic mask, allowing him to charm the reader into an acceptance of his moral 
transgressions and violence. The reader frequently witnesses Martin striking and ‘crushing’ 
those around him (SH, p.144) or threatening them (see SH, pp.27, 49); he is, as Honor 
accurately assesses earlier in the narrative, ‘a violent man’ (SH, p.63).150 His narrative, 
however, is comprised of a psychopathic mixture of callousness, charm and control that, as 
the following excerpt illustrates, allows him to conceal his own wickedness. 
 
What happened next may seem a little improbable, but the reader must just 
believe me that it did occur. […] I set my foot on the lower step [leading up 
from the cellar] and seized [Honor’s] arm roughly. Then I pulled her down 
toward me. She came stumbling, and for a moment we stood together at the 
foot of the steps, me breathing hard and crushing her arm in my grip, she 
                                                                                                                
148 For a discussion of this in relation to A Word Child, see Read, ‘Psychopathy, Morality and 
Art in Iris Murdoch’s A Word Child’. 
149 Babiak and Hare, Snakes in Suits, pp.48-50. 
150 Earlier in the narrative, Martin exhibits a similar lack of awareness of the suffering he 
causes Georgie and attempts to suppress his wickedness and charm the reader into believing 
falsehoods: he ‘applied a pressure until she winced’ (SH, p.72); later, though, he says that he 
‘had never struck [Georgie] in anger before’ (SH, p.103). 
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tense and glaring at me. I had in retrospect the illusion that her entire face, 
then and during the moments that followed, had become black. 
 […] 
She fought like a maniac; but it was remarkable too that throughout 
our brief battle she did not cry out once. […] She was even stronger than I 
would have expected. But it took me only a moment to get hold of her 
wrists. I crushed them both together in one hand, leaning my weight upon 
her until she became still. I could see her face just below mine, the black 
hairs on her upper lip, the white of her teeth. I lifted myself a little and with 
my free hand struck her three times, a sideways blow across the mouth. She 
closed her eyes and tried to turn her head away. I saw that clearly in 
retrospect too. 
After I had hit her the third time I began to wonder what I was doing. 
I let go and rolled off her. She got up without haste while I got myself into a 
seating position. My head […] felt terrible. She brushed down her coat and 
then without looking at me and still without haste she mounted the cellar 
steps. (SH, pp.110-2) 
 
The psychopathic undertones of this section are shocking: Martin’s narrative lingers gleefully 
over the cruel details of his violence, and his retrospective comments remain curiously 
dismissive and flippant, revealing his lack of emotional empathy. The reader witnesses Honor 
‘close her eyes’ and ‘turn her head away’ from him, but his vision of her face as ‘black’ 
suggests his willingness to ignore her pain and suffering. Martin increasingly aligns himself 
with such psychopathic coolness: echoing the imagery he used to describe Honor, he 
describes himself later in the narrative as an ‘assassin’ (SH, pp.124, 197), ‘like a conquering 
general’, ‘completely cool’ (SH, pp.129-30). Martin’s inconsistent awareness of Honor’s 
pain, and his lack of guilt, illustrates how he, perhaps more so than Honor, is a psychopathic 
individual capable of charming and manipulating others, including the reader, into an 
acceptance of his distorted vision of truth, downplaying or dismissing the violence of which 
he is capable. 
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Murdoch’s ironic criticism of her first-person narrators, through the use of imagery, 
symbolism and testimony from other characters, mediates the kind of psychopathic power 
that they might have over the reader. The single, subjective viewpoint presented by 
Murdoch’s narrators opposes her own view of the ambiguity and complexity inherent not 
only in novels but also in life. ‘Novels are,’ Murdoch insisted, ‘however sad or catastrophic, 
essentially comic’ (MGM, p.96). ‘Any tale of our doings’, the first-person narrator of The 
Black Prince, Bradley Pearson argues, ‘is comic. We are bottomlessly comic to each other. 
[…] Yet it is also the case that life is horrible, without metaphysical sense, wrecked by 
chance, pain, and the close prospect of death. Out of this is born irony, our dangerous and 
necessary tool.’ (BP, p.80) Jake Donaghue’s ambiguous scene of violence in Under The Net 
where he takes Anna’s wrist and throws her ‘onto a pile of velvet costumes in the corner of 
the room’ before kissing her offers such an instance of irony (UN, p.44). At this moment in 
the narrative, much like A Severed Head, there are fragments of narrative that hint at Anna’s 
terror: her eyes are described twice as being ‘wide with alarm’; ‘she lay stiffly in my arms 
like a great doll’; ‘her body became rounded and pliant’ (UN, p.44). These fragments of 
narrative, as Anne Rowe argues, present a ‘psychopathic gap’ within which Murdoch invites 
the reader to question the narrator’s behaviour.151 The modern readiness for readers to 
question the callousness, charm and control of Murdoch’s psychopathic first-person 
narrators, Rowe claims, resonates with our increasing awareness of sexual abuse in the 
entertainment industry, which has highlighted the need to champion the individual’s rights 
(or women’s rights, as expressed by the #MeToo campaign) within a patriarchal system that 
is often characterised by its coercive tendencies.152 When the reader lacks the author’s 
mediating didacticism, Murdoch’s use of irony reveals the limited reality inherent in the first-
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Under the Net (1954)’. 
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person narrator’s solipsistic vision of the world. In A Severed Head, therefore, Honor Klein 
occupies a crucial place in Murdoch’s engagement with gender as both a revolutionary 
female power figure and a tool through which Martin can displace his own cruelty, 
illustrating the how individuals have to guard against the enchanter’s power, whether they are 
male or female.  
 
Domesticity, the Female Psychopath and Motherhood 
In The Sandcastle (1957), Murdoch confronts gender stereotypes by presenting a 
Machiavellian, psychopathic portrait of motherhood; far from ‘serene mother’ or ‘devoted 
wife’, Nan Mor exerts a callous control over her family and her husband in order to maintain 
the status quo of, and her controversial superiority within, her marriage.153 The Sandcastle, 
therefore, is not a straightforward women’s novelette, as some reviews suggested at the time 
of its publication. Instead, Nan represents a vivid, early portrait of feminine evil in 
Murdoch’s fiction that offers, to quote Jermyn on contemporary representations of the female 
psychopath, ‘a catalyst who forces [women] to confront their unhappiness or dissatisfaction’ 
and illustrates ‘the instability of the domestic and the precarious nature of the roles society 
has assigned to […] women’.154 
Centred around the Mor family, which is comprised of Bill Mor, his wife, Nan, and 
their two children, Donald and Felicity, the novel concerns the arrival of Rain Carter, a young 
painter who has been commissioned to paint a portrait of the retired headmaster at the 
boarding school where Bill teaches. The Mor family is disrupted, however, when Bill starts 
an affair with Rain. A.S. Byatt focuses on the romantic central plot of The Sandcastle to 
argue that it ‘barely escapes being a woman’s novelette’, in part because it lacks ‘real 
                                                                                                                
153 Horner and Zlosnik, Landscapes of Desire, p.1. 
154 Deborah Jermyn, ‘Rereading the bitches from hell’, p.258. 
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complexity of feeling or action’.155 Similarly, for Conradi, the novel’s success as a story of 
adultery is limited by the ‘unequal’ ‘division in our sympathies between wife and mistress’: 
‘We begin to understand Nan’s disappointment but insufficiently to want Mor to return to 
her’.156 These criticisms of the novel, however, arise from a conventional reading of the 
romance or women’s novelette genre, where the reader might expect the moral of the 
narrative to be directed toward the importance of dispelling a momentary fantasy (Rain) in 
favour of domestic security and family life (Nan). The aesthetics and narrative focus of The 
Sandcastle, however, disrupt the ‘superficially light, conventional, romantic plot’ in favour of 
a more complex, demanding narrative that weaves elements of comedy, gothic romance and 
realism to accurately depict the human capacity for psychopathic evil and moral blindness.157  
Murdoch undermines the ostensibly romantic narrative of The Sandcastle by placing 
Bill Mor at its emotional centre and mixing incongruous elements of comedy and horror to 
highlight Nan’s cruelty. While the novel contains a third-person narrator, the greater amount 
of narrative introspection for Bill allows the reader to understand how his unhappy marriage 
motivates his affair with Rain. Where Nan is cruel, dominant and manipulative; Rain is 
attentive, creative and kind. Early in the narrative, the reader sees Bill ‘turn away his eyes’ 
from Nan (S, p.10), distancing himself from the wickedness she exhibits in the ‘long long 
quarrels’ that form a ‘recurring pattern’ within their marriage (S, p.212). With Rain, though, 
Bill understands ‘what it [is like] to converse with someone, reading their eyes the whole 
time. Angels must know each other in this way, without a barrier’ (S, p.280). Rain’s spiritual 
presence allows Bill to realise the extent to which ‘Nan had frustrated him, breaking within 
him piece by piece the structure of his own desires’ (S, pp.207-8), including his political 
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157 Priscilla Martin and Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch: A Literary Life (Hampshire: Palgrave 
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ambitions which she belittles and vilifies early in the narrative because she worries that his 
‘dream’ will ‘expose’ them both ‘to ridicule’ (S, p.15). Rain’s attention to Bill echoes the 
Weilian ‘just and loving’ attention that Murdoch would later praise in her moral philosophy, 
providing the reader with a crucial insight into the harsh emotional realities of Bill’s 
marriage. In Chapter Twelve, however, Murdoch juxtaposes Nan’s psychopathic attempt to 
regain control in their marriage with comedy. After discovering Bill’s affair with Rain, Nan 
concludes that ‘she would have to hold this situation as she had held all other situations, 
controlling Bill’, the awareness of which gives her ‘a little comfort’ (S, p.194-5). Nan’s 
drunkenness leading up to, and during, her ‘interview’ (S, p.199) of Bill, however, renders 
her an ironic figure of ridicule. She ‘stagger[s]’ (S, p.199) outside their house, unable to enter 
it, and decides to enter through the window of their drawing room, vehemently denying Bill’s 
help and trampling over the ‘soft and muddy’ earth of the flower-bed in the process (S, 
p.200). Once inside, she quickly rearranges the sofa and its mud-covered cushions to keep her 
upright, desperately trying to maintain her composure and control, hoping for the breeze to 
‘dissipat[e] […] the remaining smell of the whiskey’ (S, p.201) on her breath. The slapstick 
comedy, however, soon appears incongruous in the face of Nan’s psychopathic cruelty, 
glibness and manipulation, which flourishes when she begins her diatribe: 
 
Be rational, Bill! […] [T]hink about your reputation […]. Think about the 
precious Labour Party. […] If only you knew […] how pathetic you are! 
[…] Do you seriously imagine that you could make anything out of a love 
affair with an attractive, flightily little gipsy with a French upbringing who 
might be your daughter? Don’t make yourself more ridiculous than you 
already are! (S, p.202)  
 
Blackmailing Bill and vindictively insulting Rain, Murdoch illustrates the extent to which 
Nan is happy, even ‘comfort[ed]’ (S, p.194-5) by the psychopathic cruelty she deploys in 
order to maintain the status quo of her marriage, a marriage in which she holds the position of 
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power. While Nan receives less authorial examination than Bill, Murdoch’s emotional focus 
on him illustrates the stark moral differences that exist between Rain and Nan.158 Murdoch’s 
juxtaposition of Nan’s psychopathic evil with comedy, not only invites the reader to ridicule 
her, undermining her role of dominance, but also highlights her cruelty.  
Murdoch’s exploration of such unhappy marriages, or relationships marred by 
arguments and/or violence, confronts gender stereotypes and the cotemporaneous problems 
surrounding feminine autonomy within a marriage. For Lovibond, one of the main aspects of 
Murdoch’s novels indicative of ‘sexual orthodoxy’ and ‘heterosexual activity’ are their 
‘Shakespearean Felicity’, their tendency to end with a happy marriage.159 ‘The wholeness of 
the family, along with drive to form new married couples,’ Lovibond argues, ‘exerts on 
Murdoch narrative […] an imperative that is as much aesthetic as ethical’.160 The unhappy 
marriages within Murdoch’s fiction, she continues, provide ‘fertile ground for the study of 
Weilian “affliction”’, an extreme form of suffering that, as Murdoch explains, can be put to 
‘spiritual use’ (MGM, p.109). Such an ethical lesson, however, ‘relies for its full effect on the 
idea of divorce’, or the dissolution of any relationship, ‘as no more than an abstract 
possibility, unthinkable or impracticable for the average citizen’.161 Arguably, the 
psychopathic moral blindness on display within Murdoch’s unhappy fictional marriages can, 
as in the case of The Sandcastle, undermine the ostensibly ethical weight carried by marital 
reconciliation. Indeed, if the ethical weight of the narrative is toward moral vision, then the 
narrative of The Sandcastle offers greater support in favour of Bill’s relationship with Rain, 
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in whose company Nan’s cruelty ‘emerge[s] clear and intelligible’ (S, pp.207). By 
highlighting the potential for wives to be cruel, therefore, Murdoch may be offering support 
for divorce, an act that Lovibond notes ‘underwent some liberal reform in 1969’.162 Her 
engagement with such themes in The Sandcastle, moreover, offers a prescient image of the 
capacity for women to have power over men, for wives to harm their husbands.  
Murdoch illustrates how Nan’s psychopathic charm, dominance and manipulation 
affords her the power to transcend the traditional role of domestic wife at the end of the 
novel, when she puts a final halt to Bill’s affair by giving a carefully constructed speech to 
the school board despite her usual dislike of public speaking. Earlier in the narrative, Nan 
ridicules the idea of public speaking, after the newly-appointed headmaster, Giles Everard 
(Evvy), invites her to speak to the school board: 
 
‘Did I tell you that he wants me to make an after-dinner speech at that 
idiotic dinner?’ […]  
‘Yes, he told me,’ said Mor. ‘I hope you will. You’d make a good 
speech.’ 
‘No, I wouldn’t,’ said Nan. ‘I’d just make myself and you look 
ridiculous. I told Evvy so. He really is an ass. […] [I]f his idea of the free 
society is women making after-dinner speeches, he’d better find someone 
else to cooperate with. He told me to “think it over”. I just laughed at him.’ 
(S, pp.13-14) 
 
In contravention to this earlier dismissive statement, Nan gives an ‘extremely charming’ (S, 
p.289) display to the school board with her ‘masterly’ (S, p.299) speech, which allows her to 
exploit this patriarchal environment to her benefit; it affords the opportunity, as Hare 
suggests of the female psychopath, to ‘effectively use society’s expectations about female 
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behaviour to [her] own advantage’.163 No longer the quiet, domestic housewife, Nan’s ‘figure 
relax[es]’ into the role of charming, public spokeswoman (S, p.299). For some critics, Nan’s 
speech illustrates a ‘surrender [of her] power in their marriage’ that allows Bill to ‘[win] his 
freedom from his domineering wife’.164 Such a reading, however, partly misses the 
Machiavellian cruelty on display in Nan’s speech, which she triumphantly ends by throwing 
her ‘page of notes down on the table’ (S, p.299). She has orchestrated this ‘masquerade’ (S, 
p.297) not simply to offer ‘public support of his decision to stand for nomination as an 
MP’165 but to destroy Bill’s affair, to ‘corner[s] him by a public gesture’, as the narrative 
voice suggests (S, p.299).166 Nan’s successful entrance into the public sphere starkly 
juxtaposes her earlier criticisms of public speaking and shatters the dichotomous gender 
stereotype that traditionally defines the public husband and private (or domestic) wife.167  
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166 The retiring headmaster, Demoyte, is the only character to see the damage caused by 
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(S, p.122). Unable to afford her education, Demoyte offers Bill financial help, charging Bill 
to not ‘cross [him]’ on the matter (S, p.122). When Bill claims that he needs to consult Nan, 
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for a single moment? You must have willed to lose her! […] Coward and fool! […] Nothing 
was inevitably here. You have made you own future’ (S, p.312). Bill’s life, however, has 
been comprised of ‘so long and so minute an oppression’ (S, p.208) by Nan that he lacks the 
energy or courage to stand up to his wife: ‘A lifetime of conformity was too much for him. 
He stayed where he was’ (S, p.299). 
167 Kathryn Hughes, ‘Gender roles in the 19th century’, 15 May 2014, <https://www.bl.uk/ 
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The negative, notably psychopathic, representations of femininity on display in The 
Sandcastle are not unique in Murdoch’s fiction. Like Nan, Emily McHugh in The Sacred and 
Profane Love Machine and Gracie Tisbourne in An Accidental Man similarly exhibit a 
psychopathic tendency for emotional coldness, dominance, manipulation, vitriolic arguments 
and even violence. Indeed, many of these women exhibit one of the fundamental, albeit 
subtle, ‘nonverbal’ ways in which the psychopath exhibits their ‘superiority’ and power: 
direct eye contact.168 In The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, for example, Blaise 
Gavender notes the ‘strangely cold and bright’ (SPLM, p.214) form of attention offered by 
Emily’s ‘fierce blue truthful eyes’ (SPLM, p.314). One of the most striking examples of such 
‘unusually piercing’ psychopathic eye contact flourishes in The Good Apprentice,169 where 
Mother May, a character whose maternal name belies her cruelty, takes pleasure in 
vindictively insulting Edward Baltram’s late mother, with whom her husband, Jesse 
Baltram,170 had had an affair:  
 
‘Your poor mother was a bitch and a whore,’ said Mother May calmly. 
‘She slept with everyone. Jesse wasn’t even certain about you till he saw 
you.’ 
‘My God,’ said Edward. ‘You mean you’ve discussed that with him? […] 
I believe I have a real relation with Jesse. And you’re wrong about my 
mother. And anyway my mother is my business.’ 
                                                                                                                
168 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.18. 
169 Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths, p.32.  
170 While Jesse could be identified as suffering from dementia or Alzheimer’s decease, his 
past indicates his predisposition for immoral activities. In the past he was a prolific artist 
whose surrealist depictions of erotic subject matters, Rowe argues, perpetuated his fantasies 
and exhibited ‘an unhealthy interest in deformity, rape and sado-masochism’ (Rowe, The 
Visual Arts and the Novels of Iris Murdoch, p.63). His depictions of depraved sexual 
fantasies are matched by his sexual promiscuity, and led to at least one illegitimate child, 
Edward. Jesse’s attitude to sex is indicative of a psychopathic tendency for promiscuous 
sexual behaviour and ‘a willingness to participate in a wide range of sexual activities’ (Hare, 
Psychopathy Checklist, p.23); a trait which is similarly reflected in the possibility that he 
wants an incestuous relationship with is daughter, Illona, as hinted in the novel. 
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‘She was my business when she tried to break up my marriage. She 
thought she could take Jesse away. Of course she failed. He went over her 
like a juggernaut, as he did over all the other poor waifs, I heard their bones 
crunch. She had a terrible life. No wonder she committed suicide.’ 
‘She didn’t commit suicide.’ 
‘I hated your mother. I prayed for her death. Hatred kills. I probably 
brought about her death. […] [She died from a] mysterious virus. The virus 
of hate.’  
‘You must hate people.’ 
‘I have a gorgon face,’ Mother May continued to look at him with her 
calm lucid unwrinkled gaze.  
‘You conceal it well,’ said Edward. But for a second he thought he saw 
far back in her eyes like a little black thing peering out, and he was afraid. 
(GA, pp.259-60) 
 
In sharp contrast with the now-docile Jesse, Mother May’s vindictiveness is notably 
psychopathic: she appears to take pleasure in her ‘callous and sadistic treatment’ of Edward’s 
late mother.171 The sinister ‘little black thing peering out’ of Mother May’s eyes at the end of 
this scene, moreover, illustrates the propensity for evil concealed behind her ‘calm’ 
exterior.172 Mother May’s harsh judgement of characters, like her insistence that Jesse is ‘an 
incarnation of evil’ (GA, p.258), and the masked nature of her own evil illustrates, like Nan, 
the potential for the psychopath to be female: she is egotistic, callous and volatile individual, 
not a devoted, kind, loving or serene mother. 
                                                                                                                
171 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.22. 
172 When Harry (Edward’s stepfather) and Midge (the wife of Thomas McCaskerville) arrive 
at Seaford, the home of Jesse Baltrum’s family, Mother May cannot contain her excitement. 
Her awareness of the fact that Harry and Midge are having an affair leaves her ‘trembling 
with excitement’ (GA, p.309), and she struggles to hold back her laugher, later laughing with 
‘the sort of half-stilted irrepressible explosive laugh of someone who has, in some solemn or 
pompous scene, suddenly glimpsed something funny’ (GA, p.313).  
 212 
Early in the narrative of The Sandcastle, Murdoch highlights Nan’s similarly 
unmaternal tendencies. In one of her early arguments with Bill, which leaves him 
‘winc[ing]’, Nan cruelly distances herself from her children, announcing  
 
[n]either of your children are clever, and you’ve already caused them both 
enough unhappiness by pretending that they are. […] You must take some 
responsibility for the children. I know you have all sorts of fantasies about 
yourself. But at least try to be more realistic about them […]. (S, p.12; my 
italics) 
 
It is easy to see why Bill might ‘wince’ over Nan’s words here: not only does Nan insult her 
children’s intelligence, but she also avoids personal references to them. The children are not 
her children or our children, they are Bill’s children, ‘the children’. Admittedly, the reader 
can also level this criticism at Bill. Later in the narrative, when thinking about his 
relationship with Rain and the repercussions it might have for his family, he makes sure to 
prevent himself from ‘considering the children’ (S, p.248). Nan’s controlling and emotionally 
distant psychopathic behaviour, however, is symbolically aligned with her children’s unusual, 
sad, even dangerous behaviour.173  
Murdoch’s allusion to gothic tropes within her portrayal of Donald and Felicity’s 
struggle to control, express or understand their emotions illustrates the effect that Nan’s 
psychopathic callousness has on her children, and even her husband. Rain notes, for example, 
how Bill has a ‘terrible’ ‘way of crying inside [his] eyes’ (S, p.237; my italics). This odd 
image of crying echoes Donald and Felicity’s ‘ancient ritual’ called ‘Tears of Blood’, a pact 
which Felicity invokes to get Donald to promise that he will not climb the school tower. After 
Donald agrees, he hands over a razor to Felicity, she proceeds to cut ‘a tiny slit beneath each 
                                                                                                                
173 Bill notes how Nan’s lack of ‘respect’ for their home and her enjoyment of continuously 
moving its furniture generated a ‘perpetual flux’ that ‘hurt the children’ (S, p.13). 
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[of their eyes]’, and the chapter closes with ‘mingled tears and blood […] coursing down 
their cheeks’ (S, p.145). Murdoch’s gothic imagery not only foreshadows Felicity’s ‘incision 
into her arm’ to draw blood for her magic ritual (S, p.223) but also, as the end of the novel 
will bleakly illustrate, symbolises her struggle to express emotions. For Nan, emotional 
responses to situations are unwarranted. This lack of empathy, as discussed above, plays a 
fundamental role in the psychopath’s emotional and moral understanding; indeed, for Hare, 
this trait is ‘the prerequisite for love’.174 Nan represents a psychopathic belief that emotions 
represent ‘a sign of weakness’.175 ‘In her situation,’ the narrative voice explains after the 
revelation of Bills affair, ‘unhappiness […] would have been merely neurotic. Nan despised 
the neurotic’ (S, p.191). Murdoch’s presentation of Donald and Felicity’s bloodletting rituals, 
with its evocation of gothic tropes, draws attention to Nan’s psychopathic lack of empathy 
and destabilises the genre of the novel, introducing a sense of foreboding that suggests this 
novel may not be the light hearted romance that readers might expect.  
The conclusion of The Sandcastle illustrates the potential damage that Nan’s 
emotional distance has had on her daughter. Toward the end the novel, when Felicity grieves 
over her brother who has run away from home after dangerously climbing his school tower, 
breaking his solemn promise, Nan’s commitment to housework instead of the emotional 
difficulties that her daughter is undergoing echoes her earlier psychopathic belief that 
emotions are ‘neurotic’ (S, p.191). ‘Don’t be silly,’ Nan says to daughter, ‘you’ll only start 
crying again if you lie down. Why not wash all your underclothes now while the water’s hot? 
I’ll leave the ironing board, and I can iron them for you this afternoon’ (S, p.278). Nan may 
here be trying to teach her daughter a lesson in emotional self-sufficiency. However, the 
imagery surrounding Felicity in the last page of The Sandcastle is subtly suggestive of her 
                                                                                                                
174 Hare, Psychopathy Checklist, p.6. 
175 Ibid., p.22. 
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potential for self-harm and even suicide, especially considering the earlier two bloodletting 
rituals she enacts. While sitting ‘by herself […] half way up’ the steps, with her mother in the 
kitchen and her father speaking to the now-returned Donald, Felicity eerily listens to the 
sound of the ‘hissing gas’ and concludes the novel with the reflection that ‘Everything was all 
right now. It was all right. It was all right’ (S, p.318). With a father now (presumably) 
focussing on the emotional needs of his son and an inattentive unempathetic mother in the 
kitchen, Murdoch’s decision to end The Sandcastle with Felicity’s lonely, plaintive, tenuous 
form of self-reassurance strongly suggests that she is emotionally incapable of dealing with 
her ordeals and may commit suicide by gassing herself. Murdoch’s ambiguous ending 
juxtaposes a potential return to conventional domesticity with Felicity’s suicidal depression, 
illustrating how Nan’s psychopathic callousness has affected those around her, damaging her 
relationships with her husband and her children.  
Murdoch’s depiction of such striking female psychopaths as Nan Mor equivocates the 
ostensibly caring, devoted and loving behaviour expected from lovers, mothers and wives 
and highlights the fact that women, just like men, are capable of evil. Suffused with imagery 
that depicts the capacity for women to exhibit psychopathic evil, The Sandcastle illustrates 
the feminine capacity for callous, charming, controlling, dominating, manipulative, and even 
violent behaviour. Challenging the clinical bias within psychopathy and social biases 
surrounding feminine evil, Murdoch’s portrayal of Nan resonates with the female psychopath 
found in the ‘Woman from Hell’ genre, providing, as Jermyn suggests, a fertile testing 
ground for exploring ‘the contradictions surrounding women's positioning within dominant 
ideology’, including those that created the bias toward female evil in the first place.176 
Murdoch’s fictional portrayal of feminine evil conforms to such contemporary 
discussions of psychopathy, which illustrate how evil is concealed not only behind charm and 
                                                                                                                
176 Deborah Jermyn, ‘Rereading the bitches from hell’, p.267 
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artifice, but also by biased, stereotypical visions of human behaviour. For Murdoch, men and 
women do not exhibit ‘different kinds of mind’ (TCHF, p.30) or different kinds of moral 
failure: they are both as capable of goodness and evil as each other. The ‘innumerable 
unknown saints and martyrs’ that we meet, Murdoch argues, may be women, they may be 
some ‘quiet unpretentious worker, a schoolteacher or a mother, or better still an aunt’, but 
this should not blind us to an awareness of the women who also ‘have many egoistic 
satisfactions and much power’ (MGM, p.429). ‘What Murdoch wants to subvert in her 
fictions’, as Barabara Heusel Stevens argues, therefore, ‘is something larger than patriarchy: 
it is the evil that engenders such institutions, the pervasive evil of which patriarchy is only the 
shadow’; she understands that everyone is capable of moral blindness. When such 
psychopathic attitudes go unnoticed and are masked by society’s inability to confront the 
potential for women to be evil, they result in a world that, as Heusel suggests, is ‘too evil [for 
innocence] to survive’, too evil for characters like Felicity Mor to flourish.177 
 
The Existentialist and Mystic Hero; the Psychopath and the Saint 
Contemporary discussions of the clinical construct of psychopathy increasingly highlight its 
ambivalence. The wide variety of traits used to define psychopaths are in many cases 
applicable to any individual: egocentricity, impulsivity and manipulation are, as some 
commentators highlight, commonplace. For Robert J. Smith, the Machiavellian nature of 
society, ‘foster[s] psychopathy’: ‘one is encouraged to give in to impulse, aggressively 
project the self at the expense of others and let the future take care of itself’.178 The 
prevalence of such Machiavellian activities in modern society are, in a morally troubling 
sense, therefore, indicative of the extent to which psychopathy may define a ‘heavily 
                                                                                                                
177 Barbara Stevens Heusel, ‘Dame Iris at Seventy: An American Examines Her Feminist 
Record’, Literary Review, August 1989: 36-7 (p.37). 
178 Smith, ‘The Psychopath as Moral Agent’, p.193, 185. 
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socialized’ individual rather than an ‘antisocial personality’.179 Such criticisms of 
psychopathy or society, however, can be answered by highlighting the fact that psychopathic 
traits form a spectrum against which any individual’s behaviour can be measured, not only 
those of criminals. Even Janfarie Skinner’s discussion of Stevenson’s infamous antagonist 
Long John Silver, an arguably proto-psychopathic character, evidences such ‘morally 
ambiguous, shifting’ traits: he is not only ‘seductive’ and violent but also ‘courageous’ and 
‘well organized’.180 Fearlessness, moral distance and stoicism are as capable of leading to an 
increase in egoism and solipsism, as they are of leading to the ability to act quickly in face of 
danger. Such traits, as contemporary writers like Kevin Dutton argue, can motivate both the 
behaviour of psychopaths and saints, providing the latter with the necessary emotional 
distance to carry out complex moral choices. 
Murdoch’s philosophical discussions of the existentialist hero, an immoral fictional 
personality present throughout much twentieth-century fiction, indicates her awareness of the 
popularity and prevalence of psychopathic traits in contemporary fiction and society. ‘The 
violent man’, she asserts in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, is often depicted as ‘the hero 
of our time’ (MGM, p.171). Murdoch’s portrayal of such existentialist heroes within her 
fiction illustrates not only how dangerous such individuals can be but also the attraction of 
the psychopathic power and vitality they represent. Murdoch’s alignment of some of the 
leading traits of the existentialist hero with its moral counterpart, the mystical hero, however, 
suggests a prescient awareness of the moral ambivalence surrounding the traits that define the 
psychopathic personality.  
 
 
                                                                                                                
179 Smith, ‘The Psychopath as Moral Agent’, p.193. 
180 Skinner, ‘The Influence of Childhood Reading on the Fiction of Iris Murdoch’, p.221. 
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The Existentialist and Mystic Hero 
In ‘Existentialists and Mystics’ (1970), Murdoch offers her most comprehensive outline of 
the existentialist hero and his moral counterpart, the mystical hero. The existentialist hero, 
she argues, is ‘familiar to us’ because he is ‘the hero of almost every contemporary novel’ 
(SG, p.70); he can be seen in the works of ‘D. H. Lawrence, E. Hemingway, A. Camus, J.-P. 
Sartre, [and] K. Amis’ (EM, p.225). Such works, Murdoch argues, present a 
 
lonely brave man, defiant without optimism, proud without pretension, 
always an exposer of shams, whose mode of being is a deep criticism of 
society. He is an adventurer. He is godless. He does not suffer guilt. He 
thinks of himself as free. He may have faults, he may be self-assertive or 
even violent, but he has sincerity and courage, and for this we forgive him. 
[…] His will, that adventurous instrument which makes him so different 
from sticks and stones and billiard balls and greengrocers and bank 
managers, is separate from the rest of his being and uncontaminated. He 
might do anything. (EM, p.225) 
 
This figure exhibits an ‘absence of concern for, or remarks about, traditional morality’ (EM, 
p.109), a trait that Murdoch crucially notes in her 1950 review of Simone de Beauvoir’s 
L’Invitée, her first discussion of the existentialist hero and the morally impoverished 
philosophical outlook that drives his immoral, or amoral, personality. The existentialist 
hero’s ‘valueless and meaningless world’, she claims, arises from the ‘reduced [moral] 
vocabulary and simplified and impoverished […] view of the inner life’ (EM, p.293) inherent 
in existentialist philosophy.  
Murdoch notably criticised Martin Heidegger, Sartre and Stuart Hampshire for their 
portrayal of such ‘existentialist-behaviourist’ pictures of morality (SG, p.4), in which the 
individual is driven by an egoistic, heroic belief in his actions. All that drives Hampshire’s 
individual, she argues, is his ‘overtly choosing will’ which is ‘isolated from belief, from 
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reason, [and] from feeling’ (SG, p.7); the individual’s moral choices are pictured as a ‘flow of 
intention into action’ (SG, p.4). Later, in her unpublished Heidegger manuscript, Murdoch 
similarly criticises Heidegger for portraying the individual with ‘no in-built moral aspect’: 
‘Heidegger […] notices, and at once abandons, an idea of immense importance, that of the 
moral content of cognition and the ubiquity of evaluation’.181 Heidegger, she conjectured, 
may be ‘Lucifer in person’ (SG, p.70). In her first published philosophical work, Sartre: 
Romantic Rationalist (1953), Murdoch criticises Sartre’s literature for its fascination with 
‘violence and disorder’ (SRR, p.80) and his philosophical writings (more than once) for their 
picture of fellow human beings ‘as the principle of Evil’ (SRR, p.31; see also, p.50 and p.86). 
Separate from morality and unable to attend to the world and its particulars, Hampshire, 
Heidegger and Sartre portray the individual as amoral, ‘bereft of values’ and incapable of 
moral understanding, echoing the psychopath’s lack of empathy, moral blindness and 
propensity for active violence.182  
While the existentialist hero illustrates a freedom from morality and is driven by the 
pointlessness of virtue, the mystical hero is driven by the fundamental magnetism of 
                                                                                                                
181 Murdoch, ‘Sein und Zeit: Pursuit of Being’, from Heidegger (Unpublished manuscript), 
reprinted in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, ed. by Justin Broackes (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), pp.93-109, p.97.  
182 Murdoch, ‘Sein und Zeit: Pursuit of Being’, p.97. Michael Inwood indicates that the moral 
drive that may be present in Heidegger’s individual, driven by the concept of care (Sorge), is 
not moved by a universal attention to particulars, whether animal, human or inanimate. 
Heidegger’s concept of care, he explains, is ambiguous: ‘concern and solitude are compatible 
with neglect, contempt, and hatred; the only entities that lack care, concern, and solicitude are 
those that are wholly incapable of them, such as stones, trees, and animals’ (Michael Inwood, 
Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction [Oxford: University Press, 2000], p.58). Here, not only 
does Care (the potentially morally motivating aspect of Heidegger’s picture of morality) have 
both positive and negative moral connotations, but also is unavailable to ‘stones, trees, and 
animals’. Murdoch’s fiction directly attacks this Heideggerian ignorance of the need for a 
universal attention to particulars. In The Green Knight, for example, not only is the reader 
provided with a narrative of the dog, Anax, but Moy also reflects on the emotional state of 
stones: ‘Did the stones who were picked up by humans and taken into their houses mind, did 
they dislike being inside a house, dry, gathering dust, missing the open air, the rain, perhaps 
the company of other stones?’ (GK, p.109) 
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goodness. He is driven by ‘a sense of the reality and unity of some sort of spiritual world’ 
(EM, p.227), by an awareness of the ‘magnetism of good’ and the importance of the role of 
duty (MGM, p.355). Murdoch describes the mystical hero as a ‘man of faith’, whose interest 
in morality is aligned with his attempts to ‘discipline or purge’ himself of a sense of self (EM, 
p.227). While he may, like the existentialist hero, exist in a ‘godless’ world, he ‘possesse[s] 
genuine intuitions of an authoritative good’ (EM, p.227) and believes, as does Murdoch, in 
the importance of ‘goodness without guarantees’ (EM, p.227). This vision of morality, unlike 
that of existentialist philosophers, echoes Murdoch’s own moral philosophy, which illustrates 
the fundamental importance of morality to human consciousness. For her, morality is a 
‘continuous’ experience that (whether or not it is explicit or tangible) informs both the moral 
and non-moral content of thought (SG, p.36), ‘cumulative[ly]’ (SG, p.42) generating a kind of 
‘moral colour’ or ‘moral sensibility’ (MGM, p.260). The existentialist hero thus illustrates, as 
Murdoch’s moral philosophy suggests, how the ‘selfish self-interestedly casual or callous 
man sees a different world from that which the carefully scrupulous benevolent just man 
sees’ (MGM, p.177; Murdoch’s italics). 
Both the existentialist and mystical hero, although driven by different philosophical 
outlooks, experience and see a unique vision of morality that distances them from their social 
environments and allows them to see the importance of action, whether it is carried out for 
good or evil, for charitable or selfish reasons. Where the existentialist hero, ‘trying to assert 
or find himself’, experiences the ‘tension […] between will and nature’, the mystical hero, 
‘trying to discipline or purge or diminish himself’, experiences the tension ‘between nature 
and good’ (EM, p.227). Both of them, Conradi claims, are ‘outsiders’ ‘marked by their 
apparent isolation from moral norms’.183 Crucially, the moral ‘anxiety’ and ‘isolation’ of 
these ethically opposed individuals aligns them with both psychopaths and, to use Dutton’s 
                                                                                                                
183 Conradi, The Saint and the Artist, p.24. 
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term, anti-psychopaths, both of whom are capable of bypassing the moral requirements of 
others in order to instigate their preferred moral vision, a vision driven either by their heroic 
powerful will or their intuitive understanding of goodness and justice.184 
 
The Existentialist Hero and the Popularity of Violence 
‘The public’s fascination with the smooth con artist and the cold-blooded killer’, Hare argues 
in Without Conscience (1993), ‘has never been stronger’.185 Murdoch’s portrayal of 
existentialist heroes within her fiction, and her discussion of them within her philosophy, 
highlights their paradoxically ‘endearing’ and ‘shocking’ behaviour (EM, p.115); ‘sometimes 
frightening, sometimes endearing, endlessly fascinating’,186 as Skinner defines Long John 
Silver in Treasure Island, the violence of the antagonist, existentialist hero or psychopath is 
dangerously enthralling. 
For many contemporary writers, the psychopath represents an ambiguously attractive 
set of traits. The psychopath, Robert Lindner claims, is ‘a rebel without a cause, an agitator 
without a slogan, a revolutionary without a program’, and people are attracted to him because 
he ‘sparkle[s] with the glitter of personal freedom’.187 Ronald Markman argues, similarly, 
that our ‘morbid fascination’ with psychopaths arises from their ‘absence of superego’.188 For 
Joanne Intrator, this fascination is especially true of modern films, where the act of 
‘moviegoing [itself represents] an act of emotionally charged voyeurism’ in which the 
audience is attracted to, as Hare claims, the ‘notoriety, titillation, or vicarious danger’ 
represented by psychopaths.189 For many modern commentators, moreover, these popular 
                                                                                                                
184 Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths, p.31. 
185 Hare, Without Conscience, p.79. 
186 Skinner, ‘The Influence of Childhood Reading on the Fiction of Iris Murdoch’, p.221. 
187 Robert Lindner, Rebel Without a Cause (1944), quoted in Hare, Without Conscience, p.81.  
188 Ronald Markman, Alone With the Devil (1989), quoted in Bruce Weber, ‘Cozying Up to 
the Psychopath That Lurks Deep Within’, New York Times, 10 February 1991.  
189 Joanne Intrator, quoted in Hare, Without Conscience, p.81; Hare, p.150. 
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psychopath figures represent traits that are beneficial in modern society. A great deal of 
professional and sexual success, Peter K. Jonason, Norman P. Li and Emily A. Teicher argue, 
results from a ‘James Bond psychology’, from a ‘Dark Triad’ of ‘Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and psychopathy’.190 Indeed, the serial killer and business man Patrick Bateman, 
the first-person narrator of Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho, as the author attests, is a 
modern ‘symbol of greed’, indicating not only the ‘silly’, ‘vacuous’ and ‘soulless’ nature of 
the modern capitalist world of fashion, media and Wall Street, but also how easy it is to be 
‘seduced by’ it.191 The behaviour exhibited by such psychopathic or existentialist heroes, as 
Jonason et al. claim, is indicative of a wish to be successful in a modern, consumerist society 
where traits like charisma, confidence, fearlessness and ruthlessness allow individuals to 
distinguish themselves from one another.192 
Many of Murdoch’s existentialist heroes follow this psychopathic personality-type, 
where a combination of ‘low levels of conscientiousness and anxiety’, high ‘self-esteem’, 
‘resilience’ and callousness result in a highly attractive often successful individual.193 Milo 
Fane, the fictional detective created by the popular crime-fiction-writer Monty Small in The 
Sacred and Profane Love Machine, for example, echoes the wilful ignorance of morality that 
Murdoch associates with the existentialist hero and the paradoxical attractiveness of the 
violent psychopath. Milo is an ‘ironical disillusioned diminished man of power’ (SPLM, 
                                                                                                                
190 Peter K. Jonason, Norman P. Li, Emily A. Teicher, ‘Who is James Bond? The Dark Triad 
as an Agentic Social Style’, Individual Differences Research, 8:2 (2010): 111-20 (p.111). 
191 Nathalie Olah, ‘Bret Easton Ellis and the future of fiction’, TLS, 16 May 2018. 
192 Towards the end of The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, Murdoch partly disrupts the 
view that the Milo Fane-aspects of Monty’s character are attractive. Blaise, in his attempt to 
assuage his feelings of guilt for Harriet’s death, reflects that ‘I didn’t kill her, Monty did. He 
was the immediate cause. Let him have the guilt then and keep it for himself. […] Of course 
one can’t be friends with a power maniac like that. The sin of pride isolates people more than 
any other sin. Monty likes to think he is Lucifer, but really in the end he isn’t even Magnus. 
He’s thin and small, as thin and mean and shrivelled up as Milo Fane. Yes, that’s who Monty 
is after all, just Milo in the end with intellect instead of nerve.’ (SPLM, p.344) 
193 Jonason, Li, and Teicher, ‘Who is James Bond?’, p.112. 
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p.37), whose dangerous, mock-heroic violence is illustrated in the narrative when Monty 
unintentionally sees the adaptation of his novel on television. He turns on the television to 
find the ‘tall, cold, expressionless’ figure of Milo staring into ‘the muzzle of the gun which 
his captor’ de Sanctis points at him with ‘a hand [that] trembled alarmingly’ (SPLM, p.243). 
De Sanctis implores Milo to ‘keep still’. Instead, Milo ‘saunter[s] away’, turns (missing the 
bullet fired at his back) and picks up a ‘heavy bronze’ statue, which he hurls at de Sanctis 
with perfect accuracy. Looking down on ‘his fallen senseless victim’, Milo recognised that  
 
[i]t was a moment for speed. A knife flashed in Milo’s hand. With fastidious 
distaste he drew down the sock above one of de Sanctis’s fleshy Italian 
suede shoes and bared the ankle. With measured deliberation he severed the 
Achilles tendon. De Sanctis was screaming. Milo was wiping blood off his 
hand with a clean handkerchief. He was walking down the stairs. He drew a 
bar of chocolate out of his pocket and began to undo the paper. (SPLM, 
p.243) 
 
Milo’s depraved, volatile psychopathic nature is highlighted by Murdoch’s short, staccato 
fragments of present-tense narrative and the juxtaposition of his brutal and callous instance of 
violence with his nonchalant consumption of chocolate. Echoing Murdoch’s philosophical 
exploration of the psychology that motivates the ‘lonely’, violent existentialist hero (EM, 
p.110), Monty understands that Milo’s ‘cold smart ultimately passionless mind’ arises from a 
morally ‘impoverished world’ (SPLM, p.37) within which moral terms such as ‘justice’, 
‘pity’ and ‘concern’ (SPLM, p.38) have no currency. Milo’s continued popularity, however, 
which has spawned not only a television show but also ‘Milo Fane Detective Sets at the 
Supermarket’ (SPLM, p.28), as Harriet Gavendar notes, attests to the popularity of such 
psychopathic figures.  
The moral awareness that the characters achieve within Henry and Cato arises from 
the psychopathic vision of violence propounded by Beautiful Joe, a vision that notably 
 223 
attracts, frightens, and harms the eponymous Henry Marshalson. Inheriting his family estate 
after the death of Sandy, his elder brother, Henry wishes, in mock-existentialist guise, to sell 
off his family estate to vindicate his wish to live a life devoid of possessions.194 The second 
eponymous character of the novel, the priest Cato Forbes, a childhood friend of Henry, aligns 
his failing belief in God and Christianity with his hope to rescue the soon-to-be-criminal 
Beautiful Joe, with whom he falls in love (HC, p.39). When Cato leaves the Order, however, 
Beautiful Joe fabricates a gang kidnapping of Cato and later Cato’s sister, Colette, 
intimidating Henry for ransom money. By the end of the novel, Henry acknowledges the 
extent to which his moral failures were partly influenced by the confusing, seductive nature 
of Beautiful Joe’s existentialist, psychopathic violence outlook. 
The characters within Murdoch’s novels that exhibit such psychopathic behaviour or 
existentialist outlooks tend to be young men. Conradi argues that such juvenile delinquents 
were influenced by the students Murdoch taught at the Royal College of Art (RCA), many of 
whom were ‘rebel-bohemian students’ with a penchant for ‘amorality and anarchism’ that 
they directed against ‘class and custom and discipline’ (IML, p.471).195 Like the students at 
the RCA and the existentialist hero, Beautiful Joe, a ‘delinquent’ (HC, p.67), impolite, ‘ape-
like young man’ (HC, p.183), sees himself as ‘a bit of an existentialist’ (HC, p.244). For 
Murdoch, the attraction of such philosophical outlooks arises from the ‘brave individualistic, 
                                                                                                                
194 Like Emily McHugh in The Sacred and Profane Love Machine, Henry Marshalson in 
Henry and Cato criticises modern society and bourgeois values. Henry admits to Cato that 
‘[m]y mother’s living in a sort of feudal dream world. It’s all false, it’s a lie, and I’m going to 
smash it up’ (HC, p.125). Emily McHugh expounds a similar sentiment to Blaise, her lover: 
‘Your bloody bourgeois genteel set-up over there, I’d like to smash it to pieces. […] You 
wait. I’ll carry the war into the enemy’s camp. War on the bloody rich. I know how the poor 
live.’ (SPLM, p.92). 
195 At the Royal College of Art, Murdoch’s erotically charged relationship with her student 
David Morgan allowed her to engage in a vicarious fascination with these individuals. In my 
MA dissertation I drew a link between Hilary Burde in A Word Child and David Morgan, 
who admitted being ‘flatter[ed]’ by Murdoch fascination with his ‘wolfish’, sometimes 
‘monstrous’ behaviour. See David Morgan, With Love and Rage: A Friendship with Iris 
Murdoch (Kingston upon Thames: University Press, 2010), pp.17, 117.  
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rather than irresponsible, freedom’ they represent (MGM, p.157) and illustrates how ‘clever 
young people can be absolutely taken over by a philosophical view, later seen to be 
intolerably abstract and implausible’ (MGM, p.169). This sentiment is echoed in Henry and 
Cato where Henry Marshalson, like Beautiful Joe, ‘can’t help admiring’ extremely infamous 
individuals like Hitler (HC, p.70).196 Unaware of the dangerous seduction afforded by 
existentialism, Beautiful Joe offers a ‘deep criticism of society’ as if exposing a ‘sham’ (EM, 
p.225). He admits to Cato that  
 
[e]verybody cheats [and] everybody steals. […] I just nick a thing of two, 
and I never nick from poor people, only from big places like, big shops, 
they won’t miss it, they reckon on a lot of hoisting. It’s not stealing really. 
(HC, p.173) 
 
Peter similarly argues in A Fairly Honourable Defeat, like Leo Peshkov in The Time of the 
Angels, that he ‘only take[s] things from big shops. No one is hurt’; ‘under capitalism’, Peter 
explains, the items that he chooses to steal ‘are not the property of the people’; unlike 
everyone else, he asserts, ‘I’m on my own. I’m free’ (FHD, p.106-7). In Henry and Cato, 
however, Murdoch illustrates the tragic results of such an unhindered ‘amorality and 
anarchism’: Beautiful Joe, like Murdoch’s existentialist hero, believes that he can ‘do 
anything’ (EM, p.225), especially when aided with violence. 
Beautiful Joe’s violent actions when kidnapping Cato, and later Collette, prove his 
own belief in the power of fear: ‘When you get down to the nitty gritty,’ he explains, 
‘everything rests on violence in the end. […] And a funny thing, do you know, it’s awfully 
                                                                                                                
196 Beautiful Joe and Henry are both obsessed with such powerful historical, literary and 
philosophical figures. Beautiful Joe suggests that ‘old Hitler knew a thing or two’ (HC, p.41). 
Henry, alternatively, ‘had an instinctive identification with heroes beginning with H. Homer. 
Hannibal. Hobbes. Hume. Hamlet. Hitler. What a crew.’ (HC, p.70-1) He notes that 
‘Hannibal succeeded in performing miracles of military organization’ because ‘he was a 
monster of cruelty’ (HC, p.70). 
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easy to frighten anybody […]. Dead easy’ (HC, p.41); ‘[s]how a man a knife and he’ll do 
anything’ (HC, p.37). Henry’s later experience of fear at the hands of Beautiful Joe, however, 
illustrates the harsh painful realities of violence:  
 
How easy it was for the violent to win. Fear was irresistible, fear was king, 
he had never really known this before when he had lived free and without 
it. […] How well he understood how dictators flourished. The little grain of 
fear in each life was enough to keep millions quiet. (HC, p.237) 
 
Here, Murdoch mixes psychologically aware internal narration and subtle didacticism to 
illustrate how Henry’s experience of evil and fear has revealed the illusory nature of his 
existentialist belief in ‘freedom’ and violence. There is, as he notes while looking at Titian’s 
Diana and Acteon, a ‘differen[ce]’ between ‘violence in art’ or in one’s imagination, and ‘the 
horror of the real thing’ (HC, p.296). At the end of the novel, in the presence of Colette, 
Henry explains the moral importance of his new-found appreciation of the reality of violence. 
My ‘trouble all along’, he admits, has been  
 
mistaking my moral level. That idea of selling everything and clearing out, 
that was far above me, I couldn’t possible have done that in a proper way. 
Perhaps someone else could have done it. But with me it was just—yes of 
course you are right—an act of violence. (HC, p.321-2) 
 
Here, Murdoch ironically juxtaposes Henry’s intended true violence (his destruction of his 
family estate) with Beautiful Joe’s imaginary violence (his creation of an imaginary gang to 
illicit fear in his captors). Dame Patricia Raven, a character whom the reader only meets 
once, aptly explains to John Forbes, Cato and Colette’s father, how Beautiful Joe’s violence 
affected everyone: ‘A violent person has psychological power. He can frighten the non-
violent just by his will. This is a very dreadful fact. […] I think everyone acted fairly 
reasonably. It was a very obscure situation and evil confuses people’ (HC, p.331-2). While 
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Henry may have been attracted to the kind of extreme, anti-capitalist, existentialist moral 
vision presented by Beautiful Joe, his awareness at the end of the novel illustrates the 
dangerous and seductive nature of evil and violence. 
 
The Mystical Hero, ‘Counter-saints’ and ‘Anti-Psychopaths’  
Unlike the existentialist hero, the mystical hero understands, and often has the courage or will 
to confront, such instances of violence. Denis Nolan’s response to Marion Taylor in The 
Unicorn, for example, exhibits an awareness of the importance of fighting against Gerard 
Scottow’s reinvigorated ‘spiritual’ power over Hannah Crean Smith, when he wonders 
whether ‘one must not in the end fight evil with evil’, an idea that affronts Marion, ‘not 
because she abhorred evil, but because she too much feared it’ (U, p.229). In A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat, Tallis Browne crucially uses such striking and shocking ‘violen[ce]’ to 
ward off a racist, homophobic group of men (FHD, p.232). As both Denis and Tallis 
understand, sometimes the kind of violence usually reserved for antagonists, existentialist 
heroes or psychopaths is required by the mystical hero or saint. For Kevin Dutton, ‘elite 
spiritual athletes like Tibetan Buddhist monks’ might even be termed ‘anti-psychopaths’ 
because their ability to ‘feel nothing but compassion’ echoes a psychopathic lack of 
empathy.197 The psychopath’s ‘stoicism, [his] ability to regulate emotion, to live in the 
moment, to enter altered states of awareness, to be heroic, [or] fearless’, as Dutton suggests, 
can drive the moral awareness of the saint.198 
Such an ambivalent picture of the moral life, where the leading traits of the 
psychopath are aligned with the saint, is explored in The Good Apprentice, where Murdoch’s 
portrayal of Stuart Cuno illustrates an awareness of the moral proximity of the defining traits 
                                                                                                                
197 Dutton, The Wisdom of Psychopaths, p.31. 
198 Ibid., p.206. 
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of the existentialist and mystic hero. Stuart, like Murdoch’s mystical hero, argues for the 
existence and importance of morality and goodness. People need something that 
‘shows goodness as the most important thing,’ he argues; they need ‘some sort of spiritual 
idea and discipline’ akin to religion only ‘without God’ or ‘supernatural dogmas’ (GA, p.34). 
Like both the existentialist and mystic hero, however, Stuart is a solitary figure, a moral 
‘outsider’ to recall Conradi’s term.199 Stuart’s morally ‘extreme’ beliefs leave other 
characters perplexed, and they see him as a ‘moral Hitler’ (GA, p.42) or ‘moral samurai’ (GA, 
p.287). He is also crucially described by Thomas McCaskerville’s wife, Midge as a 
‘psychopath’: the only character thus named in Murdoch’s oeuvre. For Midge, Stuart’s moral 
campaign will make him ‘have a breakdown and cause a lot of trouble or become a 
psychopath’ (GA, p.224). Her definition of Stuart arises from Thomas’s description of 
Stuart’s moral vision: ‘Stuart sees the machine of life that hardens the ego – sex, drink, 
ambition, pride, cupidity, soft living – […] as one big unitary’ system with which he must 
engage and against which he must fight (GA, p.224). Like Murdoch’s psychopathic enchanter 
figures with their high cognitive empathy, Stuart sees the harmful and painful realities of 
human life. Yet, where the existentialist hero or enchanter figure sees morality as pointless or 
unhelpful, Stuart’s believes in the importance of fighting such moral frailties, not only in 
others but also within himself.  
While Stuart’s attitude may be morally perceptive and, in Murdochian terms, morally 
praiseworthy it has complex and often painful results as Stuart’s impact on Midge illustrates. 
Midge McCaskerville and Stuart’s father, Harry Cuno, who are engaged in an affair, find 
themselves getting help from Seegard’s inhabitants after they get stuck on a road trip. Once 
there, they find Stuart, who has been visiting his step-brother, Edward. After an ambiguous 
experience with Jesse Baltrum, however, all three, Midge, Stuart and Harry, drive home, with 
                                                                                                                
199 Conradi, The Saint and the Artist, p.27. 
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Stuart sitting silently in the back of the car. Stuart’s appearance as a dangerous moral figure, 
as a ‘simulacrum’ for ‘death’ (GA, p.428), is first pointed out by Jesse. When they come face-
to-face with each other, he announces: ‘There’s a dead man, you’ve got a corpse […] sitting 
at the table […]. Take that white thing away’ (GA, p.314). Jesse’s image resonates 
throughout the novel, where Stuart is pictured, on multiple occasions, as an invisible, pale or 
white corpse.200 Midge recalls this image when describing her distress at Stuart’s presence in 
the car-journey back from Seegard. ‘You sat […] staring at us’, she explains,  
 
it wasn’t like having a human being there at all. You got into the car to […] 
be a witness of our wrong-doing. […] I think you have a cruel streak. You 
negate everything, like death does. […] You don’t know how complicated 
and mysterious people are, […] you’re hardened by pride. […] You know 
nothing, you feel nothing. […] You seem to have chosen death. […] 
You’ve become a nightmare figure, a horrible ghost. (GA, p.354-5) 
 
Midge’s awareness of Stuart as a ‘negat[ing]’ inhuman force is indicative of the lack of 
empathy and stoicism that unites both psychopaths and saints, illustrating the fact that the 
good man within Murdoch’s fiction is often, as Conradi notes, ‘oddly […] cold and dead’ 
(IML, p.287). Later in The Good Apprentice, however, Midge starts to value Stuart’s ascetic 
moral outlook. She feels ‘remade,’ ‘soothed,’ ‘alive’ because of a ‘new desire’ for Stuart that 
‘alter[s]’ her sense of ‘self’ (GA, p.396). The ‘cosmic chemic change’ engendered by Stuart’s 
‘pure [moral] force’ (GA, p.396), by his ‘rays’ of ‘death’ (GA, p.527), motivates her to break 
off the affair with Harry. When Midge undergoes this ambiguous change, she ‘annihilat[es]’ 
and ‘kill[s]’ her ordinary desires in favour of an appreciation of love and truth (GA, p.527). 
Encouraged by Stuart’s psychopathic moral austerity, Midge’s positive death of the ego 
                                                                                                                
200 See, for example, GA, pp.314, 396, 400, 479, 512. 
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echoes a Murdochian vision of morality, in which the ‘defeat’ of ‘the fat relentless ego’ 
represents a fundamental moral activity (SG, p.51).  
Midge’s two vastly different experiences of Stuart’s moral power illustrate the 
complex results of an encounter with such an ascetic, mystic hero. In a morally problematic 
sense, Stuart comes to represent the kind of moral guarantee that his picture of morality 
attempts to remove: Midge, as other characters in Murdoch’s fiction do with the enchanters 
they encounter, ‘elect[s]’ Stuart as a figure of moral guidance, as her ‘God’ (TCHF, pp.73-4). 
In An Accidental Man, Dorina confronts the morally complex role which such mystical 
heroes are capable occupying, wondering if the ‘help’ received from her brother-in-law 
Matthew had ‘merely enchanted her with a particular and strange love for himself? (AM, 
p.307). The moral austerity and psychopathic charm exhibited Matthew, like Murdoch’s 
other mystical heroes, is aptly described by Ludwig: 
 
Matthew’s face, especially late at night […], had glowed like that of a saint 
with something too pure to be called cynicism or even nihilism: something 
which was perhaps more dreadful than either. Yet Matthew himself had 
seemed untouched, like a holy man whose form is seen to burn but is not 
consumed. (AM, p.364) 
 
This description of Matthew’s morally ambivalent energies might be similarly applied to 
Stuart. Despite the help they afford others, both characters exhibit a dangerous, perhaps 
‘dreadful’, spiritual energy that can, in its purity, appear psychopathically amoral, nihilistic or 
unempathic.  
While Midge’s experience of Stuart’s asceticism is (eventually) positive, Stuart 
realises the ease with which his mystical role corrupts into an amoral existentialism. After his 
father criticises him for having destroyed his affair with Midge, Stuart runs out the house and 
into London, hoping that it will ‘calm’ him (GA, p.478). Instead, recounting all his failed or 
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pained attempts to help those around him, he sees himself as a ‘passive hated witness’ of 
wrongdoing (GA, p.479) with, as Midge had warned, a dangerous tendency to deny the real 
moral complexity of those around him. As he ‘hurried back to Oxford Street’, he felt like 
 
a tall man, among the people, […] walking like (he suddenly felt, and it was 
a terrible image) a man seen in a film, when the star is seen walking alone in 
the crowded streets of New York […] filled with the magical significance of 
his role, happy or unhappy, an image of power, of the envied life, 
surrounding by other actors who are, by contrast, devoid of being; and it is 
all false. (GA, p.479) 
 
Here, Stuart’s vision of himself represents the same kind of pastiche of the existentialist hero 
or powerful modern crime hero that Murdoch uses to depict Milo Fane in The Sacred and 
Profane Love Machine. While Stuart’s moral outlook can allow him to see the moral 
problems faced by some individuals, it also has the ability to alienate him from others. 
Moreover, as his ‘terrible’ vision of himself as a powerful crime hero illustrates, his moral 
distance from others can even result in a dangerous ignorance to their ‘significance’ and 
particularity.  
Murdoch’s exploration of the morally ambivalent relationship between the 
existentialist and mystical hero suggests a prescient awareness of the moral ambiguity 
surrounding the traits that mark out the psychopath. Both the existentialist and mystic hero 
are marked by their solipsistic way of life: driven by two incompatible moral-philosophical 
outlooks, they anxiously attempt to enact, engage with, fight against, or search for an ideal 
vision of morality or society. Such fictional characters, whether antagonists or protagonists, 
anti-psychopaths or psychopaths, enchanters or saints, often represent an acerbic, sometimes 
awe-inspiring, moral extremity. The characters within Murdoch’s novels that surround such 
austere, evil, or demonic psychopathic individuals all assert the importance of their moral 
vision. For Edward, in The Good Apprentice, Stuart’s moral extremity is ‘mad’ but, as 
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Mother May answers, it may also be ‘good. Anyway he’s extreme. That’s what’s needed 
now, extremes’ (GA, p.260). Jack Sheerwater in The Message to the Planet expresses a 
similar opinion about Marcus Vallar, the central ambiguous figure of the novel: Marcus is 
‘beyond good and evil’, and this amoral outlook renders him ‘a demon’ whose extremity is 
indicative of how ‘Extreme solutions are forced upon us now. This is his time.’ (MP, p.20).  
Murdoch comically explores the ambiguously dangerous and seductive behaviour of 
such extreme psychopathic figures in her penultimate novel The Green Knight. Centering 
around Lucas Graffe’s failed attempt to murder his brother Clement, the novel illustrates 
Lucas’s amoral psychopathic cruelty but also fragments a collection of psychopathic traits, 
such as callousness, charm and fearlessness, among the other characters.201 Peter Mir and 
Bellamy James’s discussion of Lucas, however, illustrates the ultimate moral ambivalence of 
such psychopathic traits and those who exhibit them. Bellamy ‘carefully’ explains to Peter, 
 
‘Lucas, the Professor if you like, is a very strange man. He is the bravest 
person I know - ’ 
‘You like him.’ 
‘I admire him. I love him. He lives absolutely outside ordinary 
conventions.’  
‘Including morality’ 
‘He’s is very truthful -’ 
‘But prepared to deceive.’ 
                                                                                                                
201 Early in the narrative, Clement Graffe notes that Peter Mir, like his adopted brother Lucas, 
has ‘a certain authority’ (GK, p.194). Later, Clement begins to fear Peter’s ‘cunning’ and 
‘ruthless’ wish for justice and retribution: ‘He wants an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. 
[…] Perhaps they’ll just kill each other. Yes, they are both mad, it’s a battle between two 
mad magicians!’ (GK, p.238). Clement himself, however, is ‘endowed’ with ‘so much charm’ 
(GK, p.81). Similarly, Tessa has ‘an ambiguous charm’ (GK, p.54). Father Damien tells 
Bellamy of the psychopathic need to disregard emotions: ‘you should abstain from brooding 
emotionally over early sins. An excessive cultivation of guilt may become neurotic, even an 
erotic, indulgence. […] What is needed is a cool, even cold, truthfulness’ (GK, p.39). 
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‘I mean he’s honest, he sees the terrible things, he doesn’t try to cover 
them up or imagine them away - the evil of the world, the senselessness of 
it all, the rottenness of us ordinary people, our fantasy life, our selfishness -’ 
‘You seem to want to see him as a saint.’ 
‘In a way I do - I mean a sort of counter-saint - I mean he’s above, 
beyond - ’ 
‘Beyond good and evil.’ (GK, p.171) 
  
Here, Murdoch comically juxtaposes Bellamy’s measured reverence of Lucas with Peter’s 
interjections which present a more truthful but not necessarily accurate description of Lucas’s 
character. Combining a broad collection of psychopathic traits, like charm, emotional colour-
blindness, high cognitive empathy, manipulativeness and violence, Lucas represents a 
pastiche of Murdoch’s psychopathic characters rolled into one: he is an antagonist, an 
enchanter, an existentialist hero and a mystical hero, whose ambiguity destabilises any 
attempts to define him. Here, as Conradi describes Murdoch’s dichotomy of the existentialist 
and mystical hero, the psychopathic traits that comprise Lucas’s personality can be seen as a 
‘dialectical’ system or a spectrum that highlights the ambivalence of human behaviour and 
morality.202 
 Murdoch’s novels, then, illustrate the fact that human behaviour cannot be divided 
into existentialist or mystic, good or evil, male or female, psychopathic or saintly. On the one 
hand, individuals are driven by a mechanical, neurotic psyche that predisposes them to moral 
failures. On the other hand, individuals are capable, as Murdoch argues, of ‘degrees of 
freedom’ (MGM, p.308) from these immoral tendencies. Indeed, for Murdoch, there is a 
middle ground between such moral determinism and freedom, which can be accessed by 
improving our attention (SG, p.35). Murdoch’s enchanters and mystical heroes provide a 
fundamental ambiguous moral vision that reveals universal human frailties and, in so doing, 
                                                                                                                
202 Conradi, The Saint and the Artist, p.27. 
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demands a moral awareness that can help agents to combat the kind of commonplace 
thoughtlessness of which, as Arendt’s concept of ‘the banality of evil’ attests, they are 
capable. Such a vision necessarily demands that audiences deny dualist visions in which 
people are defined as either good or evil. When human behaviour stretches to depraved 
wickedness, it should not cause us to abandon our ability to acknowledge the complexity and 
uniqueness of each person or the presence of an absolute, universal goodness. Evil does not 
always beget evil; psychopathy does not always beget psychopathy. Instead, as both Murdoch 
and Dutton note, the fact that psychopaths and their spiritual counterparts ‘may have 
something to teach us’ (WP, p.32) illustrates the extent to which the individual moves within 
the ‘continuum’ of morality, wherein ‘we are aware of truth and falsehood, illusion and 
reality, good and evil’ (MGM, p.250). 
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Chapter Four 
Iris Murdoch, William Blake, and the ‘Contrary’ Natures of the Moral Life 
 
Without Contraries is no progression. Attraction and Repulsion, Reason 
and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to Human Experience. 
William Blake.1 
 
Recognize one’s own evil, mend what can be mended, and for what cannot 
be undone, place it in love and faith in the clear light of the healing 
goodness of God. 
Iris Murdoch. 2 
 
We are frail creatures, all our good is mixed with evil. It is good none the 
less. 
Iris Murdoch.3 
 
 
This chapter argues that the picture of morality portrayed in Iris Murdoch’s fiction is 
indebted to the Romantic poet and printmaker William Blake. It begins by illustrating that, 
despite Murdoch’s criticisms of both Romanticism and Blake in her letters and philosophy, 
Blake and Murdoch nevertheless share a common vision of art and morality. For them, art 
offers an inclusive liberal vision that highlights the importance of attention and offers an 
inherently ambiguous, dialectical vision of morality where evil and violence can play a 
significant and transformative role in the moral life. It goes on to discuss Murdoch’s fictional 
support for a Blakean tension in the moral life, between the contraries of innocence and 
experience, reason and energy and good and evil, by drawing attention to her implicit and 
                                                                                                                
1 William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790), in Blake’s Poetry and Designs, 
Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant (New York: 
W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.66-82, p.69 (plate 3). Hereafter referenced in 
parenthesis as Marriage, followed by plate and (where present) line number.  
2 Iris Murdoch, PP, pp.204-5. 
3 Iris Murdoch, PP, p.494. 
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explicit allusions to The Songs of Innocence and of Experience (1789-94) and The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell (1790) within her fiction. In The Bell (1958) and The Time of the Angels 
(1966), Murdoch echoes Blake’s critique of a Gnostic state of innocence, a state imbibed 
with spiritual value and thus assumed to be more morally beneficial than experience. In The 
Philosopher’s Pupil (1983), Murdoch’s Blakean warnings about the limits of innocence 
chime with the concept of ‘degenerate innocence’, which Conradi takes from A Severed Head 
to examine the ways in which Murdoch’s fictional explorations of a blind, happy innocence 
are indebted to her youthful misdemeanours in the early 1940s. In both The Time of the 
Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch alludes to the restless and passionate energies 
of ‘The Tyger’ to illustrate the value of Blakean experience and suggest the dangers that arise 
from repressing the active, creative, passionate energies symbolised by the tyger and 
expressed within The Marriage of Heaven Hell.4 Murdoch invites such a Blakean moral 
critique of repression in her portrayal of John Robert Rozanov, the eponymous philosopher 
within The Philosopher’s Pupil, with whom George McCaffrey and later his granddaughter, 
Harriet Meynell (Hattie), fall in love. Unlike Murdoch, who was aware of the power of the 
teacher figure and the dangers inherent in transgressing the boundaries of sexual and Platonic 
love, Rozanov denies, hinders or negates these emotional aspects of the moral life. Within 
The Bell, The Time of the Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil, therefore, Murdoch draws 
upon Blakean discourse to portray not only the necessary ‘tension’ between the Blakean 
‘contraries’ of the moral life but also the importance of acknowledging the passionate 
emotive aspect of the moral life, the denial of which can lead to evil. This vision, like 
Blake’s, suggests the importance of moving beyond dualism to attend to the complexity of 
                                                                                                                
4 I will use Blake’s spelling of ‘tyger’ when referring to the figure within his poem but will 
use the conventional spelling ‘tiger’ when referring to the animal. Images of such potentially 
Blakean tigers appear throughout Iris Murdoch’s fiction. Simon Foster, in A Fairly 
Honourable Defeat, for example, says of Julius King that ‘[t]here had been a tigerish look, 
but that was gone’ (FHD, p.70). 
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the moral life, which necessarily includes an understanding that experiences like evil, hatred, 
repulsion and violence are inextricably intertwined with experiences of love, tolerance, 
goodness and wisdom. 
 
Iris Murdoch, Romanticism and William Blake 
Murdoch’s writings display her enduring engagement with Blake: her fiction, her letters, and 
her philosophy are peppered by allusions to his art and poetry. One of the earliest (currently 
available) references to Blake appears in a letter to Hal Lidderdale dated 6 November 1945 
where Murdoch recalls Blake, asking Lidderdale, ‘Where are you now, in what distant deeps 
or skies?’ (LP, p.55) She may, similarly, have been making an oblique reference to the same 
poem in a letter to David Hicks dated 25 January 1946 where she writes, ‘I do love you, in 
the depths as in the heights’ (LP, p.61).5 These allusions to the fifth and sixth line of Blake’s 
‘The Tyger’, ‘In what distant deep or skies / Burnt the fire of thine eyes!’ (Songs. 42. 5-6), 
suggest that Murdoch knew Blake’s poetry by heart.6 This potential reverence for Blake is 
repeated in allusions to his artistic style in both her fiction and philosophy. He is not only 
referenced in The Time of the Angels (1964) and The Philosopher’s Pupil (1983) but also The 
Unicorn (1963), Bruno’s Dream (1969), The Black Prince (1973) and Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals (1992). In the latter, discussing Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the dualism of 
fact and value with which she strongly disagrees, Murdoch explains that  
 
The Tractatus is more like a definitive metaphysical handbook, with its 
numerous visual metaphors: logical space, the limited whole, inside and 
                                                                                                                
5 Anne Rowe and Avril Horner only note the Blakean allusion in the letter to Lidderdale (LP, 
p.55). 
6 William Blake, ‘The Tyger’, from The Songs of Innocence and of Experience, in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. 
Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.11-47, pp.38-9. Hereafter, all 
poems within The Songs of Innocence and of Experience referenced in parenthesis as ‘Songs’ 
followed by plate number and, where necessary, line reference.  
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outside, looking in a certain light (sub specie aeternis). We might here 
conjure up something like a picture by Blake, with the factual world 
spinning as a sort of glittering steel ball and the spirit of value silently 
circling around it. (MGM, p.31) 
 
A similar, ostensibly Blakean, image of a ‘hugely coloured’, ‘glittering’ and ‘shining’ ‘globe’ 
appears in The Black Prince (BP, p.258). Blake’s style is also referenced in The Unicorn and 
Bruno’s Dream: in the former, Effingham Cooper witnesses the dead bodies of Gerald 
Scottow, Hannah Crean-Smith and Peter Crean-Smith ‘in the engraved twilight, as in a 
picture by Blake’ (U, p.255); in the latter, Miles calls to mind the image of his father, Bruno, 
as ‘a venerable image housed in a niche, looking rather like a sage represented by Blake’ 
(BD, p.144). All of these references, leaving aside the question of the specific works to which 
she may be referring, suggest that Murdoch knew Blake’s writings intimately. Indeed, 
Murdoch’s focus on ‘visual metaphors’ and the problem of dualism in Metaphysics as a 
Guide to Morals, as the following discussion will illustrate, makes Blake a valid artist for her 
to ‘conjure up’. 
Critics of Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy, however, have rarely engaged with the, 
sometimes controversial, writings of Blake, despite Murdoch’s allusions to them. Such a 
lacuna exists because she herself critiqued the Romantic movement within which Blake is 
located. Within Murdoch’s moral philosophy, the Romantics are criticised for ‘the weakness 
of [their] theory of personality’ (EM, p.262); their ignorance toward moral absolutes and their 
enjoyment of fantasy appears to praise an existentialist, pseudo-psychopathic moral solipsism 
that has led to regrettable ‘changes in the portrayal of character in novels’ (EM, p.261). 
Murdoch does, however, as critics such as Megan Laverty, Daniel Majdiak and Gabriel 
Pearson have attested, engage with Romantic ideas and writers in her fiction and philosophy, 
including some of those about which she is most critical. Such a paradox is evident in her 
only philosophical reference to Blake, prior to the publication of Metaphysics as a Guide 
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Morals. In ‘T. S. Eliot as Moralist’ (1958), where Murdoch praises Eliot for reintroducing 
‘certain kinds of moral standards into literary criticism’ and for highlighting the importance 
of ‘ideals’, of ‘truth (EM, p.161) and of language (EM, p.165), Blake is listed among the 
Romantic progenitors of the culturally and morally bankrupt Liberalism that so troubled 
Eliot. This criticism, however, does not sit well with modern commentators, for whom the 
writings of many Romantics, including Blake, are not amoral. The Romantics, as Laurence S. 
Lockeridge argues, are neither moral subjectivists nor relativists; for them, ‘[t]he imagination 
is not an exclusively subjective power; its sympathy leads the self toward the world. Its 
ultimate moral function, beyond benevolence, is love’.7 This Romantic vision chimes with 
Murdoch’s praise of ‘art and morals’ as ‘the discovery of reality’ and as a loving attention to 
the world including the contingently existing person or, to echo the Blakean terminology 
used in George Steiner’s preface to Existentialist and Mystics, the ‘minute particular’ (EM, 
p.215). The writings of both Blake and Murdoch thus combat the evils of inattention by 
highlighting the value of liberalism, humanism and art, in whose ambiguous vision the 
individual can be respectfully and lovingly portrayed. In spite of these similarities, however, 
Murdoch would go on to suggest, in letters to Rachel Fenner (née Brown), a student at the 
Royal College of Art during the mid-1960s, that Blake’s monist moral vision contravened her 
own. An investigation of these criticisms, however, will prove that Blake’s and Murdoch’s 
pictures of morality share more than an awareness of the attentive value of art; they also 
share a dialectical moral vision in which violence (or violent acts) plays a fundamental role in 
the moral life, a fact that critics seem to avoid not having understood how to deal with it. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
7 Laurence S. Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 
p.71. 
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Iris Murdoch and Romanticism: disagreements and sympathies 
In ‘The Sublime and Beautiful Revisited’ (1959), Murdoch argues that the Romantic picture 
of the individual is damaging not only to morality but also to art and literature. For her, the 
Romantic individual is a ‘lonely’ (EM, p.268), ‘solipsistic’ (EM, p.269) figure who cannot 
apprehend ‘anything outside itself’ (EM, p.264), and this problematic Romantic vision results 
in three dichotomies: convention versus neurosis, the ‘Ordinary Language Man’ versus the 
‘Totalitarian Man’, and journalistic versus crystalline literature. These binaries, the first two 
of which arise from the philosophical visions of Kant and Hegel, respectively, have negative 
impacts on morality, the individual and literature. The ‘Ordinary Language Man’, with roots 
in a Kantian, empirical tradition where action is valued over emotion, is driven by ‘the 
commonest and vaguest network of conventional moral thought’ (EM, p.269). The Hegelian 
‘Totalitarian Man’, alternatively, is driven by the neurotic belief that he alone is ‘the centre of 
significance’ (EM, p.269). Murdoch argues that the Romantics’ combination of these limited 
visions of the moral agent with Kant’s ‘self-contained’ and ‘strictly purposeless’ vision of art 
‘condemn[s] the novel to being either a poem in disguise’ (EM, p.278), a ‘small, compact, 
crystalline’ object (EM, p.272), or ‘a piece of informative prose,’ like ‘a pamphlet, […] or 
piece of journalism’ (EM, p.278). She goes on to argue in ‘Against Dryness’ (1961) that the 
modern ‘twentieth-century novel’, inheriting these Romantic binaries, is thus ‘either a small 
quasi-allegorical object portraying the human condition […] or else it is a large shapeless 
quasi-documentary object […] with pale conventional characters’ (EM, p.291). In picturing 
individuals either as the centre of their moral universe or cut off from moral understanding 
altogether, Romanticism fails to acknowledge the ‘Liberal spirit’ of freedom and inclusivity 
and thus fails to provide ‘a house fit for free characters to live in’ (EM, p.286). 
Murdoch’s critical vision of Romanticism, as both she and her critics have suggested, 
is evident not only within the writings of the Symbolists, such as T. S. Eliot, but also, 
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paradoxically, her own fiction. While the Symbolists ‘professed […] to be opponents of 
Romanticism’, Murdoch explains, they nevertheless followed Kant’s (Romantic) vision of art 
in wanting to create ‘small, clean, resonant, and self-contained things’ (EM, p.273). In 
interviews, however, Murdoch repeatedly asserted her tendency, which Conradi later 
developed in The Saint and the Artist (1986), to write novels with a similarly enclosed form. 
In 1968, she admitted that her novels oscillate between being ‘open’, ‘where there are more 
accidental and separate and free characters’, or ‘closed’, ‘where [her] own obsessional feeling 
about the novel is very strong and draws it close together’ (TCHF, p.22). For Murdoch, both 
A Severed Head (1961) and The Time of The Angels present such a ‘closed’, ‘crystalline’ 
form, where the plot of the novel is developed around a single ‘myth’, or where, as in the 
case of the latter, the philosophy ‘comes into the very centre of the plot’ (TCHF, p.21). 
Gabriel Pearson and Daniel Majdiak juxtapose Murdoch’s philosophical disagreements with 
Romanticism with her self-admittedly ‘closed’ novels. Disagreeing with Murdoch’s belief 
that ‘romanticism simply equals fantasy’, Pearson argues that her ‘strength, her type of art, is 
the romantic novel’.8 Majdiak, however, is more careful to highlight the morally problematic 
aspects of Murdoch’s Romanticism. Her evil characters, for example, are paradigmatic of the 
problems inherent in the ‘solipsistic’ Romantic individual. Carel Fischer, the central priest 
who no longer believes in God, in The Time of The Angels, as Majdiak argues, is a kind of 
‘neo-Kantian Lucifer’, a character that ‘looms so large in whatever story he is found that he 
threatens to swallow up all of the other characters’.9 ‘In attending to Romanticism,’ Majdiak 
concludes, ‘[Murdoch] finds that she must reject much of what it has created, but she has 
absorbed much of its vision as well and uses it to look to the future’.10 In The Saint and the 
                                                                                                                
8 Gabriel Pearson, ‘Iris Murdoch and the Romantic Novel’, New Left Review 13-14 (Jan-Apr 
1962): 137-45 (p.145); Daniel Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, 
Texas Studies in Language and Literature, XIV.2 (Summer 1972): 359-75 (p.375). 
9 Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, pp.371, 367. 
10 Ibid., p.375 
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Artist, Conradi draws on Murdoch’s interviews to similarly argue that that her fiction from 
the 1970s onwards reflects her ‘ideal state of affairs’ for the artist, where they should 
‘combine the merits’ of both ‘form’ and ‘character’ (TCHF, p.10), of both the open and the 
closed novel.11 On this view, the Romantic or Symbolist works, whose form is driven by a 
singular, ‘self-contained’ myth or philosophical vision, are a necessary counterpart to the 
plurality of nineteenth-century novels, whose characters are illustrative of ‘real persons more 
or less naturalistically presented in a large social scene’ (EM, p.271). While Murdoch may 
have been critical of Romanticism, therefore, she nevertheless accepted that it represented 
some of the traits necessary for good literature. 
Murdoch’s sympathies with Romanticism are subtly expressed in her earlier essay, ‘T. 
S. Eliot as Moralist’ (1958), where she is careful to distinguish her own Liberal vision of art 
from Eliot’s critical vision of the Liberal environment within which the Romantics 
flourished. Eliot believes that the central moral problem that literature faces, as Murdoch 
explains, can be traced to Liberalism, Puritanism and Romanticism, which have ‘inspired’ an 
‘emotional individualism’ in which ‘every man may now invent his own religion’ (EM, 
p.162). For Eliot, Blake is indicative of these problems: his works lack ‘a framework of 
accepted and traditional ideas’; in being ‘too much occupied with [his own] ideas’, Blake’s 
works exhibit ‘a certain meanness of culture’.12 The problem here, however, as Murdoch 
locates it at the end of her essay, is that Eliot’s vision of ‘culture’ is too ‘narrow’: ‘It may be 
[as Eliot believes] that the Christian tradition must be the salvation of the West; but to argue 
this too narrowly is to neglect aspects of liberalism which are, to put it mildly, worth 
                                                                                                                
11 Peter J. Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, 2nd edn (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
2001), p.30. 
12 Blake’s satire of Christianity in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, where the voice of the 
Devil announces that Jesus is not a figure who represents the importance of virtue and rules 
but of energy and ‘impulse’, undoubtedly contributes to Eliot’s staunch criticism of him. See 
T. S. Eliot, ‘Blake’ (1920), William Blake: Songs of Innocence and of Experience: A 
Casebook, ed. Margaret Bottrall (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1970), pp.93-8. 
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preserving’ (EM, p.169). Here Murdoch implicitly reverses Eliot’s criticism of Blake and his 
neglect of Liberalism: Eliot is right to criticise ‘the self-absorption of the individual’, but he 
is wrong to discount Liberalism, Puritanism and Romanticism on these grounds. For 
Murdoch, the ideal vision of Liberalism, as she outlines in ‘The Sublime and the Beautiful 
Revisited’, is more accurately reflected by the ‘great’ nineteenth-century novelists, or by 
Shakespeare, who present a ‘loving toleration of, indeed delight in, manifold different modes 
of being’ (EM, p.277). These artists represent a form of Liberalism that can be ‘detach[ed]’ 
from Eliot’s criticism, where compassion, ‘freedom’ and love drive the creator’s ‘struggle’ 
for an artwork that represents the value of ‘knowing and understanding and respecting things 
quite other than ourselves’ (EM, p.284). Such a moral task is, interestingly, one that Murdoch 
perceives in Eliot’s poetry: his writings ‘penetrate our anxious trivial world with a profound 
compassion’, she argues, and this ‘imagin[ative]’ task ‘is, of course, to take up a Romantic 
attitude’ (EM, pp.169-70; my italics). While Murdoch does not directly rescue Blake from 
Eliot’s argument, where he appears as a Straw Man that represents Eliot’s limited vision of 
Liberalism, her argument nevertheless mediates his criticisms and reinstates the inclusive, 
Liberal vision of literature, within which there is, perhaps paradoxically, a place for 
Romanticism. 
While the Romantics may be criticised for their self-centered, solipsistic, even 
revolutionary attitudes, they nevertheless offer a vision of art that is, therefore, compatible 
with Murdoch’s moral philosophy. The Romantics, Lockeridge admits, ‘are often [said] to 
have emphasised a retreat into the isolated image in a forsaking of the poet’s social role’; yet, 
for him, they also ‘bring both the private public consciousness and the sense of the poet’s 
moral and social responsibilities to a new and heightened pitch’.13 Here, the individualism 
                                                                                                                
13 Lockeridge notes that the Romantics and the Modernists, or Symbolists to use Murdoch’s 
term, exhibit a similar ‘extremism’ in their focus on ‘the poet’s moral and social 
responsibilities’. Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.18.  
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lauded by the Romantics can be seen as a morally beneficial engagement with 
‘indeterminacy’ that, as Lockeridge argues, feeds our sense of ‘compassion’ and humility in 
the face of the moral ambiguity and complexity of others.14 For Megan Laverty, Murdoch’s 
philosophical writings are, as Pearson and Majdiak claim of her fiction, ‘uniquely’ Romantic 
because she draws heavily on the writings of Kant and Plato, both of whom Laverty argues 
are ‘great romantics’ because their writings highlight ‘the simultaneous indefensibility and 
necessity of responding to other individuals’.15 Murdoch draws on the vision of these 
philosophers in ‘The Sublime and the Good’ (1959), where she expresses her interconnected 
vision of art, morals and reality: 
 
[a]rt and morals are, with certain provisos […], one. Their essence is the 
same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of 
individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other 
than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the discovery of reality. 
What stuns us into a realisation of our supersensible destiny is not, as Kant 
imagined, the formlessness of nature, but rather its unutterable particularity; 
and most particular and individual of all natural things is the mind of man. 
(EM, p.215) 
 
Such a vision asserts the importance of moral vision and, indeed, illustrates the reason why 
the imaginative task of literature, which ‘enjoys the ambiguity of the whole man’ (EM, 
p.458), is so important for moral thinking. For Murdoch, ‘anything which alters 
consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is connected with 
virtue’ (SG, p.82); ‘[a]ttention is the effort to counteract’ fantasy (SG, p.36); ‘clear vision’ is 
the ‘result of moral imagination and moral effort’ (SG, p.37). This adoption of Simone Weil’s 
concept of attention, which Murdoch defines as ‘a just and loving gaze directed upon an 
                                                                                                                
14 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.37. 
15 Megan Laverty, Iris Murdoch’s Ethics: A Consideration of her Romantic Vision (London: 
Continuum, 2007), pp.3, 88, 7. 
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individual reality’ (SG, p.33), resonates with the Romantics’ praise of compassion and 
humility. In Murdoch’s view, Laverty explains, the ‘humble individual’, or we might say the 
humble reader, ‘has more to lose in not allowing her consciousness to be determined by a 
reality that exceeds her comprehension’.16 In his perceptive concluding remarks, Majdiak 
argues that 
 
[Murdoch] shows that we are the heirs of [the great] Romantics, just as 
much as we are the products of Romanticism […]. Since man is a creature 
who makes pictures of himself and then becomes like the picture, we need 
‘an education in how to picture and understand human situations’ (SG 
p.33). As Blake put it, we have to see through our eyes, not merely with 
them, or, as Murdoch says, we have to ‘grow by looking.’ (SG p.30)17 
 
Here, Majdiak foregrounds the importance not only of the Romantics’ praise of humility to 
Murdoch’s moral philosophy as Laverty indicates but also of Blake’s praise of sight to all of 
Murdoch’s writings, where the individual uses their imaginative faculties to attend to the 
‘unutterable particularity’ of each individual. 
 
Blakean Metaphors of Sight and Murdoch’s Vision of Art 
While Lockeridge does not discuss Murdoch in The Ethics of Romanticism, his exploration of 
Blake’s writings reveals the similarities of both writers’ visions of morality, both of which 
praise an imaginative awareness of the world.18 Murdoch asserts the importance of the 
imagination to moral development, the continued development of which generates each 
                                                                                                                
16 Laverty, Iris Murdoch’s Ethics: A Consideration of her Romantic Vision, pp.88, 7. 
17 Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, p.375. I have changed 
Majdiak’s parenthetic references from the original Yale Review publication of the ‘Idea of 
Perfection’ (1964) to the edition published within The Sovereignty of Good, as referenced 
parenthetically throughout this thesis.  
18 Lockeridge does not discuss Murdoch in The Ethics of Romanticism, but The Sovereignty 
of Good appears in his bibliography. 
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person’s moral sensibility. For her, the imagination represents ‘the searching, joining, light-
seeking, semi-figurative nature of the mind’s work’ (MGM, p.322) that allows the moral 
agent ‘not to escape the world but to join it’ (SG, p.88). Murdoch’s moral system, however, 
relies upon the crucial distinction between the opposing faculties of imagination and fantasy. 
The imagination ‘exhilarates us because [it reveals] the distance between our ordinary dulled 
consciousness and an apprehension of the real’ (SG, p.88). Such ‘dulled consciousness’ 
results from the moral individual being overpowered by fantasy, wherein the mind is 
‘continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil 
which partially conceals the world’ (SG, p.82). This ‘anxiety-ridden’, ‘fantasising’ state 
results in ‘vanity’ (MGM, p.322) which ‘can imprison the mind, impeding new 
understanding, new interests and affections, [and new] possibilities of fruitful and virtuous 
actions’ (MGM, p.322). Murdoch’s critique of the Romantic individual as a ‘solipsistic’ (EM, 
p.269) ‘lonely’ individual (EM, p.268) whose fictional plight is ‘tightly conceived’ in a ‘self-
contained myth’ (EM, p.272) chimes with this vision of fantasy and is, therefore, inimical to a 
true vision of the other. Blake’s writings, however, similarly combat such an obsessional 
amoral focus. For Blake, Lockeridge explains, the ‘imagination is the mental capacity that 
lends our life narrative its shape and purpose; […] it is […] what in common parlance is 
called our “sense of self”’.19 For both Blake and Murdoch, the imagination ‘lends’ the moral 
life ‘shape and purpose’, orients the individual toward goodness, and reveals the ‘reality’ of 
the world in which so many others live. 
In Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion (1804; c. 1821) and The Fire and 
The Sun: Why Plato Banished the Artists (1977), Blake and Murdoch, respectively, assert the 
importance of art and moral vision. Steiner, who presciently suggests that the reader can see 
‘[l]uminous shades of Blake’s “holiness of the minute particular”’ (EM, p.xv) within 
                                                                                                                
19 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.190. 
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Murdoch’s moral philosophy, quotes from Jerusalem, a text that offers an example par 
excellence, to use Lockeridge’s phrase, of ‘the realization of all human acts of imagination 
and the ultimate triumph of the ethical’.20 Therein, ‘more than the earlier prophecies,’ such as 
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell or The Songs of Innocence and of Experience, Lockeridge 
continues, Blake ‘puts forward the moral values of forgiveness, mildness, mercy, friendship, 
and self-sacrifice’.21 The central eponymous figure, Jerusalem, represents an ‘inspiration [to] 
all mankind’ by symbolising ‘Liberty’ and ‘Tolerance’, and the ‘Living Creatures’ offer a 
declaration in support the ideals Jerusalem represents:22 
 
Compell the Reasoner to Demonstrate with unhewn Demonstrations 
Let the Indefinite be explored […] 
For Art and Science cannot exist but in minutely organized Particulars 
And not in generalizing Demonstrations of the Rational Power, 
The Infinite alone resides in Definite & Determinate Identity 
Establishment of Truth depends on the destruction of Falsehood 
continually.23 
 
These lines, as Steiner implies, assert the value of the detailed attention to the individual that 
can be found within Murdoch’s art. Drawing on Blake’s ‘holiness of the minute particular’ to 
steel himself against ‘the now-dominant turn to theory’, Steiner argues that ‘art and poetry 
will always give to universals “a local habitation and a name”.’ 24 Murdoch provides the same 
                                                                                                                
20 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.201. 
21 Ibid., p.205. 
22 S. Foster Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake, with a new 
foreword and annotated bibliography by Morris Eaves (New Hampshire: Dartmouth College 
Press, 2013), pp.206-7. 
23 William Blake, Jerusalem: The Emanation of the Giant Albion, in Blake’s Poetry and 
Designs, pp. 205-341, p.279 (III. 55. 56-65). 
24 George Steiner, Errara: An Examined Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), p.6. 
Steiner takes this phrase either from the section quoted above, or perhaps from later in the 
text, where Blake expresses the same idea in the form of an aphorism: ‘every Minute 
Particular is Holy’ (Jerusalem. III. 69. 42). 
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argument, and draws on the same Shakespearean reference in The Fire and the Sun: for her, 
‘Art, especially literature, is a great hall of reflection’ and the artist is ‘a great informant, at 
least a gossip, at best a sage, and much loved in both roles. He lends to the elusive particular 
a local habitation and name’ (EM, p.461). Both Murdoch and Steiner here quote from 
Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, where Theseus declares that, ‘as imagination 
bodies forth / The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen / Turns them to shapes, and gives 
to airy nothing / A local habitation and a name’.25 For further support of this vision, Murdoch 
draws attention to ‘the words of Jane Austen’ in Northanger Abbey, where she writes that a 
novel is a 
 
work in which the greatest powers of the mind are displayed, in which the 
most thorough knowledge of human nature, the happiest delineation of its 
varieties, the liveliest effusion of wit and humour are conveyed to the world 
in the best chosen language. (EM, p.462) 
 
Both Austen’s and Shakespeare’s declarations highlight the fundamental importance of the 
creative faculty of imagination, a faculty that for both Blake and Murdoch allows the artist to 
respectfully attend to the other. The supreme value of literature here arises from its focus on 
the ‘unutterable particularity’ of ‘the mind of man’, which represents an attention to detail 
and a loving ‘discovery of reality’ (EM, p.215). 
          The ideals expressed by Austen, Blake and Murdoch highlight, as Steiner argues of 
Blake, the importance of ‘linguistic, cultural, [and] social diversity’, implying that there are 
‘more possibilities than atoms’ in the world, that ‘God lies in the detail’.26 Steiner here 
                                                                                                                
25 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1590-7), Arden Shakespeare, ed. by 
Sukanta Chaudhuri (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc., 2018), pp.117-277, p.247 (V. 1. 
14-17). 
26 George Steiner, The Idea of Europe (Nexus Institute, 2004), <https://books.google.co.uk/ 
books?id=SsWSDwAAQBAJ> [accessed 09/05/19]; Steiner, Errara: An Examined Life, p.6; 
Steiner, The Idea of Europe. 
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echoes a Murdochian idea, first used in Under The Net (1954) by Hugo Belfounder, who 
suggests to Jake Donaghue, the protagonist and narrator of the novel, that ‘God is a task. God 
is detail. It all lies close to your hand’ (UN, p.258). The same idea is expressed by William 
Eastcote, a well-known, devout, ‘saint[ly]’ (PP, p.420) character in The Philosopher’s Pupil, 
who praises an attention to ‘small things’. In his sermon, he explains, 
 
I want only to say something about simple good things which are as it were 
close to us, within our reach, part still of our world. Let us love the close 
things, the close clear good things, and hope that in their light other goods 
may be added. […] Let us seek aid in pure things, turning our minds to 
good people, to our best work, to beautiful and noble art, to the pure words 
of Christ in the Gospel, and to the world of God obedient to Him in nature. 
[…] At any time, there are many many small things we can do for other 
people which will refresh us and them with new hope. (PP, p.204-5) 
 
This moral exemplification of ‘love’ relies upon unhindered imaginative attention to the 
Other, to a ‘minute’ and ‘inviolable’ particular. By locating the value of moral sight, this 
vision combats the solipsism of Romanticism and, in so doing, reveals the similarities of 
Blake’s and Murdoch’s visions of art as a liberal, inclusive medium that imaginatively 
attends to the individual.  
 
Blake’s Dialectical Vision of the Moral Life. 
Such an appraisal of Blake’s vision was offered by Murdoch’s student, Rachel Fenner, whose 
dissertation Murdoch supervised. Aptly titled ‘William Blake and the Problem of Dualism’ 
(LP, p.608), Fenner’s dissertation was based on the theme of ‘The Imagination as a Moral 
Tool’ and contained references not only to Blake but also to Jacob Boehme, Plato and 
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Thomas Treherne (IML, p.474).27 The letters between them concerning the dissertation offer 
Murdoch’s most significant engagement with Blake and her paradoxical criticisms of his 
moral vision.28 Murdoch not only provided Fenner with a book list, for which she drew on 
Brigid Brophy’s help but also expressed philosophical and theological concerns about Blake, 
in which she distanced her own vision of morality from his.29 By the early 1960s, Murdoch 
not only develops a more substantial criticism of Blake than that which appears in her essay 
on ‘T. S. Eliot as Moralist’ (1958) but also believes that her own philosophy invalidates his 
moral claims. In a letter dated 9 November 1964, Murdoch defines Blake’s morality as a 
form of monism, akin to that which can be found in ‘Eastern religions’ where ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ ‘blend into a natural unity’. She acknowledges that this is an ‘oversimplified’ definition 
of Blake, but goes on to argue that her own philosophical ‘assumption that God [and] Good 
must connect’ problematises his ‘monistic theology’ (LP, p.285).  
                                                                                                                
27 Fenner confirmed the title was ‘William Blake and the Problem of Dualism’ for Horner 
and Rowe’s Living on Paper (corroborated by Anne Rowe, in conversation with the author, 
16 June 2016), and she later clarified Conradi’s suggestion that the dissertation concerned 
‘The Imagination as a Moral Tool’ and focused on Thomas Treherne, alongside Blake, Jacob 
Boehme and Plato (corroborated by Rachel Fenner, in conversation with the author, 4 May 
2016).  
28 Conradi’s notes on Rachel Fenner (see KUAS6/15/7/3) and Murdoch’s letters to her (see 
KUAS118) indicate that their discussions were broad, dealing with many different topics 
surrounding her dissertation subject. Fenner confirmed the nature of these discussions: she 
suggested that Murdoch’s uneasiness with the complexity of the philosophical ideas with 
which Fenner was grappling lead to ‘initial battles’ that were ‘almost arguments’. These 
discussions were, nevertheless, ‘enjoyed’ by both of them. It is interesting to note that 
Fenner, writing a dissertation focused in part on Blake, could not recall Murdoch’s opinion of 
his writings. Rachel Fenner, in conversation with the author, 4 May 2016. 
29 Murdoch wrote Fenner a reading list for the study of Willian Blake and Samuel Palmer on 
19 August 1964 in which she suggested seven books, from more general texts, such as British 
Romantic Artists (1946) by John Piper, to the more specialist Letters of William Blake (1956) 
edited by G. Keynes (Iris Murdoch, letter to Rachel Fenner, KUAS118/1/6). A letter from 
Murdoch to Brigid Brophy, dated c1950/1960s, reveals that Murdoch asked Brophy for 
‘some suggestions for a reading list for a (pupil) girl who wants to write something vaguely 
philosophico aesthetic on “reality/fantasy” in the work of Blake + Samuel Palmer. I think 
there’s a subject there, only I haven’t had time to meditate on it’ (Iris Murdoch, letter to 
Brigid Brophy, KUAS142/3/73). It is conceivable that the list written by Brophy was then 
given to Fenner. 
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There are, however, two interconnected problems inherent in this critique of Blake, 
the first relating to Murdoch’s philosophical writings themselves and the second relating to 
how Murdoch interprets Blake’s writings. Murdoch’s reference to a philosophical argument 
about how ‘God [and] Good must connect’ most likely refers to the ideas that would inform 
‘On “God” and “Good”’ (1969), the essay published five years later than her letter to Fenner 
where she would, to complicate matters, go on to suggest that ‘[her] own temperament [is] 
incline[d] to monism’ (SG, p.49). On contemplating Murdoch’s letter to Fenner, one might 
conjecture that this essay was, perhaps subconsciously, informed by these discussions of 
Blake; in the very least, her letter illustrates that she was preoccupied with the relationship 
between God and Good and with questions of monism and dualism roughly five years before 
her published discussions of them. Her own preference for monism in ‘On “God” and 
“Good”’, moreover, partly undermines her critique of Blake’s monism and, in so doing, 
raises questions about whether or not hers is an accurate definition of his moral vision. Do his 
moral categories, as Murdoch suggests, ‘blend into a natural unity’? By confronting this 
question and recalling Murdoch’s dialectical picture of morality (discussed in Chapter 
Three), one can see that her moral vision is, at least by the early 1970s, more akin to Blake’s 
than she would have countenanced in 1964.  
 Blake’s moral vision is, as revealed in works such as The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell and The Songs of Innocence and of Experience, defined not by monism but by the 
tension between two contrary states: ‘Without Contraries is no progression’, he writes in the 
former, ‘Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate, are necessary to 
Human Experience’ (Marriage. 3). The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Lockeridge argues, 
presents an ‘embattled dialectic’ that ‘point[s] to a new state of being’, which ‘promotes the 
energies of doing in acts of wrath and violence’ as well as acts of benevolence, forgiveness, 
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joy, justice, mercy and love.30 The possibility of evil should be kept in check, not through a 
passive denial of it, but through an active acceptance of it, as illustrated by the aphorisms 
within the ‘Proverbs of Hell’, such as: 
 
The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom. 
He who desires by acts not, breeds pestilence. 
The tygers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction. 
You’ll never know what is enough unless you know what is more. 
Exuberance is Beauty. 
Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires. (Marriage. 
7-10) 
 
Blake’s intent here is not to ‘blend’ moral categories, or choices, into ‘a natural unity’, but to 
reassert the presence of experiences like evil, energy, hate, or passion that were denied by 
contemporary thinkers or seen to be divorced from their opposites in a dualist vision of life. 
Among the ‘errors’ promulgated by ‘All Bibles or sacred codes’, Blake writes, for example, 
is the dualist idea ‘[t]hat Man has two real existing principles […]: A Body & a Soul’ 
(Marriage. 4). Blake also defined himself against writers like Bacon, Newton and Locke, 
whose visions of the individual and of the world left, in Blake’s mind, little room for 
‘Inspiration & Vision’.31 Blake criticised these ideas because they imposed strict moral 
visions that separated life into discrete categories of experience; his repeated use of the word 
‘contraries’ thus engenders an inherently ambiguous and dialectical picture of moral life that 
moves beyond monism and dualism and allows him to highlight the complexity of the moral 
life and the value of the imagination. Indeed, in Blake’s earliest work, All Religions are One / 
There is No Natural Religion (1788), he aligns the passionate faculties of the individual with 
                                                                                                                
30 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.205. 
31 William Blake, ‘From On Reynold’s Works’, ‘From Marginalia’, in Blake’s Poetry and 
Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant 
(New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.461-5, p.465. 
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‘Poetic Genius’ with a creative faculty of vision: ‘Man’s desires’, he writes, ‘are limited by 
his perceptions’; ‘He who sees the Infinite in all things sees God’.32 Murdoch shares this 
awareness of the limitations brought about by single-minded, potentially monist, moral 
thinking with Blake. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals Murdoch argues that the human 
tendency to ‘grasp ourselves as unities’ is problematic: in fearing ‘plurality, diffusion, 
senseless accident [and] chaos’, ‘we want to transform what we cannot dominate or / 
understand into something reassuring and familiar,’ into the ‘old and prized unities and deep 
instinctive beliefs thought to be essential to human life’ (MGM, pp.1-2). Blake’s ‘embattled 
dialectic’ in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, therefore, highlights the dangers inherent in 
ignoring the power of the ‘Senses’ and the ‘infinite’ variety of the world; like Murdoch’s, this 
vision stresses the importance of attending to the ‘plurality’ and ‘diffusion’ of the moral life, 
in which the individual needs to acknowledge both innocence and experience, love and hate, 
reason and emotion, good and evil.  
Blake and Murdoch share not only an awareness of the problems of single-minded 
moral thinking but also an austere vision of the moral life; indeed, Murdoch’s praise of 
violence in love, morality and politics offers a similarly ‘embattled’ vision of the moral life 
as Blake. In her letters and her philosophy, she expressed staunch political standpoints and 
asserted the moral and political value of violence. In a letter dated early April 1939 to her 
lifelong friend Ann Leech, for example, Murdoch writes of the necessity for violence in 
support of a communist world-view: 
 
We’ve got to reorganise society from top to bottom — it’s rotten, it’s 
inefficient, it’s fundamentally unjust, and it must be radically changed, even 
at the expense of some bloodshed. […] [B]etter a little violence than the 
                                                                                                                
32 William Blake, All Religions are One / There is No Natural Religion (1788), in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. 
Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.5-7. 
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physical, mental and spiritual starvation and deprivation of millions of men 
and women. (LP, p.10) 
 
This politically motivated, justified violence is later echoed in a recently published 
concluding section to ‘On “God” and “Good”, where she argues that ‘thinking has got to 
become more radical’.33 Therein, she goes on to assert the importance of Marxism:  
 
One characteristic of this [Maxist] thought which [is] especially importantly 
now is the finding of points of absolute non-toleration, the willingness to 
make absolute moral judgements on means to ends. No to torture, No to the 
war in Vietnam, No to the possession and testing of nuclear weapons. 
Moral thinking can now penetrate, and ought to penetrate, straight into 
politics without having to pass automatically through a testing area of 
Machiavellianism.34 
 
Here, as in the letter to Leech, Murdoch acknowledges as necessary both the moral 
perspective and the revolutionary violence of Blake’s Marriage of Heaven and Hell whose 
‘violent didactic’, as Lockeridge argues, represents a ‘mechanism for historical change’ and 
for personal and moral development.35 Some of Blake’s aphorisms may rightly arouse 
suspicion or condemnation for their ‘ruthless’ moral severity, Lockeridge argues, but these 
austere perspectives should be critiqued within the context of ‘the doctrines of contraries’, in 
which 
 
one must renounce pity in order to feel it, one must be wrathful before one 
can be loving, one must practice severity of judgement in order to forgive, 
one must suffer in order to inherit joy, one must break the Ten 
Commandments in order to become merciful, [and] one must promote 
                                                                                                                
33 Iris Murdoch, ‘Postscript on Politics’, with ‘Introductory Notes’ by Justin Broackes, The 
Iris Murdoch Review, 3 (2011): 5-7 (p.7). 
34 Murdoch, ‘Postscript on Politics’, p.7. 
35 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.158. 
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revolution however violent in order to create a society of benevolence and 
justice.36 
 
Murdoch’s vision of political activism, and indeed of moral development, contains within it a 
similarly necessary violence. 
 Murdoch’s engagement with the necessity of violence similarly appears in her fiction, 
where violence may be called upon for developmental, ethical and political need. For the 
characters in A Severed Head and The Black Prince, love involves violence; for others in The 
Unicorn and A Fairly Honourable Defeat, moral action requires violence. Honor Klein’s use 
of a Japanese Sword in A Severed Head to slice two ‘crumpled’ napkins, for example, 
represents the connection of ‘control’, ‘power’ and violence within love (SH, pp.96-7). 
Alternatively, Bradley’s love for Julian in The Black Prince is aligned with Titian’s The 
Flaying of Marsyas and illustrates how suffering and violence within love can occasion 
positive moral development. Murdoch lauded Titian’s The Flaying of Marsyas for its 
symbolism of ‘the death of the self’, wherein flaying represents how the moral agent can 
‘lose [their] egoism in [a] sort of agony, which is also ecstasy’; this ‘death of the ego’ 
represents a move away from consoling fantasy that allows the individual ‘to see the world 
with absolute vividness and clarity’.37 Here, to quote Lockeridge’s description of Blake, 
Murdoch ‘narrates the violent mental labors leading up to and preparing for true act and 
vision’.38 Murdoch’s ostensibly good and saintly characters often portray an inherent lack of 
egoism, an improved moral vision, and an awareness of the need to act in danger. In The 
Unicorn, for example, Marian is affronted by Denis’s suggestion about ‘Whether or not one 
must not in the end fight evil with evil’, ‘not because she abhorred evil, but because she too 
                                                                                                                
36 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.205. 
37 Iris Murdoch, interview with Eric Robinson, ‘Revelations’, Channel 4 Television, 22 
September 1984. Quoted in Anne Rowe, The Visual Arts and the Novels of Iris Murdoch 
(New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), p.175. 
38 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.174. 
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much feared it’ (U, p.229). In A Fairly Honourable Defeat, however, Tallis Browne, who is 
ostensibly ‘incapable of violence of any sort’ (FHD, p.168), illustrates the necessity for such 
Blakean action when he wards off a racist, homophobic group of violent men by ‘violen[tly]’ 
hitting one of them (FHD, p.232).39 For Murdoch, as for Blake, therefore, evil and violence 
should be interrogated, but they can, in spite of their dangers, be emotionally and morally 
necessary.  
 Murdoch’s open disagreements with Blake on the grounds that he is a monist, and her 
implied disagreements with him on the ground that he conforms to the negativity within her 
vision of Romanticism, are undermined by their similarities and also by the paradoxes 
inherent in Murdoch’s critique of Romanticism. Her disagreement with Romanticism for its 
‘solipsism’ reflects her moral concern that the ‘fantasising’ nature of the human being would 
result in an inability to attend to the other and her disagreement with Blake’s picture of 
morality as a form of monism reflects her concern that ‘good’ and evil would ‘blend into a 
natural unity’ (LP, p.285). Lockeridge acknowledges the ease with which such an 
interpretation of Blake arises: The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, he argues, ‘may seem […] 
to say that everything negative in human existence—death, hypocrisy, envy, pestilence, and 
tyranny—constitutes one necessary pole in an indefinitely extensible process’ and the 
implications for such an interpretation, he continues, thus lead either to ‘a morally neutralized 
process of negatives and positives, or worse, some version of commonplace adolescent 
relativism’.40 However, as we have seen, Blake is not simply an amoral, ‘solipsistic’, 
‘indulgent’ writer. For him, as for Murdoch, the human individual requires active, militant, 
                                                                                                                
39 Murdoch appears to echo Tallis’s form of violence in the later novel, The Sacred and 
Profane Love Machine, where Edgar Demarney, a similarly passive character, is so affronted 
by Harriet Gavendar’s acceptance and forgiveness of her husband’s infidelities that he 
announces she is ‘an accomplice of evil’ and punches her husband, Blaise, in an act of 
drunken defiance (SPLM, p.201). 
40 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.175. 
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revolutionary energies for moral development and moral vision. Blake’s dialectical moral 
vision is balanced between monism and dualism: evil is neither a ‘positive’ moral category, 
equal in force to goodness, nor is it a moral force whose meaning is ‘blend[ed]’ in goodness. 
Instead, as Lockeridge explains, ‘[f]or [Blake], evil is accidental, not essential; imagination 
can ultimately triumph over negation and human freedom over constraint’.41 In Blake’s 
writings, the most morally dangerous act is passivity or ‘restraint’, a selfish action that aims 
at the ‘constraint’ and ‘negati[on]’ of the other.42 Like Blake, Murdoch’s novels explore the 
difficulty of this fight against selfishness: they illustrate both ‘the selfishness which is more 
natural to [human beings], together with how this is sometimes overcome’ (TCHF, p.199). 
Blake and Murdoch’s pictures of morality thus praise the same, potentially difficult, central 
activity of moving beyond selfishness towards an attention to the Other: both writers not only 
exhibit an awareness of the inherent ‘plurality’ of the human being, the importance of action 
in politics and the inclusion of violence within the moral life but also praise imagination, an 
attention to the individual, and the ‘unutterable particularity’ of the Other. 
 
Innocence in The Bell, The Time of the Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil 
Murdoch’s fictional engagement with The Songs of Innocence and of Experience in The Bell, 
The Time of the Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil illustrates how evil can arise from an 
ignorance of the Blakean tension between the contraries of innocence and experience. While 
critical discussions account for her engagement with innocence more broadly, they have 
rarely accounted for her criticism of this Romantic theme through her quotations of, and 
allusions to, Blake, who did not, like many of the Romantics, see innocence as an inherently 
                                                                                                                
41 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, pp.156-7. 
42 William Blake, ‘From On Lavater’s Aphorisms on Man’, ‘From Marginalia’, in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. 
Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.453-4, p.454. 
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and unquestionably good spiritual faculty. Murdoch draws upon this Blakean critique in The 
Bell and The Time of the Angels. In the former, implicit Blakean allusions in James Tayper 
Pace’s praise of Romantic form of innocence invite a criticism of his ostensibly saintly 
nature. Similarly, Pattie’s praise of a benign, naive innocence in The Time of the Angels, 
albeit through explicit allusions to Blake’s poetry, reveals the limitation that arises from 
failing to acknowledge the power of experience that symbolised by Carel; only when Pattie 
acknowledges the power that Carel has had over her, a power with which she was partly 
complicit, is she able to move beyond her naive innocent state. Furthermore, Murdoch 
engages with a Blakean conception of innocence in The Philosopher’s Pupil. The sermon 
given by William Eastcote preaches an attention not only to ‘small things’, which echoes 
Blake’s praise of the ‘minute particular’, as discussed above, but also to innocence and evil. 
(Many of the townspeople of Ennistone believe Eastecote to be ‘saintly’ [PP, p.420] and see 
him as a ‘pillar of the Friends’ Meeting House’ [PP, p.34]; their reverence is expressed at 
Eastcote’s funeral, when the townspeople go on to sing Herbert Parry’s famous hymn 
‘Jerusalem’ [PP, p.472], taken from Blake’s epic poem Milton.) These allusions to Blake and 
to Romantic Ideals, however, have an even more pervasive influence on the narrative of The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, which juxtaposes the innocent Tom McCaffrey with his (half-brother) 
George McCaffrey. Like the naïve happy figures within The Songs of Innocence, Tom 
believes himself to be protected by innocence; his inability to acknowledge his own capacity 
for evil, however, suggests the moral limitations that arise from his continued praise of 
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innocent happiness.43 Murdoch’s critical attitude toward Tom’s innocence can be attributed 
not only to Blake but also to her own personal awareness of the moral pitfalls inherent in 
innocence, an awareness proven by her recently published letters and Conradi’s (recently 
published) article on Murdoch’s friendship with Philippa Foot.  
 
Gnostic Innocence in The Bell and The Time of the Angels 
The praise of innocence offered by the Romantics on the grounds that it is a virtuous faculty 
echoes the beliefs of the initiates of Gnostic religions, who believed themselves able to access 
a ‘secret code of truth’, or a special form of spiritual ‘knowledge’ about life.44 Many 
Romantics, as Kimberly Reynolds asserts, adopted such a Gnostic praise of innocence: for 
them, ‘childhood [was] seen as especially close to God and a force for good’ and thus was 
‘associated with a set of positive meanings and attributes, notably innocence, freedom, 
creativity, emotion, spontaneity and […] malleability’.45 An example of this belief appears in 
William Wordsworth’s ‘Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early 
Childhood’, where he presents childhood as a ‘glorious’ faculty affording a spiritual, 
‘visionary gleam,’ a ‘High instinct’ and ‘a master-light of all our seeing’.46 Harold Bloom 
                                                                                                                
43 Murdoch aligns both Tom and his late mother, who is referred to by the narrator as 
‘Feckless Fiona’ (PP, p.37), with the innocent figures in The Songs of Innocence. Fleckless 
Fiona is described as having been ‘curly-haired and pretty, so childish-looking, always 
laughing’; Tom inherits this happy disposition, along with his mother’s ‘bold blue innocent 
eyes’ (PP, p.120). Such imagery echoes the innocent happy figures explored at the beginning 
of The Songs of Innocence and of Experience. The overriding narrative voice of the Piper 
explains that he saw this ‘laughing’ child ‘on a cloud’ (Songs. 4. 3-4) and is asked by him to 
pipe ‘a song about a Lamb’ and to pipe ‘songs of happy cheer’ (Songs. 4. 5-10). These two 
characters are introduced to the reader by the illustration on a preceding plate (Songs. 2): the 
child flies wingless in the air looking down to the piper who stares back with his long golden 
wavy (or curly) hair blowing in the wind.  
44 Paul Johnson, A History of Christianity (1976); (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p.45. 
45 Kimberly Reynolds, ‘Perceptions of Childhood in the Romantic Period’ <http://www.bl.uk 
/romantics-and-victorians/articles/perceptions-of-childhood> [accessed 25/5/15]. 
46 William Wordsworth, ‘Ode: Imitations of Immortality from Recollections of Early 
Childhood’ (1807), in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, pp.308-12, lines 121, 56, 
146, and 152. 
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even goes as far to suggest that Blake was a Gnostic, albeit not in the same way as 
Wordsworth. Indeed, The Songs of Innocence and of Experience combats such an 
unquestioned praise of innocence. Blake did not see innocence as a kind of ‘divine spark’, 
rather his writings illustrate how spiritual awakening occurs when the individual 
acknowledges a more integrated vision of the moral life; in so doing, Blake’s poetry has the 
capacity, Bloom claims, to awaken the ‘unfelt sense of possibilities for the self’.47 
Alternatively, Wordsworth believed, Linda A. Austin claims, that ‘the passing of infancy and 
early childhood brings a loss of extraordinariness’ and ‘a diminished ability to respond to the 
world’.48 Unlike Blake, Wordsworth’s vision is emblematic of the Romantics’ belief that 
children were ‘close to God’ and innocence was representative of an inherent ‘force of good’ 
that deserved reverence over and above experience. 
Within Murdoch’s fiction, the Romantic theme of innocence is often treated as such a 
positive talisman. In The Time of the Angels, for example, Eugene Peshkov, is presented as a 
figure whose ‘innocence […] shone round him in glory’; he is a ‘necessary presence, an 
essential counterweight to Carel Fisher, a white figure against the black one’ (TA, p.177). 
Alternatively, for George McCaffrey’s mistress, Diane Sedleigh, in The Philosopher’s Pupil, 
the decorations and trinkets above her piano are seen as innocent ‘magical charms’: these 
‘little things’ were ‘proofs to Diane’s unconscious mind that innocence existed, her 
innocence and no one else’s’ (PP, p.301). John Robert Rozanov similarly views his 
granddaughter, Hattie, as a talisman of his own innocence, which he ‘needed positively to 
seclude’ (PP, p.310). For the most part, such appraisals of innocence simply highlight the 
positive emotions associated with childhood. In The Bell, however, James Tayper Pace’s 
                                                                                                                
47 See Harold Bloom, Omens of Millennium: The Gnosis of Angels, Dreams, and 
Resurrection (New York: Riverhead Books, 1996), pp.15, 34. 
48 Linda A. Austin, ‘Children of Childhood: Nostalgia and the Romantic Legacy’, Studies of 
Romanticism, 42:1 (Spring 2003): 75-98 (p.84). 
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praise of Romantic innocence in a sermon addressed to the religious community at Imber 
Court, the country house situated next to the walls of Imber Abbey, is more problematic: his 
vision recalls not only the nostalgia associated with childhood during the Romantic period 
and beyond but also the ways in which innocence was aligned with moral virtue.49  
Murdoch aligns James Tayper Pace’s sermon to the community within The Bell with a 
Gnostic trope of Romantic innocence; in denying Blakean ‘experience’ he conforms to a 
strict dualist presentation of the moral life, where innocence represents virtue and experience 
represents evil. Disagreeing with John Milton’s ‘refus[al] to praise a fugitive and cloistered 
virtue’, James argues that 
 
[innocence] has a radiance which enlightens and purifies and which is not 
to be dimmed by foolish talk about the work of experience. How false it is 
to tell our young people to seek experience! […] [I]f we can keep our 
innocence for long enough, the gift of knowledge will be added to it, a 
deeper and more precise knowledge than any which is won by the tawdry 
methods of “experience”. Innocence in ourselves and others is to be prized, 
and woe to him who destroys it, as our Lord Himself has said. Matthew 
eighteen six. (TB, p.137)50 
 
                                                                                                                
49 Linda A. Austin suggests that the sense of nostalgia that arises from this loss of the ‘mythic 
child of innocence’ did not only arise within the writings of the Romantics; it ‘derived some 
its qualities and meanings from a pre-Romantic iconology’. Austin, ‘Children of Childhood: 
Nostalgia and the Romantic Legacy’, pp.83, 96. 
50 Murdoch’s allusion to John Milton refers to Areopagitica (1644). Milton argues that ‘I 
cannot praise a fugitive and cloister'd vertue, unexercis'd & unbreath'd, that never sallies out 
and sees her adversary, but slinks out of the race, where that immortall garland is to be run 
for, not without dust and heat. Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
impurity much rather: that which purifies us is triall, and triall is by what is contrary’. This 
prescient vision is reflected in Blake’s ‘contrary’ states of innocence (an ‘unexercis’d’ 
‘cloister’d’ virtue) and experience (‘triall’) in The Songs of Innocence and of Experience. See 
John Milton, Areopagitica; SPEECH OF Mr. JOHN MILTON For the Liberty of 
UNLICENC'D PRINTING, To the PARLAMENT of ENGLAND (1644), <https://www. 
dartmouth.edu/~milton/reading_room/areopagitica/text.shtml> [accessed 03/12/15]. 
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James’s connection of ‘innocence’ with ‘knowledge’, even Biblical knowledge, offers a 
Gnostic picture of the moral life in which innocence is directly aligned with goodness. 
Toward the end of his sermon, he repeats this perspective when he suggests that Catherine 
Fawley, who is soon ‘going to be nun’ (TB, p.70), represents a perfect image of innocence in 
whom ‘the worth of innocence’ has the potential to develop into ‘knowledge and wisdom’ 
(TB, p.138). Murdoch’s veiled reference to Blake’s contrary of ‘experience’ in James’s 
sermon, however, hints at an irony that allows his support of a prelapsarian vision of 
Romantic innocence, and indeed his ostensibly ‘saintly’ character, to be undermined: by 
over-valuing innocence in his sermon he ignores the importance of experience in the moral 
life. For some critics, such as Conradi and Margarita Mauri, James is a morally praiseworthy 
character: he is a ‘saintly’ man and an ‘“upright man” guided by a sense of duty’.51 Mauri 
even lauds James’s Gnostic vision praise of innocence: ‘Truth and goodness are connected to 
knowledge, and knowledge […] to innocence. The innocent, natural, spontaneous, guileless 
person is perhaps the one that best “sees” the world’.52 In the past (when he worked at a 
youth centre), James’s moral severity aided his reputation, but at Imber Court this moral 
severity becomes problematic when he criticises Catherine’s twin brother, Nick Fawley, for 
his homosexuality. Unknown to James, Michael Meade, the owner of Imber Court, resigned 
from his position as a teacher due to a homosexual love-affair (unconsummated, according to 
                                                                                                                
51 Conradi defines James as a ‘saint’ and Michael Meade as an ‘artist’ (Conradi, The Saint 
and The Artist, p.148). Conradi’s dichotomy does not arise from a conventional view of 
sainthood. ‘The saint’, for Conradi, ‘is unconsciously good, silent, and for him it is action 
that counts. The artist is consciously, aesthetically creating his life’ (Conradi, p.18). James’s 
views, however, are far from ‘gentle’. Conradi argues that ‘James is saintly in that he urges 
and seems temperamentally suited to an austere morality with is ungrateful to the 
imagination’ (Conradi, p.148). Margarita Mauri suggests that James is an ‘“upright man” 
guided by a sense of duty’ (Margarita Mauri, ‘Knowledge and Innocence in The Bell, by Iris 
Murdoch’, in Iris Murdoch, Philosopher Meets Novelist ed. by Sofia de Melo Araújo and 
Fátima Vieira [Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011], pp.157-64, 
p.157). 
52 Margarita Mauri, ‘Knowledge and Innocence in The Bell, by Iris Murdoch’, p.163. 
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Michael) with the adolescent Nick. Now under Michael’s employ as an engineer, Nick is a 
troubled, and sometimes vindictive, character, alienated from the rest of the community, who 
dies by suicide; he is even described as having a ‘Byronic passion’ (TA, p.105) for his 
sister.53 James takes an instant dislike to Nick: ‘He looks to me like a pansy,’ James says, 
 
I had heard about him in London. They’re always trouble-makers, believe 
me. I’ve seen plenty of that type. There’s something destructive in them, a 
sort of grudge against society. Give a dog a bad name, and all that, but we 
may as well be prepared!’ (TB, p.117) 
 
This severe, cruel judgement of Nick, however, displays considerable moral blindness: he 
does not base his judgement of Nick upon anything he has witnessed, but upon overheard 
gossip and institutionalized homophobia.54 Michael reflects upon this staunch criticism: 
 
[he] marvelled once again at this curious naïvety in one who had, after all, 
seen plenty of the world. James was certainly no connoisseur in evil; a 
result perhaps of a considerable pureness of heart. Could one recognize 
refinements of good if one did not recognize refinements of evil, Michael 
asked himself. (B, p.117-8). 
 
                                                                                                                
53 Nick’s vindictive streak is revealed when, after he sees Michael kissing the young Toby, he 
traps him in the house and offers an amoral sermon that highlights the bitterness and pleasure 
of sin: ‘What is there to lighten our darkness? What is there to ease our pain? Wait, there is 
consolation and a remedy […]. I speak […] of the joys of repentance, the delights of 
confession, the delicious pleasure of writing and grovelling in the dust. O felix culpa! For had 
we been without sin we have been deprived of that supreme enjoyment. […] Let us embrace 
our sin, beloved, and fall to couple with it upon the ground.’ (TB, p.265-6) 
54 Murdoch’s portrayal of James’s fictional criticisms of homosexuality appeared before the 
Sexual Offences Act of 1967 that decriminalised homosexual acts. Nevertheless, as Priscilla 
Martin and Anne Rowe suggest, in 1958 ‘[w]hen The Bell was written, almost all educated 
liberal opinion was in favour of legalizing homosexual acts between consenting adults’ 
(Priscilla Martin and Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch: A Literary Life [Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010], p.42). James’s opinions thus represent an illiberal perspective, and can 
thus be compared with T. S. Eliot, the opinions of which, as Majdiak attests, James ‘states 
[…] unequivocally’ (Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, p.373).  
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The Blakean answer to Michael’s rhetorical question would, presumably, be no. For Blake, 
the moral agent should engage with both contrary states of their moral life, whether good or 
evil. James exhibits a derogatory, one-sided moral attitude: far from exhibiting a ‘pureness of 
heart’ (TB, p.117-8), or a ‘positively devout enthusiasm’ (TB, p.257), James remains ‘naïve’ 
of the fact that Michael and Nick have previously been intimate, unaware of the fact that this 
partly motivates Nick’s ‘destructive’ tendencies, and blind to his own prejudice. Murdoch’s 
implicit allusions to Blake indicate that James’s blinkered moral vision, governed by a 
Gnostic praise of innocence, arises from an ignorance of the contraries of the moral life. 
In The Songs of Innocence and of Experience, Blake provides a corrective moral 
picture to such Romantic Gnostic appraisals of innocence and the blinkered moral 
perspectives that arise from its focus on ideas of virginity, purity, happiness and divinity.55 
His subtitle announces that the text is intended to ‘shew the Two Contrary States of the 
Human Soul’ (Songs. 1), a vision that equivocates the Romantics’ Gnosticism by highlighting 
the importance of innocence’s ‘contrary’: experience. In the ‘Nurse’s Song’ in The Songs of 
Innocence, for example, the Nurse is unaware of the ignorant attitude engendered by the 
innocent, happy children she protects. ‘When […] laughing is heard on the hill,’ the Nurse 
feels that her ‘heart is at rest in [her] breast’ (Songs. 24. 1-2). Blake’s adjoining illustration to 
this poem depicts the happy children, the Nurse who has been put at ease by the children’s 
happiness, and a snake forebodingly climbing the branches of a tree directly above the 
children (Songs. 24. 3), highlighting how the Nurse’s false sense of security renders her 
oblivious to danger. The final poem of The Songs of Experience, ‘The Voice of the Ancient 
Bard’, expresses a similar warning about the dangers of an unmediated innocence: 
 
Folly is an endless maze, 
                                                                                                                
55 Austin asserts the interconnected symbolism of ‘pets, lambs and flowers’ to figure of the 
innocent child. Austin, ‘Children of Childhood: Nostalgia and the Romantic Legacy’, p.86. 
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Tangled roots perplex her ways, 
How many have fallen there! 
They stumble all night over bones of the dead: 
And feel they know not what but care; 
And wish to lead others when they should be led. (Songs. 54. 6-11) 
 
Here, as in the ‘Nurses Song’, Blake demonstrates the limitations of innocence: blinded by 
their happiness, children can become ‘tangled’ in the ‘roots’ of ‘Folly’, and in so doing draw 
others into Folly’s trap. While The Songs of Innocence and of Experience may fit into the 
Romantic genre due to its focus upon childhood, it does not simply offer a Gnostic praise of 
innocence, but a warning that innocence should be questioned in the light of experience, the 
participation with which can, in contravention to James’s anti-Blakean perspective in The 
Bell, provide a ‘deeper and more precise knowledge’ (TB, p.137) of the moral life. 
Unlike the indirect allusions to Blake that appear within The Bell, Murdoch draws on 
more extended quotations of Blake in The Time of the Angels, where the mixed-race maid, 
Pattie O’Driscol, recalls The Songs of Innocence and of Experience in the hope of 
recapturing, or enshrining, her lost spirituality and her lost innocence. Pattie lives with Carel 
Fisher, the demonic priest of the novel who no longer believes in God, in the rectory 
adjoining a bombed church and, echoing this environment, ‘no longer [feels] on easy 
personal terms with God’ (TA, p.27). For her, Blake’s poetry ‘takes the place of the prayer 
which took the place of the poor defeated magic of her childhood’ (TA, p.4). She ‘brood[s]’ 
upon ‘The Little Black Boy’ from The Songs of Innocence in her proud, defiant acceptance of 
the colour of her skin. Unlike the Black Boy, who announces, ‘And I am black, but oh my 
soul is white’, Pattie decides that ‘If she had a soul and souls had a colour, hers was a creamy 
brown a little darker in hue than cappuccino’ (TA, p.22). Her divine, religious attention to 
nature, moreover, is expressed in an allusion to Blake’s ‘Introduction’ to The Songs of 
Experience. When Pattie looks at a bouquet of snowdrops, she not only ‘looked at them’, she 
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‘saw them as flowers. They made, in the continuum of dark days, a pause, a gap as it were, 
through which she saw so much more than the springtime. Calling the lapséd soul, and 
weeping in the evening dew, that might control the starry pole and fallen, fallen light renew’ 
(TA, p.84). These direct quotations of Blake have been interpreted in a variety of ways by 
Murdoch scholars: some see Pattie’s quotations as evidence of her positive innocence, others 
see them as an indication of the novel’s wider discourse with the problem of contingency and 
multiplicity.56 Indeed, for Zohreh T. Sullivan, the last of these quotations ‘suggest a healthy 
Romantic norm, a positive Romanticism that emphasizes the regenerative power of wonder 
that accompanies the discovery of the external sensory world through goodness, love, and 
imagination’.57 Pattie’s engagement with Blake, however, is not entirely positive: she defines 
her love for Carel in relation to ‘Earths Answer’ from The Songs of Experience. The only 
critic to offer a more extended consideration of the impact of Blakean discourse upon The 
Time of the Angels, Daniel Majdiak, argues that 
 
[Pattie] sees that in order to achieve redemption she must maintain her own 
identity and not become enslaved to another [in this instance, to Carel]. But 
the Blakean journey through experience to an organized innocence is one 
that Pattie never finishes. Her love for Carel keeps her in the enslaved 
world of experience.58  
 
Murdoch’s inclusion of Blake’s poems in Pattie’s inner dialogue does not, therefore, simply 
offer the kind of limited appraisal of innocence offered within James’s sermon in The Bell, 
but a warning of the importance of acknowledging the enslaving power of experience, a 
lesson that is often hindered by the moral blindness of innocence. 
                                                                                                                
56 See Conradi, The Saint and The Artist, p.178. 
57 Zohreh T. Sullivan, ‘The Contracting Universe of Iris Murdoch’s Gothic Novels’, in 
Critical Essays on Iris Murdoch, ed. Linsey Tucker, gen. ed. Zack Bowen (New York: G. K. 
Hall & Company, 1992), pp.61-72, p.70. 
58 Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics of Iris Murdoch’, p.370. 
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Murdoch’s dissolution of Pattie’s quotations of Blake after the revelation that Carel 
had been having an affair with his own daughter, Elizabeth, who is first introduced to the 
reader as his niece, illustrates Pattie’s naïve complicity in his evil.59 Pattie’s alignment of 
herself with the figure of Blake’s ‘Earth’s Answer’ leaves her vulnerable to Carel’s power. 
Carel enslaves Pattie like the ‘[s]elfish father of men’, a figure that Blake aligns with the 
austere God of the Old Testament, who imprisons the figure of Earth ‘on [a] watry shore’ 
with a ‘heavy chain / [t]hat does freeze [her] bones’ (Songs. 31. 5-22).60 In interviews 
Murdoch frequently attested the presence of this problematic desire for ‘[p]eople [to] elect a 
god in their lives’ (TCHF, p.74) or ‘to be bullied by some kind of quasi-fiction which they set 
going in their own environment’ (TCHF, p.133). Pattie’s ‘black hard look’, which she turned 
upon ‘everything that was not Carel’ (TA, p.24), illustrates her complicity with the amoral 
role that Carel allots for her; for him, Pattie is his ‘dark angel’, ‘black goddess’, ‘counter-
virgin’ and ‘Anti-maria’ (TA, p.156). At the end of chapter twenty-one, however, when Pattie 
comes to terms with the knowledge that Carel has been having ‘a love affair’ with Elizabeth 
(TA, p.209), she begins to realise the extent of his power:  
 
Even if Carel had not taken her then he could have taken her at any hour, at 
any minute. Her will was his. He was the Lord God and she was the inert 
and silent earth which moves in perfect obedience. How much, how 
hopelessly, she did belong to Carel she realized […] [only now]. She had 
been bought long ago and could never now be ransomed. (TA, p.207) 
 
                                                                                                                
59 Muriel, Carel’s daughter, unwittingly revels that he is having an incestuous relationship 
with Elizabeth; Muriel’s ‘hateful’ (TA, p.207) news, intended to upset Pattie, backfires when 
Pattie reveals that Elizabeth is not, as Muriel believed, her cousin, but her sister. 
60 Simon Wilson explains that, for Blake, ‘the God of the Old Testament was a false god and 
the Fall of man, the loss of Paradise, took place, not as in the orthodox Christian story, in the 
Garden of Eden, but at the time of creation, when man was dragged from the spiritual realm 
and made material’. Simon Wilson, Tate Gallery: An Illustrated Companion, revised edition 
(London: Tate Gallery, 1991), p.67 <http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/blake-elohim-
creating-adam-n05055/text-illustrated-companion> [accessed 5/5/15]. 
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Then, she laments, ‘[a]fter all there was no salvation, no one to call the lapséd soul or weep in 
the evening dew. […] Nothing was left to Pattie except a last desire to tear and to destroy. 
The world had finally punished her for her blackness’ (TA, p.210); as ‘[t]ears gushed from 
[Pattie’s] eyes and nose and mouth’, she accepts that ‘she would have to leave him at last’; 
her love for Carel ‘was for her own torment only and not for his salvation’ (TA, p.211). Now 
Pattie’s quotations from Blake, which had supported her powerlessness, dissolve, and she 
realises the difficulty of offering Carel absolution: ‘She could not make his miracle of 
redemption’ (TA, p.211). This failed attempt to offer salvation echoes the figure of ‘The Little 
Black Boy’ with whose views Pattie vehemently disagrees: the Little Black Boy hopes that 
he can ‘shade’ the ‘little English boy’ from the ‘heat’ of God’s love (Songs. 10. 5); he hopes, 
like Pattie, to help the other ‘bear the beams’ of God’s ‘love’ (Songs. 9. 14). The painful 
reality of Carel’s incest not only gives Pattie the impetus to see how she had naively cast 
Carel in the role of an oppressive God-like figure but also highlights the extent to which her 
limited, naive innocence obscured his dangerous power. 
By the end of the novel, Pattie has enacted the Blakean task of attending to both 
innocence and experience, and has understood that evil can arise from, and be obscured by, 
either state. She can neither accept the demonic love of Carel that chimes with Blakean 
experience, nor the innocent love of Eugene Peshkov, whom she had seen as a ‘necessary 
presence, an essential counterweight to Carel, a white figure against the black one’ (TA, 
p.177). Like Pattie, Eugene had also seen Pattie in Blakean terms, as ‘the innocent, the 
undiscovered America, the good dark continent’ (TA, p.199).61 If one follows Blake’s 
contrary vision of the moral life, however, the world cannot be divided into such dualist 
                                                                                                                
61 Murdoch’s reference here appears, Majdiak claims, to refer to Blake’s America, a text 
whose eponymous figure, S. Foster Damon suggests, ‘represents the Body and its five sense, 
especially sex’ and ‘the Liberty of the Body’. See Majdiak, ‘Romanticism in the Aesthetics 
of Iris Murdoch’, p.370; and Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William 
Blake, p.19. 
 268 
moral visions. As Murdoch illustrates in The Bell, the individual must, as James fails to do, 
acknowledge the contrary aspects of the moral life: they must acknowledge not only the 
‘refinements of good’ but also the ‘refinements of evil’. Pattie’s renewed sense of autonomy 
at the end The Time of the Angels, as she leaves to help at an African refugee camp (TA, 
p.223), represents an awareness of the need to encounter both good and evil, both innocence 
and experience; she has begun to learn that an unquestioned reverence of innocence can lead 
to moral blindness and thus to the evils of inattention. 
 
Tom McCaffrey’s ‘degenerate’ Innocence  
Murdoch replicates Blake’s critical attitude to the Gnostic, Romantic trope of innocence in 
The Philosopher’s Pupil. Unlike the sermon in The Bell, where James Tayper Pace praises a 
‘cloistered’ innocence, William Eastcote’s sermon in The Philosopher's Pupil preaches a 
responsible acknowledgement of innocence and evil. Eastcote says the following to his 
fellow townspeople: 
 
Let us prize innocence. The child is innocent, the man is not. Let us prolong 
and cherish the innocence of childhood […]. Repentance, renewal of life, 
such is the task and possibility of every man, is the recovery of innocence. 
Let us see in this, a return to a certain kind of simplicity [...], not a remote 
good but very near. […] Above all, do not despair, either for the planet or in 
the deep inwardness of the heart. Recognize one’s own evil, mend what can 
be mended, and for what cannot be undone, place it in love and faith in the 
clear light of the healing goodness of God. (PP, p.204-5)  
 
While the beginning of Eastcote’s sermon replicates the traditional Romantic appraisal of 
innocence, his conclusion provides a Blakean antidote: we must ‘recognize’ our moral 
limitations and acknowledge our capacity for evil alongside the ‘simple’ ‘goodness’ of 
innocence. 
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Some of the characters in The Philosopher’s Pupil take Eastcote’s advice to heart or 
exhibit an inherent awareness of the importance of this Blakean lesson. The eight-year-old 
Adam McCaffrey admits that ‘I must stop imagining those funny things about Rufus and I 
must be kinder to my father and talk to him and not tease him’ (PP, p.205). Rufus, Adam’s 
deceased cousin, died in ambiguous circumstances due to his mother’s, Stella’s, ‘carelessness 
and stupidity’ (PP, p.359), and her silence about the realities of his death lead, as the narrator 
attests, many of the townspeople to ‘put a more sinister construction upon the child’s death’ 
(PP, p.37-8) by suggesting that his father, George McCaffrey, was responsible. The lesson 
Adam gleans from Eastcote’s sermon suggests the need not only to control one’s imagination 
but also, as James is unable to do in The Bell, to ignore gossip. Hattie similarly acknowledges 
the presence of evil, albeit without having heard Eastcote’s sermon: her ‘only positive 
feeling’, the narrator describes, ‘was a sense of her own innocence. She had not yet “become 
bad” as so many people, as she knew, became. Evil, that too was part of the white blankness 
of the future’ (PP, p.172).62 Here, like Adam, Hattie exhibits the kind of Blakean vision 
propounded in Eastcote’s sermon: Adam acknowledges the necessity to refine his attention to 
others; like Hattie, he acknowledges his capacity for evil; and, in so doing, both characters 
acknowledge the tension between ‘contrary’ states of moral life, be they innocence and 
experience or good and evil. 
Murdoch juxtaposes the Blakean awareness of such characters in The Philosopher’s 
Pupil with Tom McCaffrey, who not only exhibits a blinkered praise of innocence himself 
                                                                                                                
62 The same theme, of acknowledging one’s capacity to evil, of ‘becoming bad’, appears in 
Murdoch’s earlier novel The Nice and the Good when the fourteen-year-old Barbara asks 
Pierce (a fifteen-year-old boy who lives in the same house as she and her parents) ‘Do you 
think we’ve just become bad? […] When I was younger, when I read […] about really nasty, 
bad people, I felt so completely good and innocent inside myself, I felt that these people were 
just utterly different from me, that I could never become or behaviour really badly like them’. 
When Willy does not agree to teach her German, however, she ironically proves her own 
ability to ‘become bad’, saying ‘I don’t understand you. I think you’ve become horrid. 
Everyone’s horrid’. See NG, pp.60-1, 176. 
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but also is valued by those around him for his innocent happiness. Father Bernard, the priest 
of the town, in conversation with Rozanov, confirms how the community of Ennistone see 
Tom as ‘young, unspoilt, and “rather sweet”’ (PP, p.118): ‘There’s a happy man’, Father 
Bernard announces, ‘Happy because innocent, innocent because happy’ (PP, p.198). Tom 
offers a similar appraisal of his innocence after hearing Eastcote’s sermon: ‘I’m innocence, 
I’m good, I love everyone’, he admits, ‘oh I feel so Happy!’ (PP, p.206). For Rozanov, these 
characteristics mark Tom as an ideal suitor for his granddaughter, a figure who can best 
‘protect’ her innocence (PP, p.272). However, Tom’s limited innocence results, to use 
Rozanov’s definition of Father Bernard’s Christianity, in him ‘regard[ing him]self as 
excused, as innocent, simul iustus et peccator’, as ‘righteous and at the same time a sinner’ 
(PP, p.191). This feeling of being ‘unscarred’ and ‘harmless’ (PP, p.332), which arises from 
his inherent Gnostic praise of innocence, leads to a collection of mistakes: Tom insults Hattie 
and, later, inadvertently invites, with both comic and disastrous consequences, the entire cast 
of a play to Hattie’s home, which results in a public scandal and incites Rozanov’s anger 
because it reveals his ‘secret’ plan for Tom and Hattie to marry (PP, p.268). 
Murdoch’s portrayal of these innocent blunders and Tom’s struggle to accept 
responsibility for them recalls her own personal experience of such Blakean moral failures. In 
a recently published article concerning Murdoch’s misdeeds in her friendship with Philippa 
Foot (née Bosanquet), Conradi adopts the term ‘degenerate innocence’, which he explores in 
highly Blakean terms, to define her moral failures during the early 1940s. Before discussing 
these personal experiences, Conradi draws attention to the narrator of A Severed Head, 
Martin Lynch-Gibbon, who, he argues, 
 
invents a striking and wonderful phrase to describe the ‘idle thoughtless 
happiness which was never to come [...] in my life again’ while he is two-
timing his wife Antonia with his mistress Georgie Hands: ‘I was happy [...] 
with that particular quality of a degenerate innocence.’ The wonderfully 
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paradoxical phrase ‘degenerate innocence’ bears contemplation: it proposes 
that innocence in and of itself can be guilty. […] This theme of degenerate 
innocence flowers memorably in The Black Prince where wickedness is 
often ‘the product of a semi-deliberate inattention, a sort of swooning 
relationship to time [....] We ignore what we are doing until it is too late to 
alter it.’ […] Murdoch [herself] wanted to discover what lay beyond 
‘degenerate innocence’. From this standpoint, the myth of the Fall belongs 
critically within the spiritual quest; and [Murdoch’s own] dramas of 1943-4 
were seminal in her journey as a [moral] seeker and as a novelist.63 
 
These discussions of innocence echo Blake, who saw innocence, S. Foster Damon claims, as 
‘the technical word for the state of the unfallen man’ and its contrary experience as 
representative of ‘man’s state after the Fall’.64 Conradi continues these Blakean undertones 
when he argues that Murdoch’s concept of ‘degenerate innocence’ indicates that ‘false 
innocence must be lost or gone beyond in order to be recuperated as understanding or 
wisdom’.65 For Blake, pure innocence cannot result in ignorance: ‘Unorganiz’d Innocence’, 
as he noted in the margin of The Four Zoas (1797-1805), is an ‘Impossibility. Innocence 
dwells with Wisdom, but never with ignorance’.66 Tom thus represents a ‘degenerate’ or 
‘unorganised’ innocence that, as Blake, Conradi and Murdoch concur, does not offer 
‘wisdom’. Instead, as Lockeridge argues in relation to Blake’s concept of ‘original 
innocence’, ‘the fall into experience […] is necessary in order that the self grow 
ontologically’.67  
                                                                                                                
63 Peter J. Conradi, ‘“The Guises of Love”: The Friendship of Professor Philippa Foot and 
Dame Iris Murdoch’, in The Iris Murdoch Review 5 (2014): 17-28 (pp.22-3). 
64 Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake, p.378. 
65 Conradi, ‘“The Guises of Love”: The Friendship of Professor Philippa Foot and Dame Iris 
Murdoch’, p.23. 
66 William Blake, The Four Zoas (1797-1805) <http://www.bl.uk/collection-
items/manuscript-of-william-blakes-the-four-zoas> [accessed 15/7/15] (Plate 47, Section 7). 
67 Lockeridge, The Ethics of Romanticism, p.172-3n. 
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Tom’s moral failures within The Philosopher’s Pupil arise from such an unmediated, 
‘degenerate innocence’: in his continuous praise of ‘fun’ and ‘happiness’, he fails to reflect 
on the impact that his behaviour has on those around him. When first meeting Hattie, for 
example, he was ‘aware of having made a number of blunders’. Instead of reflecting on 
himself, he simply wonders, ‘has she no sense of humour, no sense of fun? Why is she so 
cross with me?’ (PP, p.327). These ‘blunders’ are largely the result of his and Hattie’s nerves 
on the occasion of their first meeting, but Tom’s behaviour, more often than not, revolves 
around the ‘fun’ he can have. This ignorant attitude flourishes towards the end of the novel 
when, hoping to atone for his earlier rude behaviour towards Hattie, he drunkenly invents a 
fictitious party as an excuse to visit her, inadvertently inviting the entire cast of a play to her 
residence. When Rozanov interrogates Tom for the resulting scandal he again refuses to 
acknowledge responsibility. Tom argues that ‘it was all perfectly innocent’ (PP, p.407); that 
he ‘didn’t know what [he] wanted’ to achieve in seeing Hattie because he ‘was drunk’ (PP, 
p.407); that it was an unintentional mistake (PP, p.408); and finally, that ‘it was just a lark’ 
(PP, p.408). Like the children in Blake’s ‘The Voice of the Ancient Bard’, Tom’s inability to 
consider the moral and practical implications of his actions arises from the ‘endless maze’ of 
his innocence: he is so ‘perplexed’ by fun, joy and happiness that he fails to attend to those 
around him.  
 Murdoch’s awareness of the moral dangers and personal suffering caused by the 
ignorance occasioned by selfish innocence is not only evidenced in her fiction but also in her 
philosophy and her letters. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, she argues that ‘[t]here is 
[…] a guiltless remorse when some innocent action has produced an unforeseeable 
catastrophe’ (MGM, p.500). Tom, in The Philosopher’s Pupil, engages with such feelings: 
when attempting to justify his behaviour to Rozanov, he experiences ‘unclarified feelings of 
guilt’ (PP, p.408). Frances White argues that Murdoch ‘develops th[e] theme of irreversible 
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new self-knowledge’ in the character of Tom, who is increasingly ‘tortured by yearning and 
remorse’ at the ‘permanently changed reality of his unhappy being’ (PP, p.475).68 While 
White acknowledges that Tom’s moral awareness of this ‘remorse’ is a ‘testing question’, she 
nevertheless argues that Tom ‘takes responsibility for his actions and for the hurt and damage 
they cause’ after being banished by Rozanov and ‘to that extent’, White continues, ‘he shows 
ethical sensitivity and awareness of others’.69 Immediately after White’s quotation from The 
Philosophers Pupil, however, Tom denies his moral responsibility. He reflects,  
 
how much I want to tell [Hattie] how it all came about. Yet how did it, what 
did I do wrong and when did I do wrong? How happy I could be if I could 
only see her and explain I wasn’t so stupid and so oafish, or wasn’t any 
more, and that I was sorry and . . . But that’s impossible, I will never see 
her again […], and because of her I shall be sick forever after. (PP, p.476) 
 
While Tom may exhibit a developing ‘ethical sensitivity and awareness of others’, as White 
argues, Murdoch’s use of an ellipsis followed by the conjunction ‘but’ suggests that his moral 
awareness is halted by ‘degenerate innocence’, by the happy and guiltless ignorance caused 
by his innocence. 
Murdoch’s exploration of Tom’s delayed guilt in The Philosopher’s Pupil thus echoes 
her own delayed guilt and remorse for the ‘dramas of 1943-4’ which were, for Conradi, 
caused by her ‘degenerate innocence’.70 Murdoch reflected upon the pain she caused Philippa 
                                                                                                                
68 Frances White, ‘“Past Forgiving?”: the experience of Remorse in the writings of Iris 
Murdoch’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Kingston University, 2010), p.37. 
69 White, ‘Remorse in the writings of Iris Murdoch’, p.37. 
70 The situation was described by Murdoch as a ‘quadrilateral tale’ in a letter dated 6 
November 1945 to David Hicks. She admitted to him that ‘[i]t was my first introduction to 
complete passionate love. It was also my first introduction to hate. Michael [M. R. D. Foot] 
hated me for deceiving him and them for seeming indifferent. Pip [Philippa Foot] hated me 
for making Michael suffer’ (LP, pp.51-4). 
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Foot and M. R. D. Foot (to whom Philippa Foot was later married), in a letter dated 10 
October 1946: 
 
When one has behaved as I then behaved to two people one loves the hurt 
and the sense of guilt go very deep. In a way it’s only since I came home 
[…] that I’ve realised those events fully as things that I did, as apart from 
things I suffered. […] I have lived through them again, seeing my own 
responsibility. This has not been pleasant, but was necessary. (LP, p.83) 
 
This lesson of ‘degenerate innocence’, as Conradi suggests, allowed Murdoch to understand 
that, while her ‘guilt [went] very deep’, the ability to take ‘responsibility’ for her actions 
required more life experience (LP, p.83). In The Philosopher’s Pupil, Tom’s responsibility 
for wrongdoing appears similarly delayed; he only acknowledges his wrongdoing after 
Rozanov banishes him from Ennistone for having ‘so unpardonably harmed [him]’ (PP, 
p.411). The situation experienced by Tom makes him feel ‘ill’: ‘It was Tom’s first experience 
of demons’, the narrator explains, ‘Demons, like viruses, live in every human organism, but 
in some happy lives never become active. Tom was now aware of the demons and that they 
were his demons’ (PP, p.417). Here, like Murdoch, Tom suffers from his actions (both 
physically and mentally) and only acknowledges his own moral culpability after a significant 
amount of time has passed. Masqueraded by his happiness, and occasioned by his 
‘degenerate’, ‘original’, ‘unorganised’ innocence, Tom’s continued wrongdoing is caused by 
the inability to acknowledge his own capacity for evil and the value of Blakean experience, a 
symbolic awareness that Tom only receives towards the end of the novel, when he descends 
into Ennistone’s Baths. As Murdoch herself experienced, and as she illustrates in The 
Philosopher’s Pupil and The Time of the Angels, moral and spiritual development requires an 
acknowledgement of the Blakean contraries of both innocence and experience, both of which 
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are states that should be acknowledged, to use Conradi’s phrase, by ‘all who count ourselves 
moral seekers’.71 
 
Blake’s Moral Vice: the Hinderance, Repression and Sublimation of Experience 
Murdoch further addresses these Blakean visions of morality in The Time of the Angels and 
The Philosopher’s Pupil where she illustrates the need to acknowledge the active, creative, 
passionate, and even violent energies explored within both The Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
and ‘The Tyger’. Kathleen Raine argues that the moral questions that form the theme of The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell, ‘with its vindication of the fiery energies wrongly condemned 
as evil’, most likely ‘inspir[ed]’ the central problems confronted within ‘The Tyger’.72 This 
poem, which appears as part of The Songs of Experience, debates whether or not the fiery 
energies of the tyger can be captured: it begins by asking ‘What immortal hand or eye, Could 
frame thy fearful symmetry’, but by the end of the poem, the narrative voice corrects this 
question, asking if the audience should ‘Dare frame [the tyger’s] fearful symmetry’ (Songs. 
37). Blake not only expressed this vision of morality in his poetry but also his annotations to 
the writings of others, such as his marginalia to Lavater’s Aphorisms of Man (1788), which 
are, according to Lockeridge, ‘the most succinct expression of Blake’s moral views’.73 For 
Blake, the acts of caging, ‘fram[ing]’ or limiting represent a moral ‘vice’; ‘hindering’ the 
energy symbolized by the tyger represents a denial not only of the ‘contrary’ state of 
experience but also of the artistic and religious faculties that are inherently linked to the 
                                                                                                                
71 Conradi, ‘“The Guises of Love”: The Friendship of Professor Philippa Foot and Dame Iris 
Murdoch’, p.23. 
72 Kathleen Raine, Blake and Tradition, Vol.2, Bollingen Series XXV.11 (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.31, 3. 
73 ‘Like Blake,’ Lockeridge suggests, Lavater ‘takes human form to be the pattern of truth, 
values emotion as at least the equal of reason, is hostile to abstraction, and exalts creative 
genius, friendship, subjectivity, imagination, spiritualism and even magic’. Lockeridge, The 
Ethics of Romanticism, p.89. 
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passionate emotions of the moral life.74 Murdoch’s direct and indirect allusions to ‘The 
Tyger’ and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in The Time of the Angels and The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, highlight the dangers of sublimating and repressing these energies. Her 
portrayals of Carel and George, who appear as figures of evil within their respective novels, 
illustrate how sublimating the active, creative, passionate energies symbolized by the tyger 
can be ethically misleading and creatively undermining. Indeed, in The Philosopher’s Pupil, 
Murdoch recalls her own awareness of the fluid boundaries between sexual and Platonic love 
in teacher-pupil relationships and echoes Blake’s vice of hindrance to reveal the extent to 
which Rozanov’s repression of such desires represents an ignorance toward the fundamental 
role of the emotions in the moral life. 
 
Sublimating Experience in The Time of the Angels and The Philosopher’s Pupil 
In almost all of Blake’s works, the contrary states of action, energy, experience, hatred or 
passion are symbolic of the importance of acknowledging the emotive and spiritual nature of 
the individual. Both ‘The Tyger’ and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell allude to Blake’s 
earliest work, All Religions are One (1788), a short piece that considers human creative 
energy and its connection to God, where he writes that the ‘body’ of ‘the true Man’ ‘derive[s] 
from the Poetic Genius’ and that this creative ‘faculty’ informs the ‘Religions of all 
Nations’.75 Despite offering a revision of Christian morality, The Marriage of Heaven and 
Hell attests the importance of such creative, passionate energies in the moral life as well as 
the spiritual life. Blake portrays the Devil as an eloquent speaker with the knowledge that a 
marriage of the contrary states of body and soul, good and evil, and reason and passion are 
‘necessary’ to ‘Human existence’ (Marriage. 3). The Devil vehemently disagrees with the 
                                                                                                                
74 Blake, ‘From On Lavater’s Aphorisms on Man (1788)’, Blake’s Poetry and Designs, p.454.  
75 William Blake, All Religions are One, in Blake’s Poetry and Designs, pp.5-7, p.5. 
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psychological dualism of body and soul posited by the Bible, where energy is termed a form 
of ‘Evil that comes from the body’ and reason a form of good that comes from the soul 
(Marriage. 4). In opposition to these Christian, dualist ‘Errors’, the Devil believes that the 
emotive, passionate energies labelled evil in the Bible are ‘the only life’ and their 
acknowledgement results in ‘Eternal Delight’ (Marriage. 4). As Blake had suggested earlier 
in All Religions are One, such passionate emotions are not evil but instead represent the 
creative aspect of the moral and spiritual life. ‘The Tyger’, therefore, not only echoes All 
Religions are One, with its praise of creative, spiritual energy, but also echoes the apocalyptic 
tones of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, within which Blake supports an active, 
revolutionary acceptance of potentially violent energy. 
In The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch aligns George McCaffrey with Blake’s tyger, a 
figure that represents the contrary to Tom’s innocence.76 George quotes ‘The Tyger’ in 
response to Diane, who implores him to relax, to ‘sit beside [her] and hold [her] hand’, but he 
replies that he cannot: ‘I’m too restless, tiger, tiger, burning bright’ (PP, p.302). Murdoch 
extends this allusion to her portrayal of George’s changing emotional states, to his ‘amused 
and quizzical’ ‘“cat-look”’ (PP, p.78) and ‘inane smile’ (PP, p.380, 383), which echo Blake’s 
illustrations of the tyger in the thirteen different editions of The Songs of Innocence and of 
Experience (1789-1826), where sometimes the tyger is a more charming, happy figure and 
other times it is a more looming, terrifying figure.77 These feline allusions continue 
                                                                                                                
76 George is not the only character in The Philosopher’s Pupil to be aligned with Blake’s 
tyger; the feeling of restlessness is experience by Alex McCaffrey (PP, p.65, 554), Tom (PP, 
p.291, 475, 503), George’s father, Alan (PP, p.36), the wife of Brian McCaffrey, Gabriel 
(PP, p.43), and George’s mistress, Diane (PP, p.300). 
77 See Appendix A6. These changing depictions of the tyger also illustrate the importance of 
engaging with Blake’s poetry in conjunction with his illustrations. One of the ways in which 
Blake warns against superficial readings of the poem, Stephen C. Behrendt argues, can be 
attributed to his portrayal of the tyger: for Behrendt, the notion of ‘fearful symmetry’ within 
‘The Tyger’ is rendered ‘almost laughable’ by its adjoining illustration. See Stephen C. 
Behrendt, ‘The “Third Text” of Blake’s Illuminated Books’ (1999), in Blake’s Poetry and 
Designs, pp.547-54, p.553.  
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throughout the narrative: George’s face is described as being ‘rather round’ with a ‘rather 
short’ nose and ‘small square separate teeth set on a wide arc’ (PP, p.78); he is described as 
‘padding and pacing’ (PP, p.76); he is even once described as ‘loping on dark paws’ (PP, 
p.122); and George’s ‘wide apart brown eyes’ (PP, p.381) are ‘lighted’ (PP, p.383), seeming 
to burn with the same intensity as Blake’s tyger. Where Tom’s innocence results in ignorant 
happiness, George’s experience results in emotional confusion, volatility and wickedness. 
Murdoch aligns George’s evil acts with the emotional and physical volatility 
symbolised by the ambiguous, dangerous and restless energies of the tyger. George’s 
violence is partly motivated by the confusing circumstances surrounding his son’s death, his 
complex teacher-pupil relationship with Rozanov and his relationship with his wife, Stella. 
Continually dismissed by both Rozanov and Stella, George’s repressed emotions of love and 
grief become so confused that they are inexpressible and uncontrollable; it is in such a 
confused state, at the end of the novel, that he resolves to murder Rozanov (an act he 
mistakenly believes he has carried out). George attempts, throughout the narrative of The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, to rekindle his complex and often irrational relationship with Rozanov, 
which is based on love, fear, jealousy and reverence; he is, as Murdoch herself suggested, 
‘obsessed and dominated by this man’ (TCHF, p.26). Rozanov, however, continually 
dismisses this relationship with George and eventually writes a letter to him as a ‘violent 
exorcism’ (PP, p.422). The troubled state of mind caused by this letter is signalled, again, by 
George’s ‘radiant’ and ‘funny look’ (PP, p.447). He is similarly overwhelmed by emotion 
earlier in the novel at his home, a place that symbolises both his fraught relationship with his 
wife and the grief associated with his deceased son, Rufus; there, he feels ‘engulfed’ by 
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‘undiminished’ ‘[c]louds of emotion’, by ‘stupefying flames’ of emotion (PP, p.388).78 This 
grief for his son is inextricably linked to his wife, whom he attempts to murder, perhaps 
intentionally, perhaps unintentionally, at the beginning of the novel. Although she has never 
discussed these experiences with her husband, Stella admits her complicity in their son’s 
death to N, to whom she retreats for the majority of the narrative, and explains how this 
experience left her and George in an ‘ineffable’ relationship, where they are ‘damned 
together, tied together and thrown into the flames’ (PP, p.360). When husband and wife 
eventually reunite, it ends with a fraught response from George:  
 
Oh God, why did you have to come back now, you devil, just when I was 
feeling better, you don’t know what you’ve done, you’ve spoilt everything, 
you’ve destroyed it all, you did it on purpose […] it’s common mean spite 
and jealousy – […] I could kill you for spoiling things so – you want to 
destroy me – and you killed Rufus, you killed Rufus, you killed Rufus . . . 
(PP, p.491) 
 
Ending on an unresolved ellipsis, Stella’s behaviour here, as when George attempted to 
murder her, engenders an irrevocable, emotionally confused state, which, in combination 
with his response to Rozanov’s vindictive letter, leaves him feeling that Rozanov’s death is 
an ‘absolute necessity’ (PP, p.535). Approaching Father Bernard in the hope to clarify his 
memories about his attempt to murder Stella, he admits, with a look of ‘anguish distort[ing] 
his face’, that ‘[i]t’s all still to do, it’s all still to do. […] Oh what a burden it is - […] it is all 
so terrible, so black, like a hideous dream, and I have to do it all again. […] Can good and 
evil change places? Well, well, I must go now’ (PP, p.495-6). Later, he enters Rozanov’s 
                                                                                                                
78 Murdoch’s image of George being ‘engulfed’ by ‘stupefying flames’ perhaps echoes 
Blake’s illustration of Plate 6 of The First Book of Urizen. Therein, the eponymous figure, 
who represents ‘reason’, ‘the limiter of Energy’, ‘the avenging conscience’ and the ‘sense of 
Sight’, struggles in the fires of ‘imagination’. See Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and 
Symbols of William Blake, p.419. For an example of Plate 6, see Appendix A7. 
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room ‘smiling […] so that he now looked like a man inspired at some great moment of his 
life, as when, perhaps, in a battle he seizes a flag and rushes forward against the enemy with a 
loud joyous cry, possessed by a divine frenzy or the sacred impulse of supreme duty’ (PP, 
p.533). Driven by the same ‘sense of duty [that] took possession of his body’ when he tried to 
murder Stella (PP, p.14; Murdoch’s italics), he rolls up his sleeves and, with ‘deliberate’ 
‘movements’ (PP, p.533), drags Rozanov’s body out of the bed to the bath, and ‘press[es]’ 
until ‘he felt that it was not necessary to continue’ (PP, p.536). At the end of the novel, when 
Father Bernard discovers Rozanov’s death was in fact caused by suicide, George experiences 
a veridical vision of the eclipse of the sun which alludes to the surrealist paintings of Paul 
Nash. This denouement, after which George is transformed into a ‘gentle, polite, quietly 
humorous’ (PP, pp.547-8) character, reveals not only the ambiguous nature of morality, the 
difficulty of moral judgement and the importance of redemption but also the dangerous effect 
that a denial of one’s emotions can have on the moral life.79  
Murdoch’s allusions to The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, with its images of 
claustrophobia, darkness, fear and fire, in The Time of the Angels highlights the value of 
Carel’s amoral beliefs, which illustrate the need to acknowledge the Blakean contraries of the 
moral life. In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake illustrates the benefits and dangers of 
acknowledging evil; his protagonist learns from the demonic Angel that Evil, the passionate 
experience denied within the Bible, represents a fundamental aspect of the moral life. The 
Angel presents a vision of an ‘infinite Abyss, fiery as the smoke of a burning city’ (Marriage. 
18) seething with Devilish figures of ‘the most terrific shapes of animals’ (Marriage. 18). In 
the climax of this vision, ‘cloud and fire burst and rolled thro the deep, blackning all beneath, 
so that the nether deep grew black as a sea & rolled with a terrible noise: beneath us there 
                                                                                                                
79 For a discussion of how Murdoch develops this allusion to Paul Nash in The Philosopher’s 
Pupil, see Daniel Read, ‘“Evolving a Style”: Iris Murdoch and the Surrealist Moral Vision of 
Paul Nash’, Iris Murdoch Review, 8 (2017): 29-37.  
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was nothing now to be seen but a black tempest’ (Marriage. 18). This apocalyptic image, 
which recalls Blake’s introductory poem, where ‘Rintrah roars & shakes his fires in the 
burdened air’ while ‘Hungry clouds swag on the deep’ (Marriage. 2), is echoed in The Time 
of the Angels when Marcus is pushed out of the Rectory by Carel. Marcus ‘felt a physical 
turmoil all about him, as if the darkness were seething and boiling’ and, later, ‘feared to […] 
see Carel move in a way that would reveal that black seething universe again’ (TA, p.118). 
Like Marcus, Blake’s protagonist critiques the amoral vision offered by the Angel; he 
announces that ‘[a]ll that I saw was owing to your metaphysics’ (Marriage. 19). For both 
Blake’s and Murdoch’s protagonists, however, as dangerous as these amoral visions may be, 
they represent an awareness of the contraries of the moral life, including experience, hatred 
and passion, all of which play a fundamental role in the moral life.  
Murdoch’s implicit allusions to Blake’s feline imagery in The Time of the Angels, like 
her direct allusions to ‘The Tyger’ in The Philosopher’s Pupil, illustrates the dangerous and 
necessary passion of the demonic atheist priest, Carel. Pattie, for example, notes the same 
restless, volatile behaviour aligned with George: for her, Carel’s ‘presence subjugated her 
whole being with a dark swoop, with a pounce of automatic unconscious power’ (TA, p.153; 
my italics). Unlike the reverential Pattie, Norah Shadox-Brown believes that Carel’s atheism 
is problematic and that he is ‘both mad and wicked’ (TA, p.88). In a conversation between 
Norah, Marcus and the Bishop about the fact that Carel ‘doesn’t believe in God’, the Bishop 
claims that ‘the dividing lines’ between belief or disbelief in God are not ‘as clear as they 
used to be. Passion, Kierkegaard said, didn’t he, passion. That’s the necessary thing’ (TA, 
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p.89).80 Marcus corroborates the Bishop’s view, saying ‘[w]hatever Carel believes […] he 
certainly believes it with a passion’ (TA, p.90). Norah is troubled by Carel’s creative 
passionate energy and warns that the Bishop and Marcus ‘are playing with fire’ (TA, p.91). 
Carel’s passion, however, which echoes Blake’s view that creativity is a universal spiritual 
nature, renders him ‘a profoundly religious man’ (TA, p.90), despite his disbelief in God. 
Indeed, Murdoch’s implicit allusion to the experience of the protagonist in The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell suggests the importance of Carel’s Blakean energies to a complete 
philosophical vision of the realities of the moral life. Worrying about the adequacy of his 
own philosophy, Marcus admits that the ‘sheer complexity of [his philosophical] argument 
could not but produce, as it were by friction, a certain heat’ (TA, p.117). Here, unlike Norah 
who adopts a more problematic denial of Carel’s Blakean energies, Marcus understands their 
necessity to philosophy. Marcus’s philosophical worries are allayed when, reflecting upon the 
‘exhilarating’ ‘truth’ of Carel’s beliefs, he realises that his own ‘[philosophy] book wouldn’t 
do’; instead he ‘would [have to] write another book, a better truer one with real passion in it’ 
(TA, pp.193-4). Critics have noted the similarities between Marcus’s and Murdoch’s 
philosophical writings; Marcus’s focus on ‘rescu[ing] the idea of the Absolute’, ‘eschew[ing] 
both theological metaphor and the crudities of existentialism’, and ‘the demythologiz[ation] 
of morals’, as Priscilla Martin and Anne Rowe argue, all represent a ‘project close to 
Murdoch’s [writings]’.81 While Murdoch does not strictly replicate the praise of evil in The 
                                                                                                                
80 Keirkegaard argues in Fear and Trembling that ‘human life is unified is passion, and faith 
is a passion’; that ‘[f]aith is the highest passion in a human being’; and that ‘[w]hat we lack 
today is not reflection but passion’ (Soren Keirkegaard, Fear and Trembling (1843), trans. 
Alastair Hannay [London: Penguin Books, 1985], pp.95, 146, 71). Clare Carlisle argues that, 
for Keirkegaard, ‘the Christian can only appropriate the teaching of the incarnation by a 
passionate movement beyond the limitations detected by reason’ (Clare Carlise, 
‘Kierkegaard's world, part 4: “The essentially human is passion”’, Guardian, 5 April 2010 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2010/apr/05/kierkegaard-philosophy-
passion> [accessed 12/5/16]). 
81 Priscilla Martin and Anne Rowe, Iris Murdoch: A Literary Life, p.81.  
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Marriage of Heaven and Hell, she nevertheless acknowledges the value of faith, passion and 
emotion.82 Despite Norah’s fears in The Time of the Angels, Marcus’s philosophy and the 
Bishop’s opinions of religion suggest the necessity of such Blakean energies, not just to the 
moral life but also to creativity, spirituality and philosophical thought. 
The fiery energies of ‘The Tyger’ and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell have a more 
pervasive allegorical significance in The Philosopher’s Pupil, highlighting how the individual 
needs to acknowledge the value of experience and to engage with, understand and express 
their emotions and their creative energies. In The Philosopher’s Pupil, Murdoch draws on 
apocalyptic imagery and Blakean symbolism within her portrayal of Ennistone’s Roman 
Baths, whose energies are directly aligned with George and illustrate the fundamental 
importance of such passionate, even sexual, energies. The Baths are, for example, described 
more than once as a ‘hedonistic’ place (PP, p.27, 30) whose waters have ‘an aphrodisiac 
effect’ (PP, p.33); the ‘hot jet’ that erupts from Lud’s Rill, the Roman Bath’s hot spring, is 
connected to the town’s ‘restless sensationalism […] which seems bound to erupt at periodic 
intervals’ (PP, p.32). Both the narrator and George notice his connection with the symbolic 
energies of the Baths. George, for example, notes that the Baths ‘seemed so much in tune 
with his own heart-beats and the vibration of his whole taut being’ (PP, p.296). The 
townspeople, alternatively, believe ‘that the spring [was] in some way a source of a kind of 
unholy restlessness’ (PP, p.26) or ‘moral unrest’ that suggests a ‘deep psychological or moral 
disorder’ (PP, p.32-3); they see the eruptions of Lud’s Rill, which coincided with the 
beginning of George’s ‘unhealthy mood’ (PP, p.35), as ‘a veridical harbinger of the onset of 
a funny time’ (PP, p.34). The fiery waters of the Baths, however, as in The Time of the 
                                                                                                                
82 The critique of Romanticism presented in ‘The Sublime and Beautiful Revisited’ (1959), 
for example, illustrates the moral problems that arise from a Kantian, empirical tradition 
where action is valued over emotion (EM, p.269). For Murdoch’s discussions of the 
importance of religious concepts and techniques the moral life, see ‘On “God” and “Good”’, 
SG, pp.45-74. 
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Angels, are also aligned with both creativity and philosophical thought. The aging 
philosopher, Rozanov, who feels ‘his philosophical powers [are] waning’ (PP, p.312), seeks 
the Baths’ ‘curative’ waters (PP, p.173); later, George even goes as far to suggest that 
Rozanov has ‘lost all [his] fire’ (PP, p.223), a judgement that alludes to the same Blakean 
energies that Marcus acknowledges as necessary in The Time of the Angels. 
In The Philosopher’s Pupil, the overtly sexual imagery with which Murdoch depicts 
the Baths alludes not only to Blake’s writings but also to Freud’s concept of sublimation, the 
libido and the creation of art. Her alignment of both George and Ennistone’s Baths with 
Blakean energies, moreover, allows the reader to intuit, as in The Time of the Angels, a 
potential remedy for George’s mental state: the reader should not, like Rozanov or Stella, or 
perhaps the townspeople, suppress the energies symbolised by George; instead they should, 
like Marcus in The Time of the Angels, acknowledge the value of these creative, passionate 
energies. Such a vision exceeds Freud’s view of art, in which the writer places the reader in 
‘a position [where they] can enjoy [their] daydreams without reproach or shame’ (EM, 
p.421). This vision, which Murdoch examines in The Fire and The Sun, is the opposite of 
Blake’s. For Freud, ‘the sublimation of unsatisfied libido’, as Anthony Storr explains, is 
‘responsible for producing all art and literature’.83 For Blake, alternatively, the sublimation of 
such creative energies ‘breeds pestilence’ (Marriage. 7). Often focussing on ‘awful things’ 
(PP, p.362) or macabre images, George dreams about the kind of revolutionary acts listed in 
Blake’s ‘The Proverbs of Hell’; his dream of downing babies (PP, p.91), for example, echoes 
the proverb, ‘Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than nurse unacted desires’ (Marriage. 
10). George, like Marcus, thus exhibits an inherent awareness of the moral lessons contained 
within ‘The Tyger’ and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, both which are, as Lockeridge 
                                                                                                                
83 Anthony Storr, Freud: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: University Press, 2001), p.92. 
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argues, ‘largely taken up with the conflict of energy and repression’ (ER, p.177) and invite 
the reader to acknowledge the value of such creative energies. 
Tom’s reaction to his banishment from Ennistone by Rozanov leads him to a similar 
acknowledgement of these active, passionate, violent energies. He begins to feel ‘ill’ when he 
reflects on having incited Rozanov’s anger, brought about by the flippancy with which he had 
discussed the party and the public revelation of the marriage proposal. His new ‘experience 
of [the] demons’ and ‘viruses’ (PP, p.417) of guilt and remorse leads him to descend into the 
subterranean creative depths of Ennistone’s Baths. Now, after experiencing Rozanov’s 
denial, he ‘wanted mountains of time, mountains of experience, to divide him from those 
dreadful events’ (PP, p.478). Here, Murdoch echoes the same Blakean vocabulary used to 
express Marcus’s worries about Carel in The Time of the Angels: Marcus ‘felt dread of him’ 
(TA, p.169) and, later, ponders, alluding ‘The Tyger’, ‘What demon, what apparition, become 
too terrible to bear had quenched that dreadful vitality?’ (TA, p.225). In The Philosopher’s 
Pupil, Tom engages with such a Blakean experience; driven by ‘something alien’, by the 
need to ‘do something difficult and awful and perhaps fatal’ (PP, p.498), he journeys to 
Rozanov’s room in the Baths. The narrator explains how Tom found himself 
 
in a state of restless obsessive nervous energy […]. What he needed was 
some sort of symbolic or magic act […]. Tom took a few careful noiseless 
steps [through the ‘empty, silent, half dark’ Promenade …]. A flood of 
excited physical fear took possession of the lower part of his body, a painful 
vertiginous thrilling urgent pressuring feeling, like sexual desire. Then Tom 
thought, it’s not like sexual desire, it is sexual desire. He moved quickly 
now, his mouth open, his eyes wide. He padded on his toes / toward the 
source of light, which was the partly open door of the Baptistry, which 
housed the descent to the source. (PP, pp.503-4) 
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This engagement with the Blakean energies symbolized by the Baths leaves Tom echoing 
George’s feline appearance: his eyes are ‘wide’, he ‘pad[s]’ through the halls and is driven by 
a ‘restless obsessive nervous energy’. Only after his engagement with this Blakean 
‘experience’ is he able to return to Hattie with conviction, rescuing her (as it turns out) from 
the incestuous grasp of her grandfather. Tom’s descent into the Baths represents an 
engagement with the contrary of innocence, with the active, creative, passionate energies of 
experience, an engagement that reveals his capacity for evil and the necessity for action. 
Murdoch does not, like the Romantics, envision innocence and experience as fixed 
dualist concepts, where innocence is good and, its opposite, experience is evil. Indeed, Tom’s 
blind innocence, unmediated by experience, results in varying degrees of evil, causing both 
him and those around him to suffer; it is only once Tom has acknowledged the presence of 
his ‘demons’ and the value of ‘experience’ that he can move beyond his ‘degenerate 
innocence’. The moral judgements inherent within The Time of the Angels and The 
Philosopher’s Pupil, therefore, are partly equivocated by the ‘tension’ of Blake’s contraries. 
The Time of the Angels may portray Marcus and Carel in dualist terms, as the good 
philosopher and the demonic priest, but following a Blakean reading of the novel highlights 
the necessary, passionate and spiritual energies inherent within Carel’s dangerous belief in 
the ‘power’ of ‘evil’ (TA, p.170). Murdoch’s allusions to the same apocalyptic fiery, even 
sexual, energies in The Philosopher’s Pupil, as well as her juxtaposition of George with Tom, 
Stella and Rozanov, suggests the dangers inherent in dismissing Blake’s contraries of 
experience, hatred, repulsion and passion; George may be capable of evil, but so too are the 
innocent Tom, the passive Stella and the dismissive Rozanov. 
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Murdoch’s ‘diffused eroticisms’ and Rozanov’s Repression of Desire 
Where Conradi’s semi-biographical concept of ‘degenerate innocence’ is echoed in 
Murdoch’s portrayal of Tom, her own awareness of the fluidity of Platonic and sexual love, 
as well as her vision of the sexual attraction of teacher figures, chimes with her portrayal of 
Rozanov. He exhibits a repression of desires, emotions or passions that echoes the kind of 
moral failure described in Blake’s marginalia to Lavater’s Aphorisms of Man (1788). 
Therein, he argues that 
 
To hinder another is not an act: it is the contrary; it is a restraint on action 
both in ourselves & in the person hinderd. For he who hinders another 
omits his own duty, at the time. Murder is Hindering Another; Theft is 
Hindering Another. Backbiting, Undermining, Circumventing & whatever 
is Negative, is Vice.84 
 
Here, Blake summarises the moral problems illustrated in ‘The Tyger’ and The Marriage of 
Heaven and Hell, the first of which questions the possibility of ‘fram[ing]’, or caging, the 
tyger’s active, creative, passionate energy (Songs. 42), the second of which repeatedly attests 
the moral dangers caused by a ‘passive’ attitude that negates the ‘contraries […] necessary to 
Human existence’ (Marriage. 3). Rozanov’s denial of George’s loving reverence and his 
repression of his passionate feelings towards his granddaughter result not only in George 
receiving the impetus to murder him but also in a very-nearly incestuous relationship with 
Hattie. 
                                                                                                                
84 Blake’s idiosyncratic phrase has been edited to approximate, with greater grammatical 
clarity, what he appears to be suggesting. The original phrase appears thus: ‘To hinder 
another is not an act it is the contrary it is a restraint on action both in ourselves & in the 
person hinderd. for he who hinders another omits his own duty. at the time / Murder is 
Hindering Another Theft is Hindering Another Backbiting. Undermining Circumventing & 
whatever is Negative is Vice’. Blake, ‘From On Lavater’s Aphorisms on Man (1788)’, 
Blake’s Poetry and Designs, p.454.  
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Murdoch’s portrayal of taboo relationships within her fiction arguably arises from her 
own awareness of the complex relationship between passionate erotic love and chaste 
platonic love.85 In a letter to Brigid Brophy, dated 9 July 1967, she posits the term ‘diffused 
eroticism’ (LP, p.341) to describe such ambiguous relationships and in a letter to Georg 
Kreisel, dated c. October 1967, she elaborates upon her tendency to transgress the emotional 
and sexual boundaries within them. In the latter, she admits that: 
 
I am very much a toucher and holder and slow savourer. […] I suspect this 
is connected with something very deep about sex. […] I can’t divide 
friendship from love or love from sex - or sex from love etc. If I care about 
somebody I want to caress them. But, or rather and so, I am probably not at 
all normal sexually. […] I am certainly strongly interested in men. But I 
don’t think I really want normal heterosexual relations with them. (It’s 
taken me a long time to find this out.) I think I am sexually rather odd. (LP, 
p.347) 
 
Here, Murdoch illustrates the ease with which relationships can transgress such standard 
boundaries as friend and lover, teacher and pupil, and even such familial boundaries as 
brother and sister, grandfather and granddaughter. This fascination with the experience, and 
depiction, of taboo relationships was, as Miles Leeson claims, ‘deeply personal’ and 
undoubtedly influenced novels such as A Severed Head, The Black Prince and even The 
Philosopher’s Pupil.86 Indeed, for Leeson, Bradley Pearson’s sexual attraction to Julian 
                                                                                                                
85 For a discussion of Murdoch’s fictional engagement with taboo, and its relationship to her 
own experiences, see: Emma V. Miller, ‘“We Must Not Forget That There Was a Crime”: 
Incest, Domestic Violence and Textual Memory in the Novels of Iris Murdoch’, Journal of 
Literature and Trauma Studies, 1:2 (Fall 2012): 65-94 (pp.66-7) and Emma V. Miller, 
‘“Literary Incest”: Intertextuality and Writing the Last Taboo in the Novels of Iris Murdoch’ 
(Unpublished doctoral thesis: Durham University, 2011). The monograph arising for the 
latter is forthcoming with McFarland & Company, Inc. 
86 Miles Leeson, ‘Avuncular ambiguity: Ethical virtue in Iris Murdoch’s The Black Prince 
(1973) and Simone de Beauvoir’s The Mandarins (1954)’, in Incest in Contemporary 
Literature, ed. by Miles Leeson (Manchester: University Press, 2018), pp.269-88, p.277.  
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Baffin in The Black Prince suggests ‘a violation of trust by a person in a position of authority 
and care similar to that of incest’; Julian is not a blood relative of Bradley but nevertheless, 
according to her mother, Rachel, regards him as ‘a sort of “funny uncle”’ (BP, p.405).87 Such 
a transgression of boundaries is implicit in Murdoch’s concept of ‘diffused eroticisms’, which 
illustrate how a position of authority and care can be experienced not only by parents, 
guardians or siblings but also by teachers. 
Murdoch herself was engaged, or ‘involved in’, such teacher-pupil relationships, and 
indeed ‘in both roles’ throughout her life, and her experience of them led her to see the 
teacher’s role as both ‘powerful and potentially destructive’ (TCHF, pp.124-6). The 
increasing biographical information that has been published over the past twenty years has 
revealed the extent to which Murdoch engaged in such relationships herself. One of 
Murdoch’s students at the Royal College of Art in the 1960s, for example, David Morgan, 
suggests that their relationship was ‘platonic’ but nevertheless included a sexual frisson.88 
Murdoch’s attraction to her own Oxford tutors suggests that she experienced such feelings in 
reverse. She both ‘admired’ and ‘loved’ Donald MacKinnon and Eduard Fraenkel not only 
for their classes but also for their, respectively, ‘charismatic’ and ‘terrifying’ nature (LP, 
pp.617, 610). Conradi recounts that Murdoch ‘recalled’ being told by another tutor at Oxford 
that Fraenkel will ‘paw you a bit’ (IML, p.115). Fraenkel’s students, Conradi attests, were 
both ‘excit[ed]’ and ‘disturbed to find’ in him ‘a marriage […] of the intellectual and erotic’, 
even the presence of ‘passion’ (IML, p.115). A similar ‘undercurrent of menace’ was noted in 
MacKinnon whose ‘profundity and moral passion’ created ‘a sense of deep affection, 
                                                                                                                
87 Leeson, ‘Avuncular ambiguity: Ethical virtue in Iris Murdoch’s The Black Prince (1973) 
and Simone de Beauvoir’s The Mandarins (1954)’, p.282. 
88 Morgan recounts that Murdoch kissed him with ‘the faintest taste […] of something 
lascivious’ and ‘referred to a “drawn sword ” between us […] that would stop us sleeping 
together but wouldn’t stop us touching’. See David Morgan, With Love and Rage: A 
Friendship with Iris Murdoch (Kingston upon Thames: University Press, 2010), pp.39-40. 
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puzzlement, a kind of awe’ (IML, p.124). Perhaps influenced by these experiences, Murdoch 
suggested to David Morgan that a teacher should exhibit ‘a certain sadism’ when teaching, 
although it ‘should be entirely veiled’.89 She also suggested, in interviews, that people enjoy 
these feels of sadism and control: 
 
People very often elect a god in their lives, they elect whose puppet they 
want to be, and a group of people can elect somebody in this sense as their 
leader, or their angel, or their god or whatever it might be, and then 
perhaps, almost subconsciously, are ready to receive suggestions from this 
person. And again here, I was touched and pleased that the background in 
Shakespeare was seen. Much more obvious here, of course, are the 
references to A Midsummer Night’s Dream and The Tempest. (TCHF, p.74) 
 
Murdoch herself exhibited such reverence for both her teachers and her lovers, such as Elias 
Canetti, with whom she became ‘in thrall[ed]’ in a ‘volatile’ (LP, p.604) ‘love affair’ in 1953 
(LP, p.97). Indeed, Murdoch’s vision of Canetti as a ‘Great Lion’ undoubtedly came from 
his, to use Conradi’s uncannily Blakean phrases, ‘uncanny intensity’ and ‘enormous 
intellectual-spiritual energy and imagination’.90 Murdoch’s vision of love and sexual 
attraction is recalled throughout her fiction, where she engages with themes of power and 
even subjugation in love and often depicts sexual attraction with the above animalistic 
imagery; indeed, Diane and Hattie see Rozanov, respectively, as a ‘lion’ (PP, p.160), as ‘a 
large uncontrolled animal’ (PP, p.456).91  
Murdoch’s ‘diffused eroticisms’ and her experience of dangerous, formidable teacher-
like figures undoubtedly influenced her fiction, notably The Philosopher’s Pupil; as she 
                                                                                                                
89 Morgan, With Love and Rage: A Friendship with Iris Murdoch, p.93. 
90 See Anne Rowe, ‘“I embrace you with much love”: Letters from Iris Murdoch to Elias 
Canetti’, Iris Murdoch Review, 1 (2008): 37-40 (p.39); IML, p.352. 
91 Diane is ‘trembling’ when she first sees Rozanov, whose feels ‘lion’ presence she 
experiences along with ‘a musty animal odour’ (PP, p.160).  
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herself asserted in an interview, George’s feelings toward his teacher represent ‘a love 
relationship of a special kind’ (TCHF, p.126) and Rozanov’s role as a teacher illustrates the 
potential for the ‘misuse of power’ (TCHF, p.128) in such relationships. The narrator of The 
Philosopher’s Pupil confirms that  
 
George was deeply affected by his teacher. He ‘fell in love’ with Rozanov, 
with philosophy, with Rozanov’s philosophy. However, his soul was so 
shaken that […] he never told his love; and […] he never revealed how 
absolutely this man had taken possession of his soul. (PP, p.83) 
 
Much like Pattie in The Time of the Angels, George feels enslaved, perhaps even willingly 
enslaved, to Rozanov, and thus illustrates Murdoch’s awareness of the tendency for people to 
‘elect’ a god in their lives (TCHF, p.75); indeed, George even casts himself, alluding to The 
Tempest, in role of Caliban (PP, p.146). There is, moreover, in George’s admission of love, a 
subtle allusion to Blake’s poem ‘Never Pain to Tell thy Love’ (1787-1818), where the 
speaker engages with a similarly distant, potentially unreciprocated, love: ‘Never pain to tell 
thy love / Love that never told can be / For the gentle wind does move / Silently invisibly’.92 
George tries to recreate this loving teacher-pupil relationship throughout the narrative of The 
Philosopher’s Pupil: he had, the narrator explains, ‘been attempting for years to attract John 
Robert’s attention, to […] establish a “bond” between them’ (PP, p.416) and he reveres 
Rozanov to such an extent that he reads all communication with him as a sign of love.  
 Where George hopelessly wishes to develop this enduring love for his teacher, 
Rozanov’s incestuous love for Hattie represents the dangers inherent in repressing passionate 
emotions. Rozanov remained at a distance throughout Hattie’s childhood and ‘distantly 
                                                                                                                
92 William Blake, ‘Never Pain to Tell Thy Love’ (1787-1818), in Blake’s Poetry and 
Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant 
(New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), p.390. See Appendix A1 for a facsimile 
of this poem. 
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decreed’ a ‘strict old-fashioned upbringing’ for her (PP, p.231). He employed Pearl Scotney, 
a relative of Diane, George’s mistress, to be her ‘permanent female companion’, a position 
that arose, the narrator suggests, because Rozanov perhaps ‘felt a bit guilty about having been 
inattentive’, or perhaps ‘wanted to save himself the trouble of organizing and supervising 
Hattie’s movements round the world’ (PP, p.167). This ‘dispos[al] of Hattie’ (PP, p.167) and 
his continuous ‘invisib[ility]’ (PP, p.255) throughout her childhood results in Rozanov not 
only becoming a ‘mystery’ for Hattie (PP, p.234) but also remaining in denial about his own 
love for her. Earlier in the narrative, alluding to Blake’s ‘The Tyger’, Father Bernard has a 
kind of premonition of the dangers of Rozanov’s denial of passion: Father Bernard sees 
something like ‘one of [Rozanov’s] demons […] charging in the form of a large animal 
through the foliage’, ‘extremely agitated’, ‘bundling down’ (PP, p.198). The strength of 
Rozanov’s repressed feelings is revealed by the narrator when he reflects on Hattie’s 
innocence and decides that Tom would best fit the role of her husband and protector: 
 
[W]hen he paused, what strange fantasies crowded his mind! Tom fled or 
dead, John Robert comforting a Hattie now safe in secluded widowhood. 
[…] Why was he in such a hurry to give her away? Surely he had not 
imagined the details? From what horror in himself was he so precipitately 
fleeing? His giddy and affrighted thought, shying away from this dark 
question, even at certain moments wildly imagined that […] he might be 
able at last to establish some perfect love relation with Hattie’s daughter! 
(PP, p.314; Murdoch’s italics) 
 
Here, Murdoch’s italicised statements highlight the extent to which Rozanov’s plan to marry 
Tom and Hattie can be seen as a denial of the ‘horror’ of his feelings of love for her. These 
feelings become even clearer later in the narrative when, after hearing that George and Hattie 
came face-to-face at Tom’s mistakenly arranged party, he believes that her ‘corrupt’ 
environment has left her ‘unprotected’ (PP, p.435). Before escorting her to his home, 
 293 
Rozanov reflects on Hattie in a depersonalized and subtly sexual way, thinking of her as a 
‘girl who, although she had tried semi-consciously to look younger, could not help looking 
radiantly older’ (PP, p.428). Later, Pearl’s curt response to Rozanov’s question about why he 
should refrain from taking her to his ‘little house’ highlights the dangers inherent in acting 
out these incestuous feelings (PP, p.435).  
In the context of Rozanov’s repressed love for Hattie, his denial of George symbolises 
not only a lack of interest in George but also a fear of his emotive energies. Rozanov denies 
George, spurns his intelligence and even ridicules him, calling him ‘a dull dog’, ‘an ordinary 
dull mediocre egotist’ and ‘a clown’ (PP, p.224). Father Bernard is affronted by these harsh 
judgements and implores Rozanov to ‘help’ make George ‘docile’ with ‘a little gentleness’ 
(PP, p.227).93 In continually denying any sympathetic, or even intellectual, engagement with 
George, however, Rozanov carries out a Blakean ‘vice’ and ‘hinder[s]’ George’s attempts to 
express his love.94 The narrative is unclear about whether or not Rozanov’s denial of George 
is out of fear or jealousy. Rozanov may be jealous of George’s creative nature and his 
potential philosophical brilliance: George’s inherent connection with Ennistone’s Baths 
suggests that he can access the creative energies that Rozanov finds so ‘curative’ and 
necessary to his writings. Alternatively, Rozanov may be fearful of George’s ostensibly 
demonic, evil nature or even of his ability to express his emotions: on the one hand, Rozanov 
                                                                                                                
93 In ‘a moment of grace’, after witnessing Rozanov’s cruelty, Father Bernard kisses George 
on the cheek. Rozanov’s response to this, however, where he quotes the phrase ‘Guarda e 
passa’ (look and pass on) from Canto III of Dante’s ‘Inferno’, leaves Father Bernard 
affronted (PP, p.226-7). In the Divine Comedy, the phrase is a warning by Virgil, who tells 
Dante to ignore those were ‘punished’ for their ‘state of apathy and indifference both to good 
and evil’ (Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, translated by Henry F. Cary <http://www. 
bartleby.com/20/103.html> [accessed 28/11/15]). Father Bernard is troubled by Rozanov’s 
connection of George to one of these figures because, in so doing, Rozanov ignores his own 
complicity in George’s suffering, thereby preaching a form of ignorance that Father Bernard 
finds morally repellant; ‘What a dreadful thing to say,’ Father Bernard later reflects, ‘how 
cruel Dante was’ (PP, p.492). 
94 Blake, ‘From On Lavater’s Aphorisms on Man (1788)’, p.454. 
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may believe that it is necessary to suppress George because he proves his own philosophical 
contention that, while ‘[t]he holy must try to know the demonic,’ ‘the holy’ is ‘lost’ in the 
search for such ‘demonic’ energy (PP, p.197); on the other hand, Rozanov may be fearful of 
George’s ability to express his love for Rozanov in the face of adversity. Such emotional 
freedom would, considering his own taboo love for Hattie, be dangerous and transgressive if 
it implies that she too, like George, could fall in love with him.  
Rozanov’s fear of the passionate energies symbolised by George, and of his own 
uncontrolled ‘yearn[ing]’ (PP, p.455) for Hattie, is proven when he spends two days with her. 
Crucially, Murdoch’s portrayal of their last day together illustrates the moral difficulties 
invited within ‘diffused eroticisms’ by the ambiguous boundary between Platonic love and 
sexual desire. Rozanov is ‘excited’ both at the prospect of engaging with taboo and at the 
impending sense of an argument between himself and Hattie (PP, p.451): he admits that he 
‘knew’ his love was ‘probably morally wrong,’ but that ‘he could not, […] after the peculiar 
exiting awful tension of their [verbal] fight, resist moving that step closer to her’ (PP, p.454). 
Their fight, however, leads them to two opposing conclusions. Hattie, out of Platonic, 
friendly, familial love, believes they can ‘be together like […] like loving people’ and, later, 
asks ‘[i]f you had been my teacher I would have loved you. […] Well, can’t you be my 
teacher now, somehow -?’ (PP, p.525). Rozanov, who realises that he feels ‘so much more’ 
than this love, realises the precarious moral position within which they find themselves (PP, 
p.525) and tells her to ‘to leave [his] house at once’ (PP, p.527). At this point in the novel, 
however, perhaps driven by their passionate exchange or by Rozanov’s ‘powerful and 
frightening and interesting’ visage (PP, p.526), Hattie announces a more passionate love: her 
‘pale milky-blue eyes shone with tears and anger’ (PP, p.527), she ‘fell on her knees beside 
[Rozanov’s] chair, grasping one of his hands’ and said, ‘[f]orgive me, don’t leave me, you are 
my dear grandfather, I love you, I have nobody but you, look after me, love me, don’t leave 
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me alone’ (PP, p.528). These actions exhibit the extent to which Rozanov’s love has begun, 
as it did for George, to take ‘possession of h[er] soul’ (PP, p.83). Here, Murdoch illustrates 
the ease with which the boundaries between love and sex are more fluid for those in the 
position of teacher and pupil. Rozanov’s formidable teacher-like nature and his continued 
denial of his own love for Hattie results in the almost complete transgression of the taboo of 
incest, a dangerous love that is partly motivated by their shared ‘intense’, passionate 
communication (PP, p.522).  
The abrupt ending to Rozanov and Hattie’s time together, when she is pushed out of 
his house unwittingly into the arms of Tom, offers the reader a moral quandary. When 
Rozanov answers Tom’s knock at the door, fearing the arrival of the police, he ‘d[oes] not 
hesitate’ to ‘push’ Hattie into Tom’s arms (PP, p.528). On the one hand, this quick act 
exhibits a morally praiseworthy awareness of the danger inherent in Rozanov and Hattie’s 
continued engagement with the taboo of incest. On the other hand, Rozanov’s original act of 
distancing himself his granddaughter could itself have been negated had he acknowledged his 
own passionate Blakean energies earlier. Indeed, following the Blakean concept of 
‘hinder[ance]’, Rozanov’s ignorance toward his own emotions, his lack of self-control in the 
face of solipsistic fantasies, and his denial of the energies symbolised by George, renders 
Rozanov more culpable than Hattie. Had he ‘behaved properly, naturally, to [her] as a child’, 
as he admits, this relationship ‘would not have built up’ (PP, p.522). The reader, therefore, is 
left to ponder whether Rozanov’s action of dismissing Hattie represents a return to his self-
denial of passion or an awareness of dangers of his passionate energies and the comparative 
value of Tom’s innocence. 
The motivations for Rozanov’s suicide at the end of The Philosopher’s Pupil are 
rendered increasingly ambiguous by a reflection on these moral quandaries. For Father 
Bernard, ‘[Rozanov] died because he saw at last, with horrified wide-open eyes, the futility of 
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philosophy’ (PP, p.553). Such an argument, however, resonates with Rozanov’s Blakean 
‘vice’ of denying both his own and George’s emotions. For Blake, repressing such energies is 
more problematic than an acknowledgment of their power, as symbolised by Tom’s descent 
into the source of Ennistone’s Baths. Had Rozanov engaged with the Blakean energies 
symbolised by both George and the Baths, he might not have developed a repressed desire for 
his granddaughter, and indeed he might have been more philosophically astute in 
understanding, from a Blakean perspective, that there is more to life than theories.95 Father 
Bernard exhibits an awareness of this Blakean lesson in a letter to N, the ambiguous narrator, 
at the end of the novel: 
 
The motivation of terrible deeds tends to be extremely complex, full of 
apparent contradictions, and often in fact bottomlessly mysterious, although 
for legal, scientific and moral reasons we ‘have to’ theorize about it [....] 
[Nevertheless] the chance ‘triggers’ [that] determine our most fateful 
actions [...] [must] remain opaque particulars with which science can do 
little. (PP, p.556)  
 
Here, unlike Rozanov, Father Bernard acknowledges the complexities of the moral life, 
complexities which cannot be captured by strict philosophical thought but, instead, by a 
creative vision that acknowledges the value of ‘opaque particulars’ or, to use the Blakean 
phrase borrowed by Steiner, ‘minute particulars’. Indeed, as illustrated in one of Rozanov’s 
exchanges with Hattie, he is himself incapable, even afraid, of the creative faculty of 
                                                                                                                
95 In The Philosopher’s Pupil, Rozanov’s philosophical output, like Marcus’s in The Time of 
the Angels, echoes Murdoch’s writings. A prolific fictional philosopher, Rozanov’s ‘seminal 
work’ (PP, p.83) shares the title of Murdoch’s 1952 essay, ‘Nostalgia for the Particular’. 
Bran Nicol argues that this postmodern self-reference ‘serves to subtly snag the fabric of 
Murdoch’s realism by exposing the fictionality of her work even as it strengthens its sense of 
verisimilitude’ (Bran Nicol, The Retrospective Fiction [Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004], p.155). Additionally, this self-reference invites an ironic critique of Rozanov: his 
Blakean vice of hinderance represents not only a form of self-repression but also an inability 
to attend to the minute particular. 
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imagination: ‘No, no, not there,’ he argues, ‘we will not go there […] where everything 
switches and starts to run the other way. No, I will not imagine’ (PP, p.526). Arguably, 
Rozanov’s suicide represents both a philosophical failure and a Blakean failure: the active, 
creative, passionate energies that he so fears represent an ambiguous and complex freedom 
that cannot be captured by philosophical thought.  
 Murdoch’s vision of the moral life, like Blake, acknowledges the centrality of such 
emotional experiences in the moral life, experiences that represent the kind of active, 
creative, passionate energies associated with Blake’s tyger. For Murdoch, ‘the self’, ‘the old 
unregenerate psyche, that great source of energy and warmth’ (SG, p.98), is mediated by the 
Platonic figure of Eros, whom she describes as ‘a creative spirit, he is tension, exertion, zeal’ 
(MGM, p.343). This figure exhibits similarities to Blake’s fiery energies; it represents an 
‘active principle’ of creativity and a ‘rational virtuous passion’ (MGM, p.298). For Blake, 
Frye argues, ‘imagination […] is fire’, and such fire, Damon claims, represents ‘the creative 
spirit of love’.96 Like Blake’s image of fire, Murdoch’s figure of Eros symbolises the 
centrality of a creative, loving, passionate, spiritual tension in the moral life. Discussing 
Plato’s figure of Eros, she argues, 
 
If we summon up a great energy, it may prove to be a great demon. People 
know the difference between good and evil, it takes quite a lot of theorising 
to persuade them to say or imagine that they do not. The activity of Eros is 
the orientation of desire. Reflecting in these ways we see “salvation” or 
“good” as connected with, or incarnate in, all sorts of particulars, and not 
just as “an abstract Idea”. “Saving the phenomena” is happening all the 
time. We do not lose the particular, it teaches us love, we understand it, we 
see it [… .] The dialectical descends, returning to the particular. […] What I 
have called Eros pictures probably a greater part of what we think of as “the 
                                                                                                                
96 Northrop Frye, Fearful Symmetry: A Study of William Blake (1947), (Princeton: University 
Press, 1990) p.196; Damon, A Blake Dictionary: The Ideas and Symbols of William Blake, 
p.138. 
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moral life”; that is, most of our moral problems involve an orientation of 
our energy and our appetites. (MGM, p.497) 
 
Such a vision moves beyond the kind of dualisms that Blake fought against in The Marriage 
of Heaven and Hell and acknowledges the difficult moral choices with which the individual 
has to engage in the course of a life necessarily comprised of desires that may elude their 
understanding. Such an ambiguous vision, mediated by the figure of Eros and accurately 
captured within the ‘dialectical’ modes of art, highlights the value of attending to the 
complexity of the moral life.  
The picture of morality in Murdoch’s fiction, and perhaps the philosophical writings 
that resonate with it, is indebted to The Songs of Innocence and of Experience and The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell. The importance that Murdoch placed upon the Platonic idea of 
Eros proves the existence of a Blakean ‘tension’ in the moral life between the ‘contraries’ of 
good and evil, a tension that is negotiated by a figure whose ambiguity represents the 
fundamental importance of engaging with both the docile and violent energies of Blake. In 
carrying out the moral ‘vice’ of denial, hindrance or repression, Rozanov’s actions, much like 
Tom’s, Pattie’s and James’, illustrate how evil can arise from an ignorance of the necessary 
tension between the Blakean contraries of innocence and experience, reason and passion, and 
good and evil.97 The Philosopher’s Pupil attests the need not only to pay attention to others 
but also to pay attention to one’s own capacity for evils, to accept rather than hinder the 
passionate energy of others, to appreciate the importance of creative energy in both moral and 
philosophical reasoning, and, finally, to acknowledge the necessity of Blake’s active, creative 
passionate energies in the moral life. As the behaviour of George proves, it may be difficult, 
or even impossible, to fight against one’s passions or one’s tendency to evil. Yet, as 
Eastecote’s hopeful message asserts, the individual should aim to ‘[r]ecognize one’s own 
                                                                                                                
97 Blake, ‘From On Lavater’s Aphorisms on Man (1788)’, p.454. 
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evil, mend what can be mended, and for what cannot be undone, place it in love and faith in 
the clear light of the healing goodness of God’ (PP, p.205); ‘We are frail creatures,’ as Father 
Bernard tells George, ‘all our good is mixed with evil. It is good none the less’ (PP, p.494). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Murdoch’s engagement with the philosophical, theological and secular problems of evil 
highlights the importance of acknowledging human frailty, including self-righteousness and 
hubris, the realities of which paradoxically emerge as compatible with her perfectionist moral 
philosophy. The tendency within the discourse on the problem of evil to challenge 
imperfections, whether they are failures in human actions that lead to evil or natural disasters 
that lead to suffering, perhaps even divinely justified forms of suffering, represents a self-
centred search for meaning that cannot, if the reader is to follow the lessons of the Book of 
Job, be countenanced by human thought. Instead, the individual is invited to acknowledge the 
inherent meaninglessness of morality, the lessons of faith, including perseverance, hope and 
love, and thus to see evil within the context of these far greater goods. Murdoch’s 
philosophical acknowledgement of the reality, or presence, of evil in partly dualist terms 
renders her picture of morality ambivalent. She acknowledges the problems inherent in a 
strict dualist vision of morality and, moreover, in a Jungian or Heraclitean vision of morality, 
where evil might be thought to ‘blend’ into unity. In Saint Paul’s writings, she finds that the 
dualist forces of good and evil have an ambiguous role in the moral life, akin to Plato’s Eros. 
In this vision, and indeed Murdoch’s later moral philosophy, the individual can acknowledge 
the presence of evil. Murdoch’s critique of Jung, therefore, belies the similarities of their 
moral visions, which seek, as illustrated in Murdoch’s fiction and philosophy and Jung’s 
letters to Father Victor White, an awareness of the power of evil in the moral life that 
requires seeing evil as a substantive force against which the individual can fight.  
The contemporary interest in murderers, psychopaths and white-collar criminals 
offers a lesson in the importance of acknowledging such evil tendencies in human beings. 
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The individual can be captivated, excited, fascinated by such evil. Indeed, the cruelty of 
many of Murdoch’s ostensibly evil characters offers a fundamental awareness of the limits of 
goodness. The evil character, in this respect, much like the psychopath, is not always as evil 
as she or he seems to be; and the opposite can be said of the good characters. Murdoch’s 
fictional picture of morality, where many of her good and evil characters share greater 
similarities than are implied by their moral differences, presciently echoes the traits inherent 
within the clinical construct of psychopathy. Such an ambiguous picture of morality, 
moreover, echoes Blake’s writings, which similarly exhibit the importance of looking beyond 
dualist visions of morality. Murdoch’s picture of morality is not confined to ostensible goods, 
like attraction, reason, innocence or love; instead, it requires an engagement with their 
contraries: repulsion, passion, experience and hatred. There is greater moral danger in 
ignoring or repressing this dialectical vision of morality, within which there is an inherent 
tension between the contrary states of the moral life. Murdoch’s awareness of such Blakean 
moral lessons is in harmony with their shared liberal vision of art, in which readers can attend 
to the ambiguities and complexities of the individual, acknowledge the inherently dialectical 
nature of morality, and see evil. Such an attention to evil reveals the value of engaging with 
the literary, psychological, philosophical and theological discourses surrounding the problem 
of evil. 
Murdoch was passionately aware of the fundamental role that language plays in the 
moral life. In her early moral philosophy, she illustrates how a modern vision of ethics, 
driven by a focus on linguistics, leads to an impoverished moral language: ‘Modern ethics 
analyses “good”’ on the analogy of ‘action’ and ‘choice’ and, therefore, ‘tends to ignore other 
value terms’ (SG, p.30). Murdoch, alternatively, suggests that we need an improved moral 
vocabulary that provides a place for ‘normative-descriptive words, the specialized or 
secondary value words’ such as ‘vulgar’ or ‘spontaneous’ (SG, p.30), words that can correct 
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the kind of inattention that leads to evil. Sophie-Grace Chappell draws a similarly important 
distinction between such primary and secondary words, or ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ concepts, in her 
discussion of evil: ‘If GOOD/BAD’, Chappell argues, ‘are capable of [the] kind of semantic 
profusion (and confusion)’ evident in their complex etymologies and definitions, ‘then 
neither can be a thin concept’.1 Here, the resulting ‘thick’ words of ‘bad’, ‘good’ and ‘evil’, 
with their semantic profusion of meaning, result in an inherent conceptual ambiguity that 
combats the kind of stifled moral thinking that Bernstein warns against in The Abuse of Evil 
by allowing for improved linguistic and moral exploration.2 For Murdoch, such a broad moral 
vocabulary including ambiguous, emotive words that can be infinitely clarified, described 
and explored provides space for moral autonomy. She argues in ‘The Idea of Perfection’ that 
‘[w]e learn through attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close attention to 
objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some extent share their context. 
(Often we cannot.)’ (SG, p.30). While there may be times when language eludes our 
understanding, and thus when moral understanding is partly limited, these moral limitations 
do not necessarily stop the individual from asking both themselves and others crucial moral 
questions. The moral life, as she argues, is ‘not something that is switched off in between the 
occurrence of explicitly moral choices’, but ‘is something that goes on continually’ (SG, 
p.36), and which is enabled by the development of our moral language. Such a vision of 
language, as has been illustrated in this thesis, reveals the similarities between Murdoch and 
not only contemporary commentators on evil, like Susan Neiman, for whom ‘moral concepts’ 
                                                                                                                
1 Sophie-Grace Chappell, ‘Socrates and Plato’, in History of Evil in Antiquity: 2000BCE-
450CE, ed. by Tom P.S. Angier, series ed. Chad Meister and Charles Taliaferro (New York: 
Routledge, 2019), p.2. (Page numbers refer to my 13-page document, printed at the British 
Library.) Chappell also points the reader to her earlier essay, ‘There are No Thin Concepts’, 
in Thick Concepts, ed. by S. Kirchin (Oxford: University Press, 2013), pp.182-96. 
2 Such an idea can be illustrated by drawing on Chappell’s and Murdoch’s visions of moral 
language: labelling a person, situation or event with such a ‘thick’ concept as evil allows the 
individual, by virtue of the word’s ambiguity, the opportunity to clarify their moral 
judgement by recourse to more descriptive secondary value words.  
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are ‘the most powerful ones in our language’ but also contemporary commentators on 
literature, such as Elif Shafak, for whom literature provides an egalitarian space where the 
inherent freedom and nuance of art allows to writer to engage with the realities of evils and 
injustice.3  
For both Susan Neiman and Richard Bernstein, the language of the problem of evil 
allows the modern thinker to reflect upon current injustices surrounding humanity’s treatment 
of the environment. Such ecological concerns chime with one of the growing discourses in 
Murdoch criticism, as represented by researchers like Lucy Oulton, whose PhD, titled ‘Wild 
Iris: sensing Iris Murdoch’s environmental imagination’, illustrates Murdoch’s prescient 
awareness of the moral importance of environmental activism.4 For Neiman and Bernstein, 
such modern conscientious reflections on the environment are revealing the limits of the 
traditional theological problem of evil and, indeed, the conceptual binary of human and 
natural evil. For Neiman, the events of Lisbon, Auschwitz and 11 September 2001 marked 
‘historical turning point[s]’ in our philosophical, psychological, sociological and theological 
responses to evil: ‘the intellectual shock waves generated by Lisbon [… can be] seen as the 
birth pangs of a sadder but wiser era that had learned to live on its own’.5 In the first edition 
of Evil in Modern Thought (2004), Neiman argues that eighteenth-century writers made a 
‘mistake’ in using ‘the word evil to refer both to acts of human cruelty and instances of 
human suffering’, but in the 2015 Afterword, she highlights the extent to which our 
contemporary attitude to nature has reignited these problems.6 Today, as Bernstein similarly 
                                                                                                                
3 Susan Neiman, ‘Afterword to the Princeton Classics Edition’, Evil in Modern Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton Classics edn. (Princeton: University Press, 
2015), pp.329-49), p.335. 
4 Lucy Oulton, ‘Iris Murdoch: a place of moral change – Nature and Landscape’ (The 
University of Chichester, 3 February 2019). 
5 Susan Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy, first edn. 
(Princeton: University Press, 2004), pp.xi, 5. 
6 Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, p.3. 
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argues in The Abuse of Evil, ‘[t]he entire category of natural evils has been called into 
question’.7 Many of the natural disasters of the past decade, Neiman argues, ‘have been not 
only deadlier than the Lisbon earthquake, but, thanks to global media, more present’.8 
Previously, natural disasters represented a kind of democratisation of evil and suffering, and 
this vision called for a theological response that, with God’s omnipotence unquestioned, 
highlighted the value of faith, endurance and an acceptance of our powerlessness in the face 
of the natural order. Today, however, Neiman argues, this theological response to evil, with 
its related concepts of human evil versus natural evil, has to be changed: 
 
Drawing distinctions between natural catastrophes and human evils makes 
increasingly little sense in a world where we have the power to call up 
natural forces that could be nature’s undoing—whether intentionally, 
through the nuclear weapons whose use is less regulated than ever before, or 
thoughtlessly, through the looming environmental disasters that could make 
recent storms seem like a gentle warning. When human heedlessness stokes 
destruction, then leaves the world’s poorest people at its mercy, it isn’t 
merely tragic; it’s evil.9 
 
For both Bernstein and Neiman, contemporary responses to the problem of evil require a 
more socially, politically and philosophically engaged response to combat not only the kind 
of isolated actions that lead to individual instances of suffering but also the kind of 
widespread environmental and social injustices that cause natural disasters. Today, the 
secular problem of evil thus highlights the importance of personal, religious values like 
                                                                                                                
7 Richard Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11 
(2005); (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007), p.3. 
8 Neiman, ‘Afterword to the Princeton Classics Edition’ (2015), p.338. 
9 Ibid., p.341. 
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‘acceptance, praise, and love’ as well as more secular, conscientious values like justice, 
compassion and, in this instance, environmental action.10 
 Such shared secular and religious values correspond with Blake’s, Murdoch’s and 
Shafak’s visions of art. Shafak warns of the danger of emotions in political discourse: ‘the 
reality is, at times of rapid social, political and economic change, our emotions come to the 
surface’, and these emotions are easily exploited by ‘populist demagogues’.11 An awareness 
of the power of these emotions, however, cannot be ignored; she argues that ‘we also need 
emotions on the table’; we need a ‘new narrative […] based on emotional intelligence: a 
combination of positive emotions and rational analysis – passionate, compassionate, bold, 
humanistic, non-elitist, modest, all-embracing’.12 Such a narrative, she asserts in a tone that 
recalls the revolutionary language of Blake, must be ‘defended passionately and urgently’.13 
In The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake highlights the dangers of a dualist vision of 
mankind that ignores the presence, and thus the power, of emotion and passion; for him, 
these often repressed energies are fundamental to the moral life and, indeed, to a vision of art 
that should, necessarily, be concerned with the individual whose liberty needs to be defended. 
‘Liberal, pluralistic, healthy democracy’, as Shafak argues, ‘is a delicate ecosystem that 
needs to be nourished, protected and regenerated’.14 Such protection comes from a more 
considered use of language and from humanist political engagement, both of which can be 
expressed within art. Indeed, for Murdoch the liberalism that so troubled T.S. Eliot represents 
the compassion, ‘freedom’ and love inherent within art, whose focus on the Blakean minute 
                                                                                                                
10 Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams, ed. by, ‘Introduction: Problems of 
Evil’ to The Problem of Evil (Oxford: University Press, 1994), pp.1-24, p.22. 
11 Elif Shafak, ‘It is time we stopped denigrating the public intellectual’, the Guardian, Fri 14 
July 2017. Accessed online. 
12 Elif Shafak, ‘The UK is learning that like everything else in this life, democracies can die’, 
New Statesman, 20 March 2019. Accessed Online. 
13 Shafak, ‘It’s time we stopped denigrating the public intellectual’. 
14 Shafak, ‘The UK is learning that like everything else in this life, democracies can die’. 
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particular is representative of the value of ‘knowing and understanding and respecting things 
quite other than ourselves’ (EM, p.284). 
 Such an ambiguous and pluralistic artistic vision is fundamental to combatting evil. In 
some ways, evil represents a complex problem that calls upon all the conceptual resources of 
the linguist, theologian, philosopher, psychologist, sociologist and the writer; in other ways, 
evil represents a relatively simple problem, namely, an inability to acknowledge the 
particularity of the other. Indeed, as Neiman argues, while ‘[w]hat we understand to be evil 
has changed over time’, ‘the only way to distinguish something that’s evil from something 
that’s awful is to look carefully at particulars’.15 For Blake, Murdoch and Shafak, a socio-
political environment defined by dualist binaries, populism and silence (or an impoverished 
moral language) is inimical to a respect for the minute particular. As Shafak argues, ‘all 
populist movements are essentially against plurality, against diversity. In creating dualistic 
frameworks and polarising society, they know they can spread numbness faster’.16 The job of 
the writer, therefore, is to fight such ‘indifference’, or such psychopathic deficiencies in 
empathy, and ‘rehumanise those who have been dehumanised’.17 In this thesis, Murdoch’s 
awareness of these problems has been revealed in the context of her engagement with evil.  
Such ‘dualistic frameworks’ are unhelpful to literature, politics, philosophy and morality 
because they deny the ability for the individual to engage with the pluralistic nature of the 
problem of evil, a problem that is equivocated by the complexity of the moral life, within 
which the individual is, for Murdoch, continually aware of the ‘continuum between good and 
bad’ (MGM, p.507). The novel is concerned with ‘the fight between good and evil’ (MGM, 
p.97) and, through its focus on the individual, it shares with religion the fundamental aim of 
                                                                                                                
15 Neiman, ‘Afterword to the Princeton Classics Edition’, p.335. 
16 Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, New Statesman, 5-11 October 2018: 
40-43 (p.43). 
17 Shafak, ‘Why the novel matters in the age of anger’, p.43. 
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‘defeat[ing]’ egotism (SG, p.52). In this respect, ‘good literature is’, as Murdoch argues, 
‘uniquely able publicly to clarify evil’ (EM, p.457); good literature reveals the kind of biased 
or stifled moral thinking that hinders an attention to the other and leads to an ignorance of 
evil in the moral life, both of which result in human wickedness. 
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Appendix A1: William Blake, ‘Never Seek to Tell Thy Love’ (1787-1818).1 
 
Never pain to tell thy love 
Love that never told can be 
For the gentle wind does move  
Silently invisibly 
 
I told my love I told my love 
I told her all my heart 
Trembling cold in ghastly fears 
Ah she doth depart 
 
Soon as she was gone from me 
A traveller came by  
Silently invisibly 
O was no deny  
 
  
                                                                                                                
1 William Blake, ‘Never Pain to Tell Thy Love’ (1787-1818), in Blake’s Poetry and Designs, 
Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant (New York: W W 
Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), p.390. 
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Appendix A2: William Blake, ‘The Little Black Boy’ (1789).2 
 
My mother bore me in the southern wild 
And I am black, but O! my soul is white. 
White as an angel is the English child: 
But I am black as if bereav’d if light. 
 
My mother taught me underneath a tree 
And sitting down before the heat of day. 
She took me on her lap and kissed me, 
And pointing to the east began to say. 
 
Look on the rising sun: there God does live 
And gives his light, and gives his heat away. 
And flower and trees and beasts and men receive 
Comfort in morning joy in the noon day. 
 
And we are put on earth a little space, 
That we may learn to bear the beams of love, 
And these black bodies and this sun-burnt face 
Is but a cloud, and like a shady grove. 
 
For when our souls have learn’d the heat the bear 
The cloud will vanish we shall hear his voice. 
Saying: come out from the grove my love & care, 
And round my golden tent like lambs rejoice. 
 
Thus did my mother say and kissed me.  
And thus I say to little English boy, 
When I from black and he from white cloud free,  
And round the tend of God like lambs we joy: 
                                                                                                                
2 William Blake, ‘The Little Black Boy’, from The Songs of Innocence and Experience (1789-94), 
in Blake’s Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and 
John E. Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.8-47, p.16 (plates 9-10). 
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Ill shade him from the heat til he can bear, 
To lean in joy upon our fathers knee. 
And then I’ll stand and stroke his silver hear, 
And be like him and he will then love me. 
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 Appendix A3: William Blake, ‘Introduction’ (1789).3 
 
Hear the voice of the Bard! 
Who Present, Past, & Future sees 
Whose ears have heard, 
The Holy Word, 
That walk’d among the ancient trees. 
 
Calling the lapsed Soul 
And weeping in the evening dew: 
That might controll, 
The starry pole; 
And fallen fallen light renew! 
 
O Earth O Earth return! 
Arise from out the dewy grass; 
Night is worn, 
And the morn 
Rises from the slumbrous mass. 
 
Turn away no more: 
Why wilt thou turn away 
The starry floor 
The watry shore 
Is giv’n thee till the break of day. 
 
  
                                                                                                                
3 William Blake, ‘Introduction’, from The Songs of Innocence and Experience (1789-94), in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant 
(New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.8-47, p.28-30 (plate 30). 
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Appendix A4: William Blake, ‘Earth’s Answer’ (1789).4 
 
Earth rais’d up her head, 
From the darkness dread & drear. 
Her light fled; 
Stony dread! 
And her locks cover’d with grey despair, 
 
Prison’d on watry shore 
Starry Jealousy does keep my den 
Cold and hoar 
Weeping o’er 
I hear the Father of the ancient men 
 
Selfish father of men 
Cruel jealous selfish fear 
Can delight 
Chain’s in night 
The virgins of youth and morning bear, 
 
Does spring hide its joy 
When buds and blossoms grow? 
Does the sower? 
Sow by night? 
Or the plowman in darkness plow? 
 
Break this heavy chain, 
That does freeze my bones around 
Selfish! vain! 
Eternal bane! 
That free Love with bondage bound. 
  
                                                                                                                
4 William Blake, ‘Earth’s Answer’, from The Songs of Innocence and Experience (1789-94), in 
Blake’s Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John 
E. Grant (New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.8-47, p.30-1 (plate 31). 
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Appendix A5: William Blake, ‘The Tyger’ (1789).5 
 
Tyger Tyger. burning bright, 
In the forests of the night: 
What immortal hand or eye, 
Could frame thy fearful symmetry? 
 
In what distant deeps or skies. 
Burnt the fire of thine eyes! 
On what wings dare he aspire! 
What the hand, dare seize the fire? 
 
And what should, & what art, 
Could twist the sinews of thy heart? 
And when thy heart began to beat, 
What dread hand? & what dread feet? 
 
What the hammer? what the chain, 
In what furnace was thy brain? 
What the anvil? what dread grasp, 
Dare its deadly terrors clasp! 
 
When the stars threw down their spears 
And water’d heaven with their tears: 
Did he smile his work to see? 
Did he who made the lamb make thee? 
 
Tyger Tyger. burning bright, 
In the forests of the night: 
What immortal hand or eye, 
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry?  
                                                                                                                
5 William Blake, ‘The Tyger’, from The Songs of Innocence and Experience (1789-94), in Blake’s 
Poetry and Designs, Norton Critical Edition, 2nd edn, ed. by Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant 
(New York: W W Norton & Company Ltd., 2008), pp.8-47, p38-9 (plate 42). 
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Appendix A6: William Blake, Two Illustrations of ‘The Tyger’ (1789-1818; 1825).6 
 
 
William Blake, Illustration to ‘The Tyger’ (1789-1818). 
Held in The British Museum, London. 
 
 
 
William Blake, Illustration to ‘The Tyger’ (1825). 
Held in Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. 
 
  
                                                                                                                
6 William Blake, Plate 42, The Songs of Innocence and of Experience (1789-1818), 
<http://www.blakearchive.org/copy/songsie.t?descId=songsie.t.illbk.42> [accessed 29/05/19]; 
William Blake, Plate 42, The Songs of Innocence and of Experience (1825), 
<http://www.blakearchive.org/copy/songsie.y?descId=songsie.y.illbk.42> [accessed 29/05/19].  
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Appendix A7: William Blake, Plate 6, The First Book of Urizen (1794).7 
 
 
 
 
William Blake, Plate 6, The First Book of Urizen (1794) 
Held in The British Museum, London. 
 
  
  
                                                                                                                
7 William Blake, Plate 6, The First Book of Urizen (1794),  
<http://www.blakearchive.org/copy/urizen.d?descId=urizen.d.illbk.06> [accessed 29/05/19]. 
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Appendix B1: George Herbert, ‘Love (III)’ (1633).1 
 
Love bade me welcome. Yet my soul drew back  
 Guilty of dust and sin. 
But quick-eyed Love, observing me grow slack  
 From my first entrance in, 
Drew nearer to me, sweetly questioning, 
 If I lacked any thing. 
  
A guest, I answered, worthy to be here: 
 Love said, You shall be he. 
I the unkind, ungrateful? Ah my dear, 
 I cannot look on thee. 
Love took my hand, and smiling did reply, 
 Who made the eyes but I? 
  
Truth Lord, but I have marred them: let my shame 
 Go where it doth deserve. 
And know you not, says Love, who bore the blame? 
 My dear, then I will serve. 
You must sit down, says Love, and taste my meat: 
 So I did sit and eat. 
 
 
                                                                                                                
1 George Herbert, ‘Love (III)’ (1633) <https://www.poetryfoundation.org/resources/learning/core-
poems/detail/44367> [accessed 15/2/17]. 
